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ABSTRACT
How does the African Union (AU) generate knowledge about on-going violent conflict as well as post-conflict situations? This article offers an analysis of the multiple sites and sources in the construction of conflict-related knowledge. It also reflects on the various institutional ways this knowledge is filtered into the activities of a wide range of AU actors, starting with the AU Commission, the AU Commission Chairperson and the Peace and Security Council. Emphasis is on the development of the Continental Early Warning System and some of its limitations, the latter partly related to the specific organisational culture of the African Union.
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to very constructive comments on an earlier draft by Gerhard Mai and Abulkadir Taye (both Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) as well as Antonia Witt (Frankfurt/Main, Germany) and João Gomes Porto (Lisbon). I also gratefully acknowledge the support of Eva Ommert (Leipzig) for her assistance in language editing. As always, any errors or misrepresentations are my own.
Notes on contributor
Trained as a political scientist and historian, Ulf Engel is a professor of ‘Politics in Africa’ at the Institute of African Studies in Leipzig, Germany. He is director of the PhD Graduate School of the Collaborative Research Group 1199 ‘Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition’. Engel also is a visiting professor at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University, a professor extraordinary in the Department of Political Science at Stellenbosch University and a fellow at the Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Studies.
Notes
1 OAU (Organization of African Unity), Constitutive Act of the African Union. Lomé 2000: OAU, 3(f), 4(e).
2 The term ‘organizational culture’ is a common good – yet there is no consensus on what is actually means. See Watkins MD, ‘What is organizational culture? And why should we care?’, Harvard Business Review, 15 May 2013, https://hbr.org/2013/05/what-is-organizational-culture (accessed 25 October 2017). In this article, I am applying an ideational notion of organizational culture with a focus on shared meanings and symbols. See Allaire Y & ME Firsirotu, ‘Theories of organizational culture’, Organization Studies, 5.3, 1984, pp. 193–226. The emphasis on shared values, norms, roles and expectations follows the symbolic school as represented by Geertz C, The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books, 1973, who defines culture as ‘the fabric of meanings in terms of which human beings interpret their existence and guide their action’ (p. 145).
3 For a detailed account see AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa. Assembly/AU/Dec.598 (XXVI). Addis Ababa: AU, 29 January 2016. For an update see also AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa. Assembly/AU/Dec.629 (XXVIII). Addis Ababa: AU, 31 January 2017.
4 For other examples and a developing body of methodological literature see Kent A, ‘China, international organizations and regimes, the ILO as a case study in organizational learning’, Pacific Affairs, 70.4, 1997–1998, pp. 517–32; and Siebenhüner B, ‘Learning in international organizations in global environmental governance’, Global Environmental Politics, 4.8, 2008, pp. 92–116.
5 See Finnemore M & K Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, International Organization, 52.4, 1998, pp. 887–917.
6 See U Engel, ‘The changing role of the AU Commission in inter-African Relations – The case of APSA and AGA’, in Harbeson JW & D Rothchild (eds) Africa in World Politics, 5th edn. Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2013, pp. 186–206; and U Engel, ‘The African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture – From aspiration to operationalization’, in Harbeson JW & D Rothchild (eds) Africa in World Politics, 6th edn. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016, pp. 262–82. On recent assertions of member states’ prerogatives also see Hardt H, ‘From states to secretariats: Delegation in the African Union Peace and Security Council’, African Security, 9.3, 2016, pp. 161–87.
Development at the African Union, of course, cannot be seen in isolation of related, although not similar, learning processes that are also happening at the level of the United Nations, for instance on the issue of international peacekeeping operations. See Benner T, Binder A & P Rotmann, Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning. Developing a Research Framework. Osnabrück: Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, 2007; Benner T, S Mergenthaler & P Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; and Benner T & P Rotmann, ‘“Learning to Learn?” UN peacebuilding and the challenges of building a learning organization’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2.1, 2008, pp. 43–62.
7 African Union Commission Chairperson, Report of the AUC Chairperson on Terrorism and Violent Extremism. 455th PSC meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 2 September in Nairobi, Kenya. PSC/AHG/2 (CDLV), 2014; AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, ‘Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa’. Assembly/AU/Dec.598 (XXVI). Addis Ababa: AU, 29 January 2016; and AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, ‘Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa’. Assembly/AU/Dec.629 (XXVIII). Addis Ababa: AU, 31 January 2017. For the academic debate see Reno W, Warfare in Independent Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011; Williams PD, War and Conflict in Africa. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011; and Straus S, Making and Unmaking Nations. War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015.
8 Here, again I am referring to norms, values and standards (see footnote 3). The term ‘organizational culture’ is broader than the notion ‘security culture’ as developed by Williams PD, ‘From non-intervention to non-indifference: The origins and development of the African Union’s security culture’, African Affairs, 106.423, 2007, pp. 253–79. See also Williams PD, ‘The security culture of the African Union’, in Aris S & A Wenger (eds), Regional Organisations and Security. Conceptions and Practices. Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, pp. 21–40. Rather, the notion of ‘organizational culture’ is closer to Welz M, ‘A “culture of conservatism”: How and why African Union Member States obstruct the deepening of integration’, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 36.1 (2014), pp. 4–24.
9 See Fisher L et al., African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study. Addis Ababa: African Union, 2010; and Nathan L et al., African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 2014 Assessment Study. Final Report. Addis Ababa: AU, 2015.
10 See Conflict Management Division of the Peace and Security Department (AU CMD), African Union Continental Early Warning System. The CEWS Handbook. Addis Ababa: AU CMD, 2008.
11 This is according to the German international development organization GIZ’s ‘APSA impact assessment’, reflecting on the state of the art as of 2015. See GIZ, APSA Impact Assessment. The State and Impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015. Reporting Period 2015. Addis Ababa: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (mimeo), 2016, p. 7.
12 For a discussion of the epistemological foundations of knowledge on conflict in Africa and its production ‘in neo-liberal times’ see Bliesemann de Guevara B & R Kostić, ‘Knowledge production in/about conflict and intervention: Finding “facts”, telling “truth”’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 11.1, 2017, pp. 1–20.
13 This is not to say that early information easily translates into early action or the right action. Policy responses – and more so quick responses – by international organizations, as Hardt has demonstrated, are depending on formal rules and institutions as much as on a number of ‘soft issues’, including organizational culture and various types of informal institutionalization such as unspoken rules, informal norms and informal relations. See Hardt H, Time to React. The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
14 See, for instance, Barnett MN & M Finnemore, ‘The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations’, International Organization, 3.4, 1999, p. 707, who simply assume that international organizations have a ‘culture’ which is part of their social content.
15 African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Durban: AU, 2002.
16 See Wane E-G et al., ‘The continental early warning system methodology and approach’, in Engel U & J Gomes Porto (eds) Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture. Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions. Farnham: Ashgate, 2000, pp. 91–110.
17 African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Durban: AU, 2002, §12(1).
18 Ibid., §12(2).
19 Ibid., §12(5).
20 AU CMD, African Union Continental Early Warning System. The CEWS Handbook. Addis Ababa: AU CMD, 2008.
21 See, for instance, AU PSC (Peace and Security Council), ‘Communiqué of the 360th PSC meeting’. PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCLX). Addis Ababa, 22 March 2013; AU PSC, ‘Press Statement issued after the 476th PSC meeting’. PSC/PR/BR. (CDLXXVI). Addis Ababa, 16 December 2014; and AU PSC, ‘Communiqué of the 577st PSC meeting’. PSC/AHG/COMM.1 (DLXXVII). Addis Ababa, 29 January 2016.
22 AU, ‘Special Envoys of the Chairperson of the Commission’, http://www.au.int/en/cpauc/envoys (accessed 8 May 2017).
23 AU, ‘AU Liaison Offices’, http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-field-missions-and-liaison-offices (accessed 8 May 2017).
24 See Gomes Porto J & KY Ngandu, The African Union’s Panel of the Wise: A Concise History. Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2015.
25 AUC Chairperson, Report by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on current challenges to peace and security on the continent and the AU’s efforts ‘Enhancing Africa’s Leadership, Promoting African Solutions’ to the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government. EXT/ASSEMBLY/AU/2. Addis Ababa, 25–26 May 2011, §9.
26 See Gomes Porto J & KY Ngandu, The African Union’s Panel of the Wise: A Concise History. Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2015, pp. 138–42.
27 The African Peer Review Mechanism which is the centre piece of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) process, by now has been integrated into the African Union. See NEPAD, http://www.au.int/en/NEPAD (accessed 8 May 2017).
28 The early warning systems (EWSs) of the RECs include: the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA with COMWARN), the East African Community (EAC with EACWARN), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS with MARAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS with ECOWARN), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD with CEWARN), the Southern African Development Community (SADC with REWC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). These EWSs are in very different states of operationalization and integration with CEWS is advanced to different degrees – with COMWARN, CEWARN, ECOWARN and REWC having made the biggest progress in operationalizing regional EWSs and UMA without a functioning EWS yet.
29 Twitter posting, 24 October 2017: African Union Peace @AU_PSD Oct 24: #Ghana sets the pace in promot/g peace & security on the Continent by being 1st to launch the #CSVRA & #CSVMS-Minister of National Security.
30 See L. Hutton, ‘Regional security and intelligence cooperation in Africa: The potential contribution of the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services of Africa’, in Engel U & J Gomes Porto (eds) Towards an African Peace and Security Regime. Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, pp. 179–94.
31 CISSA, http://cissaau.org (accessed 8 May 2017).
32 See AU Commission, http://www.au.int/en/organs/commission (accessed 8 May 2017).
33 ACSRT, http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/2-3591-static-about-african-centre-for-study-and-research-on-terrorism-ACSRT (accessed 8 May 2017).
34 Ibid.
35 See AU PSC, ‘Communiqué of the 502nd PSC meeting’. PSC/PR/COMM 2 (DII). Addis Ababa, 29 April 2015.
36 Based on African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Durban: AU, 2002, §20 which states that African civil societies are part of CEWS.
37 Including Africa News Briefs, News Highlights, Daily Reports, Flash Reports and Briefing Notes as well as the regular Early Warning Reports that are addressed through the Director Peace and Security and the Commissioner of Peace and Security to the AUC Chairperson and the PSC. In addition, CEWS is contributing to the Chairperson’s reports to the PSC and the AU Assembly (the latter twice year) and – not yet existing – annual PSC reports to the Pan-African Parliament.
38 On the relevance of local knowledge for peacebuilding see Súilleabháin AÓ (ed.), Leveraging Local Knowledge for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Africa. New York: International Peace Institute, 2015.
39 See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, ‘They Know Everything We Do’. Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014.
40 Participant observation at the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, March 2016. See also Faris DM, Dissent and Revolution in a Digital Age. Social Media, Blogging and Activism in Egypt. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013; and Howard PN & MH Muzammil (eds.), Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
41 I am indebted to AU CEWS for an update on the CEWS tools, provided by e-mail on 10 January 2017.
42 For details see AU CMD, African Union Continental Early Warning System. The CEWS Handbook. Addis Ababa: AU CMD, 2008.
43 Discussion with senior PSD official, Addis Ababa, 3 October 2017.
44 See Barnett MN & M Finnemore, ‘The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations’, International Organization, 3.4, 1999, pp. 699–732.
45 Ibid., p. 700.
46 Ibid., p. 707.
47 Ibid., pp. 710–15.
48 S. Autesserre, Peaceland. Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 3.
49 Ibid., p. 6.
50 Ibid., p. 13.
51 According to Barnett, paternalistic peace-building is ineffective, coercive, imposing a certain reasoning, establishes relations and attitudes of superiority and inferiority, lacks consent and legitimacy and is undemocratic. See Barnett MN, ‘Peacebuilding and paternalism’, in Debiel T, T Held & U Schneckener (eds), Peacebuilding in Crisis. Rethinking Paradigms and Practices of Transnational Cooperation. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, pp. 25–40. See also Easterly WR, The Tyranny of Experts. Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor. New York: Basic Books, 2013.
52 Participant observation at the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, November 2016.
53 In the case of Rwanda in 1993/1994 the United Nations simply refused to think about a worst case scenario and accordingly was not prepared for what was to come in April 1994. See Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 1996. The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Synthesis Report. Copenhagen, http://reliefweb.int/report/rwanda/synthesis-report-joint-evaluation-emergency-assistance-rwanda (accessed 8 May 2017).
54 Participant observation at the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, November 2016.
55 See Barnett MN & M Finnemore, ‘The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations’, International Organization, 3.4, 1999, p. 721.
56 See Mehler A, ‘Peace and power-sharing: An not so obvious relationship’, African Affairs, 108.432, 2009, pp. 453–73.
57 OAU, Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government adopted at the OAU Summit. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI). Lomé, 10–12 July 2000; and AU Assembly, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Assembly/AU/Dec. 147 (VIII). Addis Ababa: AU, 2007.
58 A Witt, Ordering by Default. The Politics and Power of Post-coup Interventions in Africa. Unpublished PhD, University of Leipzig, 2016.
59 See AU Panel of the Wise, Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Africa. Opportunities and Challenges in the Fight Against Impunity. Report of the AU Panel of the Wise. New York: AU, International Peace Institute, 2013.
60 Austin A, ‘Early warning and the field: A cargo cult science?’, in Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (ed.) Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2014, p. 15, http://www.berghof-foundation.org/training/berghof-handbook-for-conflict-transformation/handbook-articles/conflict-analysis/ (accessed 8 May 2017).
61 See Barnett MN & M Finnemore, ‘The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations’, International Organization, 3.4, 1999, p. 722; and Bliesemann de Guevara B, ‘Introduction: Statebuilding and state-formation’ in Bliesemann de Guevara B, Statebuilding and State-formation. The Political Sociology of Intervention. Abingdon: Routledge 2012, pp. 1–19.
62 This point was raised in the first APSA assessment: Fisher L et al., African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 2010 Assessment Study. Addis Ababa: AU, 2010, pp. 62–5.
63 Participant observation at the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, September 2016.
64 Benner T, S Mergenthaler & P Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 30.
65 See Hardt H, Time to React. The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 70–71.
66 See Leininger J, A Strong Norm for Democratic Governance in Africa. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2014.
67 Participant observations at the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, March and November 2016.
68 See Lisakafu J, ‘Exploring the role of the Permanent Representative Committee within the African Union’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 23.2, 2016, pp. 225–41.
69 See Hardt H, Time to React. The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 80–82 and 151–2.
70 AU Assembly, ‘Decision on the outcome of the retreat of the Assembly of the African Union’, Dec. 605 (XXVII). Kigali, Rwanda: AU, 16–17 July 2016.
71 As shown, for instance, by the case of Ghana in the case of Country Structural Vulnerability Assessments (see above).
72 See Gomes Porto J & KY Ngandu, The African Union’s Panel of the Wise: A Concise History. Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2015, pp. 147–50.
73 Participant observation at the AU Commission, Addis Ababa, September 2016.
74 See Benner T, A Binder & P Rotmann, Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning. Developing a Research Framework. Osnabrück: Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, 2007; and Benner T, S Mergenthaler & P Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.