An overview of the EU–SA Strategic Partnership 10 years on: Diverging world views, persisting interests

ABSTRACT

The European Union–South Africa (EU–SA) Strategic Partnership has entered its 10th year. It is a product of its time and particular regional and international circumstances. These having changed somewhat over the course of the last decade, it is not surprising that the dynamics of the relationship, expressed through the strategic partnership's parameters, have undergone commensurate changes. Based on the recognition that the partnership is between a multilateral institution and a state, the difference in their respective strategic positions is inevitable. The challenge, therefore, is for the EU–SA Strategic Partnership to maintain a flexibility that allows for continued contestation, development and relevance. This paper reviews the historical context of the partnership and the challenging dynamics that have evolved over the lifespan of the partnership, providing the basis for the thematic discussion which follows in this issue. The analysis in this article demonstrates that, in spite of acknowledged challenges, the functionality of the strategic partnership based on persisting interests remains intact.

KEYWORDS:

• South Africa
• EU
• Strategic Partnership
• Joint Action Plan
• Pan-Africanism

Note on contributors

Chris Landsberg is the South African Research Chair (SARChI) in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa.

Lara Hierro is a post-doctoral fellow with the SARChI in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.

ORCID

Lara Hierro http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1741-1629

Notes

1. Pre 1993. Up until that point, the new South African government under the leadership of former president Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki as deputy president had espoused a development path that saw substantial government intervention and programme of nationalisation. It was only after much courting by both internal and international business communities that the market came to dominate South Africa's future economic strategy for growth and redistribution. See Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005.

2. Ibid., pp. 68–72.

3. Ibid., pp. 68–72, see also Welsh D, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid. Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2015.

4. Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005.

5. The UK, led by Margaret Thatcher at the time, was a notable detractor from supporting the ANC: its use of violence in the struggle for liberation from Apartheid rule was cited as the reason for not engaging or using sanctions against the ruling government at the time. See Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005; Fioramonti L, ‘The European Union promoting democracy in South Africa: Strengths and weaknesses’. European Development Policy Study Group Discussion Papers, no. 30. n.d. http://ssm.com/abstract=2099122

6. The ANC in exile lobbied business groups with links to South Africa to enact sanctions against the Apartheid state. Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005.

7. Ibid., p. 57.

8. Ibid., p. 79

9. Fioramonti L, ‘The European Union promoting democracy in South Africa: Strengths and weaknesses’. European Development Policy Study Group Discussion Papers, no. 30, n.d., http://ssm.com/abstract=2099122

10. Ibid., p. 6.

11. Ibid., p. 6.

12. Ibid., p. 6.

13. Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005, p. 62.

14. Among the economists responsible for its drafting were Richard Ketley, of the World Bank. The GEAR has been critically labelled as a home-grown structural adjustment policy owing to the austere measures and strict fiscal discipline put in place that resemble the now infamous International Monetary Fund/World Bank ‘Washington consensus’, synonymous with their own SAPs. Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005, pp. 88–9.

15. Lee M, ‘The European Union – South Africa Free Trade Agreement: In whose interest?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20.1, 2002, p. 85.

16. Among which that South Africa was a developed rather than a developing country, protectionist concerns from within the EU based on overlapping produce and concerns over conflicting rules of the incoming World Trade Organization of 1995. According to Fioramonti, however, the European Parliament rejected South Africa's participation on the basis that it was not in favour of South Africa's ‘reductive status within Lomé Convention’, presumably indicating that it was in favour of a greater, substantive one. This is further supported by the interest the EU was developing at the time in post-Lomé Convention–Contonou scenarios, and installing non-reciprocal FTAs with its ACP partners. Fioramonti L, ‘The European Union promoting democracy in South Africa: Strengths and weaknesses’. European Development Policy Study Group Discussion Papers, no. 30. n.d., p. 7, http://ssm.com/abstract=2099122. See Lee M, ‘The European Union – South Africa Free Trade Agreement: In whose interest?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20.1, 2002, p. 86.

17. Fioramonti L, ‘The European Union promoting democracy in South Africa: Strengths and weaknesses’. European Development Policy Study Group Discussion Papers, no. 30. n.d., p. 7, http://ssm.com/abstract=2099122

18. The TDCA's central pillars of trade and economic relations have been transformed through the negotiation of the EU–South Africa EPA. It is this area that, over the course of the strategic partnership's history to date, has caused the most significant fissures and delays. Under the dialogue facility, or the TDCA-F, trade aspects were considered ‘off limits’ to the extent that, where certain overlaps in other dialogue areas were likely, members of the South African Department of Trade and Industry sat in to make sure that they were not discussed. Further, the length of time that the TDCA took to be ratified, as well its successor, the EPA (2015), shows the sensitivity and centrality of this area to the overall strategic partnership. Personal interview, Pretoria, 2016. The agreement on science and technological cooperation, although absorbed into the pillar on economic cooperation, has maintained itself, however, as the strategic partnership's ‘flagship’ programme and the core example of the partnership's success when needed. Personal interviews, Pretoria, 2016; Joint Cooperation Council meetings of 2010 and 2011; mentioned in all Joint communiques of the Summit meetings 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 as a ‘flagship’ and highly successful. Most recently, this area was signalled out in celebrations in Pretoria to mark Europe day and 60 years of European unification: Ambassador Marcus Cornaro was quoted as saying ‘that they had a good relationship with [South Africa] the country, and the science and technology faculties were “booming”’. Gwangwa V, ‘60 years of Europe unification market in the city’, The Pretoria News, 10 May 2017.

19. Lee M, ‘The European Union – South Africa Free Trade Agreement: In whose interest?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20.1, 2002, p.86.

20. Ibid., p. 86. The TEU or Maastricht Treaty of 1992 formally established a prerequisite for engaging in development assistance with third parties on condition of certain democratic and human rights observances. Articles 2, 3(5) of the TEU and 21 (1) of the EU (CL115) uphold the values of the UN and international law. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 9 May 2008 (C 1157), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/%20LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF

21. Fioramonti L, ‘The European Union promoting democracy in South Africa: Strengths and weaknesses’. European Development Policy Study Group Discussion Papers, no. 30. n.d., p. 6, http://ssm.com/abstract=2099122

22. ‘The emergence of post-Apartheid South Africa is without a doubt one of the most obvious auspicious developments. The development prospects of this country are contingent on its ability to reduce the causes of social tension and to improve the employment situation, but the potential for growth is considerable and the promising developments in terms of foreign investment and trade relations should reverberate throughout to the entire region thanks to the economic knock-on effects and an improvement in the domestic situation of to the other countries in to the region’. European Commission, ‘Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the eve of the 21^st century: challenges and options for a new partnership’, 1996, p. 33, http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/green-paper-on-relations-between-the-european-union-and-the-acp-countries-on-the-eve-of-the-21st-century.-challenges-and-options-for-a-new-partnership-pbCBCO96604/downloads/CB-CO-96-604-EN-C/CBCO96604ENC_001.pdf;pgid=Iq1Ekni0.1lSR0OOK4MycO9B0000HEaP8uKi;sid=pznY5p3joELYocmgPfZGQf_GBfqktj8g22k=?FileName=CBCO96604ENC_001.pdf&SKU=CBCO96604ENC_PDF&CatalogueNumber=CB-CO-96-604-EN-C

23. MIPs are regionally (geographically) and thematically based programmes of development assistance, which targeted specific areas of tailor-made assistance based on the perceived key developmental challenges. They are based on a country Action Plan, and funding is done on a seven-year cycle plan. South Africa's Country Strategy paper and hence the MIPs have been mutually designed by both the EU and South Africa. This includes areas of developmental cooperation in the strategic partnership, which have been tailored to incorporate the aims of South Africa's National Development Plan, established in 2012. See Council of the European Union, ‘Sixth South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communique’, 18 July 2013, http://eu-un.europa.eu/sixth-south-africa-european-union-summit-joint-communique/; ‘Cooperation between the European Union and South Africa’, Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csp-south-africa-2007-2013_en.pdf; ‘Multiannual Indicative Programme between the Republic of South Africa and the European Union for the period 2014–2020’, https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/DE/Trade/Fachdaten/PRO/2015/04/Anlagen/PRO201504245001.pdf?v=1

24. Lee M, ‘The European Union–South Africa Free Trade Agreement: In whose interest?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20:1, 2002, p. 86.

25. TDCA was signed in 1999 but concluded in 2004, and later amended in 2009. See Communication of the European Communities, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of an Agreement between the European Community and its member states, of the one part, and the Republic of south Africa, of the other part, amending the Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation’, Brussels, 4 February 2008 COM (2008) 50 Final; also Healy FE & J du Pisani, ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) letter of contract no. 2013/330634 – Version 1, final report executive summary’, 2014, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf

26. Council of the European Union, ‘The EU–South Africa Joint Action Plan’, 2007, pp. 1–2, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209650%202007%20INIT

27. In particular a focus on political stability, and what amounts to strategic allocation of development aid. See Grasa R & O Mateos, ‘Conflict, peace and security in Africa: An assessment and new questions after 50 years of African independence’, ICIP Working Paper. Barcelona: Institut Catala Internacional, 2010.

28. Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf

29. While the mid-term evaluation refers to four pillars, the actual TDCA outlines five titles: political dialogue, trade, trade-related issues, economic cooperation and development cooperation. The aforementioned report subsumes both trade and trade-related issues (the latter includes border measures, fiscal measures, anti-dumping, and customs union and free-trade areas) under one ‘pillar’. Healy FE & J du Pisani, ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) letter of contract no. 2013/330634 – Version 1, final report executive summary’, 2014, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf; European Communities, ‘Agreement on trade, development and cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part’, Official Journal of the European Communities, L311/3, 4 December 1999.

30. Personal interviews, Pretoria, 2016; Joint Cooperation Council meetings of 2010 and 2011; mentioned in all joint communiques of the Summit meetings 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 as a ‘flagship’ and highly successful. Most recently, this area was signalled out in celebrations in Pretoria to mark Europe day and 60 years of European unification: Ambassador Marcus Cornaro was quoted as saying ‘that they had a good relationship with [South Africa] the country, and the science and technology faculties were “booming”’. Gwangwa V, ‘60 years of Europe unification market in the city’, The Pretoria News, 10 May 2017.

31. The EU troika usually consists of three representatives to conduct the EU's external affairs. Over successive EU treaties, the combination has changed. In the context of the EU–SA ministerial meetings, post-Lisbon Treaty, the EU troika has included the incumbent Council President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy, together with the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid. For a historical perspective on the changing nature of the EU's representation externally, see Wallace H et al., Policy-making in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 435, 442, 467.

32. The Yellowwood tree, South Africa's national tree, meant to symbolise the process of resolving of ‘challenges’. See Council of the European Union, ‘The EU–South Africa Joint Action Plan’, 2007, p. 2, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209650%202007%20INIT

33. SA–EU Strategic Partnership website of the Embassy of the Republic of South Africa to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Mission to the European Union website, http://www.southafrica.be/sa-eu-strategic-partnership/

34. The Joint Cooperation Council is made up of Senior Officials and/or Ministerial level and meets once a year, and oversees the implementation of the TDCA. It is further and more specifically made up of the members of the Council of the European Union or their representatives, and of members of the Commission, and on the South African side, members of the government. See ‘Decision No 1/2001 of the Cooperation Council between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part, of 26 June 2001 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the Cooperation Council’, Official Journal, L 221, 17/08/2001, pp. 0037–0039, http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/238337b9-4cf3-4efc-a0a1-cbbe7b89bc68.0004.01/DOC_1

35. Embassy of the Republic of South Africa to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Mission to the European Union website, http://www.southafrica.be/sa-eu-strategic-partnership/

36. Council of the European Union, ‘The EU–South Africa Joint Action Plan’, 2007, p. 3, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209650%202007%20INIT

37. The PSC is made up of four permanent members (DIRCO, the National Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the EU Delegation to South Africa (EUD); and two rotating members the Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Postal Services and Telecommunications. See the Dialogue Facility website, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/about.html

38. The ‘Mogôbagôba Dialogue' as a concept refers to ‘an umbrella for sectoral cooperation forums' incorporating existing cooperation under the TDCA and new areas under the strategic partnership; in addition, structurally ‘all relevant meetings overseeing all forms of cooperation between the two partners, including the meetings of the JCC, ministerial meetings as well as regular summitry.' Joint Action Plan, 2007, p.2. The TDCA-F is the ‘technical support facility' to the strategic partnership, often simply referred to as the ‘dialogue facility' and is mandated to ‘strengthen relations and policy engagement between South Africa and the EU at the sectoral level.' See Healy FE & J du Pisani, ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) letter of contract no. 2013/330634 - Version 1, final report executive summary’, 2014, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf p.3.

39. While divergences between visions, specifically on peace and security matters in multilateral fora, were noted prior to 2013, specifically on Libya in 2011, divergences that have influenced the EU–SA SP have only recently become more pronounced. The year 2013 is notable in that it was the year before South African elections and also when the last EU–SA Summit was held. In 2014 President Jacob Zuma and Robert Mugabe called for a boycott of the EU–Africa Summit in Brussels and in 2015, Omar al-Bashir attended the AU summit in Johannesburg, South Africa and, despite the ICC indictment against him, was allowed to leave. In the same year, the ANC's Discussion Documents marked a turning point: ‘Last month, the African National Congress (ANC) lit a time bomb under South Africa's delicate relationship with the western world. In a discussion document released ahead of its national general council, the ruling party abandoned diplomacy in favour of bombast and conspiracy. The western world, and the “imperialist” US in particular, came in for stinging criticism … The document sent shock-waves through the diplomatic corps in Pretoria’. Allison S, ‘Zuma does damage control as he explains SA's foreign policy’, The Daily Maverick, 16 September 2015. According to the South African Monitor, ‘Zuma's hybrid regime and the rise of a new political order: The implications for business and NGOs’, nine ‘key dimensions have reached a critical mass and have combined to form a new political order under Jacob Zuma’. Matthee H, ‘Zuma's hybrid regime and the rise of a new political order: The implications for business and NGOs’, Report 04, Mid-Year 2015. South African Monitor, 2015, p. 7.

40. Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Communique from the 10th EU–South Africa Ministerial Political Dialogue Meeting Held in Brussels, Belgium’, 11 May 2010, p. 2, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114395.pdf

41. In 2014 South Africa, along with Zimbabwe called for a boycott of the EU–Africa Summit in Brussels. Jacob Zuma is reported as saying ‘I think that time must pass wherein we are looked at as subjects, we are told who must come, who must not come, we have not attempted to decide when we meet Europe; who must come and who must not come’. This was in response not only to the failure of the EU to issue an invitation to Grace Mugabe, but also to the EU's decision to only invite the Vice President of Sudan and not Omar al-Bashir. Fabricius P, ‘Zuma will boycott EU Summit’, IOL online, 31 March 2014, http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zuma-will-boycott-eu-summit-1668828; Roeland van de Geer on South Africa's boycott of the EU–Africa Summit, ‘Yes, we were surprised to find South Africa in this group, this is not the South Africa that we know as a continental leader, as a champion of human development’. Van de Geer R, ‘Africa and the European Union: The 2014 Africa–European Union Summit’, Presentation for the South African Institute for International Relations, Pretoria, 9 April 2014; Fabricius P, ‘Zuma's absence from summit annoys’, The Pretoria News, 11 April 2014, http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/zumas-absence-from-summit-annoys-1674888#.U0uJDVeLWa8

42. ‘Third South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communique’, Brussels, 28 September 2010, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/116791.pdf p.2.

43. Healy FE & J du Pisani, ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) letter of contract no. 2013/330634 – Version 1, final report executive summary’, 2014, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., pp. 2, 6, 9.

46. Ibid., p. 2.

47. The Dialogue Facility Executive Summary divides its activities into a Support Facility, a Rapid Response Mechanism, a Grant Fund, and Addition Technical Support Activities. Ibid., p. 2.

48. Ibid., p. 9.

49. Ibid., p. 9.

50. Embassy of the Republic of South Africa to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the Mission to the European Union website, http://www.southafrica.be/sa-eu-strategic-partnership/

51. According to a recent press statement made by EU Ambassador Marcus Cornaro, there are currently ‘250 projects altogether under the current framework’. Gwangwa V, ‘60 years of Europe unification market in the city’, The Pretoria News, 10 May 2017.

52. An important precursor to identifying projects are twinning, ‘mentoring, peer-to-peer and community practice initiatives’ or ‘external technical assistance’. Healy FE & J du Pisani, ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) letter of contract no. 2013/330634 – Version 1, final report executive summary’, 2014, p. 4, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 4.

55. One respondent indicated that when discussing policy issues around trade, negotiators were forbidden to discuss aspect of trade. The Department of Trade and Industry had to be present at meetings to enforce this. Personal interview, Pretoria April 2016.

56. Joint Cooperation Council, ‘11th meeting of the SA-EU Joint Cooperation Council’, Pretoria, 15 September 2010, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc

57. See ‘AGREEMENT on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part’, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1999, Article 81, L311/26.

58. These were in the areas of cooperation on Combating Crime, Justice, including Human Rights, and Employment and Social Affairs. In the former, since 2010 and following in 2011 JCC meetings, it would seem that South Africa was more actively pursuing the establishment of a formal dialogue in the areas of Crime, Justice and Human Rights, with the EU responding in a more subdued manner. Study tours by South Africa to Eurojust were put forward as ‘fast start initiatives’ and as an alternative to fully fledged dialogue. At that time (and as in the case of the Employment and Social Affairs, the EU's institutional makeup was apparently the reason behind the delays in setting up interaction in this area, owing to ‘issues being housed through different competency levels in the EU). By the JCC meeting of 2011, significant developments appear to have been made in ‘informal’ human rights exchanges and dialogues, with South Africa, again, appearing to be the more interested party in establishing a more formal arrangement. In the case of the Employment and Social Affairs, the Employment Fund was established in 2009 and committed €120 million (then equivalent to R1.3 billion). However, in the JCC meetings of 2010 and 2011 respectively, there appears to have been a long delay noted in the establishment of a structured dialogue, in spite of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) having been exchanged. The EU's limited resources and capacity were accepted as a contributor in this regards, although both sides acknowledged that best practices and bilateral exchange served as the most appropriate medium for progress. By the same time the following year the MOU had still not been signed. Joint Cooperation Council, ‘11th meeting of the SA-EU Joint Cooperation Council’, Pretoria, 15 September 2010, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc. Employment and Social Affairs

59. Healy FE & J du Pisani, ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) letter of contract no. 2013/330634 – Version 1, final report executive summary’, 2014, p. 7, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf

60. For example, in order to build capacity, the proposal made in the mid-term evaluation report was, among other things, to create ‘“exposure” to the concept of dialogues, as well as to EU modalities and procedures, in particular, the proposal submission process, requiring proficiency in preparing, submitting and presenting a proposal for project funding’, and ‘institutionalisation’ of capacity for dialogues, which requires a more systematic and time-bound approach to ensure that skills developed in the process are not just vested in one individual, but transferred to others within the department. Healy FE & J du Pisani, ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) letter of contract no. 2013/330634 – Version 1, final report executive summary’, 2014, p. 7, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf.p.9.

61. Ibid., p. 7.

62. Ibid., p. 7.

63. While focussed on an examination of South Africa's status as developmental state, the need for a ‘meritocratic diplomatic corps’ is instructive in Landsberg's and Georghiou's article of 2016. A diplomatic corps, capable of showing leadership, ‘backed up by efficient organisational skills and structures’ is called for, against ‘regarding the diplomatic corps as a soft landing ground for embattled politicians’. They also point out the need for a fundamental reorganisation of the diplomatic organisational infrastructure. See Landsberg C & CA Georghiou, ‘The foreign policy and diplomatic attributes of a developmental state: South Africa as case study’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 22.4, 2015, p. 488ff. Georghiou also points out the need for diplomats to be able to communicate national priorities at the international level, thereby becoming proficient in bilateral and multilateral interactions. Georghiou CA, ‘Professional diplomacy: A call for its reinforcement’, Africa Insight, 42.4, March 2013, pp. 63–8; see also Olivier G, ‘Too much blue sky planning hobbles South Africa's foreign policy’, Business Day Live, 4 March 2014, http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2014/03/04/too-much-blue-sky-planning-hobbles-sas-foreign-policy; Olivier G & H Beukes, ‘Diplomats – Who needs them?’, The Mail & Guardian, 8 July 2012, https://mg.co.za/article/2011-01-14-diplomats-who-needs-them

64. Healy FE & J du Pisani, ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) letter of contract no. 2013/330634 – Version 1, final report executive summary’, 2014, pp. 7, 8, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf

65. Georghiou's call for a return to ‘professional diplomacy’ especially in Africa and South Africa also highlights the need for ‘theme related or thematised diplomacy’ and a ‘hybrid diplomat’ combining the ‘specialist’ and the ‘generalist’. Georghiou CA, ‘Professional diplomacy: A call for its reinforcement’, Africa Insight, 42.4, March 2013.

66. Personal interview, Pretoria 2016.

67. Respondents were largely positive on the value of the strategic partnership and what it contributed to South Africa. Personal interviews, Pretoria, 2016.

68. Healy FE & J du Pisani, ‘Mid-term evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) letter of contract no. 2013/330634 – Version 1, final report executive summary’, 2014, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/saexec.pdf

69. Ibid., p. 7.

70. Ibid., p. 6.

71. Ibid., p. 8.

72. Institutional in the sense of a formal, organised operating structure with established normative framework.

73. Recent calls for ‘decolonisation of knowledge’ and the ‘Rhodes Must Fall’ movement in South Africa are a few of the public displays that underpin a strong anti-colonial/anti-West sentiment being expressed currently.

74. Personal interview, Pretoria, 2016. One respondent has interpreted this as a commitment to somewhat over zealous ‘administrative hygiene’, referring to the necessity to do everything by the book/‘tick boxes’ (personal interview). It was unclear as to whether or not this specifically referred to a lack of confidence or decision-making accountability on the South African side, or simply a reference to extreme bureaucracy. Both could have been implied and are not mutually exclusive.

75. The Africa Agenda is one which has been present since Nelson Mandela's presidency and first foreign policy iterations, but is more commonly associated with President Thabo Mbeki's tenure, as it is under this period that it became more prominent. As a theme in South Africa's foreign policy since then, however, it has become more pronounced under the 2011 White Paper ‘A Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu’. See also DIRCO, White Paper: Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. Pretoria: DIRCO, 2011, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/foreignpolicy_0.pdf

76. President Thabo Mbeki appears to recant his earlier fervour for a liberalised open economy in a recent piece of writing. See Mbeki T, ‘The great recession: Origins, Implications, and responses’, in Gumede V (ed.), The Great Recession and its Implications for Human Values: Lessons for Africa. Pretoria: MISTRA, 2016.

77. Personal interview, Pretoria, 2016.

78. Personal interview, Pretoria, 2016.

79. Personal interviews, Pretoria, 2016; also see the Ambassador of the EU to South Africa, Roeland van de Geer's speech at UNISA in 2014. Van de Geer R, ‘South Africa and the European Union: 1994–2014 Trends, development and a perspective on the future’, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 31 October 2014.

80. ‘The EU appreciates the opportunities that our SA–EU Strategic Partnership offers to share views, and understand where we are coming from, even when we disagree’. Statement by Ambassador Cornaro, Head of the EU delegation to South Africa at the Workshop hosted by the University of Johannesburg and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on ‘Reviewing a decade of EU–SA Strategic Partnership’, Radisson Blu Hotel, Johannesburg, 21–22 July 2016.

81. The EU's record in North Africa and the Middle East is a case in point, where many opportunities to use negative conditionality for political and social reform were conspicuously overlooked. Authoritarian rulers were therefore able to remain in place. See Aliboni R, ‘EMP approaches to human rights and democracy’, in Youngs R & HA Fernandez (eds), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade. FRIDE, 2005, pp. 47–58.

82. Ibid., p. 68.

83. Personal interview, Pretoria, 2016.This in fact dates back to the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003, which outlines a ‘strategic’ and interrelated approach to global security. See Council for the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf. By 2006 and the European Commission to the Council, South Africa's strategic relevance was left in no doubt. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Towards an EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership’, Brussels, 28 June 2006, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0347&from=EN

84. Carbone M (ed.), ‘Mission impossible: The European Union and Policy Coherence for Development’. Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy [e-book Adobe DRM pdf version]. Oxford: Routledge, 2009, p. 2.

85. While not explicitly in relations to the EU–SA strategic partnership, the EU's Global Strategy launched in 2016 does refer to working with its strategic partners to accomplish its foreign policy and security objectives. See European Global Strategy, June 2016. http://www.europa.eu/globalstrategy/en

86. Joint Cooperation Council, ‘12th meeting of the EU–SA Joint Cooperation Council’, Brussels, 20 July 2011, p. 9, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc

87. South Africa's position on Zimbabwe, and the ICC/Al Bashir case are all instances where South Africa has put an African Agenda before the interests and values outlined as ‘shared’ in the EU–SA SP of 2007. It is, however, South Africa's African Agenda that provides the EU with its ‘strategic’ leverage into the rest of Africa.

88. These are the new approaches to delivering overseas development assistance. It is not entirely clear, however, if ‘risk taking’ with people's development, or ‘pilot programmes’ (one-off ventures) can inspire long-term trust of the kind wished for in such a strategic partnership with the EU's partners. See Council of the European Union, ‘The EU–South Africa Joint Action Plan’, 2007, pp.1–2, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209650%202007%20INIT

89. Under former president Thabo Mbeki, it was said that South Africa was run as ‘South Africa Inc.’, referring to its business/instructional-like characteristics. See Gumede WM, Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005, p. 64.

90. The decision to reclassify South Africa as a MIC was made at the EU level without consultation with South Africa. It was, according to Zondi, this aspect that irked Pretoria foremost. See Zondi S, ‘South Africa–EU Strategic Partnership in the context of a changing North–South power dynamics’, Great Insight Magazine, September 2013, http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/new-impetus-africa-europe-relations/south-africa-eu-strategic-partnership-changing-north-south-power-dynamics/. In 2012, the EU had already begun to relook at how it allocated aid, which would cut grant-based bilateral aid, reducing the ‘volume’ of funds substantially. Pretoria had already indicated its apprehension at this in the 13th JCC Meeting. See Herbert S, ‘The future of EU aid in middle income countries: The case of South Africa’. Working Paper, 370. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2013, p. 18.

91. ‘Summary: Annual Action Programme 2015 In Favour of the Republic of South Africa, Reg EU 233/2014’.

92. The concept is that a reciprocal basis for trade relations in particular is equal, as opposed to one where preferential conditions apply, instilling a donor/recipient dynamic between partners. Personal interview, Pretoria 2016.

93. The EU–SA MIP for South Africa has seen a reduction in funds being made available, from €980 million between 2007 and 2013 to just €241 million for the 2014–2020 period. See Embassy of the Republic of South Africa to the Kingdom of Belgium, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Mission to the European Union website, http://www.southafrica.be/sa-eu-strategic-partnership/; Joint Cooperation Council, ‘11th meeting of the SA-EU Joint Cooperation Council’, Pretoria, 15 September 2010, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc.

94. This issue in fact dates back to South Africa's unsuccessful attempts to join the Lomé Convention. See Lee M, ‘The European Union – South Africa Free Trade Agreement: In whose interest?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20.1, 2002, p.86.

95. South Africa signed an Agreement with the European Anti-Fraud Office (l'Office europeen de lutte antrifraude, OLAF) in 2008 and established a communication with the Scorpions Unit, but since 2009 the OLAF unit has been unable to re-establish communication with the National Prosecuting Agency of South Africa. OLAF is the EU's Anti-fraud and corruption Office, the agreement with which allows for independent assessment/tracking of funds received from the EU. This is perhaps another indication that anti-colonial/anti-West rhetoric does not mean as much as it would appear to the EU. See Joint Cooperation Council, ‘11th meeting of the SA–EU Joint Cooperation Council’, Pretoria, 15 September 2010, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc

96. Personal interview, 2016.

97. Personal interview, Pretoria, 2016. DG DIRCO Jerry Matjila in the opening remarks of the JCC Draft Minutes of 2011, was noted to have said that the ‘EU–SA Strategic Partnership was of key importance, and that SA's membership to other groupings can not be at the detriment of its relationship with the EU’. Joint Cooperation Council, ‘11th meeting of the SA-EU Joint Cooperation Council’, Pretoria, 15 September 2010, p. 1, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc