The BRI and India’s Grand Strategy

Abstract

India’s rejection of the BRI for strategic reasons does not mean it is resistant to Chinese investments, which are—to the contrary—both welcome and rapidly increasing. Indian strategy in this respect is in accord with the changing character of the international system, where strategic competition co-exists with economic cooperation as well as competition. In contemporary international politics, structurally driven conflictive behaviour is modified by high levels of strategic and economic interdependence. This incentivises India, like other major powers, to seek optimal gains through economic exchange even as it defends its strategic interests through military means short of war.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

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18. For an insight into this, see Benjamin Miller, When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Cooperation in World Politics, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1995.

19. On hegemons versus challengers, see Robert S. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981.

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21. Jyotika Saksena, “Regime Design Matters: The CTBT and India’s Nuclear Dilemma,” Comparative Strategy, 25 (3), July 2006, pp. 209-229.

22. Rajesh Basrur and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, “Conceptualizing Strategic Partnerships”, in Rajesh Basrur and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty (eds.), India and Japan: Assessing the Strategic Partnership, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2018, pp. 1-12.

23. Caveat: This applies only to powers which are militarily and/or economically interdependent.

24. On the military aspect, see Raimo Vayrynen (ed.), The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, Routledge, New York and London, 2006.

25. On “thought styles,” see Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2002.

26. See Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar’s speech on “India, the United States and China,” IISS-Fullerton Lecture, July 20, 2015, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Singapore at<http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-lecture-jaishankar-f64e> (Accessed on January 10, 2016).

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28. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, n.d. [2017] at <http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61013712> (Accessed on August 17, 2017).

29. S. Arun, “India Seeks More Chinese Investments,” The Hindu, September 9, 2017 at <https://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/india-seeks-chinese-investments/article19651557.ece> (Accessed on September 10, 2018).

30. Reshma Patil, “More Chinese Companies Investing in India, But Political Thaws [sic], Barriers Remain,” Hindustan Times, April 17, 2017 at <https://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/more-chinese-companies-investing-in-india-but-political-relations-barriers-remain/story-MABF9zw9hBAFqUy6LasFSP.html> (Accessed on September 10, 2018).

31. Nantoo Banerjee, “China’s Investment in India: Investors Find Doing Business with India Safe and Attractive,” Millennium Post, February 26, 2018 at <http://www.millenniumpost.in/opinion/chinas-investment-in-india-286998> (Accessed on March 24, 2018).

32. Ruchika Chitravanshi, “Led By Chinese, Nearly 600 Companies Line up $85 Billion Investments in India”, The Economic Times, October 16, 2017 at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/led-by-chinese-nearly-600-companies-line-up-85-billion-investments-in-india/articleshow/61093929.cms (Accessed on March 24, 2018).

33. Ruchika Chitravanshi, Ibid.

34. Jayanta Roy Chowdhury, “Select Restrictions on FDI to Stay,” The Telegraph, March 17, 2017 at <https://www.telegraphindia.com/1170317/jsp/business/story_141047.jsp> (Accessed on September 10, 2018).

35. Thilo Hanemann, “Arrested Development: Chinese FDI in the US in 1H 2018,” Rhodium Group, June 19, 2018 at <https://rhg.com/research/arrested-development-chinese-fdi-in-the-us-in-1h-2018/> (Accessed on September 10, 2018).

36. Byron Chong, “India and the US-China Trade War,” China Brief, 120, July 11-31, 2018 at <https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/details/china-india-brief-120#guest> (Accessed on August 3, 2018).

37. This has long been India’s approach to Pakistan as well, but has not been reciprocated by the latter, notably with regard to the offer of Most Favoured Nation status.

38. Kiran Stacey, Simon Mundy and Emily Feng, “India Benefits from AIIB Loans despite China Tensions”, Financial Times, March 18, 2018 at https://www.ft.com/content/da2258f6-2752-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 (Accessed on February 12, 2018).

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Rajesh Basrur

Rajesh Basrur is Visiting Professor in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and Research Associate with the Contemporary South Asian Studies Programme (CSASP) at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford. Views expressed are personal.