![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Following a period of some distancing through the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil has made a concerted effort to engage with Africa. Today, under the leadership of President Lula, Africa is clearly a priority, especially as Brazil emerges as a global economic power and leader of the developing South. Yet, relatively little is written of Brazil's engagement with Africa and the rationale behind the political and economic drive toward the continent. What is clear is that Brazil's engagement with Africa, viewed in the historical context, maintains its underlying foreign policy principles of economic development on the one hand and the preservation of autonomy in an asymmetric world on the other. Brazil's engagement with Africa has taken on a three-pronged approach of political diplomacy, commercial engagement and development co-operation. This is indicative of a new era of Brazilian foreign policy and Brazil's process of internationalisation in general. This is a complex and inter-related process that Brazil seems to have managed well through a high degree of diplomatic sophistication and open cooperation between the political, commercial and various development entities. Africa displays one of the best contextual examples of Brazil's delicate balancing act between commercial and strategic interests and external development assistance. The way Brazil manages this and builds on its positive image in Africa is indicative of its role and approach as a new and emerging power on the international stage.
Notes
1. Vigevani T & G Cepaluni, ‘Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification’, Third World Quarterly, 28, 7, 2007.
2. The term ‘autonomy through diversification’ was used first by Vigevani and Cepaluni to describe Brazil's foreign policy evolution as a regional power and an emerging international voice in a world that is asymmetrically divided. It is also used by Doelling in her description of Brazilian foreign policy and its engagement with Africa. The notion of ‘autonomy through diversification’ will be elaborated on in more detail and in the context of Brazil's engagement with Africa in a later section of this article. See Doelling R, ‘Brazil's contemporary foreign policy towards Africa’, Journal of International Affairs, 10, Spring 2008.
3. This was a comment made by Dr Gladys Lechini from the University of Rosario, Argentina at a workshop titled ‘Brazilian Foreign Policy Toward the South: IBSA, Africa and Latin America’. This was hosted by CEBRI, in collaboration with SAIIA, on 28 August 2009.
4. Those five countries were Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome e Principe, Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau.
5. De Freitas Barbosa A, T Narciso & M Biancalana, ‘Brazil in Africa: Another emerging power in the continent?’, Politicon, 36, 1, 2009, pp. 59–86.
6. Soares de Lima MR, ‘Brazil rising’, Perspectives on a Multipolar World, 2008, <http://www.ip-global.org/archiv/volumes/2008/auumn2008/brazil-rising.html> (accessed 12 May 2010). For a more detailed analysis of this perspective of Brazilian foreign policy and its evolution see Soeres de Lima MR & M Hirst, ‘Brazil as an intermediate and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities’, International Affairs, 82, 1, 2006, pp. 21–40.
7. For a detailed analysis of Brazilian foreign policy in a historical context and particularly around the theme autonomy from the Cardoso administration to the Lula administration, see Vigevani T & Cepaluni G, ‘Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification’, Third World Quarterly, 28, 7, 2007, pp. 1309–26. The article provides and insightful description of the various degrees and periods of perceived autonomy that underpinned Brazilian foreign policy from military dictatorship to democracy and ultimately to President Lula. This clearly informed Brazil's South–South strategy and its engagement with Africa.
8. White L, ‘Assessing Investment Rationale: The Case of Anglo American Corporation in Latin America’, PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town (unpublished), 2007.
9. US State Department Country Studies, <http://countrystudies.us/brazil/111.thm> 2 February 2010.
10. US State Department Country Studies, <http://countrystudies.us/brazil/111.thm> 2 February 2010.
11. US State Department Country Studies, <http://countrystudies.us/brazil/111.thm> 2 February 2010.
12. Gonclaves J, ‘Brazil–Africa economic relations’, in Motta Pinto Coelho P & JF Sombra Saraiva (eds), Brazil–Africa Forum on Politics, Cooperation and Trade. Brasilia: Instituto Brasileiro de Ralacoes Internacionai, 2003.
13. This was the period of Brazilian foreign policy that Maria Regina Soares de Lima describes as ‘cosmopolitanism’ or a ‘search for credibility’, during which Brazil sought closer ties with the ‘credible’ democracies and advanced economies like the United States, while relations with its region and the developing world were secondary. According to the definitions provided by Vigevani and Cepaluni, this era of foreign policy would have been described best as autonomy through participation, which emphasises adherence to international regimes, especially more liberal ones, and overall acceptance in the international system.
14. For further discussion of this period, see Vigevani T & G Cepaluni, 2007, op. cit.
15. While a deeper analysis of Brazilian foreign policy is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to note some significant shifts in foreign policy thinking and decisions making that have certainly influenced Brazil's policy on Africa. Itamaraty, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, has long been the cerebral centre of Brazilian foreign policy, lost some of its autonomy under the Lula administration, which named Marco Aurelio Garcia, a Workers Party (PT) intellectual, as special advisor to the president on foreign affairs. This injected a new strain of ideology into foreign policy making and priorities, along with ‘territorial’ conflict around the policy making process. Some believe Itamaraty has also lost some of its power under the Lula administration, where the president and his advisor have taken such a keen interest (and central role) in formulating and implementing the country's foreign policy. Few would disagree that while the priority given to the developing South, and subsequently Africa, may have started with President Cardoso and the support of Itamaraty, President Lula has made this a priority while Marco Aurelio Garcia has plied the strategy with ideological credibility. Meanwhile, the role of Itamaraty and Minister Celso Amorim has been an important one of a more moderate voice in foreign policy circles, which promotes Brazil not only as a leading country of the South but also a bridge between the North and the South — thus still harnessing relations with traditional partners like the United States.
16. Brazilians had for a long time jokingly used this familiar locution to describe their country and its frustrating lack of progress.
17. The Economist, ‘Getting it together at last: a special report on business and finance in Brazil’, 14 November, 2009.
18. See Sidiropoulos E & E White, ‘South Africa can learn from the success of good planning and leadership’, Mail & Guardian, 21–27August 2009.
19. Spektor M, ‘Brazil as a Regional and Emerging Global Power’, SAIIA Policy Brief 9, 2009.
20. Black A, ‘Blood Brothers: The Emergence of Brazil and Africa’, ISIZA, March 2010.
21. South Africa has not benefited from the commodities boom in that it has not achieved the levels of economic growth, investment and reductions in unemployment like those of Brazil and other commodity exporters.
22. Brainard L & L Martinez, ‘Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's changing role in the global economy’, The Brookings Institute, 2009.
23. Brainard L & L Martinez, ‘Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's changing role in the global economy’, The Brookings Institute, 2009. Thirteen of the 100 largest firms are still state-owned today, including Petrobras.
24. See in particular: Vargas Llosa A, Liberty for Latin America: How to Undo Five Hundred Years of State Oppression. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.
25. See Sotero P, ‘Brazil as an emerging donor: huge potential and growing pains’. Development Outreach, February 2009, <www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/articleid526.html>.
26. This has been contested by some foreign policy experts who insist that Lula's Africa strategy is merely a part of Brazil's broader foreign policy development. But leadership and personality should not be understated in a relationship that does not have the history or tradition of automatic substance needed to drive relations of this nature.
27. The Economist, ‘Lula and his squabbling friends’, 12 August, 2009.
28. For example, Brazil hosted the Brazil–Africa Summit in 2003.
29. Lula Da Silva LI, ‘Presidents Speech during the Opening of the LXI UN General Assembly in New York’, 19 September 2006, O G-20 e a OMC: Textos, Communicados e Documentos. Brasilia: FUNAG
30. This was expressed by many officials in the Africa department at Itamaraty.
31. Lapper R, ‘Brazil accelerates investment in Africa’, Financial Times, 9 February 2010.
32. Lapper R, ‘Brazil accelerates investment in Africa’, Financial Times, 9 February 2010.
33. Lapper R, ‘Brazil accelerates investment in Africa’, Financial Times, 9 February 2010.
34. This comment was relayed during an interview at Vale headquarters in Rio de Janeiro in July 2009.
35. This comment was relayed during an interview at Vale headquarters in Rio de Janeiro in July 2009.
36. This information and data is based on comments made at a SAIIA arranged conference in Lunada, Angola on 3 March 2010.
37. This information and data is based on comments made at a SAIIA arranged conference in Lunada, Angola on 3 March 2010.
38. This can be inferred from statements and interviews conducted in South Africa, Angola and Zambia with some government officials and ordinary public who have expressed a more positive sentiment toward Brazilian activities in their countries.
39. This can be inferred from statements and interviews conducted in South Africa, Angola and Zambia with some government officials and ordinary public who have expressed a more positive sentiment toward Brazilian activities in their countries.
40. The history of IBSA and its evolution toward a development forum is discussed in more detail in White L, ‘IBSA Six Years On: Co-operation in a New World Order.’ Policy Briefing 8, SAIIA, November 2009.
41. This term was used by Garaldo Barros in his chapter ‘Brazil: The challenges in becoming an agricultural superpower’, in Brainard L & L Martinez-Diaz (eds), Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2009
42. In 2009 Brazil was the world's top exporter of sugar, beef, chicken, orange juice, green coffee, soya, meat and oil, and the forth largest exporter of maize and pork. See Freemantle S & J Stevens, ‘Brazil weds itself to Africa's latent agricultural potential’, Standard Bank, Economics: BRIC and Africa, 1 February 2010.
43. In 2009 Brazil was the world's top exporter of sugar, beef, chicken, orange juice, green coffee, soya, meat and oil, and the forth largest exporter of maize and pork. See Freemantle S & J Stevens, ‘Brazil weds itself to Africa's latent agricultural potential’, Standard Bank, Economics: BRIC and Africa, 1 February 2010..
44. In 2009 Brazil was the world's top exporter of sugar, beef, chicken, orange juice, green coffee, soya, meat and oil, and the forth largest exporter of maize and pork. See Freemantle S & J Stevens, ‘Brazil weds itself to Africa's latent agricultural potential’, Standard Bank, Economics: BRIC and Africa, 1 February 2010..
45. In 2009 Brazil was the world's top exporter of sugar, beef, chicken, orange juice, green coffee, soya, meat and oil, and the forth largest exporter of maize and pork. See Freemantle S & J Stevens, ‘Brazil weds itself to Africa's latent agricultural potential’, Standard Bank, Economics: BRIC and Africa, 1 February 2010..
46. These are often referenced in meetings between the two countries. It is also stated on the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation website with reference to Brazil <www.dirco.gov.za>.
47. These are often referenced in meetings between the two countries. It is also stated on the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation website with reference to Brazil <www.dirco.gov.za>.
48. This description was made in a statement by Foreign Minister Amorim at an IBSA gathering in August 2005.
49. This was a comment made by a prominent Brazilian academic and observer of Brazil–South Africa relations during an interview in August 2009.
50. Brazilian officials also expressed some concern over the Zuma government's expressed enthusiasm toward partners like Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who regularly challenges Brazilian leadership in the region. There is a real concern in Brazil that South Africa fails to understand the complexities of regional politics in Latin America and that some of its actions may inadvertently undermine its relations with Brazil — its strategic partner in the region.
51. Nkosi B, ‘South Africa, Brazil cement ties’, Mediaclubsouthafrica.com, 13 October, 2009.
52. White L, ‘Why do Investors Invest? The Rationale of South African Firms in Latin America’, Brenthurst Discussion Paper 1, 2007.
53. There is a growing literature on South–South diplomacy and IBSA in particular. But this is yet to develop much of a consensus or true accuracy and academic rigor in terms of a broadly accepted paradigm. Some alternative views of IBSA are assessed in Alden, C & MA Vieira, ‘The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism’, Third World Quarterly, 26, 7, 2005. Or Lechini G, ‘Middle powers: IBSA and the new South–South cooperation’, NACLA Report on the Americas, 40, 5, 2007, pp. 28–32.
54. Foreign policy is no longer an exclusive part of Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign ministry.
55. Amorim, C (2007), ‘Speech by the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference’, 14 December 2005, O G-20 e a OMC: Textos, Comunicados e Documentos.