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Abstract
IPE scholars have extensively studied regionalisms in various parts of the globe. However, little has been done to explore the role that countries with regional leadership aspirations have played in fostering regional integration. Why do regional powers pursue different forms of leadership to exert economic influence over their neighbors and achieve regional hegemony? Through a comparison of Russia and Turkey, I argue that elite national identity conceptions construct national economic interests and shape foreign economic policies of these regional powers. In both countries, ruling elites have embraced national identity conceptions that were in stark contrast to the national identity conceptions of their predecessors. Russia under Putin has pursued a coercive hegemonic form of leadership in Eurasia contrary to the Yeltsin era. Conversely, Turkey under Erdogan has pursued liberal regional economic leadership in the Middle East as opposed to the coercive and isolationist policies of Westernist elites. In both cases, the consolidation of political power and international developments have strengthened the prevalent national identity conceptions at home, and reinforced regional economic leadership strategies. As it highlights the domestic ideational sources of the pursuit of regional hegemony, this study has implications for the study of regional powers, regionalism and economic nationalism.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Juliet Johnson, Berk Esen, Ekrem Karakoç, the editorial board and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 For recent exceptions see, Krapohl, Meissner, and Muntschick (Citation2014); Prys (Citation2010); Krickovic (Citation2015).
2 For a recent attempt to explain variation in regional power behavior, see Flemes (Citation2010).
3 For a poststructuralist account of identity formation and the co-constitutive relationship between identity and foreign policy, see Hansen (Citation2006).
4 For the importance of history and historicity in the study of identity, see Neumann (Citation1999, pp. 1–38) and Pouliot (2010, pp. 52–91).
5 For an excellent review of the flourishing scholarship on hierarchies in world politics, see Bially Mattern and Zarakol (Citation2016).
6 This is close to what Destradi (Citation2010) calls ‘hard hegemony’.
7 I only have one interview from 2017.
8 Interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 22 May 2014.
9 Interview with Dmitri Trenin, 14 May 2014.
10 Interview with Lilia Shevtsova, Moscow Carnegie Center. 26 May 2014, Moscow.
11 Interview with Dmitry Trenin.
12 Interview with Pavel Andreev, former Executive Director of Valdai Discussion Club. Moscow, 21 April 2014.
13 Interview with Andrei Melville, Vice-Rector for Research, Higher School of Economics. Moscow, 20 May 2014.
14 Interview with Nikita Lomagin, Vice Rector, European University in St. Petersburg, 21 October 2017.
15 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation Retrieved from http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/254248 (accessed 18 January 2017)
16 Interview with Olga Butorina, Professor of Economics, MGIMO. Moscow, 20 May 2014.
17 Interview with Konstantin Sonin, Professor of Economics, Higher School of Economics. Moscow, 12 May 2014
18 Interview with Shevtsova.
19 For a detailed analysis, see Balmaceda (Citation2013).
20 Russia’s economic package for Ukraine included not only sticks, but also carrots such as the promise to purchase $15 in Ukrainian Eurobonds (Charap & Colton, Citation2017, p. 121).
21 Calculated by author according to data from the Central Bank of Russia; Retrieved from http://www.cbr.ru/Eng/statistics/?PrtId=svs (accessed 18 April 2018).
22 For a detailed analysis of the contestation over Turkish national identity, see Hintz (Citation2015).
23 Düzen kurucu ülke in Turkish.
24 Interview with Ümit Yardım, current deputy undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ankara, 16 January 2014.
25 Calculated by author according to data from Turkish Statistical Institute; Retrieved from http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046 (accessed 20 April 2018).
26 Interview with anonymous official at the Ministry of Economy, Ankara, 9 January 2014.
27 Interview with anonymous official at the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK), Istanbul. 21 January 2014.
28 Interview with anonymous official at the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK).
29 Interview with anonymous official at the Ministry of Economy, Ankara.
30 Interview with Mesut Özcan, head of Turkish Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara. 9 January 2014.
31 Turkish Statistical Institute; Retrieved from http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046 (accessed 20 April 2018).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Seçkin Köstem
Seçkin Köstem is an assistant professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara. He is also IPE fellow at the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research. He received his Ph.D. from McGill University in 2016. His articles have been published in Foreign Policy Analysis and Global Policy.