AFRICOM from Bush to Obama

Abstract

The creation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) generated considerable controversy, not only in Africa, but also within the United States. Four years on, it is possible to tentatively re-examine the premises underlying the establishment of AFRICOM as well as its activities to date, measuring them against both the promise held out by the command's proponents and the fears raised by its critics. The conclusion is that, protestations to the contrary by certain US officials notwithstanding, American interests were indeed the primary motivation for the command's launch. Nonetheless, it has turned out that in pursuit of those strategic objectives, AFRICOM's activities are, at most, an extension of and perhaps improved delivery on ongoing US security cooperation with the African states involved, rather than the vanguard of some new militarised foreign policy. While a number of questions linger, AFRICOM seems to be progressively finding its niche within both US policy and Africa's own security architecture.

Keywords:

• AFRICOM
• African security
• terrorism
• maritime security
• peacekeeping
• US foreign policy

Notes

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