![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
In a 2017 UN report on the state of inequality in sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Africa was identified as the region with the highest rate of income inequality. Resource dependent states were also identified as having high rates of inequality, and illicit financial flows were identified in the report as a leading cause of inequality. Using Zimbabwe as a case study, this article critically assesses which tools are best for preventing illicit financial flows in order to achieve developmental equity in resource rich developing economies. The extent to which multinational companies currently comply with various financial disclosure rules is assessed through a review of two companies operating in Zimbabwe. The question that this article aims to ultimately answer is this: Can regulation serve as an effective mechanism to sufficiently tackle illicit financial flows and break the extractive-inequality link that is common across resource rich African countries?
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Fola Adeleke is a Senior Research Fellow with the Mandela Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa and an Atlantic Senior Fellow on Social and Economic Equity at the London School of Economics. He was recently Head of Research of the South African Human Rights Commission. He holds a PhD from Wits University and a LLM degree from the University of Cape Town. His latest work is a book that explores a human rights based approach to investment regulation in Africa published by Routledge in 2017.
Notes
1 AU/ECA, ‘Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa Commissioned by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2015’, accessed 29 December 2017, p. 15, <https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf≥.
2 It is important to note that ‘capital flight’ does not capture all IFFs and not all IFFs constitute capital flight though capital flight is mostly illicit consisting of money illegally acquired, transferred abroad with the aim of avoiding government regulation. (Ajayi SI & L Ndikumana, ‘Scale, Causes, and Effects of Capital Flight from Africa’, in Ajayi SI & L Ndikumana (eds), Capital Flight from Africa: Causes, Effects and Policy Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 3–4.
3 Ndikumana et al., ‘Capital Flight: Measurement and Drivers’, in Ajayi SI & L Ndikumana (eds), Capital Flight from Africa: Causes, Effects and Policy Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 15.
4 Ibid., p. 27.
5 Ibid., p. 26.
6 Odusola et al., Income Inequality Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa: Divergents, Determinants and Consequences, UNDP 2017, accessed 1 April 2019, <http://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/income-inequality-trends-in-sub-saharan-africa--divergence--dete.html>.
7 Bhorat et al., ‘Resource Dependence and Inequality in Africa: Impacts, Consequences and Potential Solutions’, in Odusola et al., ‘Income Inequality Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa: Divergents, Determinants and Consequences’ UNDP 2017, accessed 1 April 2019, <http://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/income-inequality-trends-in-sub-saharan-africa--divergence--dete.html>.
8 Malinga W, ‘From an Agro-Based to a Mineral Resources-Dependent Economy’: A Critical Review of the Contribution of Mineral Resources to the Economic Development of Zimbabwe’, Forum for Development Studies, 2018, pp. 71–95, p. 86; For more on Zimbabwe's economic problems, see The Economist ‘Zimbabwe faces its worst economic crisis in a decade’, 15 August 2019, <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/08/15/zimbabwe-faces-its-worst-economic-crisis-in-a-decade>; Raftopoulos B & I Phimister, ‘Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion’, Historical Materialism, 12, 4, 2004.
9 Paragraph 17–29, 2018 Budget statement, accessed 30 December 2018, <http://img.bulawayo24.com/pdf/2018_Budget_Statement_Final.pdf≥.
10 Transitional Stabilisation Programme Reform Agenda 2018–2020 para 13, accessed 1 April 2019, <https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Transitional-Stabilisation-Programme-Final.pdf>.
11 Malinga W, ‘From an Agro-Based to a Mineral Resources-Dependent Economy’, A Critical Review of the Contribution of Mineral Resources to the Economic Development of Zimbabwe, Forum for Development Studies, 2018, pp. 71–95, p. 88.
12 AUC/OECD Africa's Development Dynamics 2018: Growth, Jobs and Inequalities, AUC, Addis Ababa/OECD publishing, 2018, p. 93.
13 Ibid., p. 99.
14 Nkurunziza JD, ‘Illicit Financial Flows: A Constraint on Poverty Reduction in Africa’, 2012, Association of Concerned African Scholars Bulletin <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.361.667&rep=rep1&type=pdf≥ p. 16; Christiaensen L, Demery L, & Stefano Paternostro ‘Macro and Micro Perspectives of Growth and Poverty in Africa’, The World Bank Economic Review, 17, 3, 2003, pp. 317–347.
15 AUC/OECD Africa's Development Dynamics 2018: Growth, Jobs and Inequalities, AUC, Addis Ababa/OECD publishing, 2018, p. 91.
16 While the effect of economic sanctions are debatable, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) released a statement on February 11 2019 stating that Zimbabwe's ‘efforts to transform the economy and bring about prosperity to the people of Zimbabwe are negatively affected by the illegal sanctions that were imposed on the country since the early 2000.’ <https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/statement-sadc-chairperson-his-excellency-dr-hage-g-geingob-president-republic-namibia-political-and-socio-economic-situation-zi/≥ (accessed 30 August 2019); See also Moyo S, ‘Economic Isolation is Hindering Zimbabwe's Transformation’, Foreign Policy, 21 August 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/21/economic-isolation-is-hindering-zimbabwes-transformation≥; Grebe J, ‘And they are Still Targeting: Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions against Zimbabwe’, Africa Spectrum, 45, 1, 2010, pp. 3–29.
17 Hawkings T & D Pilling, ‘How Zimbabwe's Economy was Brought to the Brink of Collapse’, Financial Times, 19 November 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/5fe10fea-cd13-11e7-b781-794ce08b24dc>.
18 AUC/OECD Africa's Development Dynamics 2018: Growth, Jobs and Inequalities, AUC, Addis Ababa/OECD publishing, 2018, p. 97.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 98.
21 Ibid., p. 106.
22 Transitional Stabilisation Programme Reform Agenda 2018–2020 para 14, accessed 1 April 2019, <https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Transitional-Stabilisation-Programme-Final.pdf>.
23 Background interviews on Zimbabwe's political economy and regulatory regime were conducted with academics, civil society activists and practicing lawyers. None of the interviewees was directly quoted in this article.
24 Wales-Smith S, ‘Dody Mine Moguls New Zim Play’, Mail & Guardian Online, 25 May 2018, <https://mg.co.za/article/2018-05-25-00-dodgy-mine-moguls-new-zim-play≥.
25 On 30 July 2019, following a trial at a criminal court in Monrovia, Liberia, the accused were acquitted on all charges, but an appeal is pending. ‘Sherman Tyler, others acquitted in alleged bribery case, Liberian Observer, 31 July 2019, <https://www.liberianobserver.com/news/sherman-tyler-others-acquitted-in-alleged-bribery-case/>.
26 Global Witness, ‘The Deceivers 2016’, accessed 9 August 2018, <https://www.globalwitness.org/thedeceivers/>.
27 Contango Holdings, ‘Memorandum of Understanding Signed for Acquisition of Mining Project in Zimbabwe Suspension of listing in the Company's Shares,’ accessed 7 August 2018, <https://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/news/market-news/market-news-detail/CGO/13475587.html>.
28 Chang Ha-Joon, Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. New York: Bloomsbury University Press, 2007.
29 Piketty T, Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
30 AU/ECA, ‘Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa Commissioned by the Au/eca Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2015’, accessed 29 December 2017, p. 15 <https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf≥.
31 Ibid., p. 23.
32 Ibid., p. 15.
33 Ibid., p. 24.
34 According to Transparency International,
tax evasion is the illegal non-payment or under-payment of taxes, usually by deliberately making a false declaration or no declaration to tax authorities – such as by declaring less income, profits or gains than the amounts earned, or by overstating deductions. It entails criminal or civil legal penalties. Tax avoidance is the legal practice of seeking to minimise a tax bill by taking advantage of a loophole or exception to the rules or adopting an unintended interpretation of the tax code. It usually refers to the practice of seeking to avoid paying tax by adhering to the letter of the law but opposed to the spirit of the law. Proving intention is difficult; therefore, the dividing line between avoidance and evasion is often unclear. accessed 30 December 2018, <https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/tax_evasion≥
35 Abusive transfer pricing is a situation where a multinational corporation takes advantage of the several companies in a group domiciled in different countries to move profits by one company to another in a different jurisdiction within the group of companies.
36 Trade mispricing/misinvoicing involves the deliberate falsifying of price, quality and quantity values of traded goods with the intention to evade levies, duties and taxes. It involves manipulating international trade prices through over-invoicing of imports and the under-invoicing of exports.
37 Transparency International defines this as the erosion of a national tax base and one process by which this happens. This process is when multinational companies shift the profits generated in the country outside and into jurisdictions such as offshore financial centres with lower or zero tax, thus minimising their tax burden. This practice is legal, but aside from eroding the tax base of countries where the profits have been made it also creates an unbalanced playing field, since small and medium sized businesses do not normally have access to these profit shifting schemes and therefore pay much higher taxes than multinationals; accessed 30 December 2018, <https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/base_erosion_and_profit_shifting>.
38 Publish What You Pay, ‘Policy Brief on Double Taxation Agreements: The Case of Zimbabwe 2017’, accessed June 17 2018, <http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/pwyp-resources/policy-brief-double-taxation-agreements-zimbabwe/≥; Sibanda M, ‘Mineral Revenue Transparency Reforms-Priorities for the new government 2017’, accessed 30 September 2018, <https://mukasirisibanda.wordpress.com/2017/12/29/mineral-revenue-transparency-reforms-priorities-for-the-new-government/≥.
39 Nkurunziza JD, ‘Illicit Financial Flows: A Constraint on Poverty Reduction in Africa’, Association of Concerned African Scholars Bulletin, 2012, p. 17, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.361.667&rep=rep1&type=pdf≥.
40 AU/ECA, ‘Report of the high level panel on illicit financial flows from Africa commissioned by the AU/ECA conference of ministers of finance, planning and economic development 2015’, accessed 29 December 2017, p. 42 <https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf≥.
41 Ndikumana et al., ‘Capital Flight: Measurement and Drivers’, in Ajayi SI & L Ndikumana (eds), Capital Flight from Africa: Causes, Effects and Policy Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 22.
42 Ndikumana's research notes that this is a bigger problem with oil rich countries. Ndikumana & Sarr, ‘Capital flight and Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: An Investigation of the Role of Natural Resource Endowment’ WIDER Working Paper 2016/58 pp. 3. See also Kwaramba M, N Mahonye & L Mandishara, ‘Capital Flight and Trade Misinvoicing in Zimbabwe’, African Development Review, 28, S1, 2016, pp. 50–64.
43 Ibid., p. 4.
44 Mukeredzi T, ‘Zimbabwe's Rich Fuel Inequality Through Illicit Financial Flows’, Inter Press Service, October 2014, accessed 17 July 2019, < http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/10/zimbabwes-richfuel-inequality-through-illicit-financial-flows/≥.
45 Kwaramba M, N Mahonye & L Mandishara, ‘Capital Flight and Trade Misinvoicing in Zimbabwe’, African Development Review, 28, S1, 2016, pp. 61–62.
46 AU/ECA, ‘Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa Commissioned by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2015’, accessed 29 December 2017, p. 58, <https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf≥.
47 Ibid.
48 Ajayi S, ‘Capital Flight and Economic Development in Africa’, in Ajayi SI & L Ndikumana (eds), Capital Flight from Africa: Causes, Effects and Policy Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 60.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 61.
51 Nkurunziza, JD, ‘Illicit Financial Flows: A Constraint on Poverty Reduction in Africa. Association of Concerned African Scholars Bulletin’, 2012, p. 18, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.361.667&rep=rep1&type=pdf≥.
52 OXFAM reported in 2017 that Nigeria's richest man earns enough interest on his wealth annually to life 2 million people out of poverty-OXFAM ‘Reward Work, Not Wealth 2017’, p. 10, accessed 9 August 2018, <https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-reward-work-not-wealth-220118-summ-en.pdf>.
53 There is little evidence that suggests tax incentives increases foreign tax investment. In a research report prepared by the OECD, majority of companies indicated that they would nevertheless have invested in a country where no tax incentives existed.
54 Ndikumana and Boyce, ‘Strategies for Addressing Capital Flight’ in Ajayi SI & L Ndikumana (eds), Capital Flight from Africa: Causes, Effects and Policy Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
55 Nhlapo, ‘The effectiveness of the current regulatory regime in curbing illicit capital outflows by multinational companies in South Africa’ 2018, LLM Thesis Wits University, p. 24.
56 OECD, ‘Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: Measuring OECD Responses 2014’, accessed 9 August 2018, <https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries.pdf>.
57 Africa Union, ‘African Mining Vision 2009’, accessed 30 August 2019, pp. 15–16, <http://www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/Africa_Mining_Vision_English.pdf≥.
58 Ajayi S, ‘Capital Flight and Economic Development in Africa’, in Ajayi SI & L Ndikumana (eds), Capital Flight from Africa: Causes, Effects and Policy Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 70.
59 Ibid., p. 74.
60 Nkurunziza JD, ‘Illicit Financial Flows: A Constraint on Poverty Reduction in Africa’, Association of Concerned African Scholars Bulletin, 2012, p. 16. <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.361.667&rep=rep1&type=pdf≥.
61 Boyce & Ndikumana, ‘Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries: Updated Estimates, 1970 – 2010’, Political Economy Research Institute, 2012, p. 9.
62 Ibid., pp. 19–22.
63 Ibid., p. 10.
64 Transitional Stabilisation Programme Reform Agenda 2018–2020 para 545.
65 Publish What You Pay, ‘Position paper on key mining reforms in Zimbabwe’ (2015), p. 2, accessed 12 June 2018, <http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/pwyp-resources/position-paper-on-mining-reforms-in-zimbabwe/>.
66 BBC, ‘Zimbabwe's Mnangagwa offers amnesty for funds stashed abroad’, accessed 10 July 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42155439>.
67 Transitional Stabilisation Programme Reform Agenda 2018–2020 para 544, accessed 1 April 2019, <https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Transitional-Stabilisation-Programme-Final.pdf>.
68 Zimbabwe Budget Statement 2018, accessed 5 April 2019, <https://www.parlzim.gov.zw/administration/clerk-of-parliament/clerk-s-blog/download/2254_2a2a961b96f3a47ba3c105e8d51d710d> para 513.
69 Mtomba V, ‘Illicit Financial Flows Cost Zim $500 Million’, The Standard Online, 25 December 2015, <https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2015/12/27/illicit-financial-flows-cost-zim-500-million/≥.
70 Peter E, ‘Digging for the missing $15 billion in diamond revenue in Zimbabwe’, accessed 11 July 2018, <http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/digging-for-the-missing-15-billion-of-diamond-revenue-in-zimbabwe/>.
71 ‘Transitional Stabilisation Programme Reform Agenda 2018–2020’ para 36, accessed 1 April 2019, <https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Transitional-Stabilisation-Programme-Final.pdf>.
72 Second Report of the Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy on the diamond sector in Zimbabwe for the period 2009–2016 (S.C. 15, 2018), accessed 12 July 2018, <http://www.openparly.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Report-on-the-Missing-15-Billion-Diamond-Revenues-revised.pdf>.
73 Ibid.
74 ‘Illicit Financial Flows – Funds Externalised through Non-Repatriation Of Export Proceeds’, The Herald, March 2018, accessed 19 March 2018, ≤https://www.herald.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/03/Externalisers-of-Funds-min.pdf≥.
75 ‘Mnangagwa's list: big yawn’, NewsdzeZimbabwe, March 2018, accessed 19 March 2018, <http://www.newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk/2018/03/mnangagwas-list-big-yawn.html>.
76 Kaduwo T, ‘Strengthen Financial Regulatory Bodies’, The Independent, March 2018, accessed 10 July, 2018, <https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/03/02/strengthen-fiscal-regulatory-bodies/>.
77 Sibanda M, ‘The Panama Papers: Zimbabwe must not waste this opportunity’, accessed 10 July 2018, <http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/the-panama-papers-zimbabwe-must-not-waste-this-opportunity/>.
78 This is evident from the 2017 parliamentary inquiry into the alleged missing $15 billion with Parliament acknowledging that the Minister of Mines has a tall order ensuring accountability in the mining industry. Note Second Report of the Portfolio Committee on Mines and Energy on the diamond sector in Zimbabwe for the period 2009–2016 (S.C. 15, 2018), accessed 12 July 2018, <http://www.openparly.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Report-on-the-Missing-15-Billion-Diamond-Revenues-revised.pdf>.
79 Muyambwa DF, ‘Of the ‘lost’ 15 billion diamond revenue and why Zimbabwe, now more than ever, should consider the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative’, accessed 11 July, 2018, <http://darlingtonfarai.blogspot.com/>.
80 ‘Zim's $4,2bn game changer … 90 000 jobs … timelines given’, Sunday Mail, 7 March 2018, <http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/zims-42bn-game-changer-90-000-jobs-timelines-given/≥.
81 Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe ‘Monetary Policy Statement 2018’, accessed 9 August 2018, <http://www.rbz.co.zw/assets/monetary-policy-february-2018-.pdf>.
82 Trepelkov T & M Verdi, ‘Design and assessment of tax incentives in developing countries’, United Nations, 2018, accessed 30 August 2019, <https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/tax-incentives_eng.pdf>. The authors conclude that ‘tax incentives by nature are base-eroding tax measures and violate the three basic principles of tax optimization: efficiency, equity and simplicity.’ However, tax incentives may be justified only if such programs can pass cost-benefit assessments of both economic and revenue impacts that are worth attempting or preserving. pp. 108–109.
83 Sibanda M, ‘Analysis of the 2018 Monetary Policy Statement’, February 2018, accessed 12 July 2018, <https://mukasirisibanda.wordpress.com/2018/02/13/analysis-of-the-2018-monetary-policy-statement-a-focus-on-mineral-export-incentives/>.
84 Deloitte ‘Corporate Tax Rates 2018’, accessed 1 August 2018, <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-corporate-tax-rates.pdf>.
85 Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). There was a five year period (2009–2014) when the ZANU-PF entered into a power sharing agreement with the opposition party MDC and co-governed. See Smith-Höhn J, ‘Unpacking the Zimbabwean Crisis: A Situation Report’ Institute for Security Studies, 2009, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Zim10Sep09.pdf>.
86 Moyo S, ‘Corruption in Zimbabwe: An examination of the roles of the state and civil society in combatting corruption’ 2014, PhD Thesis University of Central Lancashire, p. 126.
87 The military activities of Zimbabwe in the Democratic Republic of Congo to support former President Kabila was also regarded as an expensive exercise affecting Zimbabwe's finances. See Hawkings T & D Pilling, ‘How Zimbabwe's Economy was Brought to the Brink of Collapse’, Financial Times, 19 November 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/5fe10fea-cd13-11e7-b781-794ce08b24dc>.
88 Moyo S, ‘Corruption in Zimbabwe: An Examination of the Roles of the State and Civil Society in Combatting Corruption’ 2014, PhD Thesis University of Central Lancashire, pp. 6–7.
89 Smith D, ‘Mugabe and Allies own 40% of Land Seized from White Farmers – Inquiry’, The Guardian, 30 November 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/zimbabwe-mugabe-white-farmers>.
90 Freedom House, ‘Report on Zimbabwe 2014’, accessed 18 July 2019, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2014/zimbabwe#.VOIWK3ZwafA>.
91 Global Witness, ‘Return of the Blood Diamond: The deadly race to control Zimbabwe's new-found diamond wealth’, accessed 18 July 2019, <https://sitemedia.globalwitness.org/archive/files/pdfs/return_of_blood_diamond.pdf>.
92 Chan S, ‘Zimbabwe's First Mugabe-free Election: Mnangagwa Promises Western Cash, but Little Else’, The Conversation, July 2018, accessed 30 August 2019, <https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-first-mugabe-free-election-mnangagwa-promises-western-cash-but-little-else-99228>.
93 For an analysis on Zimbabwe's current political and economic situation, see Rotberg R, ‘Zimbabwe's Economy is Collapsing: Why Mnangagwa doesn't have the Answers', The Conversation, October 2018, accessed 30 August 2019, <https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-economy-is-collapsing-why-mnangagwa-doesnt-have-the-answers-104960>. Rotberg argues that a starting point to stop Zimbabwe’s economic decline is to acknowledge corrupt dealings that characterized the Mugabe government and repatriate all the IFFs that left the country.
94 Southall R, ‘Bond Notes, Borrowing, and Heading for Bust: Zimbabwe's Persistent Crisis', Canadian Journal of African Studies 51: 3; Pilling D, ‘Zimbabwe's Economic Crisis has Reached a Breaking Point’, Financial Times, accessed 30 August 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/ecae3702-bde1-11e9-89e2-41e555e96722>.
95 The Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act and the accompanying Regulations requires all Foreign owned business entities with a capital value of more than $500,000 to ensure that at least 51% of their shares are relinquished to local Zimbabweans.
96 Dzirutwe M, ‘Zimbabwe's Mnangagwa says new investment law to open economy’, Reuters 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-says-new-investment-law-to-open-economy-idUSKBN1HP1S6>.
97 Act 38 of 1961.
98 Section 7 (3) of the law provides that six additional members shall be appointed by the Minister of Mines, four, of whom two shall be small-workers, submitted by the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe; one submitted by the Commercial Farmers’ Union of Zimbabwe; and one shall be a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Zimbabwe who is publicly practicing. None of these 6 appointees are required to have any significant experience that will aid the implementation of the mandate of the Board.
99 The main aim of the law is the beneficial use of mineral resources. Several reports have dealt with the legal regime of the mineral sector in Zimbabwe. See, for example, Ndamba and Chisaira, ‘Responsible Investment in the Natural Resources Sector: An Analytical Profile of the Mining Sector in Zimbabwe’, 2016, Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association publication.
100 Act 4 of 2013.
101 Section 13, Act 4 of 2013.
102 Section 2(2) (a), Act 4 of 2013.
103 Section 13, Act 4 of 2013.
104 Chapter 23: 06.
105 Deloitte ‘Corporate Tax Rates 2018’, accessed 1 August 2018, <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-corporate-tax-rates.pdf>.
106 Ibid.
107 Act 14 of 2007.
108 Sect 2 (1), Act 14 of 2007. See also, Osode P & T Warikandwa, ‘Regulating against Business “Fronting” to Advance Black Economic Empowerment in Zimbabwe’, Lessons from South Africa Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 20, 1, 2017, p. 9.
109 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
110 USAID, ‘Gap analysis of mineral revenue disclosure and the information needs of various stakeholders’, 2016, p. 11.
111 Section 12. It provides for disclosure of critical data necessary at arriving at discounted cash flow or Net Present Value (NPV) mining economic model.
112 Zimplats, ‘2017 Integrated Annual Report’, accessed 8 April 2019, <https://www.zimplats.com/data/2017/10/AR2017.pdf>.
113 Ibid., p. 33.
114 Sibanda M, ‘Analysis of Zimplats 2017 integrated annual report’, accessed 8 April 2019, <https://mukasirisibanda.wordpress.com/2017/09/25/analysis-of-zimplats-2017-integrated-annual-report-11-things-that-csos-can-learn/>; <https://www.pressreader.com/zimbabwe/the-sunday-mail-zimbabwe/20160207/281505045259529>.
115 Zimplats, ‘2018 Integrated Annual Report’, accessed 9 Aril 2019, <https://www.zimplats.com/data/2018/09/ar2018.pdf>.
116 Zimplats, ‘2017 Integrated Annual Report’, accessed 8 April 2019, p. 84, <https://www.zimplats.com/data/2017/10/AR2017.pdf>.
117 ZIMPLATS (Pvt) Ltd v ZIMRA & Another (HC 12292/11, HH 169-15) [2015] ZWHHC 169; Sibanda M, ‘Tax Incentives can Puncture Efforts to Revamp Public Service Delivery’, accessed 10 September 2018, <https://mukasirisibanda.wordpress.com/2018/09/16/tax-incentives-can-puncture-efforts-to-revamp-public-service-delivery/>.
118 Karombo T, ‘Court orders a $9m refund of Zimplats levies’, accessed 10 October 2018, <https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/court-orders-a-9m-refund-of-zimplats-levies-17121625>.
119 Section 6.
120 Section 2.
121 Caledonia Mining, ‘Blanket Gold Mine Overview’, accessed 3 October 2018, <http://www.caledoniamining.com/index.php/operations/blanket-gold-mine?limitstart=0≥.
122 Various civil society organisations and international bodies have advocated country-by-country reporting. This includes the EITI, Tax Justice Network, OECD among others.
123 Publish What You Pay, ‘Policy Briefing’, accessed 9 August 2018, <https://www.publishwhatyoupay.no/sites/all/files/PWYP_PolicyBriefing_Eng_Web_0.pdf≥.
124 See, for example, South Africa's Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017.
125 European Parliament recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion (2016/3044(RSP)).
126 See also <https://www.open-contracting.org/why-open-contracting/≥.
127 Open Contracting Guiding Principles were developed by the Open Contracting Partnership in 2013 and endorsed by the World Bank Institute.
128 ‘Transitional Stabilisation Programme Reform Agenda 2018–2020’ para 1015, accessed 1 April 2019, <https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Transitional-Stabilisation-Programme-Final.pdf>.
129 Bello O, ‘Africa's Extractive Governance Architecture: Lessons to Inform a Shifting Agenda’, SAIIA Policy Briefing 2014.
130 Clause 16 of the current Bill requires the establishment of the Mining Cadastre Office with exclusive authority and jurisdiction over the whole country to document holders of mining rights, details of such rights, prescribed fees paid by right holders, location and coordinates of any mining right and title among others.
131 Bhorat et al., ‘Resource Dependence and Inequality in Africa: Impacts, Consequences and Potential Solutions’, in Odusola et al., Income Inequality Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa: Divergents, Determinants and Consequences, UNDP 2017, accessed 1 April 2019, <http://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/income-inequality-trends-in-sub-saharan-africa--divergence--dete.html>.