WOMEN’S VOICES OF RENEWAL WITHIN TRADITION

Abstract

Women’s voices are widely expressed in current movements of rejuvenation of Jewish traditions. These moves raise tensions within the religious world and the civil legal realm. In focus here is a much-debated instance: the nearly thirty-year effort by Jewish women to pray in a group in song and read from the Bible at the holy site of the Western Wall in Jerusalem. The group is called the Women of the Wall (WoW). In addition to the women's rights of speech, discussion here highlights the need to recognize duties of respect for the women’s voices. Moral analysis of the Jewish and democratic values which constitutionally define Israel founds the legal basis for this duty of respect. Both Jewish thought and Kantian analysis are seen to conceptualize the essence of freedom as obligation, from which arise duties of respect for the other. Duties of respect indeed are owed to WoW by the other worshippers at the Western Wall, as well as by the rabbinic authorities in control of forms of prayer at the site. That both Jewish and democratic values deem obligation as the essence of freedom lends support to seeing coherence between the two sets of values defining the State of Israel.

Keywords:

• moral theory
• legal theory
• Judaism
• Jewish thought
• Kantian philosophy
• freedom
• autonomy
• obligation
• duty
• Israel
• pluralism
• Women of the Wall

disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 See note 114 below.

2 Progressive trends can be witnessed in Jewish communities outside of Israel as well. See Tikkun magazine, available <http://www.tikkun.org/nextgen/what-is-jewish-renewal> (accessed 1 Jan. 2017).

3 For an extensive report, see <http://www.avichai.org.il/en/node/79> (accessed 1 Jan. 2017). Yair Ettinger writes a series of articles in the Ha’aretz newspaper, including on women's efforts at renewal within Orthodoxy.

4 Hithadshut is the most widespread name, but not the only one. See Guy Ravid, Guy Beigel, and Moran Berman et al., “Executive Summary of a Study by Joint Organizations and Funds” in Hithadshut Yehudit – Jewish Renewal in Israel: An Analysis of the Field (Tel Aviv: Midot, 2013) 6 ff.

5 See, for example, <http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/152871/tel-aviv-religious-revival> (accessed 1 Jan. 2017).

6 For instance, congregations following Rabbi Carlebach, and those modelled on Jerusalem's Shira Hadasha synagogue, meet throughout Israel. On this latter model, see the account by its founder, Tova Hartman, Feminism Encounters Traditional Judaism (Waltham, MA: Brandeis UP, 2007).

7 See the article by Yair Ettinger in Ha’aretz newspaper 24 July 2015 (magazine, 25).

8 Saba Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival,” Cultural Anthropology 16.2 (2001): 202–36, 225. Yet the shyness (“passivity and docility” 212) cultivated for piety that Mahmood describes does not characterize the hithadshut movement. I also would distinguish a goal of Mahmood's analysis from my own. While I agree with her effort at “uncoupling the notion of agency from the progressive goal of emancipatory politics” (208), and see “agency not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action,” I distance the instance of WoW from her claim that a capacity for action may be created and enabled by “specific relations of subordination” (210).

9 Frances Raday, “Claiming Equal Religious Personhood: Women of the Wall's Constitutional Saga” in Religion in the Public Sphere: A Comparative Analysis of German, Israeli, American, and International Law, eds. Winfried Brugger and Michael Karayanni (Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute, 2007) 255–99, 283. Hartman also writes of her position within the traditional structure. Hartman, Feminism Encounters Traditional Judaism.

10 Raday writes that WoW is seeking to “transform the patriarchal public space” (298). Yet WoW does not seek to change the religion. I extend my thanks to Frances Raday for her comments on this point.

11 The marking of the new month has been associated with the monthly celebration of womanhood.

12 On the relationship between US and Israeli women involved with WoW, see Pnina Lahav, “The Woes of WoW: The Women of the Wall as a Religious Social Movement and as a Metaphor” in Women's Rights and Religious Law: Domestic and International Perspectives, eds. Fareda Banda and Lisa Fishbayn Joffe (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016) 123–51.

13 Raday notes that it is also of historical and national significance (265). Likewise, the Supreme Court (see n. 26) wrote that the Wall is “a symbol of the sadness of generations and the desire to return to Zion [ … ] an expression of the strength and survival of the nation and of its ancient roots and eternality” (Hoffman I, Justice Shamgar, par. 2).

14 The partitioning at the Wall between men and women began only in 1929. See Patricia J. Woods, Courts and Gender in the Religious–Secular Conflict in Israel (New York: State U of New York P, 2008).

15 For a monthly recording of events and incidents of attacks, see WoW's website. The women were accused by opponents of creating disruption and interfering with public order, even though the violence was by haredi men and women against them. For personal accounts of the occurrences, see Women of the Wall: Claiming Sacred Ground at Judaism's Holy Site, eds. Phyllis Chesler and Rivka Haut (New York: Jewish Lights, 2002).

16 Raday cites the perspective of female insiders in world religions (283). See Feminism and World Religions, eds. A. Sharma and K.K. Young (Albany: State U of New York P, 1999) 18–22. See also Mahmood (viewing the situated subject).

Yet WoW's opponents view the efforts as a revolution. See Susan Sered, “Women and Religious Change in Israel: Rebellion or Revolution?,” Sociology of Religion 58.1 (1997): 1–24. Women of the Wall's status as outsiders, in the eyes of their opponents, can be seen in the invectives used against them, including “pigs” and “Nazis” (18).

17 Raday 259.

18 Mahmood writes that Islamic women's piety efforts may have been accounted for in the 1960s in terms of “false consciousness, or the internalization of patriarchal norms through socialization” (205).

19 Hoffman III, Justice Englard, par. 1. See note 26.

20 Raday 258.

21 The Talmud comprises rabbinic discourse interpreting the Torah and Jewish law from the third and fourth centuries, and is still accepted today as the basis of Jewish law.

22 Justice Shamgar conjectured that the opposition may be to the identity of the singers themselves (Hoffman I, Shamgar, par. 3). See note 26.

23 Raday 260.

24 Ibid. 280. Analyses of the case also regard relations of state and religion; see Yuval Jobani and Nahshon Perez, “Women of the Wall: A Normative Analysis of the Place of Religion in the Public Sphere,” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 3.3 (2014): 484–505.

25 Leah Shakdiel, “Women of the Wall: Radical Feminism as an Opportunity for a New Discourse in Israel,” Journal of Israeli History 21.1 (2002): 126–63. Raday also names Ran Hirschl's account of the conflict as a contest for cultural hegemony between a secularist-libertarian elite and traditionally peripheral groups, in this case the ultra-orthodox community (271). See Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and the Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2004) 67–68.

26 The rulings are designated as Hoffman I (High Court of Justice (H.C.J.) 257/89, 2410/90 Hoffman v. Western Wall Commissioner, 48(2) P.D. 265 (1994)); Hoffman II (H.C.J. 3358/95 Hoffman v. Prime Minister Office (22 May 2000)); and Hoffman III (Additional Hearing H.C.J. 4128/00 Director of Prime Minister's Office v. Hoffman (6 Apr. 2003)). It is noted that varying interpretations of the Court's rulings have been offered.

27 In its first decision, the Court had recommended that the government find a solution which “would allow the petitioners to enjoy freedom of access to the Wall, while minimising the injury to the sensitivities of other worshippers” (Hoffman I, Justice Shamgar, par. 3).

28 Four Justices in a minority opinion advocated full and immediate acceptance of WoW's petition to pray at the Wall plaza. The two religious members of the Court opposed any recognition of WoW's rights of prayer there.

29 The Western Wall is governed by the Protection of Holy Places Law – 1967, which seeks to prevent desecration of holy places as well as behaviour which is likely to offend the sensitivities of the members of the religious communities to whom the places are holy.

30 See Daniel Statman, “Hurting Religious Feelings,” Democratic Culture 3 (2000): 199–214; Meital Pinto, “Offenses to Feelings in Israel: A Theoretical Explication of an Exceptional Legal Doctrine,” Ethnicities 12.2 (2012): 233–48.

31 H.C.J. 96/5016 Horev v. Minister of Transportation, P.D. 51(4)1.

32 H.C.J. 14/86 Laor v. Films and Plays Censorship Board, 41(1) P.D. 121; H.C.J. 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Films and Plays Censorship Board, 43(2) P.D. 22.

33 H.C.J. 316/03 Bakri v. Israel Film Council, 58(1) P.D. 49 (2003). The specific sentiments to be protected by law are not clearly defined. The Israeli Court in Bakri (2003) (par. 7) referred interchangeably to “pain” and “harm” without identifying the emotion at issue more specifically. See also H.C.J. 14/86 Laor, 41(1) P.D. 121; H.C.J. 6126/94 Senesh v. Broadcasting Authority, 53(3) P.D. 817.

34 Bakri (Justice Procaccia concurring, par. 9) (citations omitted); see also ibid. par. 12 (“Protecting the sensitivities of the public is part of the concept of public safety and public order”).

35 Appeal by the State 23834-04-13 State of Israel v. Ras (District Court Jerusalem, 24 Apr. 2013).

36 Matt Apuzo, “Department of Justice Presses Civil Rights Agenda at Local Levels,” New York Times 20 Aug. 2015: A1.

37 41269-02-13 Phillip v. Abutbul (Magistrate's Court Beit Shemesh, 25 June 2015).

38 25435-03-15 Koliach v. Yatadot Tashmar Publishing Ltd (District Court Lod, 13 Mar. 2015); Request for Appeal 1868/15 Yatadot Tashmar Tashmar v. Koliach.

39 Request for Appeal 6897/14 Radio Kol BeRama Ltd. v. Kolech (Supreme Court, 2015) par. 9.

40 Recommendations of the Advisory Team for the Issue of Prayer Arrangements at the Western Wall, Appendix C – Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Regulations 4B(D)(Jerusalem 2016):

With regard to the southern section –

Local custom will be based on the principles of pluralism and gender equality [ … ]

41 WoW has been seen to emphasize the right to pray, rather than women's rights. See Sered 12.

42 Justice Elon (par. 29), citing Shakdiel v. Minister of Religions, H.C.J. 153/87 42(2) P.D. 221, 268.

43 Justice Elon (pars. 22, 34).

44 Justice Shamgar (par. 2).

45 Hoffman II (par. 7) recalls this discussion of dignity in Hoffman I.

46 Justice Shamgar (par. 2).

47 Ibid. (par. 2).

48 Justice Shlomo Levin in dissent (par. 6).

49 State of Israel v. Ras (par. 8).

50 Israel's Basic Law: Knesset (as amended in 1985); Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

51 The discussion here moves from obligation to the duties to which they give rise. Kant wrote that the objective necessity of an action from obligation is called duty. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals in Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) (GMM) 4: 439. See also Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals in Practical Philosophy (MM) 6: 222.

52 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: Free, 1991). See also Robert M. Cover, “Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order” in Law, Politics, and Morality in Judaism, ed. Michael Walzer (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006) (rpt. from Catholic U. Law Review).

53 Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Freedom as Respect: Freedom, Duty and Expression in Kantian Theory and Jewish Thought (forthcoming).

54 Yoram Hazony, The Philosophy of Hebrew Scriptures (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012) 104, 138–39.

55 See Amos Oz and Fania Oz-Salzberger, Jews and Words (New Haven: Yale UP, 2012) 61, and generally 57–105.

56 Jonathan Sacks, “Creativity and Innovation in Halakhah” in Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy, ed. Moshe Sokol (Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1992) 147. See Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1983) 99: Jewish legal discourse affords the power of creative interpretation.

57 Torah refers to an evolving body of laws and customs. Kenneth Seeskin, Autonomy in Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001) 69. With regard to Jewish law reflecting women's changing roles, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “The Cultural Analysis Paradigm: Women and Synagogue Ritual as a Case Study,” Cardozo Law Review 34 (2012): 609–65, 623.

58 Hoffman I, Justice Elon, par. 81.

59 Babylonian Talmud (BT) – Bamidbar Rabbah 13.15. The Jerusalem Talmud: Sanhedrin 4.2 states that the Torah must be capable of forty-nine interpretations affirming an opinion, and forty-nine opposing it. See Eliezer Berkovits, Not in Heaven (Jerusalem: Shalem, 1983) 78; Michael Rosensweig, “Eilu ve-Eilu Divrei Elohim Hayyim: Halakhic Pluralism and Theories of Controversy” in Sokol, Rabbinic Authority (the Maharal and Maharsal wrote of forty-nine conduits to the Torah); Midrash Pesikta Derav Kahana (millions of interpretations arise, one for each person standing at Mount Sinai), cited by Rabbi Professor David Golinkin, “Is Judaism Really in Favor of Pluralism and Tolerance?,” Responsa in a Moment 9.6 (June 2015). See also David Golinkin, The Status of Women in Jewish Law: Responsa (Jerusalem: Schechter Institute, 2012) 117–18.

60 David Weiss Halivny, Revelation Restored: Divine Writ and Critical Responses (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997) 83; David Novak, The Jewish Social Contract: An Essay in Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005) 79. See the biblical books Ezra 7 and Nehemia 8.

61 Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources, and Principles, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1994) 115–16, 232; David Novak, Covenantal Rights: A Study in Jewish Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009).

62 Soloveitchik compared and yet distinguishes the two, in Halakhic Man 66 n. 80. See Aaron Kirschenbaum, “Subjectivity in Rabbinic Decision-Making” in Sokol, Rabbinic Authority; Berkovits 28 (subjectivity is present in equitable interpretation).

63 Avi Sagi, The Open Canon (London: Continuum, 2007) 188; Berkovits 174. Interpretation throughout the generations is underscored by the Talmud tale that portrays Moses ascending to heaven and seeing first- to second-century Rabbi Akiva stating with respect to an interpretative ruling: “This is a law given to Moses on Mount Sinai” (BT – Menahoth 29b).

64 Golinkin, “Is Judaism Really in Favor of Pluralism and Tolerance?,” citing Olat R’iyah vol. I: 330. See also BT – Chagigah 3b (the wise sit in manifold assemblies and offer different rulings of law, and all are given by God).

65 Midrash Tanhuma (Pinhas, par. 10), cited by Golinkin, “Is Judaism Really in Favor of Pluralism and Tolerance?”

66 BT – Eruvin 13b (“these and these”); BT – Pirkei Avot 5.17 (“in the name of Heaven”). I refer to these sources to underscore principles of pluralism and respect, rather than to render an argument under Jewish law.

67 Rosensweig. Another explanation of the preference for Bet Hillel points to his school's acknowledgement that Divine Truth is complex, and may include what humans consider contradictory. Reuven Kimmelman, “Judaism and Pluralism,” Modern Judaism 7.2 (1987): 131–50, esp. 137. See also Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Halakhic Mind (New York: Seth, 1986): “absolute reality [ … ] reveals itself in manifold ways to the subject,” such that a “pluralistic cognitive approach” is necessary (16); the white light of divinity is always refracted through reality's “dome of many coloured glass” (46).

68 One must say that God gave the Torah as taught by the Sages, “even if they were to err,” according to thirteenth-century biblical commentator Nahmanides' commentary to Deuteronomy 17.11 (trans. C.B. Chavel); BT – Baba Batra 130b (even a rejected ruling may represent a valid approach).

69 BT – Baba Metzia 59. The tale of the Akhnai oven is more fully recorded in Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, “The Transformative Authorial Self in Jewish Thought,” The World Intellectual Property Organization Journal 6.2 (2015): 149.

70 Zachary Braiterman, “The Patient Political Gesture: Law, Liberalism, and Talmud” in Judaism, Liberalism, and Political Theology, eds. Randi Rashkover and Martin Kavka (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2013) 251.

71 Joel Roth, “Midrash and the Legal Process” in Etz Hayim: Torah and Commentary, eds. David L. Lieber et al. (New York: Rabbinical Assembly, 2001) 1470–74.

72 David L. Leiber, “Introduction” in Etz Hayim xx.

73 I thank Rabbi Susan Silverman for insights on midrash. For more on midrash, see Daniel Boyarin, Intertextuality and the Reading of the Midrash (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990).

74 Alan M. Dershowitz, The Genesis of Justice (New York: Warner, 2000).

75 Ibid.

76 On readers and the Talmud, see Leon Wiener Dow, “Opposition to the ‘Shulhan Aruch’: Articulating a Common Law Conception of the Halacha,” Hebraic Political Studies 3.4 (2008): 352–76, 360.

77 Roland Barthes, Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977); idem, “From Work to Text” in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism, ed. Josué V. Harari (London: Methuen, 1979).

78 See Pelagia Goulimari, Literary Criticism and Theory: From Plato to Postcolonialism (London: Routledge, 2015). Regarding the influence of this hermeneutic shift in law, see notes 115–17 below.

79 Exodus: Yitro 20.2–14, Mishpatim 21.

80 Nahmanides' commentary on Exodus: Mishpatim 21.2.

81 BT – Eruvin 54.1, Pirkei Avot 6.2.

82 Yitzhak Englard, “Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's Constitutional Framework,” Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000): 1903–28.

83 Yair Lorberbaum, “Blood and the Image of God: On the Sanctity of Life in Biblical and Early Rabbinic Law, Myth, and Ritual” in The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, eds. David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002) 55, 58.

84 See, for example, Haim Cohn, Human Rights in Jewish Law (Jerusalem: Ktav, 1984); Yehuda Brandes, Judaism and Human Rights (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2013) (Hebrew).

85 I thank Rabbi Elisha Wolfin for this insightful interpretation of Numbers 20.8.

86 See Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Discussions on Pirkei Avot (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1979) 91.

87 BT – Baba Kama 8.86.

88 Rabbi Israel Meir Kagan (Chofetz Chaim), Desirer of Life (1873), expounding upon, for example, Leviticus 19.16 (against spreading slander); Jeremiah 23.30 (false prophets steal words); Numbers 12.1, 12.10 (Miriam's punishment for speaking about Moses).

89 Martin Buber, I and Thou [1923], trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: Clark, 1937, 1958); idem, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Routledge, 1947).

90 Edith Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics (New York: Fordham UP, 2000) 128, 152.

91 H.C.J. 73/53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister of Interior, P.D. (7) 871. See below, note 97.

92 See Aharon Barak, Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2015).

93 Cf. Aharon Barak, “Constitutional Rights in Private Law” in Israeli Constitutional Law in the Making, eds. Gideon Sapir, Daphne Barak-Erez, and Aharon Barak (Oxford: Hart, 2013) 379–401.

94 Hohfeldian correlativity indicates that X's right means that Y has a duty to respect that right. Wesley N. Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” Yale Law Journal 23 (1913): 16–59.

95 See above, notes 52 (Cover), 81 and 84.

96 See Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982). Speech and expression are used here interchangeably. For a view as to their difference, see Barendt.

97 Kol Ha’am, P.D. (7) 871.

98 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, Supreme Court, 1943.

99 Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992) 91, 92–97, 316.

100 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Government (New York: Harper, 1948) 25.

101 Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630, Supreme Court, 1919 (Holmes J, dissenting). On different views comprising the truth in Jewish thought, see note 67 above.

102 See John Christman, “Introduction” in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, ed. John Philip Christman (New York: Oxford UP, 1989) 3–26.

103 Christina E. Wells, “Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence,” Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review 32 (1997): 159–96.

104 GMM 4.440.

105 GMM 4.436.

106 Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, “In Defence of Autonomy: An Ethic of Care,” N.Y.U. Journal of Law and Liberty 3.2 (2008): 548–98.

107 Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP) 83. I thank Professor O’Neill for discussion of Kant's concept of autonomy.

108 Autonomy entails self-determination (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998) A534/B562), and self-development of one's capacities (GMM 4.423), including of expression. Kant further connects artistic expression to the autonomy of a reasoning will. With aesthetic cognition the imagination is free, giving itself its own rules (Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer, trans. Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 5: 306–17).

109 The human being has a “natural purposiveness,” an “inner end,” to fulfil the speaker's capacity to “communicate his thoughts” (MM 6.429–30). As it is his end, so then is “communicating his thoughts” a man's innate right (MM 6.238).

110 In Hegel's theory of self-development, for example, expression is a necessary element. Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979) 11, 16. See Treiger-Bar-Am, “In Defence of Autonomy.”

111 468 U.S. 288, Supreme Court, 1984. With this definition the Court recognized the hermeneutic elements of intent, readers' meaning and text, as discussed in notes 78 and 115–16.

112 See notes 32, 91 and 97 above.

113 6897/14 Radio Kol BeRama; 41269-02-13 Phillip v. Abutbul; 1868/15 Yahadot Tashmar v. Koliach, note 38 above.

114 EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch, 575 U.S. – (Slip Op No 14-86) (Supreme Court, 1 June 2015). Conservative former US Justice Scalia called it an easy case. The US Supreme Court also protected as speech the donning of a jacket with an anti-war slogan, in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, Supreme Court, 1971.

The donning of a Moslem headscarf was the subject of a number of ECHR cases, for example Sahin v. Turkey, ECHR 44774/98, 2005. The regulation of the donning of a Moslem headscarf in a Christian school was discussed in 9022-06-10 Nimri v. Lebanot (Schmidt Girls' School) (Jerusalem Labour Court, 2010).

115 555 U.S. 460, 464, 474–7, Supreme Court, 2009.

116 See, for example, Hurley and S. Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, Supreme Court, 1995; Falwell v. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. 46, Supreme Court, 1988; Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, Supreme Court, 2003.

117 On the recognition of the pluralism of meanings and use of hermeneutics in US free-speech doctrine and in copyright doctrine, see Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, “Copyright, Creativity, and Transformative Use” in Copyrighting Creativity: Creative Values, Cultural Heritage Institutions and Systems of Intellectual Property, ed. Helle Porsdam (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015); Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, “Christo's Gates and the Meaning of Art: Lessons for the Law,” European Intellectual Property Review 27.11 (2005): 389–90.