![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
In Lahore, in 1999, Pakistan dropped its ‘Kashmir first’ approach and agreed to discuss it with India along with other issues. Later, under Musharraf, there was an offer to move beyond UN resolutions and adopt a four-step approach to resolve the Kashmir issue. Musharraf's proposals were taken seriously and widely hailed as a sign of flexibility and pragmatism from the Pakistani side. This paper critically analyses these approaches since Lahore and argues that they were occasioned by the changing global political context and that they were more apparent than real. At the official level, there is hardly any departure from the core stance of Pakistan on Kashmir. The civilian government in Pakistan today has retained the process of dialogue initiated by Musharraf but is yet to spell out its approach to Kashmir. The paper argues that even if there is a realization that the policy of subversion and militancy has backfired, the temptation to retain jihadis as the last option will continue to play havoc with the process of dialogue aimed at finding a solution to Kashmir in the days to come.
Notes
1. Resolution 47 (1948) was adopted by the Security Council at its 286th meeting held on April 21, 1948. This was followed by resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) on August 13, 1948 and on January 5, 1949.
2. When the name ‘Pakistan’ was coined by Rehmat Ali, the ‘K’ word stood for Kashmir. Hence this is also regarded as an unfinished task for the leadership of Pakistan.
3. The NA is spread over 72,971 sq. km (compared to Azad Jammu and Kashmir – 13,297 sq. km, and Jammu & Kashmir – 101,387 sq. km) and has been divided into two divisions (Gilgit, comprising five districts, and Baltistan, comprising two districts).
4. The resolution, passed unanimously in the parliament on February 22, 1994, expressed ‘regret and concern at the pitiable conditions and violations of human rights and denial of democratic freedoms of the people in those areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which are under the illegal occupation of Pakistan’ and demanded that ‘Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression.’ It further stated that ‘The State of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means.’ It reaffirmed that ‘India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.’
5. It emerged from personal reminiscences of people like P.N. Dhar and P.N. Haskar, who were associated with the Simla Agreement later, that Bhutto was not agreeable to turn the ceasefire line into an international border at that point of time. But he had promised to work towards that in the coming years. See P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi: The Emergency and Indian Democracy, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1996.
6. In fact, in 1958, UN mediators Gunnar Jarring and Frank Graham had observed that implementation of the resolutions was quite implausible in the changed situation, only a decade after the passing of the UN resolution. Fifty years hence, the ground situation has changed immensely. Even in 2001, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had stated that since the 47th UN resolution was not self-enforcing, it would ‘require the cooperation of both parties for implementation’, hinting at the bilateral route. (During interaction with the media at Pakistan's Chakala military airbase in March 2001.)
7. Indo-Pak bilateral talks have been characterized by top Pakistani officials associated with the dialogic track as dialogues between ‘two scorpions in a bottle’ which would only lead to a series of ‘false starts’, ‘full of sound and fury signifying nothing’. They only help India in delaying the issue of implementation of UN resolutions.
8. The elections of 1987 to the provincial assembly in Jammu and Kashmir were allegedly rigged by Farooq Abdullah's men who had allied with the Congress Party, then led by Rajiv Gandhi. This led to widespread popular disenchantment with Indian democracy. India sowed the seeds of alienation in the valley and Pakistan reaped a good harvest. Zia-ul-Haq's strategy of inciting an insurrection in the valley, towards the end of the Afghan jihad, worked.
9. This has been cited in A.G. Noorani, ‘An Insider's View’, Frontline, April 21–May 4, 2008, p. 2.
10. The Army Chief Jehangir Karamat went on to admit that Pakistan's internal security was ‘the most important facet of national security’. Quoted in The News, October 6, 1998.
11. Ejaz Haider, ‘Price of Kashmir-Afghanistan Policies’, The Friday Times, Lahore, June 3–9, 1998.
12. The other six issues were Siachen, the Wullar barrage/Tulbul navigation project, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.
13. Even at the top leadership level, then Prime Minister I.K. Gujral was not in favour of applying his Gujral doctrine to Pakistan and was not serious about any talk on Kashmir.
14. While South Africa tendered an apology for this mention, there were pressures from the United States and the United Kingdom on India to talk to Pakistan.
15. For example, M.B. Naqvi, The Dawn, June 23, 1998; Inayatullah, Khalilur Rehman, Frontier Post, June 15, 1998; and Suroosh Irfani, The News, June 18, 1998.
16. Nawai Waqt, edited by Majid Nizami, known for his diatribes against India, wrote that Nawaz was ‘following the US agenda and appeasing the Indians. This was tantamount to betrayal of the cause of Kashmir’. Nawai Waqt, February 7, 1999.
17. The Urdu media, however, latched on to their ‘Kashmir first’ argument and argued that it was useless to talk if India would not agree to discuss Kashmir. Some would argue that the Indo‐Pak bus service was a hasty step, and called Nawaz a ‘weak-kneed politician’ falling for ‘mischievous and contemptuous’ strategies planned out by India and the United States. ‘Force not talks was the answer,’ they held. Jasarat, November 19, 1998.
18. Najum Mustaq, The News, October 24, 1998.
19. Jamait-i-Islami argued that it would dilute the cause of Kashmir. The jihadi constituency, represented by the Lashkar-e-Toiba, held that jihad, not dialogue, was the need of the hour and if nuclear bombs could not make Nawaz confident then he should try with the Lashkar, which was no less than ‘an atom bomb for India’. Even his populist policy of introducing Sharia could not woo these Islamist forces to his side. Reported in The News, July 7, 1998.
20. Imtiaz Alam captured it well: ‘(The India Pakistan peace process is) an exceptionally risky route to tread, full of booby traps, mines and misleading signposts on the path.’ The News, July 12, 2001.
21. Niaz would later reminisce that he had made some progress on the Chenab formula which was unfortunately overtaken by the army action in Kargil in May 1999. See http://www.rediff.com.
22. Because US President Clinton had promised in the declaration that he would take ‘personal interest’ in resolving the Kashmir issue.
23. During Clinton's trip to South Asia in March 2000, he emphasized initiating talks with India during his brief four-hour stop-over in Islamabad after spending four days in India. Apart from this, the United States had regular dialogue with Pakistan on nuclear and security matters since 1998 and in those forums emphasized Kashmir.
24. In the BBC programme ‘Talking Point’ on August 2, 2000. Musharraf said, ‘I am for the reduction of armed forces, I am for a no war pact between India and Pakistan. So let India come forward, I am for resolving this dispute of Kashmir, let India come forward, I am for talking to, at any place, to any leadership of India. So I'm offering all kinds of peace initiatives but the ball, may I say, is in the Indian court.’ Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/863561.stm.
25. It was not Musharraf but Abdul Sattar, his foreign minister, who lamely reiterated this position.
26. Musharraf made this observation in his appearance on the programme ‘The World Today’, on ABC Local Radio, on July 13, 2001. Available at http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s329080.htm.
27. But Musharraf soon realized that his over-exposure to the media could not rescue the Summit talks at Agra. He had learnt his first lessons in diplomacy. He would advocate caution in his subsequent talks with the Indian media.
28. The Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned it in its official brief in 2005. See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Pages/Brief.htm.
29. For example, American experts on South Asia like Selig Harrison and Teresita Schaffer. Kofi Anan said he was ‘very pleased and encouraged’. Richard Boucher said it was ‘constructive to relinquish the demand for a referendum to the status of Kashmir’. BBC, December 19, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3333201.stm.
30. Daily Times, December 20, 2003.
32. These regions also included Northern Areas. The editorial of the Daily Times, the following day, suggested that Musharraf was getting acquainted with the complexity of the problem and diversity in Kashmir.
33. Musharraf, quoted in the Daily Times, October 26, 2004.
34. During his visit to Kashmir on November 17, 2004, Manmohan had stated: ‘I have made it clear to President Musharraf that any redrawing of the international border is not acceptable to us. Any proposal which smacks of further division is not going to be acceptable to us.’ Reported in the Daily Times, November 18, 2004.
35. Musharraf's breakfast meeting with Indian media on April 18, 2005. Available at http://www.millat.com/president/press/420200522544AMBreakfast%20meeting.pdf.
36. Reported in The Dawn, November 28, 2005.
37. Reported in The Dawn, November 29, 2005.
38. Musharraf's December 2006 proposal for demilitarization and autonomy was debated widely and the Pakistani media isolated the options for review and discussion as demilitarization, autonomy/self governance, joint control/shared sovereignty, sovereign Kashmir with no international personality, readjustment of territory and free trade zone, and open border.
39. See reports on General Musharraf's address in a conference titled ‘Voices from Asia: Towards a Process of Cooperation and Security’, in Tribune, February 16, 2007, at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070216/world.htm.
40. The News, June 20, 1998; and The Dawn, July 10, 1998.
41. I.A. Rehman, in The Dawn, March 6, 2008.
42. In a thought-provoking essay on the ‘multivocal’ Kashmir policy of the Pakistani state, Amélie Bloom advances the argument that apart from these two principal actors there are other important institutions and actors like the foreign office, the defence ministry, the PM's secretariat, the Ministry for Kashmir and Northern Areas (KANA), and the parliamentary committees on Kashmir. This does not exhaust the list. The armed forces also deal with Kashmir through different agencies like the ISI, the Corps Commanders’ Meetings, and operational corps dealing with Kashmir on the ground. The political parties, Islamic militant organizations, NGOs, and last but not the least the Kashmiri political and civil society groups. Therefore, the army chiefs have proposed to institute a National Security Council headed by the president and comprising the service chiefs, which would meet regularly to give the armed forces a regular stake in the decision-making concerning security affairs. The political forces have been averse to it. Musharraf's proposal to this effect in 2004 was even resisted by the religious parties. For details, see Amélie Bloom, ‘The “Multi-Vocal State”: The Policy of Pakistan on Kashmir’, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, October 2000, at http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/octo00/artab.pdf (Accessed February 28, 2009).