https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8568-8868
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Abstract
In the context of post-crisis global economic governance, the global financial inclusion agenda is widely supported by international organizations, states, and civil society organizations. Some scholars attribute the rise of this agenda to the logic of neoliberalism and power of global financial actors, yet these accounts often obscure the role of ambiguity in facilitating broad support. In scholarship on coalition politics, ambiguity is often attributed to the strategic behaviour and framing techniques of central actors (e.g. entrepreneurs). In this article, I develop the novel framework of participatory ambiguity to explain the origins of the financial inclusion agenda and theorize the co-production of ambiguity among members of the supporting coalition. By tracing the development of the agenda, I identify the origins of its ambiguity in the efforts of disparate actors to shape the purposes and direction of the agenda in favourable ways across development, economic, and security domains. This article thus offers a more complete explanation of the origins of financial inclusion at the global level. It also provides an original theoretical perspective on the construction of ideas, agency, ambiguity, and global coalitions that can be used to better explain the development of other global policy agendas.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Adam Harmes, Erin Hannah, and Bruce Morrison for their generous support and advice throughout the research process. I would also like to thank Eleni Tsingou, Ilene Grabel, and the conference participants at CPSA, BISA, and ISA for their many helpful suggestions on earlier versions of the project. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and editors at RIPE for their insightful questions and feedback that significantly strengthened the article.
Notes
1 While not identically phrased, similar definitions are offered by such organizations as the World Bank, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, and the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion.
2 For example, a recent special issue introduced by Bernards and Campbell-Verduyn (Citation2019) illuminates important links between financial technology and financial inclusion.
3 A wide range of state policy issue areas are tied to the agenda (e.g., consumer protection, financial regulation, savings incentive programs, etc.). Further, civil society organizations also promote access to financial services through a variety of traditional and new projects (ranging from microfinance programs to financial technology and mobile money programs).
4 In the absence of a formal treaty, this form of institutionalized support has served as the analytical focal point of other scholars (for instance, Soederberg, Citation2013) and was identified in multiple interviews as a key point in the establishment of the global financial inclusion agenda.
5 Interviews were conducted with officials from government finance ministries and development agencies (from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Brazil, and Ghana), as well as individuals from relevant global standard-setting bodies, intergovernmental organizations, financial firms, and nongovernmental organizations. Organizations or individuals were identified as potential participants based on primary documents or through interview responses. Many interviewees required anonymity or partial de-identification to provide candid responses.
6 Documents were requested from a total of eight departments or ministries across the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Brazil.
7 Financial integrity refers to the transparency of the financial system and legality of activities within it, specifically in relation to transnational organized criminal activity, money laundering, terrorist financing, and corruption (see de Koker & Jentzsch, Citation2013).
8 The term ‘constructive ambiguity’ is often used in research on international diplomacy (Crespy & Vanheuverzwijn, Citation2019; Jegen & Mérand, Citation2014; Shamir & Shikaki, Citation2005), building on Henry Kissinger’s definition of constructive ambiguity as ‘the deliberate use of ambiguous language in a sensitive issue in order to advance some political purpose’ (Berridge & James, Citation2003, p. 51, as quoted in Jegen & Mérand, Citation2014). ‘Strategic ambiguity’ is a more widely used term across literatures. To ensure consistency, I use the term strategic ambiguity for the remainder of the article.
9 The term ‘participatory’ is deployed in a range of other contexts, including international development (‘participatory development,’ Nelson & Wright, Citation1995; ‘Participatory Rural Appraisal,’ Chambers, Citation1994) democratic governance (‘participatory democracy,’ Pateman, Citation1970), and marketing (‘participatory branding,’ Ind & Bjerke, Citation2007). The choice of participatory in this application rather than, for instance, ‘networked’ or ‘distributed,’ is deliberate. In so doing, I draw on key insights developed in these related literatures about the potential power and agency of non-Western and/or non-state actors to shape broader ideas and agendas. This term also orients our analyses to the actors themselves and their actions rather than the shape or form of the wider constellation of actors.
10 ‘Cognitive frames’ is an umbrella term for distinct yet related types of ideas: ‘ideologies or shared belief systems, normative beliefs, cause-effect beliefs, and policy prescriptions’ (Tannenwald Citation2005, p. 15).
11 Examples of expert communities include the transnational financial policy community and anti-money laundering regime (Tsingou, Citation2010, Citation2015). However, the wider community denotes actors who operate within the same domain but may not have access to or participate in specific expert communities (such as development NGOs engaged in microfinance activities).
12 While an extended discussion is beyond the scope of this article, related dynamics are also found in scholarship on the essentially contested nature of some concepts (Gallie, Citation1955) and repertoires of ideas (Carstensen & Hansen, Citation2019).
13 Within the institutionalist literature, Herrigel (Citation2010) similarly explores the capacity of organizations to drive change through a ‘bottom-up, socially reflexive process of creative action’ (p. 2).
14 Telephone interview, January 2018.
15 Telephone interview, January 2018.
16 Telephone interview, January 2018.
17 Telephone interview, February 2019.
18 These actors include, for example, Western development agencies (e.g., USAID, DFID, GTZ), United Nations agencies (e.g., UNDP), and domestic and international civil society organizations (e.g., CARE, Save the Children, Freedom From Hunger, ACCION).
19 As noted in the program report (Plan UK et al., Citation2013, p. 23), ‘The Banking on Change partnership is committed to sharing its experiences with the Alliance for Financial Inclusion and central banks, to inform their thinking.’
20 Telephone interview, February 2019.
21 In person interview, Washington DC, October 2019.
22 In person interview, two officials with a microfinance institution subsidiary, Ghana, August 2019.
23 In person interview, Washington DC, October 2019.
24 In person interview, Washington DC, October 2019.
25 Telephone interview, May 2018; Telephone interview, February 2019.
26 Telephone interview, May 2018.
27 The specific policies identified in the survey provide a glimpse, rather than an exhaustive account, of policies associated with the agenda. For example, the survey provides little insight into policies related to mobile money despite its increasing prominence at the time.
28 Telephone interview, March 2019.
29 Telephone interview, March 2019.
30 In person interview, Washington DC, October 2019.
31 In person interview, Brussels, May 2018.
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Tyler Girard
Tyler Girard is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Western Ontario. His research explores the evolution of global norms and agendas and new approaches to conceptual measurement in international relations. His work has also been published in the American Political Science Review, International Studies Perspectives, and Journal of International Development.