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Abstract
This article analyses the link between the decision by the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) to occupy the city of Goma in November 2012 and the group's demise a year later in the hands of the revamped Congolese national army supported by the Intervention Brigade of the United Nations. The article argues that the military defeat of the M23 presents peace stakeholders in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes region with a valuable opportunity. The rebels' defeat emboldens the Congolese national army and the Intervention Brigade with regard to their ability to take on insurgent groups while raising the cost of continued rebellion for the latter and their potential backers. Although not a panacea for peace in the Great Lakes region, this turn of events should contribute towards stemming the tide of recurring rebellions in the DRC while paving the way for peaceful political engagements among Congolese socio-political stakeholders, on the one hand, and between the DRC and its eastern neighbours, mainly Rwanda and Uganda, on the other hand.
Notes
1. Biryabarema E, ‘Congo's president in Uganda for talks on stalled peace deal’, 2013, http://uk.news.yahoo.congo/congos-president-uganda-talks-stalled-peace-deal-125514741.html (accessed 2 December 2013). To the factors listed above should be added governance failure and contestations over citizenship right in the DRC as well as the security and predatory concerns of neighbouring polities (mainly Rwanda and Uganda) and competition among Western powers (USA and France) for the control of central Africa (and the Great Lakes), often resulting in inadequate intervention strategies from the international community led by the UN.
2. Baaz ME & J Verweijen, ‘The volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse: rebel-military integration and conflict dynamics in the eastern DRC’, African Affairs, 112.449, 2013, pp. 563–582.
3. Koko S, ‘Peace at last? Appraisal of the Addis Ababa peace and security co-operation framework and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098 for the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 13.2, 2013, pp. 59–86.
4. Jones P, ‘M23 in the Kivus: regional war and then a repeat of the 2009 accord?’, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/67606 (accessed 31 May 2013).
5. Jones P, ‘Rwanda's connection to the M23 rebels must not be ignored’, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/pete-jones/rwandas-connection-to-m23-rebels-must-not-be-ignored (accessed 31 May 2013). A similar attempt was undertaken by Kabila in 2004 when a number of former RCD-Goma Tutsi commanders, including General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Jules Mutebusi, refused to relocate from the Kivu region as requested by the integrated military high command. The result was a momentary occupation of the city of Bukavu by troops loyal to Nkunda and Mutbusi before their withdrawal following widespread international outrage.
6. Muhumuza R, ‘In Uganda, Congo's M23 rebels eager to negotiate’, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/uganda-congos-m23-rebels-eager-negotiate-121540260.html (accessed 17 January 2014).
7. However, following consultations with representatives of M23 and the Congolese government, Ugandan Defence Minister Crispus Kayonga (acting on behalf of President Museveni) found in his final report that the Congolese government had undertaken significant efforts to implement the March 2009 Agreement. This led Minani to argue that claims relating to the incomplete implementation of the above agreement could not explain the decision of ex-CNDP fighters to establish the M23. See Minani BR, ‘Que veut le M23? A propos de l'application de l'accord de paix du 23 mars 2009’, Congo-Afrique, 471–472, 2013, pp. 30–40.
8. As Vircoulon observes, ‘[t]here was a strong consensus from everybody in the DRC against the M23. Even within the opposition, everybody agreed that the M23 had to be defeated.’ See Dixon R, ‘Success against Congo rebels may signal sea change in peacekeeping’, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/02/world/la-fg-un-africa-20131102 (accessed 4 November 2013).
9. However, according to the International Peace Information Service, ‘there are a number of indicators that an agenda beyond CNDP grievances and North Kivu ha[d] existed since M23's creation’. International Peace Information Service, Mapping Conflict Motives: M23. Antwerp: IPIS, 2012, p. 16.
10. Writing in August 2012, Global Witness estimated the total number of M23 fighters at around 600. See Global Witness, ‘FAQ: current situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, 2012, http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/120821_Eastern%20DRC%20FAQ.pdf (accessed 12 December 2013). By October 2012, the UN Group of Experts brought that number at approximately 1250 soldiers. See United Nations Security Council Committee, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo submitted in accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2012’, October 2012, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_843.pdf (accessed 12 December 2013).
11. See United Nations Security Council Committee, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo submitted in accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2012’, October 2012, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_843.pdf (accessed 12 December 2013).; Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: ‘Rwanda should stop aiding war crimes suspect’, 4 June 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/03/dr-congo-rwanda-should-stop-aiding-war-crimes-suspect-0 (accessed 18 February 2014).
12. United Nations Security Council Committee, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo submitted in accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2012’, October 2012, p. 3, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_843.pdf (accessed 12 December 2013).
13. United Nations Security Council Committee, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo submitted in accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2012’, October 2012, p. 3, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_843.pdf (accessed 12 December 2013), p. 3.
14. United Nations Security Council Committee, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo submitted in accordance with Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 2012’, October 2012, p. 3, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_843.pdf (accessed 12 December 2013), p. 6.
15. For a detailed discussion on the CNDP internal struggles as well as split along the clan-based Nkunda/Ntaganda divide, see Stearns J, From CNDP to M23: the Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo. Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2012, pp. 22–24; 68.
16. In fact, Ntaganda is believed to have been central in the early desertions that led to the mutiny as he sought to escape arrest for the alleged crimes referred to above. He had since been the key figure ‘helping to orchestrate the rebellion’. See Jones P, ‘M23 in the Kivus: regional war and then a repeat of the 2009 accord?’, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/67606 (accessed 31 May 2013).
17. In fact, Ntaganda is believed to have been central in the early desertions that led to the mutiny as he sought to escape arrest for the alleged crimes referred to above. He had since been the key figure ‘helping to orchestrate the rebellion’. See Jones P, ‘M23 in the Kivus: regional war and then a repeat of the 2009 accord?’, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/67606 (accessed 31 May 2013).
18. Information obtained by the author from diplomats involved in regional discussions regarding the peace talks between the M23 and the Congolese government reveals that it was the latter that had called upon President Museveni to serve as the facilitator of the peace talks between the two protagonists.
19. Harris C, ‘The trouble with M23’, 2013, http://praemon.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/trouble-with-m23.pdf (accessed 24 January 2014).
20. It would be naive to assume that the decision by SADC countries, led by South Africa, to deploy troops under the Intervention Brigade was exclusively driven by their concern for peace in the Great Lakes region. Instead, their undeniable concern with stability in the DRC ought to be understood in its relation to, among other things, South Africa's ever-growing economic interests in the country as well as Tanzania's eagerness to affirm itself as an important regional player against a backdrop of its sidelining within the Eastern African Community in the hands of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda.
21. See Paragraph 9, UNSC Resolution 2098. For a detailed analysis on the Addis Ababa PSC Framework and Resolution 2098, see Koko S, ‘Peace at last? Appraisal of the Addis Ababa peace and security co-operation framework and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098 for the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 13.2, 2013, pp. 59–86.
22. Blair T & HG Buffet, ‘Stand with Rwanda. Now is no time to cut aid to Kigali’, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/21/_stand_with_rwanda_aid_un_report (accessed 15 January 2014).
23. Delany M, ‘As the Kampala peace jokes begin’, 2012, http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg2865.htm (accessed 21 November 2013).
24. Menondji M H A, ‘Problematic peacekeeping in the DRC: from MONUC to MONUSCO’, 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com/drc/problematic-peacekeeping-drc-monuc-monusco (accessed 13 February 2014).
25. International Peace Information Service, Mapping Conflict Motives: M23. Antwerp: IPIS, 2012, p. 9.
26. Jones P, ‘M23 in the Kivus: regional war and then a repeat of the 2009 accord?’, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/67606 (accessed 31 May 2013).
27. International Peace Information Service, Mapping Conflict Motives: M23. Antwerp: IPIS, 2012, p. 9.
28. This was in reference to the 2011 presidential and National Assembly elections that were seen by several national and international observers as lacking credibility.
29. International Peace Information Service, Mapping Conflict Motives: M23. Antwerp: IPIS, 2012, p. 10.
30. According to Jones, ‘[c]ontrol of the lucrative minerals and business interests in the Kivus [drove] the M23 leaders and [was] at the heart of Rwandan involvement in the conflict.’ Jones P, ‘M23 in the Kivus: regional war and then a repeat of the 2009 accord?’, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/67606 (accessed 31 May 2013).
31. De Koning R et al., ‘Striking gold: how M23 and its allies are infiltrating Congo's gold trade’, 2013, p. 2 http://www.enoughproject.org/files/StrikingGold-M23-and-Allies-Infiltrating-Congo-Gold-Trade.pdf (accessed 14 January 2014).
32. Muhumuza R, ‘In Uganda, Congo's M23 rebels eager to negotiate’, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/uganda-congos-m23-rebels-eager-negotiate-121540260.html (accessed 17 January 2014).
33. Agence Nationale de Renseignements, ‘Note à Monsieur le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire-Général des Nations Unies, Chef de la Monusco’, Kinshasa, 16 September 2013.
34. Thomson Reuters (Agency), ‘Congo blames Uganda for failure of peace accord with M23 rebels’, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/congo-blames-uganda-for-failure-of-peace-accord-with-m23-rebels-1.2423675 (accessed 21 January 2014).
35. See Déclaration sur les engagements du Mouvement du 23 Mars au terme du dialogue de Kampala, Nairobi, Kenya, 12 December 2013. An amnesty law was adopted by the National Assembly on 4 February 2014. It covers all acts of insurgency, acts of war and political offenses committed between 18 February 2006 and 20 December 2013, except war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. See Radio France Internationale, ‘RDC: une loi d'amnistie pour faits de guerre et infractions politiques’, 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140204-rdc-adoption-loi-amnistie-faits-guerre-infractions-politiques-m23-kabila (accessed 7 February 2013).
36. See Déclaration du Gouvernment de la République Démocratique du Congo à la fin des pourparlers de Kampala, Nairobi, Kenya, 12 December 2013.
37. Paddon E, ‘The perils of peacekeeping without politics: MONUC and MONUSCO in the DRC’. Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2013.
38. Kayege cited by Raghavan S, ‘In volatile Congo, a new U.N. force with teeth’, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-with-teeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html (accessed 20 January 2014).
39. Wolters S, ‘It may be too soon to celebrate the defeat of the M23’, 2013, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/it-may-be-too-soon-to-celebrate-the-defeat-of-the-m23 (accessed 21 January 2014).
40. Bisimwa cited by British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘DRC Congo conflict: M23's Bisimwa rejects UN force’, 2013, http//www.bbc.co.uk/news/worl-africa-21993655 (accessed 2 April 2013).
41. Reynaert J, ‘Monuc/Monusco and civilian protection in the Kivus’, IPIS Interns and Volunteers Series, 2011, p. 17.
42. Agence France Presse, ‘SA snipers kill Congo rebels’, 2013, http://www.enca.com/africa/sa-snipers-kill-congo-rebels (accessed 16 January 2014).
43. Agence France Presse, ‘SA snipers kill Congo rebels’, 2013, http://www.enca.com/africa/sa-snipers-kill-congo-rebels (accessed 16 January 2014). In this early fighting, two Tanzanian soldiers were killed while six others and three South Africans were wounded.
44. Stearns cited by Dixon R, ‘Success against Congo rebels may signal sea change in peacekeeping’, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/02/world/la-fg-un-africa-20131102 (accessed 4 November 2013).
45. Harding A, ‘DR Congo M23 rebels “end insurgency”’, 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24816223 (accessed 24 January 2014).
46. Colonel Mamadou Ndala was killed on 2 January 2013 in what resembles an assassination plot after his convoy was attacked while travelling from Goma to Beni. Circumstances surrounding his death are yet to be fully elucidated. Initial claims by the Congolese government that Uganda's ADF/NALU elements were behind the attack have since been discarded.
47. Radio Okapi, ‘RDC: le président Kabila suspend le général major Amisi, chef des forces terrestres’, 2012, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/11/22/rdc-le-president-kabila-suspend-le-general-major-amisi-le-chef-de-forces-terrestres/ (accessed 20 November 2013).
48. Martin Kobler (Germany) was appointed SRSG on 10 June 2013 in replacement of Roger Meece (USA) who had served as SRSG from July 2010 to July 2013. Kobler had previously served as Special Representative in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI, 2011–2013) and Deputy Special Representative in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA, 2010–2011). See United Nations Department of Public Information, ‘Secretary-General appoints Martin Kobler of Germany Special Representative for Democratic Republic of Congo’, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/sga1412.doc.htm (accessed 15 January 2014).
49. Lieutenant General Cruz (Brazil) was appointed on 17 May 2013 in replacement of Lieutenant General Chander Prakash Wadhwa (India) who served as Force Commander from July 2010 to March 2013. Cruz previously served as Force Commander of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) between January 2007 and April 2009. See United Nations Department of Public Information, ‘Secretary-General appoints Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz of Brazil Force Commander for UN mission in Democratic Republic of Congo’, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sga1407.doc.htm (accessed 15 January 2014).
50. Dixon R, ‘Success against Congo rebels may signal sea change in peacekeeping’, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/02/world/la-fg-un-africa-20131102 (accessed 4 November 2013).
51. It should be noted that foreign public aid accounts for over 40% of Rwanda's budget. See Murphy T, ‘Why Blair and Buffet are wrong about giving international aid to Rwanda’, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/12/rwanda-kagame-blair-aid (accessed 5 February 2014).
52. Radio Okapi, ‘RDC: après la défaite du M23, les annonces de reddition des groupes armés se multiplient’, 2013, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/11/21/rdc-apres-la-defaite-du-m23-les-annonces-de-reddition-des-groupes-armes-se-multiplient/ (accessed 21 January 2014). Translated by the author from the original French text.
53. Vircoulon cited Dixon R, ‘Success against Congo rebels may signal sea change in peacekeeping’, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/02/world/la-fg-un-africa-20131102 (accessed 4 November 2013).
54. Harding A, ‘DR Congo M23 rebels “end insurgency”’, 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24816223 (accessed 24 January 2014).
55. Radio Okapi, ‘Traque des ADF-Nalu: la RDC ne collabore pas avec l'Ouganda, selon l'armée’, 2014a, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/01/19/traque-des-adfnalu-la-rdc-ne-collabore-pas-avec-louganda-selon-larmee/ (accessed 21 January 2014).
56. Wolters S, ‘It may be too soon to celebrate the defeat of the M23’, 2013, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/it-may-be-too-soon-to-celebrate-the-defeat-of-the-m23 (accessed 21 January 2014).
57. Prunier G, Africa's World War. Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
58. Radio Okapi, ‘RDC: après la défaite du M23, les annonces de reddition des groupes armés se multiplient’, 2013, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/11/21/rdc-apres-la-defaite-du-m23-les-annonces-de-reddition-des-groupes-armes-se-multiplient/ (accessed 21 January 2014). According to Wolters, the military victory of the Congolese army–MONUSCO coalition over the M23 sent ‘a very strong message to the many other armed groups operating in the east whose elimination is also part of the FIB's mandate.’ See Wolters S, ‘It may be too soon to celebrate the defeat of the M23’, 2013, http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/it-may-be-too-soon-to-celebrate-the-defeat-of-the-m23 (accessed 21 January 2014).
59. Radio Okapi, ‘Nord-Kivu: tension à Masisi après des affrontements entre FARDC et APCLS’, 2014, http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2014/01/21/nord-kivu-tension-masisi-apres-des-affrontements-entre-fardc-apcls/ (accessed 21 January 2014).
60. Agence France Presse, ‘Rwanda lashes out at “cry baby” DR Congo’, 2014, http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/651988-rwanda-lashes-out-at-cry-baby-dr-congo.html (accessed 31 January 2014). It ought to be emphasised that, as much as there has at times been a deliberate (Congolese) government policy to support the FDLR, so too have different army units and their respective commanders sought rapprochement with their FDLR counterparts for their own ‘business’ interests.
61. For detailed discussions on Rwanda's and Uganda's recurring involvement in DRC rebellions, read Prunier G, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; Reyntjens F, The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Lemarchand R, ‘Reflections on the crisis in eastern Congo’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 16,1, 2009, pp. 119–32; Prunier G, ‘The “ethnic” conflict in Ituri District: Overlapping of local and international in Congo-Kinshasa’, in Chretien J-P & R Banegas (eds), The Recurring Great Lakes Crisis: Identity, Violence and Power. London: Hurst & Company, 2008, pp. 180–204.
62. Thomson Reuters (Agency), ‘Congo blames Uganda for failure of peace accord with M23 rebels’, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/congo-blames-uganda-for-failure-of-peace-accord-with-m23-rebels-1.2423675 (accessed 21 January 2014).
63. Nichols M, ‘Credible reports of Congo's defeated M23 rebels regrouping – U.N.’, 2014, http://za.news.yahoo.com/credible-reports-congo-39-defeated-m23-rebels-regrouping-201248061--sector.html (accessed 14 January 2014).
64. Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale.
65. Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands-Lacs.