Safety and security of India's N‐Weapons

Abstract

Ever since its inception, India's nuclear research and development programme has remained shrouded in secrecy and the armed forces remained out of the nuclear decision‐making loop. Besides posing practical difficulties, the virtual non‐involvement of the armed forces in the country's nuclear weapons programme has undermined the credibility of India's nuclear deterrent and raised doubts about the safety and security of nuclear weapons. This shortcoming needs to be corrected through an institutionalised consultative planning process, the working of which is characterised by open debate on all but the most sensitive aspects of policy making and military strategy.

Qualified military personnel of the (tri‐Services) Strategic Forces Command must handle all functional aspects of nuclear weapons in the field. The basic idea of modern safety design, called enhanced nuclear detonation safety system (ENDS), should be followed. Combined with electronic permissive action links (PALs), these measures ensure an exceedingly high standard of safety and prevention of unauthorised use.

There is no compelling reason for India to maintain fully assembled nuclear warheads, mated with the delivery systems, with all the attendant risks of accidental or inadvertent and unauthorised launch. Nuclear theft and smuggling are also emerging threats. Security needs to be arranged for rail‐and road‐mobile ballistic missiles as well. Nuclear and missile security involves an intricate inter‐relationship between personnel, instructions for access, data and information, management and organisation, communications arrangements and safety and security equipment.