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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the limits of ECOWAS’ top-down approach to mediation, based on a case study from Burkina Faso in 2014 and 2015. It shows the growing importance of ordinary citizens in the regulation of political arenas, both at the domestic and the regional level, as well as citizens’ impact on ECOWAS mediation in Burkina Faso. It thereby argues that mediation in ‘revolutionary’ situations is hardly feasible. In Burkina Faso, the 2014 popular uprising created a new kind of citizenry who felt ‘sovereign’ and expressed its grievances through mass mobilisations. In such political contexts, regional mediation, which aims at re-establishing stability and power-sharing agreements, becomes problematic because it contradicts the spirit ‘from the streets’. Moreover, the top-down approach also erodes the legitimacy of the mediators, who are perceived to work against ‘the people’s will’. The reflection draws attention to the tensions between international mediators and actors from below and highlights the need to craft new strategies for conducting mediation in the context of popular uprisings.
Acknowledgements
This special issue is the result of a workshop organised and financed under the Program Point Sud of the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), held in January 2017 at the Centre pour la gouvernance démocratique Burkina Faso (CGD) in Ouagadougou. The author would like to thank the Program Point Sud, the co-organisers of the workshop – Augustin Loada, Antonia Witt and Ulf Engel – the CGD, and all participants for their contributions on African interventions ‘seen from below’.
Note on contributor
Abdoul Karim Saidou is a political scientist at the University Ouaga 2 of Burkina Faso and member of the Centre for Democratic Governance. He is also an associate researcher at the group for research and information on peace and security of Brussels (Belgium). His areas of interest include security sector reforms, conflict management and the democratisation process in francophone West Africa.
Notes
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3 Lebeau Y et al. (dir.), Etat et acteurs émergents en Afrique, Paris: Karthala, 2003 ; Gibbon P, ‘Some reflections on civil society and political change’, in Rudebeck L, O Tornquist & V. Rojas (eds), Democratization in The Third World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998, p. 23–56 ; Otayek R, ‘La problématique “africaine ” de la société civile ’, in Gazibo M & C Thiriot (dir.), Le politique en Afrique : États des débats et pistes de recherche. Paris : Karthala, 2009, pp. 209–26.
4 Edwards E, ‘Introduction: Civil society and the geometry of human relations’, in Edwards E (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society, Online publication, 2012, p. 2, www.oxfordhandbooks.com
5 Quoted by Kontheh R, ‘Responding to conflicts : The role of civil society in West Africa’, in Gaya S (ed.), Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum, 2006, p. 273.
6 See Loada A, ‘Réflexions sur la société civile en Afrique : Le Burkina de l’après-Zongo’, Politique africaine, 76, 1999, pp. 136–51.
7 Moore C W, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Conflict Management. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass, 1996, p. 15.
8 Lanz D, ‘Who gets a seat at the table? A framework for understanding the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations’, International Negotiation, 16, 2011, pp. 275–95.
9 Paffenholz T, ‘Civil society and peace negotiations : Beyond the inclusion–exclusion dichotomy’, Negotiation Journal, January 2014, p. 69.
10 Ibid.
11 Anthony Wanis-St J & D Kew, ‘Civil society and peace negotiations: Confronting exclusion’, International Negotiation, 13, 2008, pp. 11–36.
12 Engel U (ed.), New Mediation Practices in African conflicts. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitatsverlag, 2012.
13 I was member of the Center of Democratic Governance (CGD) one the leading civil society organisations in Burkina Faso and headed in 2014 by Augustin Loada. CGD was member of a larger civil society coalition, the Citizen’s Resistance Front (FRC). I participated to the civil society actions before, during and after uprising. I served as member of the Reform and National Reconciliation Commission, one of the key transitional organs created after the popular uprising.
14 See a comparative analysis of the 1966 and 2014 popular uprisings by Domba Jean Marc Palm, Maurice Yaméogo, Blaise Compaoré : un destin croisé ? Ouagadougou : Editions Mercury, 2017.
15 See Loada A, ‘Réflexions sur la société civile en Afrique : Le Burkina de l’après-Zongo’, Politique africaine 76, 1999, pp. 136–51.
16 Hagberg S et al, Transformations sociopolitiques burkinabè de 2014 à 2016. Uppsala : Uppsala Universitet, 2007.
17 Loada A, ‘Contrôler l’opposition dans un régime semi autoritaire : Le Burkina de Blaise Compaoré’, in Hilgers M & J Massocchetti (dir.), Révoltes et opposition dans un régime semi autoritaire : cas du Burkina. Paris : Karthala, 2009, p. 270.
18 CGD, L’alternance et les règles du jeu démocratique. Ouagadougou : CGD, 2009.
19 Hilgers M & A Loada, ‘Tensions et protestations dans un régime semi-autoritaire: croissance des révoltes populaires et maintien du pouvoir au Burkina Faso’, Politique africaine, 131, 2013, pp. 87–208 ; Bonnecase V, ‘Ce que les ruines racontent d’une insurrection’, Sociétés politiques comparées, 38, January–April. 2016, http://www.fasopo.org/
20 The coalition was composed of 15 organisations such as the Burkinabe movement for human and people’s rights (MBDHP), the CGD, the Rural World Association, the Research Group on Democracy and Socioeconomic development, etc. The coalition was transformed into the FRC in 2013.
21 The author participated in the campaign as operations manager of the CGD. The CGD provided technical and financial support for the campaign. The leaders who initiated the petition used it as a way of creating public awareness about the issue, but they knew that the parliament would never vote it. That is why they did not submit it to the parliament.
22 Hilgers M & A Loada, ‘Tensions et protestations dans un régime semi-autoritaire: croissance des révoltes populaires et maintien du pouvoir au Burkina Faso’, Politique africaine, 131, 2013, pp. 87–208.
23 This party won the 29 November 2015 general elections. Roch Kaboré has been elected president of Faso.
24 Blaise Compaoré has been elected first in 1991, and re-elected in 1998, 2005 and 2010.When it was adopted by referendum in 1991, the Constitution stipulated a two-terms limit, and the duration of the term was seven years. In 1997, Blaise Compaoré decided to abrogate the term limit. However, in 2000, following the Norbert Zongo crisis, president Compaoré accepted the reintroduction of the term limit and the adoption of a five-year term. It was on the basis of this new law that he contested the 2005 presidential election. Therefore, unless the Constitution was amended, he could not contest the 2015 election. See Loada A, ‘La limitation du nombre de mandats présidentiels en Afrique’, Afrilex, 2003.
25 Luntumbue M, ‘Burkina Faso: vulnérabilités et risques de turbulences’, Note d’Analyse du GRIP, 17 September 2013, pp.10–11, www.grip.org
26 Thomas Sankara was the revolutionary leader who ruled the country from 1983 and 1987. He remains a symbol of integrity in country. Joseph Ki-Zerbo was a famous politician and historian; he died in 2006. Norbert Zongo was a journalist assassinated in 1998 by the Compaoré regime. The three figures still inspire the youth in Burkina Faso and even abroad.
27 Ouédraogo B, Droit, démocratie et développement en Afrique. Un parfum de jasmin souffle sur le Burkina. Paris : L’Harmattan, 2014.
28 The Catholic Church declared its opposition to the constitutional reforms proposed by Blaise Compaoré and its position has influenced the public debate on the issue. See Lettre pastorale des Evêques du Burkina, 15 July 2013 at : www.catholique.bf
29 Sy C, De l’insurrection au perchoir : Chronique d’un engagement citoyen. Ouagadougou : Les éditions Bendré, 2007, p. 31.
30 ICG, ‘Nine months to achieve the transition’, report no. 222/Africa, 28 January 2015.
31 Ouédraogo, B, ‘ Balai citoyen : le contexte d’une éclosion’, in Kupper C et al., Une jeunesse africaine en quête de changement. Bruxelles : GRIP, 2017, pp. 49–55.
32 See Hervé Ouattara’s story of the popular uprising at www.lobservateur.bf
33 He made this statement at the Conference on popular insurrection organized by his party at Ouagadougou on 29 October 2016 which I attended as one of the panelists.
34 Interview at Ouagadougou with Luc Marius Ibriga, 6 September 2017.
35 Interview at Ouagadougou, 20 March 2016.
36 See his declaration on Burkina Info Television on 21 May 2017 at www.burkinainfo.tv
37 See his interview published on 25 June 2017 in the Newspaper L’Evènement at: www.evenement-bf.net
38 Safiatou Lopez and Hervé Ouattara were among the team representing civil society in the committee charged with the responsibility of electing the president of the transition. Two political parties seized the constitutional court to contest their status of civil society because they are members of the MPP.
39 Mahamadé Savadogo ‘La page ouverte par l’insurrection ne s’est pas encore refermée’, Fasozine, 70, 2017, pp. 16–17.
40 See for example AU (African Union), Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Addis Ababa: African Union, 2007.
41 See AU, Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 465th Meeting on the Situation in Burkina Faso, http://www.peaceau.org
42 ECOWAS, Communiqué Burkina Faso Crisis: Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Authority. Accra: Republic of Ghana, 6 November 2014. cf. http://news.ecowas.int/.
43 Ibid.
44 AU, Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 465th Meeting on the Situation in Burkina Faso, http://www.peaceau.org.
45 Ikome F, Good Coups and Bad Coups: The Limits of the AU’s Injunction on Unconstitutional Changes of Government. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007, p. 55.
46 ISS, Burkina Faso: A Test for the AU’s Impact on crises, www.issafrica.org
47 Ibid.
48 See Laurie Nathan, How and Why African Mediators Compromise Democracy, https://www.law.upenn.edu/
49 According to Augustin Loada, during the debate on the transitional charter, civil society leaders recommended a provision stating that only civilians can be appointed as prime minister, but this idea was rejected by some political leaders. For him, this was the evidence that a deal has been arranged between the army and some political leaders. cf. Interview at Frankfort, 10 September 2017.
50 See article 41 of the mentioned protocol. See also article 8 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001.
51 Kontheh R, ‘Responding to conflicts: The role of civil society in West Africa’, in Gaya S (ed.), Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum, 2006, pp. 278–83.
52 Other good examples are CDD, RADDHO, WILDAF, MARWOPNET, WANSA, etc. See ibid.
53 It was formally launched in December 2003 during the first West Africa Civil Society Conference held in Accra in Ghana, with the support of ECOWAS.
54 Even though scientifically speaking, traditional and religious leaders are part of civil society, in Burkina Faso, the concept of civil society is used to refer to civic organisations.
55 See article 12 of the transitional charter.
56 The Constitution of Burkina Faso authorizes civil disobedience in case of unconstitutional government. See article 167.
57 See ISS, Burkina Faso: Where Does it Leave the AU Norm on Unconstitutional Changes of Government?, 1 December 2014, www.issafrica.org.
58 See AU, Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Addis Ababa: African Union, 2007, Article 10.
59 Ibid., Article 23.
60 Sampson, PR, ‘Conceptual shifts in multi-track mediation in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Engel U (ed.), New Mediation Practices in African Conflicts. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitatsverlag, 2012, pp. 237–54.
61 The founding charter of the FRC mentioned social and economic issues such as land reform, education, access to potable water, health, in addition to political reforms. See FCR, Plate-forme pour la constitution d’un front de résistance citoyenne contre la confiscation de la souveraineté de notre peuple à des fins monarchiques, 2013, www.lefaso.net.
62 Interview at Ouagadougou with Luc Marius Ibriga, 6 September 2017.
63 My personal notes of the debate during the Workshop on African peacekeeping seen from below organized by Point Sud and the CGD, Ouagadougou, 28 January 2017.
64 In 2014, Chériff Sy attempted a mediation in order to reconcile the two civil society groups, but the mediation failed eventually.
65 MBDHP, Droits humains au Burkina Faso : Rapport 2014. Ouagadougou, 2014, p. 13.
66 The commission had five sub-committees in charge of the following themes: political and constitutional reforms; electoral reforms; Medias reforms, truth, justice and reconciliation; public finances; and protection of public assets.
67 See Diallo M, ‘Front social: la CCVC appelle à une journée de protestation le 8 avril’, 3 April 2015, www.lefaso.net.
68 Sawadogo T, ‘Baisse “ insignifiante” du prix des hydrocarbures : La CCVC annonce un sit-in le 4 février’, 29 January 2015, www.lefaso.net.
69 See MBDHP, Report on human rights in Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou, 2015, p. 11.
70 Saidou A K, ‘Burkina Faso: où en est la réforme de l’armée deux ans après l’insurrection populaire?’, Note d’analyse du GRIP, 12 January 2017.
71 ICG, Nine Months to Achieve the Transition. Report no. 222/Africa, 28 January 2015, p. 3.
72 See Communiqué of the Council of Ministers, 16 March 2015, www.lobservateur.bf.
73 See Saidou A K, ‘Modes d’alternance and consolidation démocratique en Afrique’, Afrilex, 6 February 2017.
74 See the report about the performance of the transition parliament, http://archives.assembleenationale.bf.
75 See Lydia Rouamba, ‘La transition au Burkina Faso: la société civile est-elle sensible au genre’, www.lefaso.net
76 Ibid.
77 Interview at Ouagadougou with Luc Marius Ibriga, 6 September 2017.
78 Sy C, De l’insurrection au perchoir : Chronique d’un engagement citoyen. Ouagadougou : Les éditions Bendré, 2007, p. 162.
79 In 2002, Civil society organisations in Burkina Faso were organized into 11 components, as follows: (a) women’s organisations; (b) research and training organisations; (c) trade unions; (d) religious organisations; (e) human rights and specific organisations; (f) private medias organisations; (g) non-governmental organisations and development organisations; (h) youth organisations; (i) vulnerable group organisations; (j) peasant organisations; (k) cultural organisations. See Loada A, La gouvernance des organisations de la société civile au Burkina Faso, www.spong.bf
80 Interview at Ouagadougou with Luc Marius Ibriga, 6 September 2017.
81 It is very significant to notice that the ministers kidnapped were from civil society. This means that the RSP was conscious of their power in the system.
82 See Jean Baptiste Ouédraogo’s interview in the Newspaper L’Observateur Paalga released on 29 October 2015.
83 Sy C, Burkindlum : Mes cahiers de la résistance au putsch de septembre 2015 au Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou : Les éditions Bendré, 2017, p. 40.
84 In February 2015, the RSP rejected decisions made by President Kafando about the security of the presidency and imposed its own officers on the president. In July, the RSP created further tension and forced the president to reshuffle the transitional government out of which the Prime Minister Zida lost the defence ministry and was forced to fire Colonel Auguste Barry, who was Minister of Internal Security. See Saidou AK, ‘Burkina Faso: où en est-on avec la réforme de l’armée deux ans après l’insurrection populaire ?’ , Note d’analyse du GRIP. Bruxelles, 12 January 2017.
85 For example, Colonel Mamadou Bamba, the spokesman of the military junta during the September coup, was arrested in 2016. He is suspected of being involved in the assassination of a student leader, Dabo Boukary, in 1990 by the presidential guard. In the assassinations of Thomas Sankara in 1987 and Norbert Zongo in 1998, it has been established that the murderers were from the same military unit.
86 Sampana L, ‘La démilitarisation paradoxale du pouvoir politique au Burkina Faso’, in Augé A & A Gnanguênon (dir.), Les armées africaines et le pouvoir politique au sud du Sahara. Paris : Les Champs de Mars, 28 October 2015, pp. 34–49.
87 See their declaration at www.lefaso.net, 19 September 2015.
88 Sy C, Burkindlum : Mes cahiers de la résistance au putsch de septembre 2015 au Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou: Les éditions Bendré, 2017, p. 40.
89 See AU, Peace and Security Council, Communiqué 544th Meeting, 18 September 2015 , http://www.peaceau.org/.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Joint Communiqué of the International Group on the Monitoring and Support to the Burkina Faso Transition (GISAT-BF), 17 September 2015, http://www.ecowas.int/.
93 ISS, Burkina Faso: A test for the AU’s impact on crises, www.issafrica.org
94 Nathan L. ‘Marching orders: Exploring the mediation mandate’, African Security, 10, 2017, pp. 1–21.
95 Sy C, Burkindlum : Mes cahiers de la résistance au putsch de septembre 2015 au Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou: Les éditions Bendré, 2017, p. 71.
96 My personal notes of the debate during the Workshop on African peacepeeking seen from below organized by Point Sud and the CGD, Ouagadougou, 28 January 2017.
97 See the announcement made by the minister of foreign affairs of Benin on 6 September 2015 at www.newsaouaga.com
98 See Laurie Nathan, How and Why African Mediators Compromise Democracy, https://www.law.upenn.edu/
99 See the interview of Guy Hervé Kam at www.lexpress.fr
100 Interview with Harouna Kaboré, Ouagadougou, 14 September 2017.
101 My personal notes of the debate during the Workshop on African peacekeeping seen from below organized by Point Sud and the , Ouagadougou, 28 January 2017.
102 See ECOWAS, Communiqué of the Heads of States Summit, Abuja, 22 September 2015, http://news.ecowas.int/.
103 The reluctance of the chief of staff of the army to react to the coup d’état was explained by the fact the RSP was the most powerful military unit of the country. During the 2011 mutiny, the RSP took a large part of arms and ammunitions from other military units, thus creating a disequilibrium in terms of military power. See Bergezan G, ‘Dépenses militaires et importations d’armes dans cinq pays oust africains’, Note d’analyse du GRIP, 15 June 2016, p. 3.
104 Interview at Ouagadougou with Luc Marius Ibriga, 6 September 2017.
105 Sy C, Burkindlum : Mes cahiers de la résistance au putsch de septembre 2015 au Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou: Les éditions Bendré, 2017, p. 76.
106 The RSP attacked some private media like Radio Omega and forced the journalists to stop their activities.
107 Interview at Ouagadougou, 27 January 2017.
108 This raises the issue of the use of local resources and strategies in mediation. See Mwanasali M, ‘African conflict prevention strategies’, in Gaya S, (ed.), Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum, 2006, pp. 184–202.
109 The 22 September 2015 ECOWAS summit has requested the Heads of States of Niger, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo to attend this ceremony and to express ECOWAS’s support to the government and people of Burkina Faso. President Mack Sall was supposed to be the head of the delegation, but because of his controversial role he did not attend the ceremony, probably in order to prevent any hostile public demonstration.
110 Despite this official decision, some soldiers from RSP resisted and military action was taken on 29 September to force them to surrender.
111 Lederach J. P., Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliations in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1997.
112 He made this statement during a public conference I attended at Ouagadougou on 16 September 2017. The event was organized to celebrate the September 2015 popular resistance.
113 My personal notes of the debate during the Workshop on African peacepeeking seen from below organized by Point Sud and the CGD, Ouagadougou, 28 January 2017.
114 See Banégas R, ‘Putsch et politique de la rue au Burkina Faso’, Politique africaine, 139, 2015, pp. 147–70.
115 Bazié JH, De l’insurrection à la législation au ‘ Pays des hommes intègres’ . Ouagadougou : Les Presses Africaines, 2015.
116 Interview at Ouagadougou with Luc Marius Ibriga, 6 September 2017.
117 Paffenholz T, ‘Civil society’, in Chétail V (ed.), Post Conflict Peace Building: A Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 61–73.
118 On the issue of dispute over mandates, see Nathan L. ‘Marching orders: Exploring the mediation mandate’, African Security, 2017, pp. 1–21.
119 Interview at Ouagadougou, 14 September 2017.
120 He asked Madiambal Ndiaye, a Senegalese journalist and friend of him, who was attending a media international workshop at Ouagadougou, to contact president Macky Sall. See Sy C, Burkindlum : Mes cahiers de la résistance au putsch de septembre 2015 au Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou: Les éditions Bendré, 2017, pp. 67–8.
121 CGD, L’alternance et les règles du jeu démocratique. Ouagadougou: CGD, 2009.
122 . ‘From an ECOWAS of states to ECOWAS of peoples’ has become an official leitmotiv of the regional organisation, http://ecowas.int/.
123 My personal notes of the debate during the Workshop on African peacepeeking seen from below organized by Point Sud and the CGD, Ouagadougou, 28 January 2017.
124 Another proposal was to introduce presidential term limit in the Protocol as a way to address constitutional crisis in the region. On 21 May 2015 during an ECOWAS summit at Accra, Gambia and Togo voted against the proposal, and then blocked the whole reform.
125 Interview at Ouagadougou, 6 September 2017.
126 See Nathan L, How and Why African Mediators Compromise Democracy, https://www.law.upenn.edu/.
127 Sy C, Burkindlum : Mes cahiers de la résistance au putsch de septembre 2015 au Burkina Faso. Ouagadougou: Les éditions Bendré, 2017, p. 76.
128 Interview at Ouagadougou, 14 September 2017.
129 Beer J & PE Stief, The Mediator’s Handbook. Gabriola Island: New Study, 1997, pp. 134–5.
130 See also Witt A, ‘Mandate impossible: Mediation and the return to constitutional order in Madagascar (2009–2013)’, African Security, 10.3–4, 2017, pp. 205–22.
131 Sampson PR, ‘Conceptual shifts in multi-track mediation in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Engel U (ed.), New Mediation Practices in African Conflicts. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitatsverlag, 2012, pp. 237–54.
132 Banégas R, ‘Putsch et politique de la rue au Burkina Faso’, Politique africaine, 139, 2015, pp. 147–70.
133 Paffenholz T, ‘Civil society and peace negotiations: Beyond the inclusion–exclusion dichotomy’, Negotiation Journal, January 2014, pp. 74–6.
134 Lanz D, ‘Who gets a seat at the table? A framework for understanding the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations’, International Negotiation 16, 2011, pp. 275–95.
135 Ibid., p. 289.
136 Ibid., p. 285.
137 Schumpeter J, Capitalisme, socialisme et démocratie. Paris : Payot, 1972.