South Asia's Unstable Nuclear Decade

Abstract

The tenth anniversary of India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests enables scholars to revisit the issue of South Asian proliferation with a decade of hindsight. I argue that nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects. First, nuclear weapons' ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war. Second, these Indo-Pakistani crises led India to adopt a more aggressive military posture toward Pakistan. This could exacerbate security-dilemma dynamics and increase the likelihood of future Indo-Pakistani conflict.

Notes

An earlier version of this article appeared as ‘Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia’, International Security, 33(2), 2008, pp. 71–94.

1. For optimistic arguments, see Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘For Better: Nuclear Weapons Preserve an Imperfect Peace’, in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton, New York, 2003, p. 117; K. Subrahmanyam, ‘India and the International Nuclear Order’, in D.R. Sardesai and Raju G.C. Thomas (eds.), Nuclear India in the Twenty-first Century, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002, p. 83; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Here We Go Again’, New York Times, May 17, 1998. For pessimistic arguments see Scott D. Sagan, ‘For Worse: Till Death Do Us Part’, in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 106–107; P.R. Chari, ‘Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia’, in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné (eds.), The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia, Report no. 38, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, June 2001, p. 16; and Kanti Bajpai, ‘The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent’, in Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, HarAnand, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 150–188.

2. By ‘limited’ war, I mean a conflict resulting in at least 1,000 battle deaths that involves guerrillas, proxy forces, or states’ regular militaries, but does not cross official international boundaries on a scale sufficient to threaten the loser with catastrophic defeat.

3. In the 25-year period between independence and the end of the Bangladesh conflict, India and Pakistan fought three wars: in 1948, 1965, and 1971.

4. See V.P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, HarperCollins, New Delhi, 2006; Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning, Sage, New Delhi, 2000; Amarinder Singh, A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights, 1999, Motibagh Palace, New Delhi, 2001; and Y.M. Bammi, Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquered, Gorkha Publishers, Noida, India, 2002.

5. The period from the late 1980s until 1998 can be considered a ‘de facto’ nuclear period. During these years, India and Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, but probably could have produced them if necessary. See S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2007.

6. Benazir Bhutto, interview by author, August 2004.

7. See V.R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict without End, Viking, New Delhi, 2002.

8. Benazir Bhutto, interview by author, n. 7.

9. President Pervez Musharraf, interview by author, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, April 2004.

10. Jalil Jilani, interview by author, Islamabad, Pakistan, April 2004.

11. Ibid.

12. Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2005, p. 191.

13. Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2006, pp. 73–74; and Ganguly and Hagerty, n. 13, pp. 160–162.

14. Former Indian Army Chief of Staff General V.P. Malik, interview by author, New Delhi, India, April 2004.

15. G. Parthasarathy, interview by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004 and December 2007.

16. Gen. V.P. Malik, interview by author, n. 15.

17. A.B. Vajpayee, interview by author, New Delhi, India, June 2006.

18. For detailed discussions of the 2001–2002 crisis, see V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished, Sage, New Delhi, 2003; Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis, Report no. 57, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, September 2006; and Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, ‘The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, Security Studies, 2005, 14(2), pp. 290–324.

19. See President Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation, Islamabad, January 12, 2002, at http://www.millat.com/president/1020200475758AMword%20file.pdf; Alan Sipress and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‘Powell “Encouraged” by India Visit’, Washington Post, January 19, 2002; Robert Marquand, ‘Powell Tiptoes Indo-Pak Divide’, Christian Science Monitor, January 18, 2002; and Susan Milligan, ‘India-Pakistan Standoff Easing, Powell Says’, Boston Globe, January 18, 2002.

20. Brajesh Mishra, interview by author, New Delhi, India, May 2005; and V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, n. 19, p. 80.

21. Brajesh Mishra, interview by author, n. 21.

22. A.B. Vajpayee, interview by author, n. 18.

23. George Fernandes, interview by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004.

24. Brajesh Mishra, interview by author, n. 21.

25. V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, n. 19, pp. 80, 82, 87; V. Sudarshan and Ajith Pillai, ‘Game of Patience’, Outlook (Mumbai), May 27, 2002; and retired Indian generals, interview by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004.

26. V.K. Sood, interview by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004.

27. This is not to argue that Islamabad was directly involved in the Parliament and Kaluchak operations. My point, rather, is that Pakistan nurtured the militant groups behind these and other anti-Indian attacks as part of its strategy of low-intensity conflict in Kashmir. This strategy, in turn, was facilitated by Pakistani nuclear weapons, which insulated Pakistan from all-out Indian retaliation and attracted international attention. Thus, the 2001–2002 attacks fit a broad pattern of violence stretching back to the late 1980s, and were closely linked to Pakistan's nuclear capacity.

28. See, for example, V.R. Raghavan, ‘Nuclear Deterrence: An Indian Perspective’, presentation at Wilton Park Conference, ‘The Future of Nuclear Deterrence in the North Atlantic Alliance’, West Sussex, UK, October 2006, at http://www.delhipolicygroup.com/bulletin26.htm; Russell J. Leng, ‘Realpolitik and Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry’, in T.V. Paul (ed.), The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 126–127; and Praveen Swami, ‘A War to End a War: The Causes and Outcomes of the 2001–2002 India-Pakistan Crisis’, in Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur (eds.), Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia and Beyond: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb, Routledge, London, 2009, 144–161.

29. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 2006–2007, pp. 6, 143.

30. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Free Press, New York, 2006, pp. 201–204; Stephen Philip Cohen, ‘The Nation and the State of Pakistan’, Washington Quarterly, 25(3), 2002, pp. 109–122; Samina Yasmeen, ‘Pakistan's Kashmir Policy: Voices of Moderation?’, Contemporary South Asia, 12(2), 2003, pp. 187–202; Jessie Lloyd and Nathan Nankivell, ‘India, Pakistan, and the Legacy of September 11’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15(2), 2002, pp. 269–287; and Robert G. Wirsing, ‘Precarious Partnership: Pakistan's Response to U.S. Security Policies’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 30(2), Summer 2003, pp. 70–78.

31. Samina Yasmeen, n. 31, pp. 12, 15; and Katherine Butler, ‘Toppling Musharraf: Heat Rises on Pakistani Leader’, Independent, February 20, 2006. On the assassination attempts, see Pervez Musharraf, n. 31, pp. 244–262.

32. Vali Nasr, ‘Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in Pakistan’, Middle East Journal, 58(2), 2004, pp. 195–209.

33. Indian GDP growth jumped from 5.6 per cent to 8.4 per cent between 1990 and 2005, and is expected to continue above 8 per cent in 2008. See S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, ‘The Transformation of US–India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future’, Asian Survey, 47(4), 2007, pp. 642–656.

34. Raj Chengappa, interview byauthor, New Delhi, India, December 2007. See also ‘India-Pakistan: Understanding the Conflict Dynamics’, speech by Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon at Jamia Millia Islamia, April 11, 2007.

35. Although the Delhi and Mumbai bombings were more deadly, the parliament and Kaluchak attacks were widely viewed as a greater national affront, as they targeted the foremost symbol of the Indian state as well as the family members of Indian military personnel. On the bombings, see Amelia Gentleman, ‘Delhi Police Say Suspect Was Attack Mastermind’, International Herald Tribune, November 13, 2005; ‘LeT, JeM, SIMI Helped Execute Terror Plan’, Times of India, October 1, 2006.

36. See Anthony H. Cordesman, The India-Pakistan Military Balance, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2002; Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1997; and S. Paul Kapur, n. 6, pp. 50–53.

37. Ashley J. Tellis, n. 37, pp. 20–21; Center for Land Warfare Studies additional director Gurmeet Kanwal, interview by author, New Delhi, India, December 2007.

38. For critical analyses of Parakram see, for example, V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, n. 19; and Praveen Swami, ‘Beating the Retreat’, Frontline, 19(22), 2002.

39. This discussion draws on the following sources: interviews by author in New Delhi in December 2007 with several of Cold Start's intellectual architects, including Vijay Oberoi, former army training command director and army vice chief of staff; Arun Sahgal, head of the Center for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution, and member of the Indian National Security Council Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation; Gurmeet Kanwal, director of the Center for Land Warfare Studies; and senior US defence officials. Colonel Amarjit Singh, ‘Strategy and Doctrine: A Case for Convergence’, Presentation at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India, 2007; Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? An Assessment of the Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine’, International Security, 32(3), 2007/2008, pp. 158–190; Subhash Kapila, ‘India's New “Cold Start” War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed: Parts I and II’, South Asia Analysis Group Papers, no. 991 and no. 1013, Noida, India, May 4, 2004, and June 1, 2004; and Tariq M. Ashraf, ‘Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces’, Military Review, November–December 2004, pp. 53–62.

40. Tariq M. Ashraf, n. 40, p. 59.

41. Vijay Oberoi, interview by author, New Delhi, India, December 2007. See also ‘Cold Start to New Doctrine’, Times of India, April 14, 2004.

42. Brigadier General Khawar Hanif, Pakistani defense attaché to the United States and Major General Muhammad Mustafa Khan, Director General (Analysis) Pakistan Inter-services Intelligence agency, interviews by author, Monterey, CA, June 2007.

43. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Waltz Responds to Sagan’, in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, n. 2, pp. 131–132.

44. See, for example, Scott D. Sagan, ‘Sagan Responds to Waltz’, in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, n. 2, pp. 157–158.