G20 rising powers’ status seeking through social creativity: The case of South-South development cooperation

ABSTRACT

This study aims to explore how rising powers who are also donors within the G20 strive to achieve a positively distinctive identity in the field of development cooperation through status-seeking strategies. The article employs Social Identity Theory (SIT) to critically examine and understand the increasing importance of South-South cooperation in the foreign policies of the nine selected G20 rising donors (namely China, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Mexico, India and Argentina). For this purpose, it will first explain why status matters for rising powers. Second, it will present the linkage between status-seeking policies of states and state identity. Third, it exposes social creativity as a driver of state behaviour. And fourth, it focuses on G20 rising powers’ quest for status through social creativity with a particular focus on South-South development cooperation.

KEYWORDS:

• G20
• rising powers
• status
• Social Identity Theory
• south-south cooperation
• development cooperation

ORCID

Emel Parlar Dal http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6508-6069

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their fruitful comments and the editors and guest editors of this special issue.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Emel Parlar Dal is associate professor at Marmara University’s Department of International Relations. She conducted research at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva during the 2010–2011 academic year. In 2013 she was an academic visitor at St. Anthony’s College Middle East Centre, Oxford University. During 2015–2016 she worked as the coordinator of a TUBITAK-SOBAG research project on the contribution of Turkey and the BRICS to global governance. Her recent publications have appeared in Third World Quarterly (SSCI), Global Policy (SSCI), Contemporary Politics, International Politics (SSCI), Turkish Studies (SSCI), International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis (SSCI), and Perceptions.

Samiratou Dipama holds a PhD in EU Politics and International Relations from the European Union Institute of Marmara University. She has published various articles on political conditionality, democracy promotion and development aid in indexed journals and edited books.

Notes

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5 Since there is no consensus in IR literature whether China and Russia are great powers, ‘near’ great powers or rising powers, this study will consider them in the grouping of rising powers for the assesment of the comparative aid data of the selected G20 rising donors.

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10 Ibid.

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14 Larson DW & A Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy’, International Security, 34, 4, 2010, pp. 63–95; Clunan AL, ‘The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence’, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2009, pp. 1–225.

15 Parlar Dal E ‘Status-seeking policies of middle powers in status clubs: the case of Turkey in the G20’, Contemporary Politics, 2019, p. 13. doi:10.1080/13569775.2019.1627766.

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18 Ibid.

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30 Linda AJ et al. ‘Achieving Positive Social Identity: Social Mobility, Social Creativity, and Permeability of Group Boundaries’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 2, 1996, p. 241.

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32 Linda AJ et al. ‘Achieving Positive Social Identity: Social Mobility, Social Creativity, and Permeability of Group Boundaries’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 2, 1996, p. 242.

33 Larson, DW & A Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy’, International Security, 34, 4, 2010, pp. 63–95.

34 Larson, DW & A Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy’, International Security, 34, 4, 2010, pp. 63–95.

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36 Linda AJ et al. ‘Achieving Positive Social Identity: Social Mobility, Social Creativity, and Permeability of Group Boundaries’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 2, 1996, p. 242.

37 Larson, DW & A Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy’, International Security, 34, 4, 2010, pp. 63–95.

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48 OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), The Russian Federation’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), https://www1.oecd.org/dac/stats/russias-official-development-assistance.htm.

49 Dirco, White Paper on South African Foreign Policy – Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. Pretoria: South Africa: Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2011.

50 See AidData dashboard, http://dashboard.aiddata.org/.

51 TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency), TIKA Development Assistance Report 2016.

52 OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), Development Co-operation Report 2017: Data for Development. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017.

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55 OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), Development Co-operation by Countries Beyond the DAC: Towards a more complete picture of international development finance, OECD, May 2015.

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57 OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), Development Co-operation Report 2017: Data for Development. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017.

58 OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), The Russian Federation’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), available at: https://www.oecd.org/russia/russias-official-development-assistance.htm.

59 TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency), TIKA Development Assistance Report 2016.

60 See OECD Statistics at https://stats.oecd.org/.

61 The UNDS is the biggest multilateral development actor, accounting for $18,4 billion, or 33%, of multilateral aid in 2015. Its functions range from providing a forum for dialogue, decision-making and norm-setting, to research, advocacy, technical assistance and humanitarian aid.

62 Adopted in July 2015 at the 3rd International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD), the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (the Addis Agenda) created a holistic and coherent framework for financing sustainable development and is critical for the realisation of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and targets. The Paris Agreement is an agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), dealing with greenhouse-gas-emissions mitigation, adaptation, and finance, signed in 2016. Adopted by UN Member States on 18 March 2015 at the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai City (Japan), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 is a global agreement to reduce and prevent disaster risks across the globe. It aims to strengthen social and economic resilience to ease the negative effects of climate change and man-made hazards.

63 SNIS (Swiss Network for International Studies), The Proliferation of Multilateral Funds, https://snis.ch/project/proliferation-of-multilateral-funds/.

64 In this line, among the selected 9 G20 rising powers, only 4 of them (China, India, Russia and Turkey) prioritize bilateral aid over multilateral aid. The rest uses multilateral channels more extensively than bilateral ones. When it comes to their multilateral aid disbursement, among these 9 G20 rising powers 6 of them use non-core or in other terms multi-bi channels where they can put restrictions regarding the modalities of aid distribution.