Club governance and legitimacy: The perspective of old and rising powers on the G7 and the G20

ABSTRACT

Club governance is among the most contested of global governance approaches. This article investigates legitimacy evaluations of two informal governance clubs from the perspective of both old powers and rising powers. It examines how legitimate the G7/G8 and the G20 are perceived to be and which (de-)legitimation criteria are used in the context of these summit regimes, assessing how legitimacy evaluations in the media vary across these two settings, across different types of actors and over time. The article shows that rising powers challenge certain aspects of the global order more than old powers. While the criteria linked to output legitimacy, such as effectiveness, tend to be more prominent than criteria on input legitimacy, such as participation, the latter seem to be more important for rising powers than for old powers. This article contributes to the various bodies of literature on club governance, the legitimacy of international institutions and the role of rising powers in global governance.

KEYWORDS:

• Global governance
• G20
• G7
• club governance
• legitimacy
• legitimation
• rising powers

Introduction

The Group of 20 (G20) and the Group of 7 (G7), formerly the Group of 8 (G8), have in recent times offered one of the most contested approaches to global governance.¹ This article investigates the legitimacy of these informal institutions, putting a focus on the perspective of both old (ie, members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD) and rising powers. While the economic growth of rising powers such as the IBSA states (India, Brazil and South Africa) and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)² has been widely discussed, more and more emphasis has also been placed on the political dimensions of their rise, for instance in the context of the G20. Whereas the role of the rising powers in global governance has become a subject of considerable scrutiny,³ their view on the legitimacy of international institutions and global governance has not yet been the subject of much detailed study.

In this article, legitimacy is understood as perceptions or beliefs of audiences that an ‘institution’s exercise of authority is appropriate’ and legitimation and delegitimation are defined as processes of strengthening or weakening the legitimacy of institutions.⁴ Legitimacy is key for international organisations and institutions in global governance more generally. For instance, legitimacy can safeguard compliance with rules developed by international organisations and ensure their capacity to create new rules.⁵ Yet, when the legitimacy of an institution is contested, government support for that institution is likely to be weakened, thus undermining its ability to shape global cooperation.⁶ In spite of the importance of legitimacy for international organisations, the dynamics and drivers of legitimacy beliefs and the patterns of legitimation have received insufficient attention in empirical analyses so far. Against this background, this article examines the dynamics of legitimation in global economic governance by putting the spotlight on media discourses about the legitimacy of club governance.

Analysing patterns of legitimacy evaluations in the media is important for several reasons. The media is a central venue for elites to communicate their various views on legitimacy⁷. The resulting legitimacy debates can affect public discussion,⁸ are a key source of cues for citizens forming their legitimacy beliefs on international institutions⁹ and have the potential to generate pressure on the representatives of international institutions to reform their institutional set-up.¹⁰ Legitimacy communication in the media is thus a key element of the process of legitimation of international organisations and hence of significant relevance for global cooperation.

This article assesses the legitimacy of the G7/G8 and the G20, which are at the centre of heated debates in international relations.¹¹ While the G7/G8 and the G20 may be less formal and less institutionalised than other international institutions, a lower degree of institutionalisation is exactly what is typical of various international regimes in the current world order.¹² That world order is characterised by multi-level and network governance, in which summit diplomacy and clubs such as the G7/G8 and the G20 play an increasingly important role.¹³

The article investigates the legitimacy evaluations of the G7/G8 and the G20 in newspaper articles and assesses how evaluations of legitimacy vary across these two settings and how they vary over time. It also assesses the extent to which legitimacy perspectives vary across different types of speakers, ie, the persons who are the sources of the examined legitimacy evaluations. Above all, this article examines whether legitimacy evaluations vary depending on whether their source is a speaker from an old or a rising power. The study also sheds light on how legitimacy evaluations differ across various types of speakers, ie, journalists, representatives of international organisations, national politicians and representatives of civil society organisations. While the analysis also includes voices of ordinary citizens, the focus is on legitimacy evaluations of the elite, ie, the legitimacy communication of actors whose positions in society allow them to have a potential effect on political decision-making.¹⁴

This study shows that rising power actors are challenging the legitimacy of the existing global order, as do numerous old power actors. At the same time, the results of the analysis demonstrate that actors from rising powers challenge certain aspects of the global order more frequently than do those from old powers and based on different legitimacy criteria. While certain criteria that are linked to output legitimacy, such as effectiveness, tend to be more prominent in the assessed discourses than input criteria, such as participation, the latter legitimacy criteria seem to be more important for rising than for old powers. Moreover, rising powers refer more frequently to the perspective and the challenges of those outside the clubs under consideration than do old powers.

This article contributes to the literature on club governance and to research on legitimacy in the context of international institutions.¹⁵ More particularly, it assesses legitimacy evaluations of the G7/G8 and the G20 and asks on what grounds they are regarded as legitimate or perceived as lacking legitimacy. While there is some research on this question in the context of the G7/G8,¹⁶ no study systematically addresses this question both for the G7/G8 and the G20. Moreover, the novel contribution of this article lies in the assessment of the perspectives of both old and rising powers in this context.¹⁷ The goal is to shed light on whether legitimacy evaluations by actors from rising powers express different legitimacy beliefs than those from North America and Europe. The article thereby also adds to the literature that investigates how rising powers shape the future of global governance: Are they likely to generate disruptive change or do they rather contribute to upholding current global governance arrangements?¹⁸

The article begins by presenting the contours of the current literature on the legitimacy of international institutions. Next, the article sets out the methodology used in this study, before the main part presents the empirical findings. The final part of the article provides concluding comments and discusses avenues for future research.

Legitimacy and legitimation of international institutions

Research on legitimacy can be distinguished by its approach, whether empirical or normative; this article takes the former approach. The normative approach focuses on the conceptual clarifications of the principles according to which political authority should be regarded as legitimate.¹⁹ On the other hand, according to the empirical variant, often referred to as sociological understanding, legitimacy is determined by the perceptions and beliefs of those who are subject to that political authority about how that authority is exercised.²⁰ Those actors with legitimacy beliefs are referred to as constituencies when they are bound by the authority of the institution in question, as in the case of the member states of the G7/G8 and their citizens. In the opposite case, they can be referred to as observers, as in the case of rising powers that are not members of the G7/G8.²¹

While empirical research on the legitimacy of political authority has made progress over the last years, the legitimacy of international organisations, and global governance institutions more generally, has only in more recent times been the focus of systematic empirical investigation.²² One strand of research consists of studies that explore what contributes to forming the beliefs of citizens and civil society regarding the legitimacy of international institutions.²³ Another strand of research tackles the question of how different types of practices that seek to strengthen or undercut legitimacy bring about the legitimisation or delegitimisation of international organisations.²⁴

In contrast to the large majority of existing empirical research on the legitimacy of international institutions to date, this study puts the spotlight on two informal intergovernmental institutions rather than formal international organisations like the United Nations (UN) or the European Union (EU). While there is some research on legitimacy and legitimation dynamics that also covers the G7/G8,²⁵ there is hardly any empirical analysis of these concepts in the context of the G20 or across both summit regimes. One exception is a study of self-legitimation strategies of the G8 and the G20.²⁶

Legitimation and delegitimation practices aim at legitimising or delegitimising political authority. They can be behavioural or discursive, the latter being the focus of this article.²⁷ Behavioural practices of legitimation are actions or procedures that are meant to boost the legitimacy of an institution, for example by expanding options for non-state actors to interact with the organisation, strengthening transparency or improving the representation of rising powers.²⁸ Behavioural delegitimation practices, on the other hand, include street protests and social media campaigns.²⁹ Discursive practices of legitimation are statements in the public realm involving a positive evaluation, whereas delegitimation practices entail a negative evaluation.³⁰ Illustrations of the former include public expressions of praise by members of the G20 for its performance, for example in the press.³¹ Examples of discursive practices of delegitimation, on the other hand, include non-governmental organisations (NGOs) publicly voicing criticism regarding the G8, for instance in the media.

In spite of the relevance of legitimacy discourses in the media for global cooperation, few studies examining them exist. While there are now studies on legitimacy communication in the media on specific issues,³² actors,³³ organisations,³⁴ and historical periods³⁵ as well as one comprehensive investigation across different international organisations over time, including the G8,³⁶ the patterns of legitimacy evaluations in the media regarding both the G7/G8 and the G20 have not been systematically analysed and compared.

Rising powers and their role in global governance have been the focus of much scholarly analysis in light of their perceived importance to the future of global governance.³⁷ Yet, the view of rising powers on the legitimacy of international institutions and their practices of legitimacy has not been subject to systematic empirical analysis yet – although scholars have acknowledged the importance of these questions for global cooperation.³⁸ In the literature on rising powers in global governance, they are sometimes seen as challenging the legitimacy of the existing global order and favouring a more multi-polar and pluralist system; but it remains unclear to what extent this view is justified. By analysing their legitimacy evaluations on club governance and mapping discursive legitimation in the media, this article sheds new light on the perspective of rising powers on the global order.

Method and data

The findings in this article on discursive legitimation practices are based on data on political communication.³⁹ While discursive legitimation and delegitimation of international institutions can happen in institutional arenas (eg, parliaments) and citizen arenas (eg, the workplace), this article focuses on an intermediate arena (eg, political parties), in this case the media.⁴⁰ The analysis in this study makes use of content analysis of newspaper articles to code legitimacy discourses in the quality press.⁴¹ Building on existing research, the analysis is based on newspaper articles in the quality press because media discourses play a significant role in the legitimation of international organisations and because these newspaper articles are key arenas for elites, selected by the press as important and trustworthy sources, to voice their legitimacy evaluations.⁴²

The study focuses on the rising powers of India and South Africa, which, as part of the BRICS and the IBSA states, play a central role in ongoing global power shifts. This makes them especially interesting cases to study, both because of their important role in the world economy and because they tend to regard and present themselves as being essential players in international politics.⁴³ In addition, the analysis focuses on two old powers, namely Germany and the United States.

The study is based on an assessment of newspaper articles from these four countries over eight years, taking into account both the earliest years (2008–2011) and the more recent phase (2014–2017) of the G20 as a meeting at the level of heads of states and government.⁴⁴ Each assessed newspaper article includes, as a minimum, one statement dealing with positive or negative evaluations of the G7/G8 or the G20. In Germany, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung were studied; in the US, the New York Times and the Washington Post; in India, the Times of India and the Hindu; and in South Africa, the Mail & Guardian and the Sunday Times.⁴⁵ Relying on intensity sampling, as previous research in this field has done, analysis focused on the periods around the summits of the organisations under consideration.⁴⁶ The data consists of more than 800 individual statements. Each statement was manually analysed and then coded according to a number of dimensions. To safeguard the reliability of the data, the coding was conducted by two persons in parallel and inconsistencies between their coding decisions were discussed and resolved.

The coding of the legitimacy evaluations was undertaken in two steps. The first step consisted in downloading the newspaper articles that mention the G7/G8 or the G20 from electronic archives. The next step consisted in coding each statement that contained a legitimacy evaluation of the G7/G8 and the G20. Each legitimacy evaluation was coded in terms of the institution it concerns and whether it expresses a positive or negative view on the institution. Building on existing research this data provides a basis to study both the intensity (ie, the frequency) of legitimacy communication in the media, as well as its tone, ie, whether the evaluations of the G7/G8 and the G20 are positive (legitimation) or negative (delegitimation).⁴⁷

In addition, statements were coded as belonging to the rising power group when it was apparent that they were uttered by a person from a country belonging to that category. No matter whether the statements showed up in an old power or a rising power newspaper, what mattered for the coding was the speaker being, for instance, a politician or a journalist or a member of an NGO in India or South Africa. In addition to distinguishing between speakers from rising powers and old powers, the collected data also differentiates between different speaker types by distinguishing whether the legitimacy evaluations in the coded newspaper articles were voiced by journalists, representatives of international organisations, national politicians or members of civil society, including academics, economic actors and NGOs. The coded statements were also assessed in terms of whether they address the perspective of observers, ie, of those who are not part of the G7/G8 or the G20.

Moreover, the statements were coded in terms of a set of legitimacy criteria that are used to evaluate the legitimacy of international organisations and that have been used in previous empirical analyses of legitimacy.⁴⁸ The legitimation criteria are organised according to two dimensions (see Table 1): on the one hand, they represent the distinction between input and output legitimacy, focusing on either the quality of decision-making procedures or the performance of institutions.⁴⁹ On the other hand, the legitimacy criteria are organised according to the distinction between democracy-based issues (eg, participation or the protection of democratic rights) and non-democracy-related issues (eg, effectiveness or capability). For example, the statement by the Canadian Prime Minister in the Mail & Guardian in 2010 that ‘it was concerted action by the G20 that averted economic catastrophe’⁵⁰ was coded as a positive evaluation of the G20 by a national politician based on the non-democracy-related legitimacy standard of effectiveness.

Table 1. Four categories of legitimacy criteria.

	Democracy-based	Non-democracy-related
Input	– Popular sovereignty – Participation – Deliberation – Transparency – Accountability – Legality – Credibility – Demos/community	– (charismatic) leadership – Expertocratic leadership – Religious authority – Traditional processes – Moderation – Capability/agency – Seriousness
Output	– Protection of democratic rights/human rights – Reversibility – Democratic empowerment – Contribution to public good	– Effectiveness – Efficiency – Distributive justice – Contribution to stability – Contribution to identity – Contribution to morality – Sovereignty/power – Good international standing – Innovation – Relevancy/good agenda

Source: The criteria in the table are based on Schmidtke H & F Nullmeier, ‘Valuation analysis and the legitimacy of international organizations’, German Policy Studies, 7, 3, 2011, pp. 117–53.

While this approach is promising for investigating the legitimacy of club governance and the legitimation of the G7/G8 and the G20, the sample used in this study is limited in terms of the period, countries and newspapers covered. As such, this study cannot do justice to the full picture of legitimacy evaluations on the G7/G8 and the G20, or offer an adequate basis for generalisations or causal inferences regarding the patterns of legitimacy evaluations or their drivers. For instance, the approach cannot be extended to autocratic countries because it can only be meaningful in regimes in which freedom of the press and expression are guaranteed. Moreover, the approach itself also entails some limitations. For example, the approach might cause some noise in the data, for instance when strong criticism of individual leaders that belong to the G20, or a critical stance on globalisation more generally, generates negative evaluations of club governance arrangements that are driven either by very specific or very broad concerns that are only indirectly linked to the legitimacy of the G7/G8 or the G20 itself. However, the collected data still contributes to our understanding of the legitimacy perceptions regarding club governance in both old and rising powers and of the legitimacy criteria on which the underlying evaluations are based. In addition, the analysis undertaken in this study can open up new avenues for research on these key issues for global cooperation and on the future of global governance.

Empirical findings

The results of the data analysis show that the G7/G8 and the G20 are the objects of a substantial number of legitimacy evaluations in the press of both old and rising powers. Among these, the intensity of legitimacy evaluations on the G20 was higher than in the case of the G7/G8. The share of statements from speakers tied to old powers is higher than the share of those from the rising powers, both regarding the G7/G8 and, to a lesser extent, the G20.⁵¹

Legitimation and delegitimation

The findings regarding the tone of legitimacy communication in the press show that the share of positive legitimacy evaluations of the G7/G8 is low;⁵² legitimacy evaluations of the G20 are considerably more positive than those for the G7/G8. For the time period under consideration, only around 33% of statements on the G7/G8 are positive; in the case of the G20, the share of positive statements amounts to around 49%. One reason behind the low number of positive legitimation statements regarding the G7/G8 appears to be the growing importance of rising powers for the world economy. The analysis of legitimacy evaluations in the media suggests that the increasingly prominent role in global governance of rising powers undermines both the input and output legitimacy of the G7/G8; this smaller summit regime is perceived as ever less representative and less capable of addressing global issues.

We might expect that rising power speakers argue more in favour of the legitimacy of the G20, of which they are a member, rather than of the G7/G8, from which they are (by and large) excluded. In the early years of the G20, the share of positive statements on this summit regime was indeed higher in the case of speakers from the rising powers than in the case of speakers from the old powers. Yet, the analysis indicates that, currently, the average share of positive statements on the G20 differs little between old and rising power speakers, amounting to around 50% each. In the case of the G7/G8, the share of positive statements differs more strongly between the old and the rising powers: 35% for old powers and 24% for rising powers. We thus find that the G7/G8 enjoys higher legitimacy among its constituencies than among observers. This ties in well with previous research which shows that states which are not represented in the UN Security Council, for instance, evaluate the legitimacy of this body more critically than do its members.⁵³

With regard to legitimation across different types of speakers, the findings suggest that a large majority of the evaluative statements in the press, apart from journalists, are made by members of civil society and by national politicians. The analysis reveals that civil society actors are the most critical ones. National politicians view the G7/G8 and the G20 much more positively,⁵⁴ while journalists typically take a more balanced perspective.

In sum, the analysis suggests that, above all, the G7/G8 is facing a substantial legitimacy problem, with a large majority of speakers questioning its legitimacy, but that the G20 is also frequently questioned in the press from a legitimacy perspective.

Legitimacy evaluations over time

Have positive legitimacy evaluations of the G7/G8 and the G20 increased or decreased over time? Both for the G7/G8 and the G20, the share of positive legitimation has fallen.⁵⁵ At the same time, the frequency and tone of legitimacy evaluation fluctuate over time. In the context of the G20 summit in Toronto in 2010, the relatively low share of positive evaluations might be explained by the fact that there was less agreement among the attending leaders and thus a less comprehensive outcome document compared to previous summits. This was in part because by 2010, many countries had entered recovery mode after the global economic recession, so the urgency of and need for a short-term common crisis response had fallen. As an Indian journalist from the Hindu wrote after the Toronto Summit: ‘The divisions were in contrast to the unity that characterised the previous three G20 summits, when the urgency of a potential global collapse produced solidarity and a unified economic approach’.⁵⁶ In the context of the Cannes Summit in 2011, the relatively low share of positive legitimacy statements might be because the G20 agenda was strongly overshadowed by the European debt crisis. The Hindu published an article in November 2011 noting that the outcome of the summit ‘can hardly be described a success’, an assessment matched by many other commentators in the press across the analysed countries.⁵⁷ More generally, the agenda and outcome of summit meetings are often strongly affected by current events and crises, be it the terrorist attacks in Paris or Manchester, or the Ukraine crisis with Russia. This is in line with previous research that illustrates multiple ups and downs of legitimacy evaluations of international organisations, for instance shaped by important economic and political events.⁵⁸

Legitimation criteria

The assessed legitimacy statements also provide insights into different types of normative criteria for positive and negative evaluations of club governance.⁵⁹ In terms of negative evaluations of the G7/G8, it is hardly surprising that, for the rising powers, challenges regarding input legitimacy (around 52%) dominate the media discourse.⁶⁰ Conversely, old powers focus more on output criteria (around 60%, especially lack of effectiveness) than on input criteria in the context of the G7/G8.⁶¹

In the context of the G20, while there are some differences between old and rising powers, the evaluation criteria are more similar across speaker groups than in the case of the G7/G8, ie, in a context in which rising powers are observers rather than members. In the case of the G20, positive evaluations of both variants of input legitimacy play a considerably stronger role for rising powers than for old powers, while output criteria are more important for old powers than input criteria. At the same time, non-democracy-related output legitimacy (eg, effectiveness) is the most prominent type of criterion for speakers of both old (66%) and rising powers (48%) who make a positive evaluation of the G20.⁶² As an example of the various statements conveying praise for the outcome of a number of G20 summits, especially the earlier ones after the global economic crisis, consider for instance the New York Times underlining that

the April 2009 London summit meeting of the Group of 20 is widely regarded as a great success. The world’s largest economies agreed on an immediate coordinated approach to the global financial crisis then raging and promised to work together on banking reforms that would support growth.⁶³

One Indian journalist wrote in September 2009, in praise of the outcome of the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, that the leaders had produced a ‘communiqué at the end of its summit here on Friday whose genuine heft is likely to be felt in the global economy for years to come’.⁶⁴ Some assessed statements also suggest that club governance was regarded as effective by providing important input for multilateral negotiations, including those for the Paris Climate Agreement adopted by the UN in 2015, and more generally as promoting trust between global leaders. For instance, a journalist from the Washington Post wrote that the G7 declaration ‘encourages ambition among international negotiators meeting in Paris later this year to hammer out a major global warming pact’.⁶⁵

In the case of the G20, the second most prominent criterion for legitimation is that of non-democracy-related input legitimacy for speakers from both old powers (20%) and rising powers (28%), often voiced with a reference to the better capability of the G20, relative to the G7/G8, to address the global financial crisis and other global challenges. As the Washington Post noted in July 2008, there was widespread agreement that the ongoing global problems would be solved only with ‘the participation of countries like China, India, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa’.⁶⁶

The third most prominent type of criterion for positive legitimation in the case of the G20 is democratic input legitimacy (around 10% among old power speakers and around 20% for rising power speakers). For instance, in April 2009, the Hindu cited an Indian politician welcoming ‘the decision to give emerging and developing countries greater voice and representation’.⁶⁷ As the Washington Post stated in November 2008, the inclusion of new players is ‘a model of what high-level diplomacy will look like in the future, with emerging giants gaining a voice in a club that long included only the richest of nations’.⁶⁸ Interestingly, during the first years of the existence of G20 summits at the level of heads of state and government (2008–2011), democratic input legitimacy was the second most prominent criterion of assessment for rising powers speakers (rather than the third). By 2014–2017, with rising powers getting used to the idea of being members of the club, their evaluation criteria seem to have converged with those of the old powers in that regard.

What criteria matter when old and rising power speakers evaluate the legitimacy of club governance negatively? In the case of the G20, mirroring the findings on positive evaluations discussed above, the lack of output legitimacy is very prominent. Negative evaluations of non-democracy-related output legitimacy are the most frequently mentioned concerns voiced by speakers from both old and rising powers. One frequently mentioned concern is that it has become increasingly difficult to come to an agreement. This worry is more pronounced in the context of the G20, with its more diverse membership, than in the context of the G7/G8. This is especially the case now that the immediate problems of the global financial crisis have been addressed; no longer is there an urgency for a coordinated short-term crisis response, and for working together. And now, although the G20 has turned its full attention to the longer-term governance of the global economy and a more fundamental reform of global economic governance, several voices explicitly underline the fact that the G20 has not been reliable in terms of implementing its policy objectives. Others stress that they view the annual summit of the G20 as having ‘degenerated into a publicity opportunity for divergent national concerns’.⁶⁹ There have also been voices that express the view that the G20 ‘has become very inefficient and too big’, as former Director-General of the World Trade Organisation Pascal Lamy told the New York Times in 2014.⁷⁰ Some evaluations of the most recent G7/G8 and G20 summits have emphasised how much the effectiveness of club governance seems to hinge on the individual leaders around the table and that, with personalities like Donald Trump, consensus is not easy to achieve in the G20 and even among the smaller group of the G7/G8.

At the same time, there are also substantial concerns about the input legitimacy of the G20. Negative evaluations of input legitimacy are voiced in terms of both democratic criteria, such as a lack of participation, and non-democracy-related criteria, such as capability or agency. In fact, while worries about output legitimacy of the G20 overall are voiced more frequently by old powers than are worries about input legitimacy, the rising powers, in contrast, refer more frequently to criteria that signal a lack of input legitimacy in the G20. For instance, as an Indian journalist wrote in the Hindu in April 2009: ‘Even if the countries representing 60% of the world’s population and 90% of the world Gross Domestic Product have the ability to reshape international financial arrangements, the will to do so is not apparent’.⁷¹ Regarding the lack of democratic input legitimacy, a common concern, especially for rising powers, is that summit regimes do not sufficiently represent all countries. For instance, in the case of the G20, the South African newspaper Mail & Guardian quoted a representative of the government as saying that ‘you cannot have a global organisation that is not democratically founded’.⁷²

The analysis of club governance conducted in this study thus underlines a ‘widespread emphasis on broader and more equal state participation’; ironically, the ‘demand for more societal participation, however, does not rank as the newly emerging powers’ highest priority’ and arises instead from (mostly Western) civil society organisations.⁷³ At the same time, the G20 is often regarded as a vehicle to promote the role of rising powers in global governance, both individually, for instance in the context of the Chinese G20 presidency in 2016 ‘cementing their position as leader of the Global South’,⁷⁴ but also in the context of the group of BRICS countries. For example, in 2014, the South African Mail & Guardian underlined that ‘the recent G20 summit presented the BRICS countries with an opportunity to fast-track plans for the establishment of a joint financial institution’, ie, the New Development Bank.⁷⁵ In 2015, the Hindu noted: ‘BRICS can give shape to [the] G20, Mr. Modi said at the meeting that is being seen as a signal from the BRICS nations to the developed countries of their rising significance in global matters’.⁷⁶

Views of non-members

The remainder of this section sheds light on the evaluative statements that refer specifically to the perspective of those countries which, excluded from membership in the examined clubs, are only observers of both the G7/G8 and the G20. These views are of interest because it remains an open question whether, and if so in which ways, the rise of the new powers and the emerging multipolar world ends up being positive for less developed countries. Some voices are optimistic,⁷⁷ pointing for instance to the role of rising powers as benign regional hegemons who represent the interests of the less developed countries in their region. Others, however, are rather pessimistic, underlining that it is above all the poorer, more vulnerable and less powerful states that suffer due to the decline of multilateralism in today’s multipolar world, or suggesting that rising powers will not be particularly strong proponents of the poor or speak out in favour of less developed countries in their region and beyond.⁷⁸

In the context of the G7/G8 and the G20, do rising powers refer more often than do old powers to the problems of poorer countries, or not? In relative terms, statements from rising power speakers do indeed refer more frequently to the problems of non-members, particularly poor countries, than speakers from old powers. That in itself does not imply that rising powers are better representatives of the interests of the poor than old powers. At the same time, several evaluative statements assessed in this study seem to suggest that some emerging economies, such as South Africa, do raise their voice in favour of better representation for those not at the table and view themselves as representatives of the excluded ones. For instance, a member of the South African government, quoted in the Mail & Guardian, referring to the G20, said: ‘South Africa would be arguing for better representation of developing countries at these institutions, as well as for the heads of these organisations to be appointed in a more democratic manner’.⁷⁹ However, there are also voices in rising power states that hint at a tension between the role of rising powers and other developing countries in the context of the G20 and global governance more generally. For instance, in 2015, the South African Sunday Times noted: ‘The more success … other developing countries have in pushing for a bigger voice, the more South Africa’s voice will shrink’.⁸⁰

Conclusion

As rising powers emerge as central players in the global arena, they encounter a world order that has, for the most part, been set up and maintained by and for the United States and its allies. A key question for the future of global governance in that context is how legitimate the international institutions are perceived to be by rising powers and on which normative basis rising power actors are evaluating the legitimacy of these institutions – or the lack thereof.

Against this background, this article has assessed one set of legitimacy evaluations of the G7/G8 and the G20, examining which legitimation criteria matter most for old powers vs those that matter for rising powers. The article sought thereby to contribute to a greater understanding of the contested club governance approach of the G7/G8 and the G20 and the grounds on which they are regarded as more or less legitimate by either rising or old powers.

Based on the analysis of more than 800 legitimacy evaluations from eight quality newspapers, the article shows that rising power actors are indeed challenging the legitimacy of the existing global order, as do numerous old power actors. At the same time, the findings of this article indicate that rising powers do challenge certain parts of the global order somewhat more frequently than old powers and use somewhat different legitimacy criteria. Non-democracy-related output criteria, such as effectiveness, are the most prominent points on which positive legitimation of the G7/G8 and the G20 have at certain points been expressed, both for old and rising powers. This was especially true during the post-crisis period of the late 2000s. These criteria also feature, however, in negative evaluations of these club governance arrangements, and moreso as the more long-term challenges of economic reform have risen on the agenda.

Democratic input criteria (ie, inclusivity), on the other hand, also play a key role in the evaluations and are more important for rising than for old powers. Democratic legitimacy criteria are especially prominent in the evaluations of the G7/G8, but also around the first set of G20 summits, arguably because the rising powers were more aware of the promises and pitfalls of being excluded from the G20. This article thus substantiates the expectation that there are ‘universal but differentiated notions about the appropriate sources of the legitimation of international institutions from new and old powers’.⁸¹ At the same time, more recently, the categories of normative criteria that old and rising powers use have started to converge.

Moreover, the findings in this article suggest that key concepts from normative legitimacy research in the global arena appear to be, at least to some extent, relevant in the context of empirical legitimacy research regarding the summit regimes in question. The findings suggest that procedural normative concepts that matter in ongoing debates in political theory about global justice and the legitimacy of international institutions, such as participation, fit well with what the research found in examining these notions empirically in the context of the G7/G8 and the G20. With regard to issues such as human rights or distributive justice the link is much less clear-cut, in part because there are few direct statements in the assessed media that evaluate the legitimacy of the G7/G8 and the G20 from the perspective of these issues. The important role of democratic input criteria in turn mirrors recent research which shows that ‘procedural legitimacy standards are gaining ground: international organisations are increasingly evaluated not only based on what they accomplish, but also based on how they arrive at decisions’.⁸²

The article also indicates that speakers from rising powers seem to refer more frequently to the problems of poorer countries and their challenges than do speakers from old powers. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that rising powers are better representatives of those that are not part of the relevant summit regimes – but the fact gives rise to interesting questions regarding the implications of the new multipolar world order for poorer and less powerful states. The assessment of the coded legitimacy statements also shows that NGO representatives take a much more critical stance on club governance than do other actors, above all national politicians.

The article contributes to the literature on legitimacy in global governance and on the role of rising powers in global governance. It substantiates research that indicates that rising powers do not seek to generate disruptive change but rather support the existing global order. At the same time, some rising powers are currently contributing to the creation of a parallel order, for example in the context of the BRICS or the BRICS-led New Development Bank⁸³

Future research might focus on the perceived legitimacy of such recently established institutions, driven by rising rather than old powers, from the perspective of different types of actors. It would also be interesting to assess how legitimacy evaluations in ‘new’ social media such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook differ from those in traditional print newspapers. Future research could also seek to investigate how media coverage of club governance, and the legitimacy perceptions it entails, links up with rates of effectiveness for these governance approaches in terms of compliance.⁸⁴ To what extent do members of the G7/G8 and the G20 meet the commitments they make during their annual summits? Last but not least, future research could study in more detail the drivers of varying perceptions of legitimacy in the context of club governance, for example by assessing the role of political events or new communication technologies in shifting existing patterns of legitimacy evaluations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author .

Note on contributor

Dr Clara Brandi is a Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). She holds a PhD from the European University Institute, an MPhil in Politics from the University of Oxford and a Master’s in economics from the University of Freiburg, where she received the Hayek Award. Her recent publications have appeared in leading journals such as Global Environmental Politics, The World Economy, and Climate Policy. She teaches at the University of Duisburg-Essen and the University of Bonn.

Notes

1 I am highly grateful for the helpful comments I received from the two anonymous reviewers and for the support of my research assistants. In particular, I would like to thank Nora Immink and Nathalie Venanzi for their excellent work.

2 In 2003, the IBSA Dialogue Forum of India, Brazil and South Africa formed, with the first official summit taking place in 2006. In 2009, the first formal BRICS summit took place, giving rise to a new multilateral forum of emerging economies, including Brazil, Russia, India, China and, since 2010, South Africa.

3 For example, see Nel P, ‘Redistribution and recognition: What emerging regional powers want’, Review of International Studies, 36, 4, 2010, pp. 951–74. Stephen M, ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society, 26, 3, 2012, pp. 289–309. Kahler M, ‘Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo’, International Affairs, 89, 3, 2013, pp. 711–29. Lipton M, ‘Are the BRICS reformers, revolutionaries, or counter-revolutionaries?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 24, 1, 2017, pp. 41–59. Stuenkel O, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order. John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

4 Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606, p. 585.

5 Chayes A & AH Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.

6 Sommerer T & H Agné, ‘Consequences of legitimacy in global governance’, in Tallberg J et al. (ed.), Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 153–68.

7 See also Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of internationalorganizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of InternationalOrganizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

8 King G et al., ‘How the news media activate public expression and influence national agendas’, Science, 358, 6364, 2017, pp. 776–80.

9 For example, citizens are more likely to evaluate the legitimacy of international organizations negatively when they are frequently exposed to negative legitimacy evaluations by political elites and civil society actors. See Dellmuth LM & J Tallberg, ‘Elite communication and popular legitimacy in global governance’, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2757650.

10 Lenz T & LA Viola, ‘Legitimacy and institutional change in international organisations: A cognitive approach’, Review of International Studies, 43, 5, 2018, pp. 939–961.

11 On debates about the legitimacy of the G20, see also the article by Benson and Zürn in this special issue. On the G20 from the perspective of different theories of international relations, see Slaughter S, The G20 and International Relations Theory. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019.

12 See also Vabulas F & D Snidal, ‘Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organisations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements’, The Review of International Organizations, 8, 2, 2013, pp. 193–20.

13 Gstöhl S, ‘Governance through government networks: The G8 and international organizations’, Review of International Organizations, 2, 1, 2007, pp. 1–37.

14 Higley J & G Moore G, ‘Political elite studies at the Year 2000’, International Review of Sociology, 11, 2, 2001, pp. 175–80. See also Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

15 On club governance, see Cooper A, ‘The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested “steering committee” for the world’, International Affairs, 86, 3, 2010, pp. 741–57. Kirton J, G20 Governance for a Globalized World. London: Routledge, 2016. Cooper A & R Thakur, The Group of Twenty (G20). London: Routledge, 2013.

16 Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

17 On the rising powers in the G20, see also Heine J, ‘Will they have table manners? The G20, emerging powers and global responsibility’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 17, 1, 2010, pp. 1–11.

18 Kahler M, ‘Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo’, International Affairs, 89, 3, 2013, pp. 711–29. Lipton M, ‘Are the BRICS reformers, revolutionaries, or counter-revolutionaries?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 24, 1, 2017, pp. 41–59.

19 For example, see Bernstein S, ‘Legitimacy in global environmental governance’, Journal of International Law and International Relations, 1, 1–2, 2005, pp. 139–66. Buchanan A & RO Keohane, ‘The legitimacy of global governance institutions’, Ethics & International Affairs, 20, 4, 2006, pp. 405–33.

20 Reus-Smit C, ‘International crisis of legitimacy’, International Politics, 44, 2, 2007, pp. 157–74.

21 Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606, p. 586.

22 For an overview of recent research on legitimacy and global governance, see the following: Tallberg J et al. (ed.), Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Zürn M, A Theory of Global Governance. Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Dingwerth K et al., International Organizations under Pressure: Legitimating Global Governance in Challenging Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. See also Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606.

23 See Johnson T, ‘Guilt by association: The link between states’ influence and the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations’, Review of International Organizations, 6, 1, 2011, pp. 57–84. Ecker-Ehrhardt M, ‘Cosmopolitan politicization: How perceptions of interdependence foster citizens’ expectations in international institutions’, European Journal of International Relations, 18, 3, 2012, pp. 481–508. Voeten E, ‘Public opinion and the legitimacy of international courts’, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 14, 2, 2013, pp. 411–36. Dellmuth LM & J Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organisations: Interest representation, institutional performance, and confidence extrapolation in the United Nations’, Review of International Studies, 41, 3, 2015, pp. 451–75. Schlipphak B, ‘Measuring attitudes toward regional organizations outside Europe’, Review of International Organizations, 10, 3, 2015, pp. 351–75. Anderson B et al., ‘Does international pooling of authority affect the perceived legitimacy of global governance?’ The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 661–83. Nielson DL et al., ‘The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society views of international election observers’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 685–715.

24 Steffek J, ‘The legitimation of international governance: A discourse approach’, European Journal of International Relations, 9, 2, 2013, pp. 249–75. Bernstein S, ‘Legitimacy in intergovernmental and non-state global governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18, 1, 2011, pp. 17–51. Brassett J & E Tsingou, ‘The politics of legitimate global governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18, 1, 2011, pp. 1–16. Zaum D (ed.). Legitimating International Organizations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Binder M & M Heupel, ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from recent general assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly, 59, 2, 2015, pp. 238–50. Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2018, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59. Rocabert J et al., ‘The rise of international parliamentary institutions: Purpose and legitimation’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 607–31.

25 Gronau J & H Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy in world politics – international institutions’ legitimation strategies’, Review of International Studies, 42, 3, 2016, pp. 535–57. Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

26 Gronau J, ‘Signaling legitimacy: self-legitimation by the G8 and the G20 in times of competitive multilateralism’, World Political Science, 12, 1, 2016.

27 Bäckstrand K & F Söderbaum, ‘Legitimation and delegitimation in global governance: Discursive, institutional, and behavioral Practices’, in J Tallberg et al. (eds), Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 101–18. Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606.

28 See Grigorescu A, ‘Transparency of intergovernmental organizations: The roles of member states, international bureaucracies and nongovernmental organizations’, International Studies Quarterly, 51, 3, 2007, pp. 625–48. Tallberg J et al., ‘Explaining the transnational design of international organizations’, International Organization, 68, 4, 2014, pp. 741–74.

29 Gregoratti C & A Uhlin, ‘Civil society protest and the (de)legitimation of global governance institutions’, in Tallberg J et al. (eds), Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 134–52.

30 For a recent assessment of various forms of legitimation since the 1970s, see Dingwerth K et al., International Organizations under Pressure: Legitimating Global Governance in Challenging Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Gronau J & H Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy in world politics – International institutions’ legitimation strategies’, Review of International Studies, 42, 3, 2016, pp. 535–57. Halliday TC et al., ‘Rhetorical legitimation: Global scripts as strategic devices of international organizations’, Socio-Economic Review, 8, 1, 2010, pp. 77–112. Steffek J, ‘The legitimation of international governance: A discourse approach’, European Journal of International Relations, 9, 2, 2003, pp. 249–75. Stephen MD, ‘Can you pass the salt? The legitimacy of international institutions and indirect speech’, European Journal of International Relations, 21, 4, 2015, pp. 768–92.

31 Another example are international organizations using their public communication office for positively branding their messages and advertising institutional reform. For an analysis of the establishment and practices of public communication office of international organizations, see Ecker-Ehrhardt M, ‘Self-legitimation in the face of politicization: Why international organizations centralized public communication’, Review of International Organizations, 13, 4, 2018, pp. 519–46.

32 O’Brien R et al. (eds), Contesting Global Governance. Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

33 Ishiyama J et al., ‘At the water’s edge: The decline of partisan liberal internationalism?’ Acta Politica, 50, 3, 2015, pp. 320–43.

34 For an illustration of discursive delegitimation in the context of the public critique of member regarding the UN Security Council, see Binder M & M Heupel; ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from recent general assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly, 59, 2, 2015, pp. 238–50.

35 Steffek J, ‘The output legitimacy of international organizations and the global public interest’, International Theory, 7, 2, 2015, pp. 263–93.

36 Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59. The analysis by Schmidtke includes the G8 but not the G20 and is restricted to media discourses in Western countries.

37 For example, see Nel P, ‘Redistribution and recognition: What emerging regional powers want’, Review of International Studies, 36, 4, 2010, pp. 951–74. Stephen M, ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy prientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society, 26, 3, 2012, pp. 289–309. Kahler M, ‘Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo’, International Affairs, 89, 3, 2013, pp. 711–29. Lipton M, ‘Are the BRICS reformers, revolutionaries, or counter-revolutionaries?’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 24, 1, 2017, pp. 41–59. Stuenkel O, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order. Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

38 Zürn M & M Stephen, ‘The view of old and new powers on the legitimacy of international institutions’, Politics, 30, 1, 2010, pp. 91–101.

39 Recent examples of content analysis of political communication for investigating legitimacy discourses include Binder M & M Heupel, ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from recent general assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly, 59, 2, 2015, pp. 238–50. Dingwerth K et al., International Organizations under Pressure: Legitimating Global Governance in Changing Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Two promising alternative empirical methods for studying legitimacy beliefs include assessing political behaviour, eg, protests but also institutional reform, or making use of survey data. For studies based on political behaviour, see Tallberg J et al., The Opening Up of International Organizations: Transnational Access in Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2013. Zaum D (ed.), Legitimating International Organizations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Grigorescu A, Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations? Normative Pressures and Decision-Making Rules. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. For recent studies based on surveys, see Nielson DL et al., ‘The elusive sources of legitimacy beliefs: Civil society views of international election observers’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 685–715. Dellmuth L & B Schlipphak, ‘Legitimacy beliefs towards global governance institutions: A research agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2019. doi:10.1080/13501763.2019.1604788.

40 Schmidtke H & S Schneider, ‘Methoden der empirischen Legitimationsforschung: Legitimität als mehrdimensionales Konzept’ in Geis A et al. (eds), Der Aufstieg der Legitimitätspolitik. Rechtfertigung und Kritik politisch-ökonomischer Ordnungen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 225–42. See also Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, TheReview of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, p. 597.

41 The term ‘quality press’ typically refers to more serious newspapers that report on world events and important news stories. See Collins English Dictionary, accessed 14 November 2019, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/quality-press>.

42 For a very similar methodological approach, see also Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

43 While some scholars favour the middle power category, the BRICS countries and the IBSA states are better characterised as occupying a dual role as regional and rising powers. Stephen M, ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society, 26, 3, 2012, pp. 289–309.

44 The period from 2011 to 2014 was left out of the analysis due to the pragmatic need to focus on a limited number of years and the reasoning that it is especially interesting and relevant to assess the earliest and the most recent years of the pertinent summit regimes.

45 To the extent possible, the data collection is based on one centre-left and one centre-right newspaper in each country to avoid any potential bias due to varying ideological backgrounds of newspapers. See also Lichter SR, ‘Theories of media bias’, in Kenski K & KH Jamieson (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 403–16.

46 See Couldry N et al. (eds), Media Events in a Global Age. London: Routledge, 2010.

47 Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59, p. 636. Tallberg J & M Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations’, The Review of International Organizations, 2019, 14, 4, pp. 581–606, p. 589.

48 Nullmeier F et al., Prekäre Legitimitäten: Rechtfertigung von Herrschaft in der postnationalen Konstellation. Campus: Frankfurt am Main, 2011. Schmidtke H & F Nullmeier, ‘Valuation analysis and the legitimacy of international organizations’, German Policy Studies, 7, 3, 2011, pp. 117–53.

49 Scharpf F, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

50 Le Guernigou Y & P Zengerle, ‘G20 leaders near agreement, if not progress’, Mail & Guardian, 12 November 2010.

51 From the total number of statements on the G7/G8, around 75 percent are statements by speakers from old powers and 10 percent are by speakers from the rising powers. In the case of the G20, there are also more statements from the old rather than the rising powers, but the shares are more balanced than in the G7/G8 case: while around 60 percent of statements on the G20 are by old powers, around 25 percent are statements from rising powers.

52 This confirms existing research on the G8. See Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

53 Binder M & M Heupel, ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from recent general assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly, 59, 2, 2015, p. 244.

54 This finding ties in with earlier research which suggests that political elites tend to use legitimation practices to back the international organizations that are important to them. Gronau J, & H Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy in world politics – international institutions’ legitimation strategies’, Review of International Studies, 42, 3, 2016, pp. 535–57. Ecker-Ehrhardt M, ‘Self-legitimation in the face of politicization: Why international organizations centralized public communication’, The Review of International Organizations, 13, 4, 2018, pp. 519–46. Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

55 For the G20, the share of positive statements from rising power speakers seems to have fallen faster than the share of positive evaluations from old power speakers.

56 Chan S & J Calmes, ‘G-20 nations to focus on deficits’, The Hindu, 29 June 2010.

57 Naravane V, ‘Note of disappointment at Cannes’, The Hindu, 6 November 2011.

58 Schmidtke H, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation of international organizations in the media: Patterns and explanations’, The Review of International Organizations, 14, 4, 2019, pp. 633–59.

59 Democratic output legitimacy, for instance a reference to the protection of human rights, does not seem to be a relevant legitimacy standard for either old or rising power speakers – both in the context of the G7/G8 and the G20.

60 Rising power speakers frequently mention both problems with democratic input criteria (around 36 percent, eg, lack of participation) and also non-democracy-related input criteria (around 17 percent, eg, lack of capability).

61 In terms of positive legitimacy evaluations, output criteria (especially in terms of effectiveness) rather than input criteria (such as participation) dominate the legitimation discourse of both old and rising powers on the G7/G8.

62 The same is true in the case of the G7/G8.

63 Johnson S, ‘The European Debt Crisis and the G-20 Summit Meeting’, The New York Times, 3 November 2011.

64 Varadarajan S, ‘India pleased as G20 summit scales new height,’ The Hindu, 27 September 2009.

65 The Washington Post, ‘A carbon-free future?’, 11 June 2015. At the same time, several evaluations fear that club governance is undermining legitimacy. As Kumi Naidoo of South Africa, Co-chair of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty, was quoted in The New York Times in July 2009: ‘The G-8 is an elite cocktail, a self-appointed group. […] I think it’s an anachronism, and consistently undermining the work of other multilateral initiatives.’ See Baker P & R Donadio, ‘Does G-8 work with 35 leaders in tow?’, The New York Times, 10 July 2009.

66 Coleman J, ‘As summit approaches, G-8 weighs expansion’, The Washington Post, 5 July 2008.

67 The Hindu, ‘G-20 pledge not to raise new trade barriers’, 4 April 2009.

68 Failoa A & G Kessler, The Washington Post, ‘As summit starts, emerging nations weigh new Clout; Brazil, China, India step up in diplomatic power shift’, 15 November 2008.

69 The Hindu, ‘The Grumbling 20’, 7 September 2016.

70 Ewing J, ‘New phase begins for the Group of 7’, The New York Times, 3 June 2014.

71 Ravi N, ‘London summit’s burden of expectations’, The Hindu, 1 April 2009.

72 Mail & Guardian, ‘World needs to deal with capital inflows’, 9 November 2010.

73 Stephen M, ‘Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa’, Global Society, 26, 3, 2012, pp. 289–309.

74 Aneja A, ‘India, China set for ‘constructive’ talks on G-20 sidelines’, The Hindu, 4 September 2016.

75 Steyn L, ‘Another brick in the wall for the New Development Bank’, Mail & Guardian, 18 November 2014.

76 The Hindu, ‘BRICS can give shape to G20, says Modi’, 16 November 2015.

77 For example, see Culp J & J Plagemann, ‘Hooray for global justice? Emerging democracies in a multipolar world’, Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric, 7, 2014, pp. 39–66.

78 For instance, see Brandi C, ‘Rising powers in the global trading system – China and mega-regional trade negotiations’. Rising Powers Quarterly, 1, 1, 2016, pp. 71–83.

79 Mail & Guardian, ‘World needs to deal with capital inflows’, 9 November 2010.

80 Sikhakhane J, ‘Zuma’s jet won’t get us very far’, Sunday Times, 15 November 2015.

81 See Zürn M & M Stephen, ‘The view of old and new powers on the legitimacy of international institutions’, Politics, 30, 1, 2010, p. 96.

82 Dingwerth K et al., International Organizaisations under Pressure: Legitimating Global Governance in Challenging Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

83 See also Stuenkel O, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order. John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

84 This strand of research could draw on the annual compliance reports prepared by the University of Toronto G7/G8 and G20 Research Groups as well as on their assessment of media attention and approval. For example, see G20 Research Group and Center for International Institutions Research of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, 2018 G20 Buenos Aires Summit Final Compliance Report, 2019. See also G7 Research Group, Media Analysis of the G7 and the 2015 Schloss Elmau Summit, 2016.