![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
The earliest years of offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities between rivals can be the most harrowing. India and Pakistan have certainly followed this pattern. But over time, rivals can moderate their competition, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Formal arms control treaties, like those negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union, are unlikely for southern Asia. India and Pakistan can, however, employ tacit agreements, confidence-building, and nuclear risk-reduction measures to allay mutual concerns over nuclear weapons. Forward progress on this agenda will likely be constrained by extremist acts linked to Pakistan and political instability there.
Notes
1. See, for example, Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (eds.), Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia, Vision Books, New Delhi, 2003.
2. For an evaluation of the US role, see Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis, Stimson Center Report no. 57, September 2006, at http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=327.
3. For an optimistic assessment of the prospects of nuclear stabilisation in South Asia, see Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2006.
4. See, for example, Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, Between Recessed Deterrence and Ready Arsenal, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2001; and Feroz H. Khan and Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Pakistan, the Dilemma of Nuclear Deterrence’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2008, pp. 215–240.
5. Ashley J. Tellis, n. 4, p. 695.
6. See, for example, Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?’, International Security, 32(3), 2007/2008, pp. 158–190.