Abstract
In this paper I report a qualitative study of a series of court decisions concerning the meanings of science and the gold standard of special education research. I describe two sets of court proceedings and subsequent decisions that considered the admissibility of statements purportedly given by disabled children using a strategy known as facilitated communication. The legal decisions focused on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. I draw on Minow's descriptions and critique of three approaches to legal analysis to interrogate the two court decisions. I have argued that the legal system privileges a particular kind of scientific discourse, based on the traditional scientific method that emphasizes empiricist forms over questions of rights or value. This discourse dismisses and disqualifies forms of knowing and the subjects who claim to know about their own lives.
Notes
1. The author lives in New Zealand. Consistent with the New Zealand disability strategy (Minister for Disability Issues Citation2001), this paper uses the construction ‘disabled people’ to signal that disability is a site of oppression, distinct from differences or impairments that individuals may live with.
2. Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013 (1923).
3. Department of Social Servs. ex rel. Jenny S. v. Mark and Laura S., 593 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (Fam. Ct. Ulster, Sept. 15, 1992, Peters, J.).
4. People of the State of Kansas v. Marc Warden, #92‐CR1198, 18th Judicial District, Sedgwick County, Kansas (March 10, 1995, Abbott, J.).
5. Americans with disabilities act 1990 (Pub L 101‐336, 104 U.S. Stat 327).