The EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership and global environmental governance: Towards effective multilateralism after Copenhagen?

ABSTRACT

This paper uses an analytical framework drawn from organisational studies to unpack and evaluate climate change relations under the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership. The article finds that, while the EU and South Africa share a common purpose and high-level climate goals, many of the formal organisational structures set up under the partnership to tackle climate change and the environment are weak and have fallen into disuse. At the same time several factors outside of the strategic partnership, such as South Africa's hosting of the Durban climate change meeting, have played a significant role in promoting climate cooperation between the two partners. Therefore, while the strategic partnership creates an additional opportunity for climate cooperation, it is by no means the only or even the most important instrument in the EU's foreign policy tool box for negotiation and dialogue.

KEYWORDS:

• Climate change
• UNFCCC
• South Africa
• European Union
• strategic partnership
• environmental diplomacy

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has identified its strategic partnerships as building blocks for its goal of ‘effective multilateralism’. By building support bilaterally with key partners around the world the EU hopes to secure its preferred vision of global governance based on legally binding agreements and multi-lateral organisations.¹ The EU's allegiance to multilateralism is particularly apparent in the field of global environmental governance. Most environmental problems do not stop at national borders – they are transboundary and require collective solutions from governments and other actors. On pure efficiency grounds, therefore, the environment, and especially climate change, lends itself to multilateralism and the EU has consistently championed the pursuit of global environmental governance through international legally binding agreements.

In particular, the EU has gained a reputation as a leader in global climate change governance and has been largely credited with spearheading the successful ratification and eventual entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2005.² The EU's leadership role in the negotiations for an agreement for the post-Kyoto period, however, proved more contentious, as demonstrated by the failure of the EU at the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2009 to get its vision of a unilateral legally binding agreement accepted by the international community. Despite high ambition, the EU was left out of the key negotiations conducted at the COP by new climate leaders (such as the US, China and South Africa). This created a ‘diplomatic fiasco’ that is sometimes held up as a vignette of how ‘strategic partners’ have worked against the EU to undermine its multilateral ambitions on the global stage.³

The Copenhagen COP was seen by the EU as a ‘wake-up call’ to change its approach to its global climate change leadership.⁴ Thereafter the EU invested far more resources in environmental diplomacy, including through its strategic partnerships. In July 2011, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Directorate General (DG) for Climate Action within the European Commission prepared a ‘Joint Reflection Paper’ entitled Towards a Renewed and Strengthened EU Climate Diplomacy in which the EU declared its intention to reinforce its commitment to climate diplomacy,⁵ more specifically, to ‘continue to raise climate change concerns in relations with strategic partners’⁶ and ‘[e]stablish local climate change working groups in strategic partner countries’.⁷

South Africa is one of the EU's 10 strategic partners. It is also a key ally in the EU's global climate change ambitions. South Africa has played an important role in global climate change negotiations at the UNFCCC: as the host of the Durban COP in 2011; as a regional leader in Africa; and as a member of the BASIC countries⁸ (that contributed to the EU's failure in Copenhagen). Cooperation on global issues such as tackling climate change and other environmental concerns has been an important aspect of the strategic partnership with the EU.⁹ Consequently, climate change and the environment have featured in every EU–South Africa Summit.

This article uses an analytical framework originally drawn from the literature on organisational studies to provide an assessment of environmental cooperation within the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership. While an earlier assessment of climate cooperation under the strategic partnership by Oberthür and Groen¹⁰ concluded that the partnership added little value in international climate change negotiations, the EU's increased emphasis on climate diplomacy, including through strategic partnerships, warrants a new systematic assessment, especially in light of the significant roles that both South Africa and the EU played in the successful conclusion of the UNFCCC negotiations in Paris 2015 and in view of the 10th anniversary of the strategic partnership in 2017.

The next section of the article sets out the analytical framework first proposed by Wilkins¹¹ to systematically unpack and evaluate strategic partnerships. This framework is then applied in the next section of this article to examine one element of the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership, namely climate change cooperation. Guided by the framework, this empirical section is divided into three sub-sections concerning the ‘formation’, ‘implementation’ and ‘evaluation’ phases of the strategic partnership. The final section reflects on the implications of this evaluation for the EU's pursuit of effective multilateralism.

Analytical framework and methods

A universal definition of the term ‘strategic partnership’ is difficult to find in the international relations literature. Different authors ascribe different meanings to the term, with varying focus on issues such as security¹² or trade.¹³ In some instances, the term is used unwittingly as a signifier of a close relationship between actors, but not necessarily to denote a formal bilateral engagement.¹⁴ Wilkins defines a strategic partnership as ‘structured collaboration between states (or other actors) to take joint advantage of economic opportunities, or to respond to security challenges more effectively than could be achieved in isolation’.¹⁵

Wilkins argues that strategic partnerships have been inadequately served by theories that fail to differentiate between partnership and other ‘systems of alignment’ (eg, alliances, coalitions, security communities). Borrowing from organisation studies, he proposes an analytical framework for analysing strategic partnerships on the basis of their institutional properties over three sequential phases: formation, implementation and evaluation.

According to Wilkins, the formation phase of a strategic partnership is governed by three factors: environmental uncertainty, which entails actors collaborating to mitigate uncertainty; strategic fit, which denotes the compatibility and complementarity that partners bring to a relationship; and finally a system principle or common purpose that provides a basis of mutual understanding for the partnership or ‘a reason for being’. Wilkins notes that common goals can be interpreted differently by the partners and that there may be unofficial goals or hidden agendas. Finally, strategic partnership-building is a top-down process that requires significant support from top leaders and direct involvement from top leaders is a key ingredient in a partnership's success.

The implementation phase of a strategic partnership is accompanied by the construction of the organisational structure of the partnership, which can take on varying levels of complexity based on the depth of cooperation planned between the partners and the bureaucratic levels involved. This phase delineates the roles and responsibilities of the strategic partners, including how the bureaucracies will interact and what procedures they will follow. Organisational structure therefore governs the interaction of the partner states within the relationship. Wilkins warns that a ‘flawed organisational structure, weakly held or poorly defined goals, inherent power imbalances or conflicts between partners will impede its successful implementation’.¹⁶

The evaluation phase provides an opportunity to revisit some of the fundamentals of the formation and implementation phases to test the efficacy of a strategic partnership. Wilkins outlines four areas for assessment. The first is the alignment of common interests and shared values. The closer the partners are in these areas, the ‘more cohesive the partnership and the stronger the incentive for participants to cooperate to achieve mutual payoffs’.¹⁷ Second is the progress toward goal attainment; ultimately a strategic partnership's success is based on the ability to fulfil its stated goals. There is also the question of mutual perceptions. Here Wilkins proposes an examination of issues that strengthen or challenge partnerships such as historical legacies, contrasting ideologies or cultural (dis)connections. Finally, Wilkins considers how a partnership can be affected by external factors such as external pressures in the forms of unanticipated events, shifting goals or changes in the status of a partner.

This article applies the analytical framework proposed by Wilkins to systematically examine just one element of the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership, namely climate cooperation. In the European Commission's original document outlining its ideas, ‘Towards an EU–South African Strategic Partnership’, it was recognised that both the EU and South Africa ‘share a strong commitment to tackling the causes and impacts of climate change’.¹⁸ The subsequent 2007 Joint Action Plan¹⁹ set out the main focus areas and activities of the strategic partnership listing ‘global environmental issues, including climate change’ as one of the ‘possible themes for enhanced political and economic cooperation’. It was envisaged that ‘stronger political dialogue, leading to common political positions on subjects of mutual interest and to joint political action where appropriate’ would form the ‘very backbone of the strategic partnership’.²⁰ Data for the analysis in this article was obtained from both primary and secondary documents including official joint statements resulting from EU–South Africa summits, press releases and meeting reports. This material was complemented by elite interviews conducted between August to October 2016 with key EU and South African officials.

Climate change in the strategic partnership

This section presents climate change cooperation under the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership in three sub-sections concerning the ‘formation’, ‘implementation’ and ‘evaluation’ phases of the strategic partnership as set out in Wilkins' framework.

Formation

Environmental uncertainty

According to Wilkins, actors join together in strategic partnerships to increase their capabilities and flexibility to counter environmental uncertainties. Climate change was recognised as a mutual threat likely to exacerbate existing environmental and development challenges, noted in the European Commission's original document outlining its ideas on the partnership.²¹ In the subsequent Declaration on Climate Change made in 2008 at the first EU–South Africa Summit, both partners acknowledged ‘that climate change is a serious global challenge which demands urgent, cooperative and shared responsibility to act’.²² Joining forces to tackle this mutually recognised uncertainty promised to increase both partners' capabilities in the main international forum for tackling climate change, namely the UNFCCC climate negotiations. From the EU point of view, South Africa is a vital climate ally in Africa. South Africa had already played a proactive role in international climate change negotiations where it has obtained the reputation of bridge builder between the EU and the global South.²³ Cooperating with the EU helped South Africa increase its standing in the international climate change negotiations, where it was keen to build its international profile and improve its credibility and recognition among its peers and stakeholders.²⁴ Partnering with important climate players, such as the EU, but also others such as the BASIC group of countries, has provided an ‘opportunity to play in the first league of international climate policy’.²⁵ In addition, the EU was an important actor in the global debate on climate finance, which was a priority for (South) Africa.²⁶

Strategic fit

Faced with this shared uncertainty, Wilkins' framework suggests that actors initiate a search to identify compatible and receptive partners. From the EU's perspective, South Africa was the ideal climate partner in Africa owing to its role as a regional leader as well as overlapping preferences in the international climate negotiations. South Africa is sometimes regarded as playing a gateway function for the EU in its relations with Africa as a regional leader on the continent and especially in Southern Africa.²⁷ South Africa and the EU also shared some important interests with regards to the UNFCCC negotiations. According to Oberthur and Groen,²⁸ ‘despite some differences, EU preferences have overlapped much more with South Africa than [with those of] many other developing countries, including most BASIC states’. Most importantly, South Africa has been supportive of a legally binding international framework for both developed and developing countries. There is also the question that arises: if not South Africa, then which other African state could the EU more successfully engage with on a bilateral basis on these issues?²⁹

System principle

Having established a strategic fit, the partners seek to ascertain the possibilities of collaboration by creating a system principle where a common purpose is solidified into shared interests and understandings.³⁰ The common concern about the threat of climate change was articulated in the 2008 Declaration on Climate Change in which both partners underlined their ‘joint commitment to the objectives and principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol … [and] … .agree[d] on the necessity to conclude negotiations on a strengthened and effective global agreement for the climate change regime’.³¹ The partners also affirmed their intention ‘to work closely together on the development of all elements of an agreement on the climate regime beyond 2012’, including to limit a global temperature increase to below two degrees Celsius and to scale up climate finance.³² Beyond this general common purpose, however, important differences remained on how this would be achieved. For example, the EU had not yet formulated any specific figures or plans on how (and how much) to scale up climate finance and South Africa was originally a strong opponent of top down greenhouse gas reduction targets favoured by the EU.³³

Implementation

Organisational structure

Wilkins emphasises that the organisational structure of a partnership can be multi-layered, with engagement on many bureaucratic levels. Indeed the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership offers a range of opportunities for engagement at various levels, including with respect to environmental issues and climate change. For example, the 2007 Joint Action Plan³⁴ specified that a high-level dialogue on the environment would be established as part of the Mogôbagôba Dialogue – an umbrella for various sectoral cooperation forums comprised of meetings of different high-level bodies. However, no clearly defined goals for this dialogue were set. The action plan also made provision for climate change to be discussed under ‘global issues’ in EU–South Africa summits. In addition, a number of environment-related activities were organised under the EU–South African Strategic Partnership Dialogue Facility – a fund for activities surrounding the thematic areas of the strategic partnership. Ad hoc relations on climate change and the environment also took place outside the formal institutional structures of the strategic partnership, some of which are considered here as they support and/or interact with the strategic partnership.

The South Africa–EU Commission Forum on Environment and Sustainable Development (FESD) was established in 2007 as one of the sectoral pillars of discussion under the Mogôbagôba Dialogue. According to the EEAS, the forum is composed of a Senior Level Policy Dialogue on the Environment and a Working Group on Climate Change.³⁵ The original interlocutors on the EU side were the Directors General for the Environment and for Climate Action, and the EEAS, and on the South African side the Department of Environment and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).³⁶ It was envisaged that the forum would meet at least once a year.^37,38 However, in reality the forum has only met on three occasions (2007, 2011 and 2012). ^{39, 40} Themes for cooperation in the FESD included climate change, waste management, sustainable consumption and production, biodiversity, technical assistance and environmental governance, as well as North–South and multilateral cooperation.⁴¹ In the negotiations surrounding the Rio+20 Conference, the green economy was added to the list of topics of mutual interest.⁴²

In the meeting of the FESD in the run up to the Durban COP in 2011, three main themes were discussed: biodiversity (mostly issues surrounding the COPs of the Convention on Biological Diversity), the green economy (specifically the workshop on green growth held in conjunction with the forum in Pretoria) and climate change (which focused largely on South Africa's hosting of the COP).⁴³ Both sides stressed the significance of an ‘African COP’ for bringing the climate agenda further into focus on the continent and agreed that ‘the role as host offered South Africa and Africa a unique possibility for showing leadership and taking action forward in the international context’.⁴⁴ Funding for the COP was discussed and in the end the EU provided $7.3 million.⁴⁵

Indeed the run up to the Durban COP saw much closer high-level contact between EU and South African officials on issues of environment and climate change.⁴⁶ According to an official at the EU Delegation,⁴⁷ it was preceding this COP that the Working Group on Climate Change was established. This group mainly consisted of all the EU member states represented in South Africa and active on climate change issues. Efforts were also made to reach out to other top-level officials from South Africa and the EU who came to speak to the working group.⁴⁸ After the Durban COP the group continued to meet twice a year but its focus was redefined towards implementation and green cooperation more broadly, while the membership of the group expanded to include all development partners (not just EU member states) active in the area of environment and climate change in South Africa.⁴⁹ In contrast, the more formal and high-level Senior Level Policy Dialogue on the Environment (which was in practice the core of the FESD) failed to meet again after 2012. According to an official from the EU delegation,⁵⁰ the lack of meetings is not due to a lack of commitment to work together on the relevant issues but instead the high number and importance of international negotiations and meetings taking place that stretch the capacity of South African government officials were to blame.

A further forum for climate cooperation – the Climate Diplomacy Group – was established in the run-up to COP 21 and in response to the 2011 Joint Reflection Paper on Climate Diplomacy.⁵¹ This group is run jointly between the EU (EEAS) and interested EU member states. The group is ‘another platform for reaching out to South Africa to see what they are doing but also to give visibility to what the EU is doing’.⁵² Typical events include panel discussions at universities and the discussion of climate related issues. Although the Climate Diplomacy Group is part of a global initiative by the EU (ie, wider than just in South Africa or in other strategic partners), according to an EU official, all activities between the EU partners feed into the Joint Cooperation Council meetings and by extension the annual summit, and then ultimately have an impact on the strategic partnership itself.⁵³

Climate change was discussed in every annual EU–South Africa summit up to 2013, when the last summit took place. The records of these meetings show that the discussions intensified prior to the Durban COP as the EU and South Africa collaborated more closely in preparation for South Africa's hosting of the event. At the first EU–South Africa Summit in Bordeaux in 2008, a Declaration on Climate Change was issued as discussed above.⁵⁴ In the press release after the second EU–South Africa Summit in September 2009 – just two months before the ‘diplomatic fiasco’ of Copenhagen, a sizable chunk of the text was devoted to climate change including a statement that both sides were ‘determined to step up the pace of negotiations in order to reach agreement in Copenhagen in December 2009’.⁵⁵ Potentially contentious issues such as climate adaptation, climate finance and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities were also raised, but since these issues continued to remain areas of contention between the EU and African countries,⁵⁶ it seems unlikely that these issues were fundamentally addressed in this forum.

The EU–South Africa Summit in Brussels in 2010 devoted even more text to climate change discussions and appeared to go into specific details of the area of cooperation, including: working jointly in the ad-hoc working group on long-term cooperation action under the UNFCCC; fast-start finance; plans for the transition to a low-carbon economy and climate adaptation for developing countries; and strengthening development cooperation in the field of climate change and sustainable development in South Africa.⁵⁷ These discussions were influenced by the need to reach an ambitious outcome at the Cancun COP ‘preparing the ground for a successful Conference of the Parties in South Africa in 2011’.⁵⁸ The following year at the EU–South Africa Summit in Skukuza, South Africa, the two partners reiterated their commitment to work together ahead of the Durban COP later in the year.⁵⁹ Cooperation towards Rio+20 was also discussed at this summit and at the following summit in Brussels in 2012.⁶⁰ Both partners reaffirmed their intention to ‘jointly support the process of international cooperation on climate change in order to adopt a protocol, legal instrument or agreed outcome applicable to all Parties, no later than 2015 and to come into effect and be implemented from 2020’.⁶¹ In Pretoria in 2013, the partners gave perhaps their most emphatic statement yet that global challenges such as climate change should be dealt with multilaterally: ‘We believe that only a multilaterally agreed, rules-based climate change regime can meet the challenge posed by climate change and our common goal of keeping the global average temperature increase to below two degrees Celsius’.⁶²

Another avenue for dialogue and exchange on the environment and climate change is the dialogue facility, which serves as a tool to organise and fund dialogue and activities surrounding the thematic areas of the strategic partnership. However, this instrument has not focused on climate change activities; it has instead supported engagement around broader environmental issues such as the green economy and preparations for Rio+20 negotiations.⁶³ Specifically, the facility funded a workshop on the green economy in 2011, as well as a series of workshops with civil society and a series of issue papers in 2012. For the Rio+20 preparations, the facility coordinated a process of consultation between the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and labour, business and civil society. This broad-based consultation process was considered particularly novel by one official close to the facility, contrasting it with the more closed-natured process conducted by other South African government departments.⁶⁴ There were, however, differing reports on how much engagement there was in the consultation process from the South African side, particularly with respect to the role of civil society.⁶⁵ Still, the EU's support for South Africa's Rio+20 build-up appears to have been particularly well received by South African government officials because ‘we were preparing for the Rio+20 when everyone else was preparing for COP 17 [of the UNFCCC in Durban]. So it was in that hectic moment when they said that they could help’.⁶⁶

Although far less structured than the formal annual summits, frequent high-level meetings have also taken place between the EU and South Africa on an ad hoc basis. For example, in 2010 the EU Commissioner for Environment and the EU Commissioner for Climate Action met the South African Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs.⁶⁷ A similar meeting between the EU Commissioner for Environment and the South African counterpart took place the following year as well.⁶⁸ Moreover, there have also been meetings between the EU Commissioner for Climate Action, the South African President, the Minister for International Relations and Cooperation, the Minister for Tourism and the Minister for Water and Environmental Affairs. During these meetings discussions related to both South Africa’s international and domestic climate policy. In July 2015 Ms Edna Molewa, South African Minister of Environmental Affairs, and Mr Maroš Šefčovič, Vice President of the European Commission for the Energy Union, met to discuss cooperation on climate change and to reaffirm their shared commitment to secure the adoption of an ambitious new climate agreement in Paris in December of that year.⁶⁹ The partners also discussed their respective intended nationally determined contributions to the new global agreement. So far, however, this type of high-level meeting has remained sporadic.⁷⁰

More regular mid-level contact and exchanges on the environment and climate change also take place between the EU and South Africa. For example, debriefing sessions take place between the South African government (DIRCO) and the officials in the EU delegation as well as member state representatives in South Africa.⁷¹ In addition, both sides have made good use of other opportunities for discussion in the margins of the relevant multilateral forums, such as the UNFCCC, Rio+20, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification and the negotiations surrounding the sustainable development goals (SDGs).⁷² According to a representative from DEA, ‘these discussions help … [they] are very frank discussions and even at a technical level they help to understand particular positions that they [the EU] will be taking and they augment the standing engagements [more structured discussions] in keeping up with the evolving nature of international negotiations’.⁷³ In this way strong relationships built up over the COPs and other international meetings from frequent interaction between the technical officials and negotiators.⁷⁴ According to an official in the DEA talking about the negotiations surrounding Rio+20 and the SDGs, these relationships were also helped because South Africa had already worked closely with the EU, and when they went to the meetings ‘we understood more of the issues and positions that were to be taken [by the EU] …  It [the relationship with the EU] becomes, one, natural and … , second, more issues based …  so that by the time you engage you are moving from an informed position’.⁷⁵

Evaluation

Common values, interests and goals

The more closely common interests, values and goals align, the more cohesive the partnership and the stronger the incentive for participants to cooperate to achieve mutual payoffs.⁷⁶ As discussed above, at the broad level South Africa and the EU shared a commitment to the objectives and principles of the UNFCCC and specifically for reaching an effective global agreement on climate change. The EU and South Africa also shared some important negotiations preferences, including the need for developed countries to scale up finances for adaptation and technology transfer, if not on the details of how this would be done. Over the course of the UNFCCC negotiations, there is evidence of some convergence between the values and objectives of South Africa and the EU, which has helped resolve some of these details. For example, the EU came to ‘better recognise adaptation needs in Africa and … [became] increasingly supportive of making adaptation a central element of the future climate agreement’, a point that South Africa and the African group of negotiators vehemently upheld for a long time in the UNFCCC negotiations.⁷⁷ In turn South Africa agreed to (bottom up) legally binding reduction targets, in the form of intended nationally determined contributions.

At times, however, hidden agendas (mentioned by Wilkins) served to weaken climate cooperation between the two partners. This was most apparent when South Africa's international leadership ambitions led to its siding with the BASIC group of countries in the Copenhagen COP (breaking with both the African Group of Negotiators and with the EU in its bid to secure its place at the table of the core negotiations).⁷⁸ South Africa's position as a network power at the crossroads of various foreign policy networks leaves the country playing to multiple foreign policy audiences.⁷⁹ While at times this dynamic position has weakened South Africa's potential cooperation with the EU (eg, at the Copenhagen COP), at others times (eg, the Durban and Paris COPs) this position has enabled South Africa to perform a vital bridge-building function. This position does, however, mean that, depending on the issue and the situation, South Africa’s interests may lie outside of the strategic partnership and more in line with other foreign policy partners.

Goal attainment

According to Wilkins, a strategic partnership must be evaluated above all by its progress towards goal attainment. While the shared commitment to ‘conclude negotiations on a strengthened and effective global agreement for the climate change regime after 2012 by the end of 2009’⁸⁰ was missed in terms of the intended timeframe, ultimately a global climate change agreement was reached in 2015. Both the EU and South Africa played important roles in reaching this agreement, as well as important milestones along the way: for example, a coalition between the EU, low-lying states and African states (in part facilitated by South Africa) helped push recalcitrant states towards agreement and paved the way for the adoption of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action in 2011.⁸¹ The final text represented a return to multilateralism with the UN at the centre for crafting a climate treaty rather than the proliferation of competing forums for climate cooperation.⁸² At the Paris climate summit, EU diplomats and African countries were driving forces behind the negotiations on many levels. In particular, in the final days of the summit, a ‘high-ambition coalition’, including the EU (and its 28 member states) as well as 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, was instrumental in paving the way to a successful agreement. In the end, the outcome of the Paris COP exceeded expectations, producing an agreement that is generally regarded as a success and a reaffirmation of environmental multilateralism.⁸³

What is less clear, however, is to what extent the strategic partnership played a role in the attainment of this high-level goal. Wilkins remains relatively quiet on issues of causality. The formal structures, such as the EU–South Africa summits and the FESD, failed to gain much traction. Although climate change was on the agenda of every annual summit and all three of the meetings of the FESD, there is little evidence that contentious issues were resolved through these high-level and fairly rigid structures. In addition, high-level joint declarations on climate change were issued before both ‘successful’ COPS (eg, Paris) and ‘unsuccessful’ COPs (Copenhagen). Indeed, both of these organisational structures have slipped into disuse owing to the lack of capacity and also the lack of prioritisation on South Africa's part.⁸⁴ While there was increased discussion and support for climate change in 2010–2011 as well as additional diplomatic efforts such the Working Group on Climate Change, these were a reaction to external factors (ie, South Africa's hosting of the Durban COP) and not intrinsic to the momentum of the strategic partnership. Rather than complementing the UNFCCC negotiations, participating in the formal organisational structures of the strategic partnership, in addition to the UNFCCC meetings, stretched the capacity of South African officials and the structure eventually fell into disuse.⁸⁵ Additional climate diplomacy structures (eg, the Climate Diplomacy Group) were also established in the run up to the Durban COP, and these were outside of the strategic partnership and common to other of the EU's (non-strategic) partners.

In contrast, the strategic partnership played a different role in the preparations for Rio+20 and the subsequent agreement of the SDGs; frequent exchanges, sometimes at a very technical level, helped South African officials gain a greater understanding of their counterparts' positions and prepare for the negotiations. The dialogue facility also played a greater role in supporting civil society activities in this area. It is perhaps easier, therefore, for the strategic partnership to add value to discussions on topics that are less high profile and politicised, and so the political stakes are lower, and also on topics where the opportunities to interact internationally are lower. According to an official in DIRCO,⁸⁶ ‘if climate change “normalises” and becomes like any other issue it would also become like other issues in [the] strategic partnership. But at [the] moment there is a huge difference in political prioritisation’. Climate change is a top priority issue which means that engagement with the EU takes place at a variety of levels and with different bodies. It became evident that, while almost all of those interviewed for this study maintained that the partnership was useful in some indirect way – for example, creating an additional opportunity to reach out at an appropriate level⁸⁷ – the strategic partnership was by no means viewed as the only or even the most important channel for discussion.⁸⁸

Mutual perceptions

Wilkins argues that creating a climate of mutual trust is paramount to sustained cooperation but that many issues may strengthen or challenge this, such as historical legacies, ideologies or cultural affinities or clashes. In this instance, the twin legacy of colonialism and apartheid remains a powerful scar on the collective psyche of South Africans. In fact, as Habib argues, it is impossible to extricate South Africa's historical legacy from its foreign policy trajectory.⁸⁹ The result has been a foreign policy which promotes African issues and the advancement of non-Western multilateral relationships, while maintaining a degree of circumspection, at least in public, regarding South Africa's proximity to Western interests. In fact all three of South Africa's presidents in the democratic era – Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma – have struggled with the country's history and its relationship with the West. Mbeki and Zuma in particular have maintained an ideological and cultural distance, which Wilkins notes can have consequences on the longevity of a strategic partnership. Indeed, South Africa either voted against or abstained from voting on several Western-backed initiatives during the country's recent two terms on the UN Security Council.⁹⁰ Adding to concerns about the importance of the EU in South Africa, no high-level summit has occurred between the two partners since 2013, despite stipulations in the strategic partnership that such a summit occur annually. President Zuma also did not attend the last EU–Africa summit in 2014, heightening concerns about the ambivalence with which he perceives relations with Europe. Finally, the most recent ANC discussion document on foreign policy makes explicit the role of South Africa to counter what it deems as ‘neo-imperialist economic relations’.⁹¹

In relation to climate change more specifically, there are also important cultural differences that impact on the level of commitment on climate change from the partners. While climate change has long-standing support from the EU public and is high on the political agenda,⁹² in South Africa the low level of pressure from civil society can be seen as an excuse for inaction by politicians.⁹³ The attraction of demonstrating leadership at big international conferences such as the Copenhagen and Durban COPs has often proved irresistible, but the depth of commitment to these initiatives from top politicians is sometimes questionable and probably temporary.⁹⁴ As Wilkins points out, this low level of political support can contribute to the weak performance of the strategic partnership in this regard, for example leading to limited resources and capacity of officials to negotiate and discuss climate change in the strategic partnership.

External factors

A range of external factors can weaken a strategic partnership's performance, for example: external pressures, shifting goals, changes in partner status, hidden or simply the lack of available resources or motivation for further capacity-building.⁹⁵ One of the most significant factors in cementing climate relations between South Africa and the EU – South Africa's hosting of the Durban COP – was unrelated to the strategic partnership. The COP led to a step up in collaboration between the partners through the formal institutional structures of the strategic partnership but an increased level of cooperation would have been expected even without a strategic partnership. Hosting the COP both elevated the status of South Africa as an international climate player and motivated South Africa to form alliances and seek collaboration between different parties, so emphasising even further South Africa's bridge-building role between developed and developing countries.

Summary

Table 1 summarises the analysis of climate cooperation in the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership. Wilkins' criteria for the successful establishment of a strategic partnership in the formation phase were largely fulfilled: climate change was recognised as a mutual threat in the initial thinking leading to the strategic partnership; the two partners were a good strategic fit sharing some common negotiating preferences as well as jointly enhancing each other’s international standing; the partners then committed themselves to the common purpose of pushing for a global legally binding climate change agreement in the UNFCCC negotiations. In the implementation phase a range of organisational structures at various levels was put in place to engage both sides on issues of climate change and other environmental issues. However, many of these formal structures fell into disuse while more ad hoc forums outside of the strategic partnership continued to be used by officials. Wilkins helps us to expose some of the shortcomings in the relationship between the partners in the final evaluation phase of this framework. For instance, while both partners shared a common goal, their interests were not completely aligned, with South Africa in particular playing to multiple foreign policy audiences. In addition, although the strategic partnership's high-level goal of securing a global climate change agreement was reached, the level of causation that can be attributed is low. Also, intrinsic factors (such as the colonial legacy) appeared to challenge the partnership in general as well as climate change cooperation in particular, especially low public and political support for climate change within South Africa. Finally, external factors (such as South Africa's hosting of the Durban COP and multiple opportunities for informal discussion in the margins of the UNFCCC process) played a significant role in promoting climate change cooperation between the partners. Therefore, while the strategic partnership provided further opportunities for discussion and collaboration on climate change issues, it was by no means the only, or even the most important, channel for cooperation.

Table 1. Climate change in the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership: Characteristics and evaluation criteria

Characteristic/criteria	Climate change cooperation
Formation
Environmental uncertainty Will joining together increase the partners capabilities and flexibility to counter a common threat?	Joint action increased both partners’ capabilities to tackle the mutually recognized threat of climate change (via the UNFCCC negotiations): South Africa was an important climate actor (providing a bridge between developed and developing countries). Interaction with the EU (and other climate heavy weights) strengthened South Africa’s standing on global stage.
Strategic fit How compatible and receptive are the partners?	South Africa and the EU were a good strategic fit: Both partners shared many (UNFCCC) negotiation preferences. South Africa is a regional leader in Africa; The EU is an international climate actor.
Systems principle Do the partners share a common purpose?	Both partners shared a common purpose: In the Declaration on Climate Change (2008) both partners agreed on the broad goals in the UNFCCC and on the need to reach an effective global agreement on climate change in order to limit global temperature rise to below 2° Celsius.
Implementation
Organisational structure What organisational structures have been put in place? How do these function in practice? Are the goals well defined? How are conflicts between the partners resolved? Are there any power imbalances?	Several organisational structures that addressed climate change were set up under the strategic partnership: South Africa–EU Forum on Environment and Sustainable Development was established in 2007 but only met on three occasions. A lower-level Working Group on Climate Change was established prior to the Durban COP but changed focus thereafter. Climate change featured in all EU–South Africa summits. The last summit was in 2013. The dialogue facility supported environment activities did not focus on climate change. Relevant activities outside the strategic partnership included: informal discussions of ministers; debriefing sessions for negotiators; a Climate Diplomacy Group; and meetings of officials in the margins of the UNFCCC.
Evaluation
Common interests, values and goals How closely aligned are the common interests, goals and values of the partners?	South Africa and the EU had a shared goal at a high level (ie, to support the UNFCCC process and secure an international climate change agreement). The two partners also moved closer together on certain lower-level issues (eg, the importance of adaptation; scale and nature of climate funding). South Africa played to multiple foreign policy audiences.
Goal attainment What progress was made towards the shared goal?	The UNFCCC negotiation process culminated in an international climate change agreement in December 2015. Both partners played an important role in the successful conclusion of these negotiations. It is not clear to what extent the strategic partnership played a role.
Mutual perceptions What issues challenge or facilitate the integrity of the partnership?	The historical legacy of colonialism makes the EU an uncomfortable partner for South Africa. Climate change is less of a priority with the South African public/politicians than in the EU.
External factors What external factors affect the partnership?	Hosting of the Durban COP inevitably led to a step up in climate relations (irrespective of the strategic partnership).

Based on Wilkins TS, ‘Russo–Chinese Strategic Partnership: A new form of security cooperation?’ Contemporary Security Policy, 29.2, 2008 and authors’ own research.

In pursuit of effective multilateralism

This article seeks to assess climate cooperation under the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership as part of the EU's pursuit of ‘effective multilateralism’ in the UNFCCC negotiations. ‘Effective multilateralism’ was presented by the European Security Strategy in 2003⁹⁶ as the EU's preferred mode of engagement.⁹⁷ The EU reiterated the centrality of multilateralism in its 2016 Global Strategy, emphasising that it would ‘promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle’.⁹⁸ The EU is multilateral by nature and by vocation⁹⁹ and EU leaders tend to see international collaboration as a preferred – even default – means to meeting challenges.¹⁰⁰ The EU's effective multilateralism doctrine is therefore characterised by a preference for legally binding commitments and powerful international regimes.¹⁰¹ However, ‘effective multilateralism’ is an ambiguous concept. The ‘effective’ part has been interpreted as meaning that the EU's approach to multilateralism can be flexible.¹⁰² In other words, the EU can choose from a broad range of instruments in its foreign policy tool box so that, when multilateralism or inter-regional approaches are not working, the EU can easily switch to the bilateral level, particularly when there are pressing concerns or immediate gains to be attained.¹⁰³ Depending on the issue at stake, different forms of ‘lateralisms’ may therefore appear more effective vis-à-vis different partners.¹⁰⁴

The EU's 2008 review of the European Security Strategy¹⁰⁵ suggested that these different ‘lateralisms’ were compatible and that they complement each other by providing ‘partnerships for effective multilateraism’.¹⁰⁶ However, the document remains vague about how the different ‘lateralisms’ feed into each other.¹⁰⁷ Bilateralism will not automatically lead to effective multilateralism. In this context bilateral strategic partnerships are presented as an innovative means of striving towards the EU's ultimate goal on an international scale.¹⁰⁸ As such, bilateralism is viewed by the EU as a deliberate effort to ‘deepen multilateralism’¹⁰⁹ and even ‘multi-lateralise’ EU bilateral relations by integrating universal concerns and norms into summits with major global actors.¹¹⁰ Therefore, while the strategic partnerships have mostly focused on trade, they also touch on policies that go beyond trade, such as energy and climate change.¹¹¹

Yet, according to Keukeliere and Hooijmaaijers,¹¹² ‘[t]he surprise to Europeans about their isolated position during the Copenhagen Conference pointed to a major flaw in the EU’s approach towards emerging powers and the strategic partnerships’. While the European Commission's ‘Joint Reflection Paper’ in 2011 declared the EU's intention to step up its use of strategic partnerships in the EU's bid to strengthen its climate diplomacy after Copenhagen, the assessment of climate cooperation in the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership presented in this article offers considerable room to doubt the efficacy of this intention. It is not clear how, if at all, these bilateral efforts ‘fed into’ the EU's pursuit of ‘effective multilateralism’ in terms of the UNFCCC negotiations. Rather than complement these international negotiations, the formal organisational structures of the EU–South Africa summits and the FESD appeared to occur in parallel and even compete for scarce resources. Overstretched South African officials rather favoured informal, more ad hoc, opportunities to reflect and discuss positions with their EU counterparts, for example on the margins of the UNFCCC process or in informal debriefing sessions in South Africa. In addition, other diplomatic forums were set up by the EU outside of the strategic partnership in order to collect information on the positions of key potential climate allies. In this sense it appears that the formal organisational structures of the strategic partnership were by no means the only, or even the most important, diplomatic channels available. This is surprising, since institutionalised relationships, such as a strategic partnership, in principle provide formal routinised structures precisely to move away from more ad hoc diplomatic relations, which can be dependent on a few key individuals and so vulnerable to fluctuation.

At best the strategic partnership potentially contributed indirectly by creating an informal ‘enabling environment’ providing multiple opportunities for contact and forging closer relationships and understanding between the partners. In certain areas (eg, Rio+20 and the green economy) these opportunities gained more traction than others (eg, climate change). This article has only touched on the factors that could help account for which issue areas are likely to flourish through inclusion in strategic partnerships, for example less high-profile and politicised issues. Further research is needed to develop a more robust understanding of these factors. If, as mooted, the FESD is reinvigorated in South Africa, the selection of discussion topics should be carefully considered. In this light, for example, it could be beneficial to choose topics where the political stakes are relatively low. There are a number of issues to choose from which the EU and South Africa are already collaborating on in a practical way (ie, through development cooperation), such as waste management and sustainable consumption and production.

This does not necessarily mean that controversial issues should be off the agenda in the strategic partnership entirely, but that the level of ambition, particularly on the EU's side, should be reduced and the strategic partnership used more ‘strategically’ to target issues for which there are less alternative opportunities for discussions. Even within these selected areas, the EU should be mindful that, while there may be an expectation that the strategic partnership should lead to heightened cooperation (still often equated with a convergence towards the EU's position), environmental diplomacy can work in a less direct way. For example, there is value in gathering information to deepen understanding of partners' interests and any underlying domestic politics, which contribute to negotiating.¹¹³ Further, this can assist in identifying political trade-offs in order to generate better negotiating strategies. In addition, the EU could also consider stepping up its supporting activities (eg, through the dialogue facility) in these targeted issue areas. Building the capacity of relevant actors is the first crucial step towards cooperation (before negotiation and dialogue) where there are inherent asymmetries between the partners. Further research is needed to determine how (and how well) the strategic partnership influenced EU–South Africa relations in other environmental issue areas and in particular to learn lessons about what works and what does not. It would also be useful to see how a range of environmental issues are dealt with in other strategic partnerships of the EU such as that with Brazil.

Conclusions

Wilkins' analytical framework was originally intended to analyse strategic partnerships in their entirety. However, this framework has provided a useful device in this article for systematically unpacking and beginning to evaluate one element of a strategic partnership. In particular the framework encourages the analysis to encompass the sequence of phases in a strategic partnership including the factors that brought the partners together initially, how the partnership was organised on the ground, whether it eventually attained its goals as well as what internal and external factors may have influenced the partnership. While the EU and South Africa share a common purpose and high-level climate goals, many of the formal organisational structures set up under the partnership to tackle climate change and the environment are weak and have fallen into disuse. At the same time several external factors, such as South Africa's hosting of the Durban COP, have played a significant role in promoting climate cooperation between the two partners.

Ultimately Wilkins uses the framework to make a judgment on whether a strategic partnership will endure or not. However, it is not the ambition of this paper to make such judgments about the likely future of the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership. The analysis presented here confirms the initial impressions by Oberthür and Groen¹¹⁴ that the strategic partnership is not the only, or even the most important, factor in EU–South Africa climate change cooperation. However, beyond such linear evaluations, the very existence of the strategic partnership itself continues to act as an impetus to bureaucrats on both sides to remain engaged with the issues. The partnership creates an expectation of continuity – neither partner has professed an interest in letting the strategic partnership disintegrate. This path dependency alone probably ensures that the EU and South Africa will continue to seek ways in which to cooperate through the channels provided by the strategic partnership. It is therefore important that the EU critically reflects on how best to maximise the impact of this instrument in its foreign policy tool box. It is perhaps in the spirit of capacity building and listening in a genuine two-way flow of information and views that the strategic partnership might prove most useful in effective environmental multilateralism in future.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Lesley Masters and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions on previous drafts of this article. We would also like to thank the EU and South African officials who kindly agreed to be interviewed as part of this research.

ORCID

Camilla Adelle http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4500-0496

Notes

1. Gratius S, Can EU Strategic Partnerships Deepen Multilateralism? FRIDE Working Paper, 109. Madrid: FRIDE, September 2012.

2. Groenleer MLP & LG van Schaik, ‘United we stand? The European Union's international actorness in the cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45.5, 2007, pp. 969–98.

3. Keukeleire S & B Hooijmaaijers, ‘The BRICS and other emerging power alliances and multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific and the Global South: Challenges for the European Union and its view on multilateralism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52.3, 2014, pp. 582–99.

4. Bäckstrand K & O Elgström, ‘The EU's role in climate change negotiations: from leader to “leadiator”’, Journal of European Public Policy, 20.10, 2013, pp. 1369–86.

5. EEAS and European Commission, ‘Towards a renewed and strengthened EU climate diplomacy’, Joint Reflection Paper, 1. Brussels, July 2011.

6. Ibid., p. 4.

7. Ibid., p. 5.

8. BASIC countries comprise Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

9. European Commission, Towards an EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership, COM (2006) 347. Brussels, European Commission, 2006.

10. Oberthür S & L Groen, ‘The EU and South Africa: Building bridges’, in Grevi G & T Renard (eds) Hot Issues, Cold Shoulders, Lukewarm Partners: EU Strategic Partnerships and Climate Change. European Strategic Partnerships Observatory Report 2. November 2012. FRIDE: Madrid.

11. Wilkins TS, ‘Russo–Chinese Strategic Partnership: A new form of security cooperation?’ Contemporary Security Policy, 29.2, 2008, pp. 358–83.

12. Grevi G, Making EU Strategic Partnerships Effective. FRIDE Working Paper, 105. Madrid: FRIDE, 2010.

13. Geldenhuys D, ‘The comprehensive strategic partnerships between South Africa and Russia,’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 37.2, 2015, p. 121.

14. Blanco L ,‘The functions of “strategic partnership” in European Union foreign policy discourse’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29.1, 2016, pp. 38–9.

15. Wilkins TS, ‘Russo–Chinese strategic partnership: A new form of security cooperation?’, Contemporary Security Policy, 29.2, 2008, pp. 358–83.

16. Ibid., p. 366.

17. Ibid., p. 366.

18. European Commission, Towards an EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership, COM (2006) 347. Brussels, European Commission, 2006, p. 9.

19. Council of the European Union, The South Africa–European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan, 9650/07 (Presse 105) 15 May 2007. Brussels, 2007.

20. Ibid.

21. European Commission, Towards an EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership, COM (2006) 347. Brussels, European Commission, 2006.

22. Council of the European Union, First EU–South Africa Summit, C/08/222 of 25 July 2008. Brussels, 2008, p. 8.

23. Husar J, ‘South Africa in the climate change negotiations: Global activism and domestic veto players’, in Dröge S. (ed.) International Climate Policy. Priorities of Key Negotiating Parties. SWP Research Paper. Berlin: SWP, March 2010, pp. 98–108.

24. Oberthür S & L Groen, ‘The EU and South Africa: Building bridges’, in Grevi G & T Renard (eds) Hot Issues, Cold Shoulders, Lukewarm Partners: EU Strategic Partnerships and Climate Change. European Strategic Partnerships Observatory Report 2. November 2012. FRIDE: Madrid.

25. Ibid.

26. Nelson MB, ‘Africa's regional economic powers and climate change negotiations’, Global Environmental Politics, 16.2, 2016, pp.110–29.

27. Fioramonti L & J Kotsopoulos, ‘The evolution of EU–South Africa relations: What influence on Africa?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 22.4, 2015, pp. 463–78.

28. Oberthür S & L Groen, ‘The EU and South Africa: Building bridges’, in Grevi G & T Renard (eds) Hot Issues, Cold Shoulders, Lukewarm Partners: EU Strategic Partnerships and Climate Change. European Strategic Partnerships Observatory Report 2. November 2012. FRIDE: Madrid.

29. Nelson MB, ‘Africa's regional economic powers and climate change negotiations’, Global Environmental Politics, 16.2, 2016, pp. 110–29.

30. Wilkins TS, ‘Russo–Chinese strategic partnership: A new form of security cooperation?’, Contemporary Security Policy, 29.2, 2008, pp. 358–83.

31. Council of the European Union, First EU–South Africa Summit, C/08/222 of 25 July 2008. Brussels, 2008, p. 8.

32. Ibid.

33. Tondel F, H Knaepen & LA van Wyk, ‘Africa and Europe combatting climate change towards a common agenda in 2015’, Discussion Paper, 177. Maastricht: ECDPM, 2015.

34. Council of the European Union, The South Africa–European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan, 9650/07 (Presse 105) of 15 May 2007. Brussels, 2007.

35. EEAS (European External Action Service), ‘Sustainable development’, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/south_africa/eu_south_africa/climate_energy_environment/substainable_dev/index_en.htm (accessed 19 July 2016).

36. ESPO (European Strategic Partnerships Observatory), Forum on Environment and Sustainable Development (FESD), http://strategicpartnerships.eu/dialogues/eu-south-africa-forum-on-environment-sustainable-development-fesd/ (accessed 19 July 2016).

37. Chevallier R, ‘Taking stock of the strategic partnership between the EU and South Africa’, Working Paper, 11 September 2009. South African Institute of International Affairs.

38. Personal interview, Official from EU Delegation, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 August 2016.

39. European Commission, ‘International Climate Finance’, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/finance/index_en.htm (accessed 18 November 2016).

40. Personal interview, Official from EU Delegation, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 August 2016.

41. European Commission, ‘Bilateral and regional cooperation South Africa’, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/relations_south_africa_en.htm (accessed 18 November 2016).

42. Ibid.

43. Dialogue Facility, ‘12th meeting of the EU–SA Joint Cooperation Council, Brussels 20 July 2011’, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc2011 JCC report (accessed 18 November 2016).

44. Ibid.

45. Oberthür S & L Groen, ‘The EU and South Africa: Building bridges’, in Grevi G & T Renard (eds) Hot Issues, Cold Shoulders, Lukewarm Partners: EU Strategic Partnerships and Climate Change. European Strategic Partnerships Observatory Report 2. November 2012. FRIDE: Madrid.

46. Dialogue Facility, ‘12th meeting of the EU–SA Joint Cooperation Council, Brussels 20 July 2011’, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc2011 JCC report (accessed 18 November 2016); also, from a personal interview with an official from the EU Delegation, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 August 2016.

47. Personal interview, official from the EU Delegation, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 August 2016.Africa, 24 August 2016.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. EEAS & European Commission, ‘Towards a renewed and strengthened EU climate diplomacy’, Joint Reflection Paper, 1, Brussels, July 2011.

52. Personal interview, Official from EU Delegation, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 August 2016.

53. Ibid.

54. Council of the European Union, First EU–South Africa Summit, C/08/222 of 25 July 2008. Brussels, 2008, p. 8.

55. Council of the European Union, Second South Africa–European Union Summit, 13231/09 (Presse 266) of 11 September 2009. Brussels, 2009, p. 3.

56. Tondel F, H Knaepen & LA van Wyk, ‘Africa and Europe combatting climate change towards a common agenda in 2015’, Discussion Paper, 177. Maastricht: ECDPM, 2015.

57. EEAS, ‘Third South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communiqué’, Brussels, 28 September 2010.

58. EEAS, ‘Third South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communiqué’, Brussels, 28 September 2010, p4.

59. Council of the European Union, Fourth South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communiqué, 14292/11 (Presse 311) of 15 September 2011. South Africa, 2011.

60. Council of the European Union, Fifth European Union-South Africa Summit Joint Communiqué, 13899/12 (Presse 384) of 18 September 2012). Brussels, 2012.

61. Ibid., p. 4.

62. EEAS, ‘Sixth South Africa–European Union Summit Joint Communiqué’, Pretoria, 18 July 2013, p. 8.

63. Personal interview, official from the Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa, 26 October 2016.

64. Personal Interview, consultant, Pretoria, South Africa, 16 November 2016.

65. Personal interview, representative of an environmental NGO, Cape Town, 29 August 2016.

66. Personal interview, official from the Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa, 26 October 2016.

67. Dialogue Facility, ‘12th meeting of the EU–SA Joint Cooperation Council, Brussels 20 July 2011’, http://www.dialoguefacility.org/Resource%20Centre/SA-EU%20reports/JCC%202011Minutes.doc (accessed 18 November 2016).

68. Ibid.

69. Department of Environmental Affairs (South Africa), ‘Joint press release: South Africa and the EU reaffirm shared commitment to address the climate change challenge, 16 July 2015’, https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/southafrica_eu_commitmentonclimatechange (accessed 19 July 2016).

70. Ibid.

71. Personal interview, officials (*2) from DIRCO, Pretoria, South Africa, 28 October 2016.

72. Personal interview, official from EU Delegation, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 August 2016; personal interview, anonymous, Pretoria, South Africa, 13 October 2016, pp. 4, 5.

73. Personal interview, official from the Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa, 26 October 2016.

74. Personal interview, official from the Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa, 26 October 2016; personal interview, officials (*2) from DIRCO, Pretoria, South Africa, 28 October 2016.

75. Personal interview, official from the Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa, 26 October 2016.

76. Wilkins TS, ‘Russo–Chinese strategic partnership: A new form of security cooperation?’, Contemporary Security Policy, 29.2, 2008, pp. 358–83.

77. Tondel F, H Knaepen & LA van Wyk, ‘Africa and Europe combatting climate change towards a common agenda in 2015’, Discussion Paper, 177. Maastricht: ECDPM, 2015, p. vii.

78. Nelson MB, ‘Africa's regional economic powers and climate change negotiations’, Global Environmental Politics, 16.2, 2016, pp. 110–29; Husar J, ‘South Africa in the climate change negotiations: Global activism and domestic veto players’, in Dröge S. (ed.) ‘International climate policy. Priorities of key negotiating parties’, SWP Research Paper. Berlin: SWP, March 2010, pp. 98–108.

79. Nelson MB, ‘Africa's regional economic powers and climate change negotiations’, Global Environmental Politics, 16.2, 2016, pp. 110–29.

80. Council of the European Union, First EU–South Africa Summit, C/08/222 of 25 July 2008. Brussels, 2008, p. 8.

81. Tondel F, H Knaepen & LA van Wyk, ‘Africa and Europe combatting climate change towards a common agenda in 2015’, Discussion Paper, 177. Maastricht: ECDPM, 2015.

82. Bäckstrand K & O Elgström, ‘The EU's role in climate change negotiations: From leader to “leadiator”’, Journal of European Public Policy, 20.10, 2013, pp. 1369–86.

83. IISD Reporting Services, ‘Summary of the Paris Climate Change Conference: 29 November–13 December 2015’, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 12, 663, p. 42; Christoff P, ‘The promissory note: COP 21 and the Paris Climate Agreement’, Environmental Politics, 25.5, 2016, pp. 765–87.

84. Although there are talks underway between the EU Delegation and DEA with a view to reinvigorating the FESD.

85. Personal interview, official from EU Delegation, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 August 2016.

86. Personal interview, officials (*2) from DIRCO, Pretoria, South Africa, 28 October 2016.

87. Personal interview, official from EU Delegation, Pretoria, South Africa, 24 August 2016.

88. Personal interview, officials (*2) from DIRCO, Pretoria, South Africa, 28 October 2016.

89. Habib A, ‘South Africa's foreign policy: Hegemonic aspirations, neoliberal orientations and global transformation’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 16.2, pp. 143–59.

90. Reid G, ‘South Africa's worrying prevarication on LGBT rights’, Human Rights Watch, 2014.

91. African National Congress, International Relations Policy Discussion Document, March 2012.

92. European Commission, ‘Citizen support for climate change’, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/citizens/support_en (accessed 14 June 2017).

93. Death C, ‘Environmental movements, climate change, and consumption in South Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 40.6, 2014, pp. 1215–34.

94. Ibid.

95. Wilkins TS, ‘Russo–Chinese strategic partnership: A new form of security cooperation?’, Contemporary Security Policy, 29.2, 2008, pp. 358–83.

96. Council of the EU, European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels, 2003.

97. Renard T, ‘Partnerships for effective multilateralism? Assessing the compatibility between EU bilateralism, (inter-)regionalism and multilateralism’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29.1, 2015, pp. 18–35.

98. European External Action Service, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy. Brussels, June 2015.

99. Gratius S, ‘Can EU Strategic Partnerships deepen multilateralism?’ FRIDE Working Paper, 109. Madrid: FRIDE, 2011.

100. Afionis S & I Bailey, ‘Ever closer partnerships? European Union relations with rapidly industrializing countries on climate change’, in Bailey I & H Compston (eds), Feeling the Heat: The Politics of Climate Policy In Rapidly Industrializing Countries. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012, pp. 57–74.

101. Keukeleire S & B Hooijmaaijers, ‘The BRICS and other emerging power alliances and multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific and the Global South: Challenges for the European Union and its view on multilateralism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52.3, 2014, pp. 582–99.

102. van Schaik L & B ter Haar, ‘Why the EU is not promoting effective multilateralism: On a fundamental flaw in the European Security Strategy’, Clingendael Policy Brief, 21. Clingendael Institute, 2013.

103. Renard T, ‘Partnerships for effective multilateralism? Assessing the compatibility between EU bilateralism, (inter-)regionalism and multilateralism’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29.1, 2015, pp. 18–35.

104. Ibid.

105. Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World. Brussels, 2008.

106. Renard T, ‘Partnerships for effective multilateralism? Assessing the compatibility between EU bilateralism, (inter-)regionalism and multilateralism’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29.1, 2015, p. 18.

107. Ibid.

108. Gratius S, ‘Can EU Strategic Partnerships deepen multilateralism?’ FRIDE Working Paper, 109. Madrid: FRIDE, 2011.

109. Ibid., p. 11.

110. Vasconceleos 2010 in Afionis S & L Stringer, ‘The environment as a strategic priority in the European Union–Brazil partnership: is the EU behaving as a normative power or soft imperialist?’, International Environmental Agreements, 14.1, 2014, pp. 47–64.

111. Keukeleire S & B Hooijmaaijers, ‘The BRICS and other emerging power alliances and multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific and the Global South: Challenges for the European Union and its view on multilateralism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52.3, 2014, pp. 582–99.

112. Keukeleire S & B Hooijmaaijers, ‘The BRICS and other emerging power alliances and multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific and the Global South: Challenges for the European Union and its view on multilateralism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52.3, 2014, pp. 593–4.

113. Ibid.

114. Oberthür S & L Groen, ‘The EU and South Africa: Building bridges’, in Grevi G & T Renard (eds) Hot Issues, Cold Shoulders, Lukewarm Partners: EU Strategic Partnerships and Climate Change. European Strategic Partnerships Observatory Report 2. November 2012. FRIDE: Madrid.