Short term interests, long term perspectives: Balancing South Africa's peace and security approach in the EU–SA Strategic Partnership

ABSTRACT

South Africa’s peace and security outlook in the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership has been guided by the content and substance of the founding document, which incorporates an interdependent approach to development. For South Africa, engagement in the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership is framed by its historical background, its identity and the content of its foreign policy. South Africa's foreign policy in particular adopts an integrated approach to securing the state within its surrounding regional and continental geography. This article reviews South Africa's approach to peace and security, in the context of the strategic partnership. The article argues that, overall, South Africa's definition of peace and security is compatible with that of the EU; however, Pretoria's vision of how it provides peace and security has naturally changed in line with the varying international circumstances in which it has found itself. While this has proved difficult at times to reconcile, peace and security collaboration in the strategic partnership has managed to remain intact.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• South Africa
• strategic partnership
• peace
• security

Notes on contributor

Lara Hierro is a post doctoral research fellow with the SARChI in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.

Notes

1. Landsberg C, ‘South Africa's foreign policy in context’, in Masters L & C Landsberg C (eds) Proceedings Report Al-Bashir and the Crisis in South Africa's Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospects, held at the Johannesburg Institute for Advance Study, Johannesburg, 22 July 2015.

2. These are both explained in the White Paper Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. DIRCO, 2011, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf

3. See Matthee H, ‘Zuma's Hydrid Regime and the Rise of a New Political Order’, Report 04 Mid-Year, SA Monitor (South African Monitor), 2015, p.7. In addition the following sequence of events support this: The last EU-SA Summit was held in 2013. In 2014 South Africa held its fifth general elections. This was also the year that President Jacob Zuma and Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe called for a boycott of the EU–Africa Summit. In 2015 at the African Union (AU) Summit held in Cape Town, President Zuma refused to arrest Omar al-Bashir under the terms of the ICC, of which South Africa is a member. ANC Discussion Documents of 2015 also show a marked shift in emphasis towards ‘Africanist’ and South–South solidarity.

4. Van de Geer R, ‘Africa and the European Union: the 2014 Africa-European Union Summit’, Presentation for the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), 9 April 2014, ‘Putin, Zuma discuss Ukraine Crisis’, The BricsPost Online, 3 April 2014 <http://thebricspost.com/putin-zuma-discuss-ukraine-crisis/> ANC National General Council Discussion Documents 2015, p.162 ; See also SAIIA’s Elizabeth Sidiropoulos analysis of South Africa’s position on the Ukraine and its relations with Russia. Sidiropoulos E, ‘South Africa’s Response to the Ukrainian Crisis’, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Policy Brief, June, 2014, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303632832_South_Africa's_Response_to_the_Ukrainian_crisis; Fabricius P,‘Zuma’s absence from Summit annoys’, The Pretoria News , 11 April 2014. <http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/zumas-absence-from-summit-annoys-1674888>; ‘Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on South Africa and Burundi and the International Criminal Court’, Council of the EU, Press Release, 21/10.2015. (2017), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/10/47244649410_en.pdf; Statement by Ambassador Cornaro, Head of the EU delegation to South Africa at the Workshop hosted by the University of Johannesburg and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) on Reviewing a decade of EU SA Strategic Partnership, Radisson Blu Hotel, Johannesburg, 21-22 July 2016.

5. The EU–SA ministerial troika meetings have taken place in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. The EU troika usually consists of the current president of the European Council, the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and the Commissioner for External Relations. Wallace H et al., Policy-making in the European Union. Oxford: University Press, 2010, p. 442. The EU–SA ministerial meetings the EU troika has included the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid. Unfortunately, however, the EU's Peace and Security Committee meeting minutes with South Africa are not available to the public.

6. The dialogue facility was the interim ‘technical support facility to strengthen relations and policy engagement between South Africa and the EU’. Separate to this is policy engagement between South Africa and the EU at sectoral level, and overall political dialogue provisioned by the TDCA, the strategic partnership. See Healy FE & J du Pisani, Mid-term Evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F), Letter of Contract no. 2013/330634 – Version 1, Final Report Executive Summary, 2014, p. 3, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf

7. As ‘active’ dialogues under the peace and security SP, specific information on their progress (numbers of meetings, participants and so forth) has not been made available despite requests made. It must be assumed that this information is restricted and it has therefore not been possible to review for the purposes of this article. It suffices to say, however, that dialogue facilitation and collaboration, specifically as regards the Kimberley Process, peace and security dialogue with multi-level stake holders and the more generalised cooperation and high-level political dialogue in peace and security, takes place.

8. See Global Witness website, http://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process/ and Global Witness, Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control Zimbabwe's New-Found Diamond Wealth. London: Global Witness, 2010, pp. 2–9.

9. There is sufficient information in the public domain for an assessment to be made of these interdependent dynamics, which form part of the summit commentary between 2008 and 2013, and they are therefore covered.

10. Allison S, ‘ANC's future foreign policy: All roads lead to China’, The Daily Maverick, 20 August 2015; Soko M, ‘Zuma's muddled foreign policy’, Finweek, 4 February 2016.

11. Allison S, ‘ANC's future foreign policy: All roads lead to China’, The Daily Maverick, 20 August 2015; Soko M, ‘Zuma's muddled foreign policy’, Finweek, 4 February 2016. For a range of responses to South Africa's foreign policy particularly as regards its voting on Libya, see also Jeenah N, ‘Engaging with a region in turmoil: South Africa and the Middle East and North Africa Region’, in Masters L et al. (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015, p. 151.

12. First elaborated in a 1993 article written by President-to-be Nelson Mandela, where he stated ‘South Africa cannot escape its African destiny’ and further acknowledged the necessity to develop in tandem with other African states on the continent, this has been carried through to the White Paper Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu, as well as in the vision of the African Agenda 2063.

13. Later identified as the ‘butterfly strategy’ South Africa's foreign policy works from Africa, stretching to the east and west. South Africa's strategic priorities as identified in the White Paper Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu, are to begin with ‘enhancing the African Agenda’, of which ‘the promotion of democracy, good governance, human rights, peace and security, and sustainable development on the African continent’ form the first point of departure. IGD (Institute for Global Dialogue), A Foreign Policy Handbook: An Overview of South Africa's Foreign Policy in Context. Pretoria: IDG, 2014, p. 9.

14. ‘Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs’. Mandela N, ‘South Africa's Future Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 72.5 (November–December 1993, p.86). Under President Thabo Mbeki the link between peace and stability, democracy and human rights was carried through. See DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa) 2003, Strategic Plan for 2003–2005, p.14, http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/stratplan03-05/stratplan01.pdf; DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa) Strategic Plan 2013–2018, pp. 3–4, http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/strategic_plan_2013-2018/strategic_plan_2013-2018.pdf

15. The promotion and renewal of Africa (carried over into Agenda 2063), through integration and unity would necessitate closer solidarity and allegiances with African states rather than European ones. The strategic value derived from an influential South Africa in Africa, in various sectors but particularly in development, peace and stability, is potentially mutually beneficial.

16. Council of the European Union Presse 105 9650/07/07 (Presse 105)/EU of15 May 2007 The South Africa–European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan. Brussels, pp. 1–2.

17. Masters L, et al. ‘Principles and practice: South Africa's foreign policy after two decades’, in Masters L et al. (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015, p. 3.

18. Olivier G, ‘South Africa's foreign policy towards the global North’, in Landsberg C and van Wyk J-A (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 1. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2012.

19. Roger Southall points out that South Africa, as a ‘regional hegemon’ and as a liberal economic policy exemplar, was recognised by both the EU and the US. Southall R, ‘South Africa: An African peacemaker?’ in Southall R (ed.) South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006, p. 2.

20. At various points throughout the summits, South Africa's role in mediation efforts on the continent has been praised. See for example, the fourth Summit where South Africa and SADC's role in Zimbabwe were equally praised. Council of the European Union Presse 311 14292/11 (Presse 311)/EU of 15 September 2011 Fourth South Africa-European Union Summit Joint Communiqué. South Africa, p. 5.

21. South Africa's call for the denouncement of Nigeria in the wake of the executions was called ‘un-African’ by the Organisation of African Unity in fact. See Southall R, ‘South Africa: An African Peacemaker?’ in Southall R (ed.) South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2006, p. 4. This must have been extremely hard to accept and according to Gumede, was something that Mbeki took to heart. Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005, pp. 178–9.

22. Gevisser M, Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred. Cape Town: Johnathan Ball, 2009.

23. Gumede draws the conclusion that President Thabo Mbeki realised that the ‘ANC government's cardinal error’ had been to not consult other continental leaders. Mbeki learnt and decided henceforward to ‘Never again … go it alone’, recognising the ‘need to act in concert with others and to forge strategic alliances in pursuit of foreign policy objectives’. Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press,2005,p. 179

24. The ANC's National Executive Committee decided to ‘recall’ President Thabo Mbeki after accusations of ‘political meddling’ in proceeding with prosecuting then ANC president Jacob Zuma. Beresford D, ‘Mbeki is forced out after split in ANC’, The Guardian, 21 September 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/21/mbeki.resignation

25. South Africa has acted in conjunction with other African states through regional or continental organisations (multilateral fora) in peace and security/mediation efforts or acting as an interlocutor. South Africa was active in both Libya and Sudanese attempts at mediation, in conjunction with the AU High Level Panel more recently, apart from examples in Burundi, Zimbabwe (with SADC), the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire. While not all successful, South Africa has shown its preference for acting in concert rather than as a lone actor.

26. Council of the European Union Presse 230 13825/07 (Presse 230)/EU of 10 October 2007 South Africa–EU Strategic Partnership Joint Communiqué, Tshwane.

27. DIRCO, White Paper, Building A Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. Pretoria: DIRCO, 2011, p. 20, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf

28. Ibid., p. 10.

29. South Africa's African Agenda, while attributed to the ANC more generally, is more often accredited to former President Thabo Mbeki for placing it as a central tenet of South African foreign policy. It is the understanding of South Africa's place and role in the rest of Africa, and the international environment, and its commitment to Africa's renewal. More succinctly, it has been identified as to create the socio-economic conditions that lead to peace and security, working from the regional to the continental, to the international levels to ensure this. Zondi S, ‘Africanity, pan-Africanism and African Renaissance: South Africa's African Agenda Under Mbeki and Zuma’; Graham S, ‘South Africa's voting behaviour at the United Nations Security Council: A case of boxing Mbeki and unpacking Zuma?’in Masters L et al. (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015.

30. President Zuma's decision to stay away from the EU–Africa Summit in 2014 was attributed to his standing in solidarity with Omar al Bashir's not being invited, as well as a Robert Mugabe's call for African leaders to boycott the Summit. ‘Mugabe urges AU boycott of EU Summit’, ENCA News Online, 28 March, 2014, http://www.enca.com/africa/mugabe-urges-au-boycott-eu-africa-summit

31. Calls for a decolonisation of knowledge have surfaced amid the Rhodes Must Fall movement in South Africa, at Oxford University, England, and at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University.

32. The EU has in instances become defensive to what it sees as political posturing: comments made in response to Gwede Mantashe's interview with Reuters news outlet in 2012 were met with then EU Ambassador Roeland van de Geer's response: ‘Don’t say that in this economic period we don’t need each other because that undermines the relationship … The world is in an economic crisis. Do not give up on any of your investors’. Fabricius P, ‘Gwede bites the hand that feeds us’, The Pretoria News, 29 June 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/gwede-bites-the-hand-that-feeds-us-1331160; Louw-Vraudran L, ‘EU diplomats taken aback by Zuma's summit snub’, 4 April 2014. https://mg.co.za/article/2014-04-03-eu-diplomats-taken-aback-by-zumas-summit-snub. ‘Mantashe: We don’t need the West’, Fin24, 23 May 2012, http://m.fin24.com/fin24/Economy/Mantashe-We-dont-need-the-West-20120523

33. David Chandler exposes the vagueness of the application of human rights in the international system, and shows how it is this very aspect that allows for its political manipulation. See Chandler D, ‘Universal ethics and elite politics: The limits of normative human rights theory’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 5.4, 2001, pp. 72–89.

34. The following direct quotation is insightful into South Africa's governing party's perspective of the ICC, and hence its reasoning behind the desire to create an alternative continental judicial structure: ‘It is our view however that the ICC has gradually diverted from its mandate and allowed itself to be influenced by powerful non-member states. We perceive it as tending to act as a proxy instrument for these states, which see no need to subject them to its discipline … It is being used as a court against Africa.’ ANC (African National Congress), National General Council Discussion Documents. Marshalltown: ANC, 2015, p. 175.

35. This point refers to more than socio-economic inequalities. Zondi refers to South Africa as a ‘contested state’ that ‘is part of the western world, identifying with features in the main, yet it desires to see a post-western world at the same time … It is not a single state. This contested nature of the state and nationhood, the co-existence of various national identities plays itself out in foreign policy … In South Africa, we don’t quite mean the same thing by human rights – there is no one overriding conception of human rights.’ Zondi S, ‘An overview of South Africa's foreign policy’, in Masters L & C Landsberg C (eds) Proceedings Report Al-Bashir and the Crisis in South Africa's Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospects, held at the Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study, Johannesburg, 22 July 2015, p. 7.

36. Council of the European Union Presse 340 12592/13 (Presse 340)/EU of 18 July 2013 Sixth South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communiqué, Pretoria, p. 7.

37. Council of the European Union Presse 105 9650/07 (Presse 105)/EU of 15 May 2007, The South Africa–European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan. Brussels, p. 2.

38. Science and Technology is at the forefront of development: South Africa is home to the only ‘supercomputer’ at the Centre for High Performance Computing on the African continent, which allows for high speed internet for the rest of Africa. It also happens to be the key African state in the Square Kilometre Array radio telescope.

39. In Ambassador Marcus Cornaro's own words: ‘SA and the EU are becoming “increasingly less like minded”. This is particularly relevant in the area of Human Rights, at the core of both SA and the EU's foreign Affairs policy.’ Statement by Ambassador Cornaro, Head of the EU delegation to South Africa at the Workshop hosted by the University of Johannesburg and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on Reviewing a Decade of EU SA Strategic Partnership, Radisson Blu Hotel, Johannesburg, 21-22 July 2016.

40. Council of the European Union Presse 340 12592/13 (Presse 340)/EU of 18 July 2013, Sixth South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communiqué. Pretoria, p. 7.

41. Although at the time the intervention in Libya was deemed ‘humanitarian’ it has since then been acknowledged as ‘regime change’ by outside interests. See Zenko M, ‘The big lie about the Libyan war’, Foreign Policy, 22 March, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/libya-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-intervention/

42. Allison S, ‘ANC's future foreign policy: All roads lead to China’, The Daily Maverick, 20 August, 2015; Soko M, ‘Zuma's muddled foreign policy’, Finweek, 4 February 2016.

43. There have been many attempts, however, to rationalise South Africa's behaviour, from a plain misunderstanding of the workings of the UNSC and the politicking behind the scenes to naivety. Graham S, ‘South Africa's voting behaviour at the United Nations Security Council: A case of boxing Mbeki and unpacking Zuma?’, in Masters L et al. (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015, pp. 84–5.

44. Herman van Rompuy remarks made after the Fourth Summit in 2011, stated that he had ‘explained [to] President Zuma the actions taken by the European Union to support this process and the need for the UN to play a leading role in coordinating the post-conflict activities’. Council of the European Union Presse 2011 312/11 (Presse 312)/EU of 15 September 2011, Remarks by Herman van Rompuy President of the European Council following the EU–South Africa Summit. South Africa, 2011.

45. Graham S, ‘South Africa's voting behaviour at the United Nations Security Council: A case of boxing Mbeki and unpacking Zuma?’, in Masters L et al. (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015.

46. There were over the course of South Africa's first tenure on the Council, 121 resolutions; South Africa voted in favour of 120 and abstained on one. Ibid., p. 77.

47. Naeem Jeenah and Suzanne Graham both outline the change in South Africa's voting behaviour after the Libya vote and hint at South Africa being put off from repeating the circumstances and, one would assume, the same kind of unflattering attention. South Africa preferred rather to stay with its BRIC partners on the Syrian crisis. For further analysis of this situation, see Jeenah N, ‘Engaging with a region in turmoil: South Africa and the Middle East and North Africa region’, in Masters L et al. (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015, p. 159, and Graham S, ‘South Africa's voting behaviour at the United Nations Security Council: A case of boxing Mbeki and unpacking Zuma?’, in Masters L et al. (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015.

48. Jeenah N, ‘Engaging with a region in turmoil: South Africa and the Middle East and North Africa region’, in Masters L, et al. (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015, pp. 148–50.

49. At a later date and after the bombing campaign had been initiated, the AU attempted a further initiative towards peace brokerage, firstly consulting with Muammar Ghadafi and then the idea was to approach the opposition in Benghazi. However, President Zuma, who had been part of the process until that point, did not proceed with the rest of the Panel to Benghazi, but rather returned to South Africa. This was considered a grave oversight, which angered the opposition rebels who consequently rejected the AU proposal. Ibid., p. 150.

50. Graham S, ‘South Africa's voting behaviour at the United Nations Security Council: A case of boxing Mbeki and unpacking Zuma?’, in Masters L et al. (eds) South African Foreign Policy Review Volume 2. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015, p. 85.

51. An unnamed European diplomat was reported to have quipped: ‘Everyone knows when you talk about no-fly zones you’re talking about the use of force and military intervention.’ Roussow M, ‘SA's no-fly zone hits turbulence’, The Mail & Guardian, 25 March 2016, https://mg.co.za/article/2011-03-25-sas-nofly-vote-hits-turbulence

52. Chandler D, ‘The road to military humanitarianism: How the human rights NGOs shaped a new humanitarian agenda’, Human Rights Quarterly, 23.3, August 2001, pp. 678–700.

53. Specifically, post-Cold War ‘humanitarianism’ has been re-framed from a human rights-based perspective rather than the one with which it was originally associated based on neutrality and human needs. Human needs are therefore overlooked in pursuit of human rights/humanitarianism, the latter being highly politicised, and intervention justified on the basis of ‘ethics’. The human rights/humanitarianism or ‘new humanitarianism’ in international discourse has further, over time, been institutionalised into one externally driven by non-governmental actors (including civil society), and according to a long-term ‘developmental’ outlook geared towards social and economic transformation. Poor organisation of the latter by non-Western governments has become accepted as the root cause of conflict and civil wars in non-Western countries. Sanctions and aid withdrawal are condoned, as in Zimbabwe for a time, in the name of ‘humanitarianism’ as a generalised term, while actual ‘human values and practices’ and victims’ needs are forfeited. Ibid.

54. South Africa had, at the point of writing, informed the ICC of its intent to withdraw its membership based on what it believed to be its biased targeting of African leaders. Burundi had also indicated that it would be preparing to do so, and Gambia also followed. The ICC's case around Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir spilt into a re-examination of the use of the ‘human rights’ concept, giving rise to what has been termed in academic circles and public media as a ‘post-human rights era’, or an era where human rights are contested, and, in the case of African countries, re-examined from an African perspective. At a public dialogue held by the Centre for Conflict Resolution on Human Rights Challenges in South Africa's Foreign Policy, in Pretoria, 2016, Deputy Director-General for Global Governance and continental Agenda, Ambassador Ebrahim Saley, stated of the UN Human Rights Council that it had lost its credibility by ‘its “unbalanced” handling of issues arising from the “so-called open ended war on terror” including “secret” detention centres such as Guantanamo Bay and extra-judicial, summary and arbitrary executions, torture and enforced disappearances’. Ambassador Saley was also reported to have said ‘some countries’ exhibited ‘double standards’ in the UNHRC, as they were focusing ‘solely on human rights abuses in Africa and the Middle East and neglecting such abuses, and the right to self-determination in other places like Western Sahara and Palestine’. See Fabricius P, ‘SA's different universe of human rights: Has Zuma switched off the light of human rights that used to guide SA Foreign Policy’, Institute for Security Studies, 26 October 2016. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sas-different-universe-of-human-rights See also Allison S, ‘African revolt threatens international criminal courts legitimacy’, The Guardian, 27 October 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/oct/27/african-revolt-international-criminal-court-gambia

55. ‘Of course, we cannot possibly agree on all issues … ’. Roeland van de Geer's presentation to the South African Institute for International Relations in April 2014: Africa and the European Union: The 2014 Africa–European Union Summit, Pretoria, 9 April 2014, https://www.saiia.org.za/speeches-presentations-other-events-materials/505-speech-by-amb-van-de-geer-on-africa-and-the-eu/file; also mentioned regularly in personal interviews undertaken for this research.

56. Personal interviews, Pretoria, 2016.

57. There have been many studies detailing the relations between the EU, North Africa and the Middle East (or MENA), and how authoritarian leaders maintained their power (both directly and indirectly) with EU support: fear of instability in the region led to the EU ignoring human rights violations selectively, in order to maintain ‘stability’. Authoritarian leaders often heightened fears by portraying opposition parties, the majority of which were Islamist, as anti-Western/anti-imperialist. The case of the Algerian ‘interrupted’ elections in 1992 is informative. See Cavatorta F, The International Dimension of the Failed Algerian Transition: Democracy Betrayed? Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009, pp. 149–50; see also Schlumberger O, ‘The ties that do not bind: The Union for the Mediterranean and the future of Euro-Arab relations’, Mediterranean Politics, 16.6, 2011, pp. 135–53.

58. The term Islamist is used here to refer to political parties.

59. In the exchanges on human rights over the course of the SP, it has been the EU that has appeared to be reticent to move forwards with a dialogue on human rights, with South Africa initiating. See Draft Minutes, 12th Meeting of the SA–EU Joint Cooperation Council (JCC), Brussels, 20 July 2011, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc.

60. ‘South Africa stressed the need for all to respect the right the Zimbabwean people to determine their future free of outside interference and that the most urgent task now is to assist the leadership of Zimbabwe across the political divide to negotiate an agreement that will help Zimbabwe solve its challenges.’ Council of the European Union Presse 2008 12233/08 (Presse 222)/EU of 25 July 2008, First EU–South Africa Summit Bordeaux. Brussels.

61. South Africa has had an interest in maintaining stability in Zimbabwe to prevent civil war and the further possibility of refugees overflowing into South Africa. The relaxing of sanctions, on the other hand, could see EU business interests positively affected. This has happened without much progress being made precisely in those issue areas (human rights) that saw their introduction. See Zimbabwe's Reforms: An Exercise in Credibility – or Pretence? Southern African Report, 6. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016, p. 22, endnote 99; Gevisser M, Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred. Cape Town: Johnathan Ball, 2009, p. 300; Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005, p. 185.

62. International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: The road to Reform or Another Dead End? Harare/Johannesburg/Nairobi/Brussels: ICG, 2011, p. 11.

63. Ibid., p. 23. See also The Solidarity Peace Trust, The Hard Road to Reform. Durban: The Solidarity Peace Trust, 2011, p. 16.

64. Begun in the 1990s as a backlash against neoliberalisation, the Indigenization Campaign and its Act (the Indigenization and Empowerment Act) was aimed at making foreign business interests with assets of more than USD$500 000, ground 51% of their holdings in Zimbabwe. Significantly, China was excluded. See The Solidarity Peace Trust, The Hard Road to Reform. Durban: The Solidarity Peace Trust, 2011, pp. 13 and 20.

65. Ibid.p. 8.

66. Ibid., p. 18; SADC (Southern Africa Development Cooperation), Communiqué: Summit of the Troika on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, SADC 31 March 2011, Livingstone: SADC, 2011, http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=3776

67. The Solidarity Peace Trust, The Hard Road to Reform. Durban: The Solidarity Peace Trust, 2011, p. 19. See also Panapress, ‘Zim paper sharply criticises Zuma’, 4 April 2011, http://www.panapress.com/Zim-paper-sharply-criticises-Zuma--13-767076-18-lang4-index.html

68. It is worth quoting here: ‘the mere fact that President Zuma of South Africa voted for the atrocities that the US and its NATO allies are committing in Libya … makes him an undesirable SADC facilitator on the political and security situation in Zimbabwe. Zuma cannot be trusted … It has become very clear that Zimbabwe's national security interests do not lie in SADC or AU pacts given the Judas Iscariot fact that is now rampant in the region.’ Johnathan Moyo, ‘Unmasking SADC Troika circus in Zambia’, citied in The Solidarity Peace Trust, The Hard Road to Reform. Durban: The Solidarity Peace Trust, 2011, p. 20.

69. Ibid., p. 10.

70. Council of the European Union Presse 2011 312/11 (Presse 312)/EU of 15 September 2011, Remarks by Herman van Rompuy President of the European Council following the EU–South Africa Summit. South Africa, 2011.

71. According to Global Witness, the international advocacy group instrumental in establishing the KP after exposing ‘blood diamonds’ in 1998, the KP was ‘founded on a commitment to stamp out “systematic and gross human rights violations” and to set in place safeguards to ensure that such diamond related abuses could never happen again’. In 2009, Bernard Esau, Namibian Deputy Minister of Mines and Chair of the he KP for that year declared that the KP ‘was not a human rights organisation’. See Global Witness website, http://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process/ and Global Witness, Return of the Blood Diamond: The Deadly Race to Control Zimbabwe's New-found Diamond Wealth. London: Global Witness, 2010, pp. 2–9.

72. Ibid.

73. European Union External Action Service webpage, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/zimbabwe/eu_zimbabwe/political_relations/index_en.htm

74. Council of the European Union Presse 340 12592/13 (Presse 340)/EU of 19 July 2013 Sixth South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communiqué. Brussels, p. 5.

75. Elections in Zimbabwe in July of 2013 were reported to have been ‘won’ on offering material benefits and also from ‘the informal mining sector’. See The Solidarity Peace Trust, The End of A Road: The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe. Johannesburg: The Solidarity Peace Trust, 2013.

76. The yearly review performed by the EU on restrictive measures against Zimbabwe has been extended for a further year against President Robert Mugabe, his wife Grace Mugabe and Zimbabwe Defense Industries: measures imposed against five high-ranking members of the ‘security apparatus’ will remain suspended and an arms embargo will remain in place. See Council of the European Union, ‘Zimbabwe: EU extends sanctions by one year’, Press Release, 15 February 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/15-zimbabwe-eu-prolongs-sanctions-by-one-year/

77. ‘Mugabe urges AU boycott of EU Summit’, ENCA News Online, Friday 28 March, 2014, http://www.enca.com/africa/mugabe-urges-au-boycott-eu-africa-summit

78. ‘SA joins other African countries in boycotting the EU–Africa Summit’, SABC News Online, Sunday 30 March, 2014, http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/b7aefa80437527288db98da64eba5fdc/SA-joins-other-African-countries-in-boycotting-EU-Africa-Summit-20143003

79. Louw-Vaudran L, ‘EU diplomats taken aback by Zuma's Summit snub’, Mail & Guardian Online, 4 April, 2014, http://mg.co.za/section/news-africa

80. Ibid.

81. Council of the European Union Presse 340 12592/13 (Presse 340)/EU of 19 July 2013 Sixth South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communiqué. Brussels, p. 5.

82. Summit Joint Communiqués in 2009, 2010, 2011. Council of the European Union Presse 2009 13231/09 (Presse 266)/EU of 11 September 2009 Second South Africa–European Union Summit. Kleinmond, Third South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communique Brussels 28 September 2010, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/116791.pdf ; Council of the European Union Presse 2011 14292/11 (Presse 311)/EU of 15 September 2011, Fourth South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communiqué, South Africa.

83. Fabricius P & L van Zilla ‘Al Bashir Saga: ANC government takes on SA Constitution – again’, Biznews.com Online, 15 June 2015, http://www.biznews.com/undictated/2015/06/15/al-bashir-saga-anc-government-takes-on-sa-constitution-again/

84. Pelz D, ‘Opinion: South Africa’s Democracy Eroding’, DW Akademie Online, 24 June 2015; <http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-south-africas-democracy-eroding/a-18538125>

85. Ambassador Jerry Matjila, in the opening of the Joint Cooperation Council meeting in 2011 said ‘SA–EU Strategic Partnership was of key importance, and that SA's membership to other groupings cannot be at the detriment of its relationship with the EU’. 11th meeting of the SA–EU Joint Cooperation Council Pretoria, 15 September 2010, https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dialoguefacility.org%2FResource%2520Centre%2FSA-EU%2520reports%2FFINAL%2520Minutes%2520JCC2010.doc

86. In discussions following the public dialogue on Human Rights Challenges in South Africa's Foreign Policy hosted by the Centre for Conflict Resolution, in Pretoria 2016, Ambassador Ebrahim Saley, Deputy Director-General, Global Governance and Continental Agenda, DIRCO, Tshwane, stated that human rights remain central to SA's foreign policy; however, ‘we [South Africa] are critical of those who use human rights to effect regime change.’ (Notes taken by the author.) The ANC 2015 Discussion Documents, although not directly related to active foreign policy, is considered to give an early indication of the ruling party's direction in the near future. It also goes to great lengths to deal with this very issue and is insightful as to the current sentiment held by the ruling party: ‘We reaffirmed our unwavering commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights on the continent of Africa and beyond … We believed, as we still do, that those who committed such crimes must be prosecuted and punished by an impartial body empowered by international cooperation to defend the universal values of justice. The matter relating to the President al-Bashir therefore is of major concern to the African National Congress and we the allegations levelled against him in a serious light … It [South Africa] remains committed to a system to international justice to ensure that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished.’ ANC National General Council, Discussion Documents, 2015, pp. 174–5, http://www.anc.org.za/documents/discussion-documents/any-author/2015

87. African philosophy of communalism , promoting a ‘common good of society’ and ‘humanness’ as key to human growth. Venter E, ‘The notion of Ubuntu and communalism in African educational discourse’, Studies in Philosophy and Education, 23.149, 2004, pp. 149–60.

88. See the AU, Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4, Principles (p) ‘Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes in government’, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf