South Africa as an emerging power: from label to ‘status consistency’?

Abstract

South Africa proudly wears the label ‘emerging power’, with its membership of the BRICS and G20 probably the most visible signs of this conferred status. This paper explores the concept of the emerging powers within the context of current global power shifts and locates South Africa within this group. It discusses the criteria for and characteristics of emerging powers, and then turns to some of the constraints and challenges faced by these states. Specific attention is paid to the ‘how’ of these states' recognition and inclusion in global institutions and the impact of domestic conditions and regional politics on their positions, focusing particularly on South Africa. It concludes that these factors will continue to challenge South Africa's ability to rise above the semblance of importance conferred by its inclusion in the category of emerging powers to a position in which it exercises this status to its own advantage, including its idealistic objectives of promoting greater global equality and recognition for Africa and the global South. Although other emerging powers face similar challenges, South Africa's domestic constraints and related lack of regional and global reach, politically and economically, threaten its ‘status consistency’ as an emerging power.

Keywords:

• South Africa
• emerging powers
• global institutions
• power shift
• status consistency

Notes on contributor

Maxi Schoeman is professor and head of the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria. She serves as deputy chairperson of the South African Council on Foreign Relations (SACOIR).

Notes

1. The Presidency, Twenty Year Review: South Africa: 1994-2014, Pretoria: The Presidency, 2014, p153, http://www.thepresidency-dpme.gov.za/news/Documents/20%20Year%20Review.pdf (accessed 3 July 2015).

2. ‘An age of disorder’ is how Randall Schweller describes the current international system; it is, according to him, a time during which world politics needs ‘a fundamental rethinking’, in efforts to answer the question, ‘(w)hat sort of global order will emerge on the other side of the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity?’ See Schweller R, ‘Emerging powers in an age of disorder’, Global Governance, 17, 2011, pp. 285–97.

3. ‘Brazil – An economic superpower, and now oil too’, The Economist, 17 April 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/11052873 (accessed 12 February 2015).

4. Volgy T, R Corbetta, K Grant & R Baird, ‘Major power status in international politics', in Volgy T, R Corbetta, K Grant & R Baird (eds) Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 7.

5. Ibid., pp. 10–11.

6. Keohane R, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World. New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 258.

7. See e.g. Abu-Lughod J, Before European Hegemony: The World System AD 1250-1350. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991; Vanaik A, ‘Capitalist globalisation and the problem of stability: Enter the new quintet and other emerging powers’, Third World Quarterly, 34.2, 2013, pp. 194–213. It should be pointed out that both perspectives adopt a type of ‘longue duree’ approach with periodisation of the development of capitalism.

8. Ikenberry GJ, ‘The three faces of Liberal Internationalism’, in Alexandroff A & A Cooper (eds), Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance. Waterloo and Washington, DC: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 17.

9. Garten J, The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change Our Lives. New York: Basic Books, 1997, p. ix. Garten's list includes Brazil, China, India and South Africa, but excludes Russia.

10. O'Neill J, ‘Building better global economic BRICs’, Global Economics Paper, no. 66. London: Goldman Sachs, 2001, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf (accessed 10 September 2015).

11. Garten J, The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change Our Lives. New York: Basic Books, 1997, p. x.

12. See Hart F & B Jones, ‘How do rising powers rise?’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 52.6, 2010, pp. 63–88. The authors use as example the case of the failure internationally to deal with the Zimbabwe crisis in the early 2000s: ‘The effort was largely confounded by South Africa's unwillingness to take a tough stance’ (p. 74).

13. Stephen M, ‘Rising powers, global catioalism and liberal global governance: A historical materialist account of the BRICs challenge’, European Journal of International Relations, 20.4, 2014, pp. 912–38.

14. Ibid., p. 919.

15. Golub P, ‘From the new international economic order to the G20: How the “global South” is restructuring world capitalism from within’, Third World Quarterly, 34.6, 2013, p. 1002.

16. Vanaik A, ‘Capitalist globalisation and the problem of stability: Enter the new quintet and other emerging powers', Third World Quarterly, 34.2, 2013, pp. 194–213, at p.197.

17. Alden C & M Vieira, ‘The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism', Third World Quarterly, 26.7, 2005, p. 1079.

18. Ikenberry GJ, ‘The three faces of Liberal Internationalism’, in Alexandroff A & A Cooper (eds), Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance. Waterloo and Washington, DC: The Centre for International Governance Innovation and Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 36.

19. Declining oil prices in the period 2014/2015 may impact the size of the economy as Nigeria is heavily dependent on oil exports, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_ni.pdf (accessed 12 February 2015).

20. Castañeda JG, ‘Not ready for prime time', Foreign Affairs, 89, 2010, p. 114.

21. Servais J-M, International Labour Organisations (ILO). Alpehn and den Rhyn: Wolters Kluwer, 2011, p. 89.

22. See Hurrell A, ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: What space for would-be great powers?’, International Affairs, 82.1, 2006, pp. 1–19.

23. For more details, see Vickers B, ‘South Africa: Global reformism, global apartheid, and the Heiligendamm Process', in Cooper A & A Antkiewicz (eds), Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2008. See also Berkowitz B, Y Ramkolowan, M Stern, F Venter & M Webb, ‘The role of South African Business in Africa: South African outward investment’, NEDLAC, 12 November 2012, http://www.safpi.org/sites/default/files/publications/regional_investment_development_report.pdf (accessed 18 September 2015).

24. See ‘South Africa in the global arena', http://www.thepresidency-dpme.gov.za/news/Pages/20-Year-Review.aspx for an overview of the country's international achievements/contributions since 1994 (accessed 3 February 2015). See also Shaw T, Cooper A & G Chin, ‘Emerging powers and Africa: Implications for/from global governance?’, Politikon, 36.1, 2009, p. 37.

25. See Vickers B, ‘Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as a development partner’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25.4, 2012, pp. 535–56.

26. South Africa has 104 embassies and high commissions abroad, as well as permanent missions with nine international organisations; conversely, it hosts 123 embassies and high commissions and 35 international organisations, http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/index.html (accessed 10 February 2015).

27. This information is based on 2013 figures, obtained from Ms Cleo Rose-Innis, Chief Director in Treasury, on 3 December 2014.

28. This information is based on 2013 figures, obtained from Ms Cleo Rose-Innis, Chief Director in Treasury, on 3 December 2014.

29. See e.g. the contributions in MacDonald D, R Patman & B Mason-Parker (eds), The Ethics of Foreign Policy. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007; as well as Niblett R, ‘The economic crisis and the emerging powers: towards a New International Order?’, Real Instituto Elcano, 2012, p. 3. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/c30ccd804a3bd9bd8c15bf3b1240dd34/00053_Niblett_Economic_crisis_emerging_powers.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=c30ccd804a3bd9bd8c15bf3b1240dd34 (accessed 4 December 2014).

30. For a discussion of the difference between the concepts ‘middle power’ and ‘emerging power’, see Alden C & M Vieira, ‘The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism', Third World Quarterly, 26.7, 2005, pp 1078–81.

31. Cooper A & D Flemes, ‘Foreign policy strategies of emerging powers in a multipolar world: an introductory overview’, Third World Quarterly, 34.6, 2013, p. 952.

32. If leadership is defined to imply voluntary compliance and acceptance, all the BRICS countries, though Brazil perhaps to a lesser extent, are at most ‘contested’ leaders in their respective regions.

33. Goldman Sachs, ‘The N-11: More than an acronym’, March 2007, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/brics-book/brics-chap-11.pdf (accessed 1 February 2015).

34. See Shaw T, Cooper A & G Chin, ‘Emerging powers and Africa: Implications for/from global governance?’, Politikon, 36.1, 2009, p. 29.

35. For a discussion of the term ‘colonialism of a special type’ see SACP 1989. ‘The path to power: Programme of the South African Communist Party adopted at the Seventh Conference 1989’, http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2638 (accessed 23 October 2015).

36. Cooper A & R Thakur, The Group of Twenty (G20). London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 19–32.

37. It was the Heiligendamm Process that elevated South Africa's status ‘up to a level on par with the BRICs’. Shaw T, Cooper A & G Chin, ‘Emerging powers and Africa: Implications for/from global governance?’, Politikon, 36.1, 2009, p. 36.

38. In this regard, Hurrell refers to ‘Western claims to techonicratic and normative legitimacy’. Hurrell A, ‘Power transitions, global justice, and the virtues of pluralism’, Ethics and International Affairs, 27.2, 2013, p. 193.

39. Heine J, ‘Will they have table manners? The G20, emerging powers and global responsibility’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 17.1, 2010, p. 1; 2.

40. See, e.g. ibid., pp. 1–11; Schweller refers to it as the question of whether the emerging powers will act as ‘spoilers, supporters or shirkers’. Schweller R, ‘Emerging powers in an age of disorder’, Global Governance, 17, 2011, p. 287. See also Niblett R, ‘The economic crisis and the emerging powers: towards a New International Order?’, Real Instituto Elcano, 2012, p. 1, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/c30ccd804a3bd9bd8c15bf3b1240dd34/00053_Niblett_Economic_crisis_emerging_powers.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=c30ccd804a3bd9bd8c15bf3b1240dd34 (accessed 4 December 2014).

41. McDonald K & Patrick, S. 2010. ‘UN Security Council enlargement and U.S. interests’. New York: Council on Foreign Relations pp. 19-20.

42. Mandela N, ‘South Africa's future foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs, 72.5, 1993, p. 19.

43. A permanent seat on the Security Council will arguably be the ultimate evidence of the much-touted global power shift.

44. Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), ‘Building a better world: The diplomacy of ubuntu’, White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy. Pretoria: DIRCO, 2011, www.dirco.gov.za (accessed 12 February 2015).

45. ‘BRICS plans not at risk, says Zuma', 23 January 2015, http://mobi.iafrica.com/business/2015/01/23/brics-plans-not-at-risk-says-zuma/ (accessed 1 March 2015).

46. See e.g. Kahler M, ‘Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient status quo’, Review of International Affairs, 89.3, 2013, pp. 711–29; Nolte D, ‘How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics', Review of Internationa Studies, 86.4, 2010, pp. 881–901 and Stephen M, ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: the foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society, 26.3, 2012, pp. 289–309.

47. See Alden C & M Schoeman, ‘South Africa in the company of giants: The search for leadership in a transforming global order, International Affairs, 89:1, 2013, pp. 122–23.

48. See e.g. Krönke M, ‘Trends in attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa, 1997–2011’. Cape Town: Afrobarometer Dispatches No. 44, 4 September 2015, http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad44-trends-attitudes-toward-foreigners-south-africa-1997-2011 (accessed 10 September 2015). See also, for the most recent xenophobic attacks (early 2015): Ebrahim S, ‘African fury over xenophobic attacks’, 23 April 2015, http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/african-fury-over-xenophobia-attacks-1.1849398#.Vg5KA6MaKUk (accessed 20 September 2015).

49. See ‘Building a better world: The diplomacy of ubuntu’, White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy. Pretoria: Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 13 May 2015, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf (accessed 5 March 2013).

50. See Nel P, ‘Redistribution and recognition: what emerging regional powers want’, Review of International Studies, 36, 2010, pp. 951–74.

51. Olivier G, ‘Ideology in South Africa's foreign policy’, Politeia, 25.2, 2006, pp. 69–83.

52. On China's regional role, see e.g. Godwin P, China as Regional Hegemon?. Australia: Africa-Pacific Center, 2004, pp. 1–21, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf (accessed 24 October 2015). On Brazil's regional role, see Bethell L, ‘Brazil as a regional power in Latin America or South America?’, 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_view/220-brazil-as-an-regional-power-in-latin-america-or-south-america (accessed 24 October 2015).

53. Vickers B, ‘South Africa: Global reformism, global apartheid and the Heiligendamm process', in Cooper, A & Antkiewicz, A. (eds) Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2008, p. 187. See also Andreasson S, ‘Africa's prospects and South Africa's leadership potential in the emerging markets century’, Third World Quarterly, 32.6, 2011, pp. 1165–81.

54. Schweller R, ‘Emerging powers in an age of disorder’, Global Governance, 17, 2011, p. 295.

55. Niblett R, ‘The economic crisis and the emerging powers: Towards a New International Order?’, Real Instituto Elcano, 2012, pp. 4–5, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/c30ccd804a3bd9bd8c15bf3b1240dd34/00053_Niblett_Economic_crisis_emerging_powers.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=c30ccd804a3bd9bd8c15bf3b1240dd34 (accessed 4 December 2014).

56. Brighi E & C Hill, ‘Implementation and behaviour’, in Smith S, A Hadfield & T Dunne (eds), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (2nd edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 162–3.

57. ‘Reflecting on twenty years’, Fast Facts, no. 4/2014/issue 272. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 2014, p. 3.

58. ‘Is there a “perfect storm” on the horizon?’, Fast Facts, no 4/2014/issue 272. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 2014, p. 1.

59. See e.g. Bond P, ‘South Africa's inconvenient truths', 14 November 2014, http://mg.co.za/article/2014-11-13-south-africas-inconvenient-truths (accessed 14 November 2014).

60. Gelb S, Inequality in South Africa: Africa: Nature, Causes and Responses. Johannesburg: The Edge Institute, 2003, http://www.tips.org.za/files/Gelb_Inequality_in_SouthAfrica.pdf (accessed 20 February 2015).

61. For excellent overviews and analyses of current socio-economic conditions in South Africa , see ‘Reflecting on twenty years’, Fast Facts, no. 4/2014/issue 272. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 2014, pp. 1–21; ‘Not a bad story, but far from a fairy tale’, Fast Facts, no. 8/2014/issue 276. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 2014; Kings S, ‘Inequality mocks SA's freedom’, 30 October 2014, http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-30-inequality-mocks-sas-freedom (accessed 5 February 2015) and Oxfam, Even it Up: Time to End Extreme Inequality, 2014, http://www.oxfam.org/en/research/time-end-extreme-inequality (accessed 7 March 2015).

62. See ‘2014 tax statistics’. Pretoria: National Treasury and SARS’, 2014, pp. 28–9, http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/tax%20statistics/2014/TStats%202014%20WEB.pdf (accessed 24 October 2015). See also Joubert P, ‘How many taxpayers are there really?’ MISES Institute, March 2012, www.mises.co.za (accessed 2 December 2014).

63. This is from Chapter IX. See http://www.gov.za/documents/south-african-defence-review-2014 (accessed 15 November 2014). For a brief analysis of the 2014 Defence Review, see Cilliers J, ‘The 2014 South African Defence Review: Rebuilding after years of abuse, neglect and decay’. Policy Brief 56. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, June 2014.

64. Engelbrecht L, ‘Time to lose Hoefyster?’, Defence Web, 24 July 2009, www.defenceweb.co.za (accessed 25 February 2015). See also Baker D-P, New Partnerships for a New Era: Enhancing the South African Army's Stabilization Role in Africa. Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2009, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ (accessed 25 February 2015).

65. Esterhuyse A, ‘Getting the job done: Transformation in the South African military’, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, XXXII(1), June 2010, p. 16.

66. National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 (Chapter 7), http://www.npconline.co.za (accessed 7 November 2015).

67. Olivier G, ‘Too much blue-sky planning hobbles SA's foreign policy’, 5 March 2014, http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/default.asp?ipkCategoryID=1848&archive (accessed 10 February 2015).

68. Olivier G, ‘Diplomasie bly in slag’ (‘Diplomacy bears the brunt'), Beeld 5 February 2015, www.netwerk24.com/stemme/2015-02-05-diplomasie-bly-in-slag (accessed 5 February 2015).

69. Cooper A & R Thakur, The Group of Twenty (G20). London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 128–30.

70. Suttner R, Recovering Democracy in South Africa. Auckland Park: Jacana, 2015.

71. See Moseneke D, ‘Keynote address – Reflections on South African constitutional democracy – transition and transformation by Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke at the Mistra-Timali-UNISA Conference 20 Year of South African Democracy: So Where to Now?', UNISA, 12 November 2014, pp. 15–17.

72. Suttner R, Recovering Democracy in South Africa. Auckland Park: Jacana, 2015, p. 51.

73. Cooper and Thakur refer to a ‘governance gap’ that opened up towards the late 1990s in the face of the emergence of new economic powers, the impact of globalisation and in the increasing prominence of the social and developmental arenas. Cooper A & R Thakur, The Group of Twenty (G20). London: Routledge, 2013, p. 53.