Abstract
In this piece I will focus on what I think is a central aspect of Albert Camus’s thinking, embodied in the distinction he makes in The Rebel between rebel and revolutionary. His is a philosophy of rebellion and he thinks that revolutions are a distorted expression of our need to rebel against that which we cannot accept. His views should serve as a counterpoint to those who think that an all-or-nothing approach to social change is desirable (those who, for instance, are too quick to justify murderous campaigns allegedly aimed at justice). And the issue here is not that embodied crudely in the reactionary (or conservative)/radical dichotomy. Rather, it is a defence of the need to rebel within limits, not so much to preserve the old against the threat of the new but, instead, to preserve basic human decency from the dark side of outrage, without dismissing what is crucial about outrage and emancipatory struggles.
disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 This is not the place for me to quibble about Camus’s interpretation of Nietzsche. I would be happy to accept that he is being uncharitable. What I am interested in here are Camus’s ideas, including how Camus interprets Nietzsche. His interpretation is at least plausible, but Nietzsche is, of course, notoriously difficult to pin down and Camus has little time for detailed textual analysis. His concerns are elsewhere.
2 See, for instance, Camus, The Rebel 248.
3 See Camus, The Myth ix.
4 For a discussion on this topic, see my “Blind Sisyphus.”
5 For a discussion on the common ground between these authors, see Zaretsky’s Albert Camus: Elements of a Life.
6 See Camus, The Rebel 39–53.
7 See Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality.