The BRI and India’s Neighbourhood

Chinese President Xi Jinping initially proposed to build an ‘economic belt’ and a ‘21st-century Maritime Silk Road’ in 2013 which were formalised as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) in a document—‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road’—released by the National Reform and Development Commission in 2015.¹ The BRI is a huge investment, trade, connectivity and infrastructure undertaking involving 65 countries in three continents and collectively accounting for over 30 per cent of the global GDP, 62 per cent of the world’s population and 75 per cent of known energy reserves.²

The Chinese initiative aims to connect the country with Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Russia and Europe by land networks and Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania and East African coastal regions via maritime trade routes.³ Beijing has identified six specific economic corridors⁴ to build the BRI networks and constructed supporting international financial institutions, i.e. the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund (SRF), to finance the infrastructure and connectivity projects.

The launching of the BRI has brought several intriguing questions to the fore: Why has China launched the BRI? What are Beijing’s motivations? What consequences—geo-economic and geo-political—will it have on the neighbourhood and beyond? How have other states reacted to the BRI? What challenges will China confront to implement the BRI? What impact, if any, will it have on the existing systemic structure?

While these are immensely important questions in relation to the BRI, there is no space to address them all in this introductory note. It is, however, important to make some quick comments on a few issues to set the theme of the special issue into a proper context. China has multiple economic, political, security and strategic objectives to pursue the BRI⁵ and the sources of the initiative can be located at both domestic and international levels.⁶ Indeed, the BRI may arguably be construed as the Chinese grand strategy in quest of its place and role in the contemporary global structure.

An initiative of such magnitude is bound to produce a significant geo-economic and geo-political impact. If Beijing can successfully implement its plan, the BRI retains the promise of altering the existing structural arrangements in Asia and beyond. The possibility of such an eventuality has alarmed several regional and global powers which is reflected in their reactions to the BRI. While many countries have endorsed the Chinese initiative (most notably Russia), a number of major states, such as the US, Japan, India, the European Union, Australia etc., have opposed it. The common concern they all have is that China is seeking greater influence in international relations and aims to alter the existing political, economic and strategic structures to promote its interests at their expense.

The Indian government opposes the BRI because it suspects that the initiative is not what China claims it to be. New Delhi views that the ‘BRI (with CPEC as its flagship initiative) violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity……We are of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality, and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.’⁷ Analysts in India interpret their government’s lukewarm response towards BRI as an indication of their apprehension of the BRI because of its ambiguity, lack of transparency, lack of consultation with the relevant stakeholders and China’s growing military presence in the Indian Ocean Region.⁸ Consequently, New Delhi worries that the BRI projects may lead to debt trap, corruption, political instability, environmental problems and unsustainability in its neighbourhood.⁹ While at this stage it is difficult to fully ascertain the fallout of the BRI projects, there are indications that they are creating a ‘debt trap’ in some countries and in some cases leading to a condition of ‘neo-colonialism’.¹⁰

New Delhi is particularly concerned about the BRI infrastructure and connectivity projects in the smaller South Asian countries and the Indian Ocean littoral states. India has traditionally viewed the South Asian region and the Indian Ocean as its back yard¹¹ over which it has historically maintained a position of influence. It is apprehensive that the BRI projects will enhance Beijing’s stature and undermine India’s influence over those states.

More specifically, New Delhi is opposed to one of the flagship projects of the BRI in South Asia—the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It contends that the project runs through (Pakistan-controlled) Kashmir and hence it ‘violates Indian sovereignty’.¹² While the issue of sovereignty is cited as the official reason for opposing the CPEC, the key reason is India’s worry about the geopolitical implications of the project.

Consequently, the BRI projects in India’s neighbourhood have triggered a new round of Sino-Indian rivalry in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Although there is a deep geo-political undertone involved, its key character is geo-economic. In recent years, New Delhi has increased its economic engagement through aid, investment, trade and connectivity projects in its neighbouring states, ostensibly to counter the Chinese BRI projects.

This special issue seeks to explore the dimensions and the dynamics of Sino-Indian competition in South Asia and the Indian Ocean that have arisen following the launching of the BRI by Beijing. Besides this introductory note, there are five articles in the issue. The articles were originally presented as papers at an international workshop in Hull, UK on September 11–13, 2018, organised by the South Asia Project within the Department of Politics at the University of Hull. The papers were subsequently revised for this special issue.

Rajesh Basrur in his article entitled ‘The BRI and India’s Grand Strategy’, provides an in-depth analysis of New Delhi’s politico-strategic concerns in relation to the BRI and the debate in India surrounding it. The author appreciates New Delhi’s reservations about the Chinese initiative but argues that India’s response to the BRI should be constructed within the context of India’s own grand strategy which it has crafted around the essential character of the post-Cold War international system. He posits that although India’s relative weakness vis-à-vis China is a good reason for it to be wary of the BRI and it has already rejected the Chinese initiative, New Delhi should cooperate with Beijing from which it can reap significant economic benefit. The author points out that India pragmatically continues to seek foreign direct investment (FDI) from Chinese sources, hence India can benefit from Chinese FDI offers while simultaneously carrying the potential of moderating long-standing tensions.

Abhijit Singh in his article—‘Sino-Indian Dynamics in Littoral Asia: The View from New Delhi’—explores the emerging naval dynamics between India and China in littoral South Asia and New Delhi’s concerns about China’s growing naval activities in the Indian Ocean following the announcement of the BRI. He notes that the concern is ‘deep’ because Chinese naval deployments have shrunk New Delhi’s ‘traditional sphere of influence’. The establishment of a military base in Djibouti by China and the takeover of the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota are watched in New Delhi with deep suspicion. India faces a dilemma in countering Chinese naval presence in its neighbourhood because India cannot hope to match China’s power projection in its near seas. He posits that New Delhi needs to raise the tempo of Indian naval operations in the wider Indo-Pacific littorals to counter Chinese naval power.

S. Akbar Zaidi’s article—‘A Road Through Pakistan and What This Means for India’—illustrates the politics of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its domestic and regional consequences. He explores various possibilities emanating from the China-Pakistan relationship and the CPEC, and analyses what regional implication it could have if India is included in the discussion.

Bhumitra Chakma in his article—‘The BRI and Sino-Indian Geo-economic Competition in Bangladesh: Coping Strategy of a Small State’—explains the dynamics of the geo-economic competition between India and China in Bangladesh. He argues that although the competition for influence in Bangladesh has been longstanding, it has intensified in recent years in view of the Chinese BRI projects in that country. Both countries have extended economic support to Bangladesh to extend their political influence over Dhaka. The Bangladesh government has pursued a policy of being a ‘fence sitter’ to engage both sides and reap maximum benefit from their competition.

Smruti S. Pattanaik in her article—‘India’s Policy Response to China’s BRI in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives: Challenges and Prospects‘—explains the context and the dynamics of the geo-economic competition between India and China in three small South Asian states. She notes that while China’s engagement with aid in those states is not new, what is new is the huge BRI investment projects to build ports, roads, tunnels, power plants etc. The Chinese projects have elicited reaction from India which has increased its aid, investment and other economic engagements to counter Chinese influence in those states. While the two powers are engaged in a geo-economic tussle in those states, the author notes, it is not a zero-sum competition. Their competition rather should be viewed as ‘congagement’ in which there are competitive and cooperative elements.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bhumitra Chakma

Dr Bhumitra Chakma is Senior Lecturer, Director of the South Asia Project and Programme Director for BA Politics and International Relations at the Faculty of Business, Law and Politics, University of Hull, UK. Views expressed are personal.

Notes

1. Initially Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed to ‘jointly build an “economic belt” along the Silk Road’ to ‘deepen cooperation and expand development in the Euro-Asia region’ at an address at Nazarbayev University in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, on 7 September, 2013. Later in the same year in October at an address to the Indonesian parliament, he invited the Southeast Asian states to build a ‘21st-century Maritime Silk Road’. These announcements were formalised on 28 March, 2015 as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI). http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html.

2. The World Bank Group, March 29, 2018; https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative

3. Although land networks and maritime silk road are mentioned in the Chinese vision and actions document, Beijing gradually added a third dimension to the BRI – the Digital Silk Road. This point was brought to my attention by Dr Xiudian Dai, a Hull University academic. He presented a paper on this subject at a conference organised by the South Asia Project at the University of Hull on September 11–13, 2018. His paper is titled – ‘The BRI and China‘s soft power strategy: Implications of the Digital Silk Road’. This paper will be published in a forthcoming edited volume.

4. The six corridors are: China-Mongolia-Russia; China-Central Asia-West Asia; China-Indochina Peninsula; China-Pakistan; Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar; and the New Eurasian Land Bridge (connecting Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province with Rotterdam, Holland).

5. Michael Clarke, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Exploring Beijing’s Motivations and Challenges for its New Silk Road’, Strategic Analysis, 42 (2), 2018, pp. 84–102.

6. Yong Wang, ‘Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China‘s new grand strategy’, The Pacific Review, 29 (3), 2015, pp. 455–463.

7. ‘Official Spokesperson‘s response to a query on participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum’, May 13, 2017, available at https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/official+spokespersons+response+to+a+query+on+participation+of+india+in+oborbri+forum

8. Montgomery Blah, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative and India’s Concerns’, Strategic Analysis, 42 (4), 2018, pp. 313–332.

9. Gulshan Sachdeva, ‘Indian Perceptions of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative,’ International Studies, 55 (4), 2018, pp. 285–296.

10. The construction of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka is frequently cited as a case of debt trap. See, Maria Abi-Habib, ’How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,’ The New York Times, June 25, 2018. Interestingly, there is apprehension in Pakistan about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. S. Akbar Zaidi, a prominent Pakistani political economist and a contributor in this special issue, views that when CPEC is operationalised, Pakistan may turn into a Chinese colony. See, Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, ‘After OBOR gets ready, Pakistan will become China’s colony: S Akbar Zaidi,’ The Economic Times, June 12, 2017.

11. This is reflected in the formulation of the ‘Indian Doctrine’. See, Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘The Indian Doctrine,’ India Today, August 31, 1983, p. 20.

12. ‘CPEC violates sovereignty: India tells China,’ The Economic Times, July 12, 2018.