The effectiveness-legitimacy nexus in the G20’s Development Working Group: A view from Mexico

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the G20’s effectiveness-legitimacy nexus while undergoing a shift from club to network governance. Despite pitfalls, it is argued that the strategic widening of the G20 agenda, coupled with its more inclusive approach to a variety of topics within the work streams, carries potential for increasing its effectiveness and legitimacy. Analysing the working arrangements of the Development Working Group and Mexico’s participation (through AMEXCID) and other forms of engagement for G20 members – for example, the Voluntary Peer Learning Mechanism on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda – the key claim of the article is that, beyond summitry, the G20’s effectiveness could better be assessed by the outcomes of its work streams and working groups, coupled with individual country efforts, which should thus receive more public attention as a means to counter criticism regarding weak legitimacy.

KEYWORDS:

• G20
• development working group
• 2030 Agenda
• network governance
• Mexico
• AMEXCID
• effectiveness-legitimacy nexus

Introduction

In debates on the future of global governance in a world of increasing economic and political uncertainty, one of the pillars that has come under pressure is the ‘Group of Twenty’ or G20. It is commonly observed that the G20 has gone from club to network governance, with a proliferation of state (government agencies, for example) and non-state actors in the wider ‘G20 family’ discussing a broad array of topics throughout the rotating presidency period.¹ This has posed challenges to the coherence and integrity of the G20 and has simultaneously raised concerns about its effectiveness and legitimacy.

The purpose of this article is to present a view from Mexico on the effectiveness-legitimacy nexus of the G20, recently the focus of increased attention,² and how it has become evident in the G20’s work for sustainable development between 2017 and 2018. The empirical material examined draws from official reports and documents; interviews with members of Mexico’s Agency for International Development Cooperation (Agencia Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, AMEXCID), the division for G20 and other areas of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, SRE); the authors’ observations from different policy forums; and the academic literature.

In this article, we focus on the G20’s Development Working Group (DWG) established in June 2010 at the Toronto Summit with the objective of creating opportunities for developing countries – a pledge that was followed up at subsequent summits. In the DWG, the participation of international development practitioners can have a direct impact on the configuration of collective commitments, considering that this group intends to shape decision-making regarding allocation of foreign aid and development cooperation. We see this as a prime example of actor diversification in network governance beyond the confined limits of traditional diplomacy, which may render the DWG’s work as more legitimate to outsiders. Moreover, the role of ‘intermediary actors’ such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in DWG deliberations should not be overlooked. They assist the G20 members and provide technical expertise. In other words, the DWG’s effectiveness is also related to intermediary actors’ specific input, and it is likely that elements of their contributions appear in the final DWG commitments. Still, the G20 member countries adapt the commitments to their national policies as they see fit.

It should be made clear from the start that the aim is not to make a theoretically-driven contribution to the debate either from a normative or sociological perspective on the G20’s effectiveness-legitimacy nexus, but rather to provide an empirically grounded analysis. Nor have the authors probed into the issue of whether there is a tradeoff between effectiveness and legitimacy undergirding the G20’s broadened agenda. While the analysis is situated within the discussion on input, output and throughput legitimacy, the study did not test any established normative criteria for these categories. Instead, the study takes a more functional and practical approach to the effectiveness-legitimacy nexus; the analysis begins from the standpoint that legitimacy is derived from effectiveness; that is, that the DWG’s ability to deliver on commitments and produce deliverables creates greater possibility for achieving legitimacy for the DWG – first and foremost, among actors involved in the processes of shaping governance (internal legitimacy), but also in terms of the G20’s public image (external legitimacy).

To be precise, the article argues that the answer to the effectiveness issue could be sought in work streams and working groups rather than G20 summit conclusions. However, studies on this topic do not abound since the relevant discussions in the G20 are classified as ‘restricted-access’ – a reflection of an opaque community. In particular, the track run by finance officials contrasts strongly with the sherpas’ agenda-setting effort that is by nature more open to outreach groups.³ In this regard, the authors seek to leave a distinct contribution from a Mexican perspective. Accordingly, the central claim is that the ‘effectiveness scores’ for the G20 go beyond summitry, and therefore specific deliverables and accountability practices from working groups as well as country efforts to implement collective actions should receive more public attention as a means to assess more accurately the depth and scope of the G20’s effectiveness and legitimacy deriving from the outputs of deliberations. This is in line with Susan Harris Rimmer’s three ‘strategic elements’ for increasing success for the G20 presidency chair: giving ‘evidence of political leadership;’ cultivating a ‘credible outreach narrative that emphasises the unique perspective of the host’; and, undertaking a ‘serious investment in the troika leadership.’⁴

In addition, the article addresses the question as to whether the G20 and its broadening network based on formal and informal meetings between government officials has led to the emergence of a culture of cooperation among advanced and emerging countries. Here discussion brings to the fore Mexico’s participation in the DWG (through AMEXCID) and its engagement with the Voluntary Peer Learning Mechanism (VPLM), an innovative initiative by the DWG launched during the German presidency (in 2017) to foster knowledge-sharing on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (henceforth, the ‘2030 Agenda’). Furthermore, the article examines Mexico’s participation in the Early Childhood Development (ECD) initiative discussions in the DWG during the Argentine presidency (in 2018). Lastly, the authors argue that Mexico, as a promotor of triangular cooperation and South-South cooperation, has a prominent role in promoting understanding of national and regional dynamics (by engaging in mutual learning and socialisation processes) in the co-construction of global governance dynamics.

Following this introduction, the article reflects on different views on legitimacy in global network governance and the G20’s transformation from club to network governance, drawing from diplomacy studies, new multilateralism, and global governance and transnational networks literature. Next, the article problematises some aspects of the effectiveness-legitimacy nexus and follows up with two perspectives: on one hand, the DWG effectiveness as a group, and, on the other, the country specific efforts for the implementation of collective actions where issues of both input and output legitimacy can be readily identified and better understood. First is a deeper look into the work stream in the DWG, which provides valuable insights about network governance and the effectiveness and accountability of deliberations (that is, the ‘effectiveness scores’ linked to the discussion about the G20’s overall effectiveness and legitimacy). By way of example, discussion makes specific references to experiences on the part of Mexico’s participation in the DWG through AMEXCID and the repercussions at the domestic level following the outcome of deliberations in the DWG. There appears to be a certain effectiveness reflected in the way the DWG reaches agreement and in how Mexico, in this case, brings home the commitments to the domestic setting. The article argues that there is potential for increased legitimacy for Mexico’s involvement in the G20 agenda in the context of a wider remit for government and non-governmental actors as a result of knowledge exchange and socialisation across ministerial boundaries.

Second, the article emphasises individual country or group contributions or efforts to increase the G20’s ‘effectiveness scores’ and simultaneously boost its internal legitimacy, illustrated by the VPLM for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda launched by the German presidency in 2017, as well as the interaction between global and national dimensions embedded in the ECD initiative of the Argentine presidency. Finally, the conclusion summarises the findings and points to areas of research that could shed new light on the main topics covered in this article.

Views on legitimacy in global network governance

Globalisation has seen the continuous growth and recognition of non-state actors as important players in global politics. David Held et al depicted three core features of globalisation; increases in the extensity (scale), intensity (volume) and velocity of social interactions.⁵ In today’s ‘network society’, Manuel Castells has explained why and how networks are central to the information age.⁶ Valentine M Moghadam proposes that ‘the network form of transnational organising may be the one most conducive to the era of globalization.’⁷ Governance can be described as clusters of processes and mechanisms characterised by networks, fluidity and an endless interaction between deconstruction and reconstruction of mechanisms, processes and institutions. The G20 sits at the apex of global governance, confronted with a legitimacy crisis that may not be entirely its own fault: increasingly complex policy environments both at the global and domestic levels put pressure on ‘governance clubs’ to adapt rapidly and absorb changes that impact their capacity to steer political agendas. This situation is also conducive to a mismatch between resources and stated objectives, consequently, these ‘governance clubs’ may become less effective. The following argument by Allen Buchanan and Robert O Keohane serves to illustrate the challenge the G20 is facing regarding its legitimacy: ‘If one is unclear about the appropriate standards of legitimacy or if unrealistically demanding standards are assumed, then public support for global governance institutions may be undermined and their effectiveness in providing valuable goods may be impaired’ (p. 407). In addition, as the study by Jonas Tallberg et al suggests, the legitimacy enjoyed by these institutions with different audiences may be affected in negative terms – that is, producing de-legitimation.⁸ The crux for the G20 is that its broad agenda may also require different standards of legitimacy (functional, normative, sociological, and so forth) to operate across various work streams. This requires more introspection, and the authors contend that the DWG work on the development commitments is a positive example in this regard.

Robert Dahl, David Held et al, and Fritz Scharpf, among others, have localised the roots of input legitimacy in the following: ideals of participatory democracy, active citizenship, civic virtue, institutionalised political processes incorporating explicit preferences of citizens, transparency and accountability.⁹ Input legitimacy is associated with inclusiveness; it involves interactions with non-governmental actors (civil society, private sector, academia and experts), and it centres on responsiveness to citizens’ views – hence the compliance or commitment aspect is key. By contrast, output legitimacy is commonly measured in terms of effectiveness, that is, how well government delivers on policies. It is also related to the capacity of a given political institution to successfully solve problems related to policies. Citizens gauge the results of such effort and approve or disapprove – legitimising or delegitimising. Accordingly, following Buchanan and Keohane, output legitimacy also has to do with appraising compliance (for example, the degree to which mandate was respected) and beliefs in the validity of the problem-solving effort.¹⁰ A third category proposed by Vivien Schmidt is throughput legitimacy, a ‘performance criterion’ addressing ‘what goes on in the ‘black box’ of governance between input and output.’ It denotes ‘governance processes with the people, analysed in terms of their efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to interest consultation.’¹¹ As such, it captures beliefs in the validity of the process, which is seen as credible if it adequately manages to connect inputs with outputs.

We reason that output and throughput legitimacy are very difficult to test in the G20 context; first, because of the secretive nature of negotiations, and second, because it is hard to pinpoint the specific G20 influence, broadly speaking, on domestic policies. However, input legitimacy is traceable in the G20 through the activities of engagement groups, especially in conjunction with summits. Steven Slaughter’s studies on the interactions between G20 summitry and civil society (in the form of the ‘C20’) are key to understanding the dynamic of effectiveness in participation mechanisms and support for the same (legitimacy); this illustrates how the G20 over the years ‘has taken on an increasingly complicated and institutionalised form where outreach groups operate as transnational policy networks.’¹²

Finally, the debate on the G20’s legitimacy came to the fore in the T20 meetings between think tanks in Tokyo, 26–27 May, 2019. In the plenary discussion on ‘The Future of Politics and Global Governance: Society for the 21st Century,’ Marc Fleurbay suggested that perhaps it is time for engagement groups to ask for a seat at the table at G20 summits as a means to ‘scale up’ participation and leverage of non-state actors in the G20. This idea would obviously trigger questions about representation and influence; how ‘representative’ must an engagement group be, and how successful in terms of its proposals leaving an imprint on the G20 agenda, in order to qualify for a seat at the summit? Or, which engagement group might carry the greatest potential to shrink the G20’s gap in legitimacy as the self-proclaimed hub of global governance? Who will decide? As Alan Hudson points out, ‘stakeholders are likely to hold different conceptions of “legitimacy”’ and it might be more fruitful to approach such legitimacy as socially constructed rather than a quality that can be objectively held’.¹³ He posits that ‘Acknowledging the fact that legitimacy is about justification, and that justifications can be made on a variety of bases and to a range of stakeholders, can help us to move away from a simplistic and confusing understanding of legitimacy.’¹⁴ This lies at the heart of the G20’s struggle with legitimacy, it is here argued. Self-justification from within the G20 working groups and from G20 leaders, justification across engagement groups for contributing ‘the most’ to improving G20 legitimacy overall, and the quest for internal and external legitimacy – all of these aspects feature in this study.

The next section conceptualises the G20’s transformation from club (emphasising interstate dynamics and national interests) to network governance (more complex, dynamic, and less hierarchical), which features in diplomacy studies literature¹⁵ and studies on new multilateralism.¹⁶ Moreover, this same trend has been captured in literature on transnational global governance networks.¹⁷ Coupled with the growing tendency to include a wider array of issues on its agenda – reflecting the plurality of its members and their national interests and priorities – this tests the G20’s effectiveness in its deliberations and the legitimacy deriving from their results. Some actors have adopted a stance of cautious acknowledgement of the broadening of the G20 agenda and the engagement of an increasing number of stakeholders; invited observer countries are viewed as efforts to counter criticism regarding the weakening legitimacy of the G20. However, there is concern that such measures might simultaneously imply dilution or ‘mission creep’ of the G20’s core mandate (preserving financial stability, macroeconomic coordination) and impact negatively on the actual effectiveness of agreed-upon collective actions.

The G20’s transformation from club to network governance

There is no scope here to delve into the path to formalisation and contemporary design of the G20 through the G7/G8, via the post-2008 crisis situation producing financial, economic, and social repercussions virtually all over the world, and the parallel increase of outreach groups mirroring the intensification of non-state actors’ engagement with the global governance agenda. From a Mexican perspective, the institutionalisation of the high-level dialogue between the G8 and the ‘Outreach Five’ (O5) or the G5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) through the Heiligendamm process launched in 2007, was a key initiative for engaging with the so-called emerging economies, and Mexico pursued a bridging role in this process.¹⁸ In 2010, contributing to discussions on the ‘rise of the rest,’ Mexico’s former Foreign Minister Jorge G Castañeda, in office 2000–2003 under President Vicente Fox, published in Foreign Affairs an article titled ‘Not Ready for Prime Time. Why Including Emerging Powers at the Helm Would Hurt Global Governance.’ Yet, Castañeda concluded that: ‘At the end of the day, the World’s inner sanctum will be expanded to include only the few states that possess the ambition to enter it and at least one good reason for doing so – such as geographic, demographic, political, or economic heft.’¹⁹

For his part, Andrew Cooper has argued that the G20 resembles a ‘“recession-buster” with a vital but momentary purpose’ but could also qualify as an ‘embedded “steering committee” for the world.’²⁰ Growing problem-complexes featuring clusters of issues not only concerning the great global recession but also involving security and international terrorism and the overlap with migration, and the nexus between climate change, food insecurity and migration, saw the G20 widening discussions into areas beyond its traditional turf, ie, the Finance Track. Evidently, these problem-complexes required expertise from circles other than the offices of prime ministers or presidents, foreign ministries and ministries of finance or treasury to achieve meaningful discussions around diagnosis and prescriptions for these issues – hence demonstrating a certain effectiveness in taking action to strengthen inter-ministerial coordination. Indeed, it is now common for ministries of labour, health, education, energy, and environment, as well as development cooperation agencies, to participate directly in the specific working groups that aim at generating collective actions and recommendations for G20 members.

The process of welcoming major emerging economies to the group – considered significant regional players in the multipolar world order – saw a parallel development; that of inviting a variety of stakeholders organised into so-called outreach groups, the two most active being civil society (Civil Society 20 or C20) and the private sector (Business 20 or B20). It should be underlined that these two kinds of outreach groups had already appeared in the G8 context; civil society appeared at the summit in Genoa (2001) and Gleneagles (2005),²¹ and the private sector had been present since 2006 when major German businesses launched the idea of regular meetings ahead of each summit which later became institutionalised practice.²² Mexico’s presidency in 2012 offered broader outreach practices to civil society organisations (CSOs) including labour organisations and think tanks;²³ this practise became formalised at the St Petersburg Summit in 2013. The following year, the Australian presidency enhanced further the participatory mechanism for citizens’ involvement by setting up a website where CSO affiliates could give their opinion on what issues should be prioritised by the C20, as well as sharing relevant information on these issues which formed part of the C20 final communiqué handed over to the G20 summit.²⁴ The effect was to challenge the normative and agglomerating ‘gospel’ of ‘minilateralism’ in the G8²⁵ on the basis of competing (world)views from within the wider ‘G20 family’ itself and a multitude of stakeholders from developing countries.²⁶ In addition to the institutionalised efforts of the G20 as a whole to include other actors through outreach practices, each G20 member was allowed to adopt a distinct level of commitment and approach to consultation and inclusion of domestic civil society, academia, private sector and other interest groups concerning the preparation of national positions and policies linked to those issues discussed at the multilateral level; there exists no generalised commitment regarding the depth and intensity of this kind of collaboration domestically.

The evolution of the G20 since 2008 has intrigued scholars in various parts of the world and today there is a growing body of studies regarding perceptions of its effectiveness and legitimacy in global governance;²⁷ until now, there has however been virtually no contribution from a Mexican perspective.²⁸ From a closed circle dominating negotiations (under the G8 and ‘minilateralism’) to the wider remit under multilateralism, to today’s multi-stakeholder mode, any global forum or agenda, at least formally, includes, recognises and mentions the relevance of non-governmental actors’ participation in global politics. As Harris Gleckman argues,²⁹ ‘in the intergovernmental arena, multi-stakeholder consultations have gained wide support as an umbrella framework for bringing together diverse constituencies to develop common approaches to contemporary global challenges.’ In diplomacy studies, it is possible to identify a set of approaches examining the participation of non-governmental actors in global politics: multi-stakeholder diplomacy,³⁰ public diplomacy,³¹ network diplomacy,³² think tank diplomacy,³³ and transprofessionalisation of diplomacy.³⁴

As ministries of foreign affairs have come under pressure to invite different stakeholders to partake in deliberations on foreign policy, several changes at the institutional or organisational level, as well as the personal level, are evident. These changes are visible in diplomats’ day-to-day interactions and have added new functional qualities to their repertoire, including a strengthened capacity for networking and appraisal of the complexity of the contemporary multi-actor foreign policy process. Mexico is no exception, but studies do not abound on this shift in Mexican diplomacy.³⁵ According to Jorge Heine:³⁶

[D]iplomats must practice ‘network diplomacy’. This means engaging a vastly larger number of players in the host country—including many who would have never thought of setting foot in the rarefied atmosphere of the salons and private clubs the diplomats of yesteryear used to frequent. More and more, diplomacy is becoming ‘complexity management’.

Kathryn Hochstetler reasons thus:³⁷

There is no doubt that the greater involvement of civil society in diplomacy has widened the diplomatic agenda. Civil society actors bring the perspective of the society, those of ordinary citizens rather than the political elite who by definition make up the world’s government and much of the diplomatic corps.

As they link up with their own peers across the world, this gives a further impetus to transnational relations,³⁸ hence the relevance of talking in terms of transnational policy networks.³⁹ According to Dianne Stone, these networks include:⁴⁰

‘Internationalized public sector officials’: diplomats, public officials, and regulators engaged in international issues and networks; ‘international civil servants’: officials working for IGOs; and ‘transnational policy professionals’: consultants, foundation officers, business leaders, scientific experts, think tanks pundits, and NGO executives.

Obviously, all these groupings embrace different kinds of actors that form part of the wider ‘G20 family.’ However, there is no automatic increase in legitimacy resulting from the increasing proliferation of non-state actors in the outreach groups alone.

Characteristics of the G20’s effectiveness-legitimacy nexus

Anti-globalisation critics tend to see the G20 as an illegitimate club of global governance or a ‘toothless talk shop.’⁴¹ Even the Chinese President Xi Jinping at the opening of the G20 summit on 3 September 2016 called for the leaders to turn the club into an action team, instead of a talk shop.⁴² In the G20’s history, a number of summits have been accompanied by strong – even violent – protests (such as Hamburg in 2017). It could be suggested that people rallying movements focusing on, for instance, the poor, fair trade, human rights and the rights of indigenous people and feminism would be unlikely to change their mind about the core issue of the G20’s legitimacy problem despite being welcome to partake in side-events of the G20 summits. Furthermore, the inclusion of non-governmental actors in multilateral discussions does not guarantee effective and systematic participation of those actors at the domestic level or the full cycle of policies derived or linked to the G20 processes.

Put simply, the crux is that the G20 is a club for the top leaders of the world’s 20 largest economies harbouring two-thirds of the world’s population and producing roughly 80% of global GDP, a fact that has made it a self-proclaimed leader in steering global governance under the homogenising, agglomerating ‘gospel’ of trade liberalisation, deregulation of markets, and neo-liberal economic and political globalisation. The problem is that this leaves out a great number of countries and people that have less political-economic influence in global affairs, but not necessarily lower stakes in those problem-complexes being debated by the G20.⁴³ Capturing this dilemma, Harris Rimmer says: ‘The G20 is a site where poverty and wealth exist very close together. It should do more to understand itself and the relationship between development, growth and inequality before the G20 can fulfil its global governance potential.’⁴⁴ Seen in this light, from a truly global perspective, should the G20 do more to escape the pitfalls of self-justification and self-legitimation in order to achieve greater global legitimacy?

According to Mathias Albert, in today’s ‘stratified global governance,’ the G20 obviously plays an important role since it ‘increases variety in global governance.’ Nevertheless, Albert argues, it could be argued that part of the G20’s legitimacy problem is also related to the phenomenon of ‘fictions and symbols of control’ of global governance, a tendency visible in other international players as well (the EU, the UN system, the WTO).⁴⁵ Global leaders today simulate being in control of global governance,⁴⁶ but there are areas that escape them or that are simply beyond reach either voluntarily (for example, the Panama Papers scandal) or involuntarily (for example, droughts, floods and other natural disasters), or simply because of disagreements within the G20 about the desired direction of global governance. There is simulation of being in control regarding the challenge of regulating various types of flows: ie, migrants, commercial transactions of different kinds, emissions causing climate change and pollution. Therefore, there is an acute need to introduce more efficient governance in global politics. The growing demands from non-state actors or multi-stakeholders to be reckoned as co-players in global governance have been met with rather slow moves to design efficient mechanisms for their proper inclusion in forums such as the G20. Additionally, the influence sought by CSOs, in particular, is not unproblematic,⁴⁷ especially in areas of ‘high politics.’ In some instances, initiatives to institutionalise multi-stakeholders’ participation in multilateral forums have been criticised as attempts at co-optation.⁴⁸ Albert suggests that the legitimacy crisis of international institutions might have come about as a result of ‘over-institutionalisation.’⁴⁹ In this vein, we could interpret this as multi-stakeholder participation mechanisms failing to be properly thought through. In some instances, they then appear ineffective or even counter-productive, leading to weakened legitimacy for the innovations proposed in the effort to enhance or deepen non-governmental actors’ participation in global issues. As Slaughter succinctly puts it: ‘Is the Civil 20 outreach process a genuine and useful form of public engagement that can enhance the effectiveness of the civil society sector to influence the G20 or is it a largely symbolic and tokenistic attempt to include and manage this sector?’⁵⁰

One international organisation that has been criticised for lacking legitimacy and effectiveness is the EU. Recalling the observation by one Mexican diplomat that ‘today, there is not one G20 but several … ’ the comparison with the EU is not far-fetched: a rotating EU presidency every six months, the troika principle (past, present and future presidencies agreeing on a certain common platform), different councils, specific budget allocations for hosting high-level meetings and summits, unforeseen expenses, anti-EU protests and police resources (and possible compensation for damages) – and new topics on the ever-increasing agenda to debate, deliberate, and decide upon. For example, considering the domestic economic situation in Argentina, how much did it cost to organise the meeting in May 2018 with the G20 foreign ministers? Why, indeed, meet in real life at all? Taking this counter-argument further, might climate-smart politicians opt for video conferences instead? If the G20 continues this way, the legitimacy issue may be fuelled further because national governments are often not keen to defend the ‘value added’ of extra summits or extraordinary high-level meetings in the face of criticism from the general public. In sum, the expansion of the G20 is not necessarily a change for the better – and to boot, it is one that puts additional stress on the already saturated G20 negotiation system.

Effectiveness and legitimacy in the G20 development working group

At the outset, it might seem contradictory to ask the G20 to do more regarding its ‘effectiveness’ given that it does not adopt any binding decisions. Therefore, it is even more interesting that one of the outreach groups, the T20, has launched the call for producing more concrete policy recommendations that could translate into real actions by the member countries. Certainly, at the summit level, the G20 is an agenda-setter and can paint grand visions based on the lowest common denominator of its members, or send joint messages to home audiences or other target audiences (ie, the global financial sector, or the WTO). Nonetheless, the G20 has no supervising body or mechanism to oversee that common G20 rhetoric will translate into national priorities, so intentions embedded in discourses run the risk of remaining mere intentions. Besides, it is extremely difficult to test how much of the substance of national policies (especially economic and foreign policy, or competition and investment policy) has been inspired by the work of the G20 network; this is why the effectiveness issue is so tricky and hard to pin-point with scientific accuracy.

Practices implemented at the working group level do, however, provide evidence of the effectiveness of these efforts to address accountability demands. In 2012 in Los Cabos, leaders invited the DWG ‘to explore putting in place a process for ensuring assessment and accountability for G20 development actions by the next Summit.’⁵¹ As a result, in 2013 the DWG conducted its first accountability exercise setting out ‘the progress achieved since the adoption of the 2010 Seoul Multi-Year Action Plan (MYAP) on Development.’⁵² The first exercise covered the 67 commitments derived from the Seoul MYAP, as well as those development commitments from the 2011–2012 leaders’ declarations. The DWG assessed progress in the nine pillars of the MYAP. During the 2014 Australian presidency, members agreed to a DWG Accountability Framework. It established the elaboration of two core products: first, the Comprehensive Accountability Report (CAR) every three years submitted to leaders through sherpas, that ‘should cover the state of play for all ongoing G20 DWG commitments, including in-depth assessment of progress in each priority area and a traffic-light report’; and second, an annual progress report documenting the status of existing commitments and capturing ‘new commitments to enable a simple, systematic and regular review’, submitted only to sherpas.⁵³ The DWG Accountability Framework also includes criteria to frame new commitments and reassess and address commitments identified as stalled or as having made mixed progress, and suggests that each G20 presidency ‘appoint a small group of members to an Accountability Steering Committee to support the presidency to implement the DWG Accountability Framework’. For these reports, commitments are extracted from the specific initiatives produced by the DWG and leaders’ declarations and have been identified as ‘on track,’ ‘completed,’ ‘off-track,’ ‘stalled,’ with ‘mixed results,’ ‘completed with on-going monitoring’ or even ‘redirected’ to another work stream.⁵⁴ For example, the 2016 DWG commitment to establish the G20 Global Platform on Inclusive Business (GPIB) was marked as completed in the 2017 Hamburg Annual Progress Report on G20 Development Commitments, and during the Argentine presidency, the G20 requested the UNDP to update the GPIB to support knowledge-sharing on innovative practices to support inclusive business.⁵⁵ The Osaka Comprehensive Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments in 2019 marked this commitment as ‘on track’ and reported that the GPIB was updated in 2018 and linked to the platform of the global initiative referred to as the Inclusive Business Action Network (iBAN).⁵⁶ Furthermore, both the UNDP and iBAN released the G20 Inclusive Business Activities Update in December 2018, providing analysis of experiences from G20 member countries with regard to promoting inclusive business through policies and projects.⁵⁷

The 2017 Hamburg Annual Progress Report on G20 Development Commitments represented progress ‘year one after the adoption of the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda.’ In addition to tracking those DWG development commitments that remain active, ‘it also present[ed] progress on other selected 2030 Agenda-positive G20 commitments’ that emerged from other work streams.⁵⁸ Subsequent presidencies continued with this innovation in the respective accountability reports on development commitments, even though the inclusion of selected commitments from other work streams has been intensely debated within the DWG. Furthermore, owing to the fact that the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda and its annual updates include commitments derived from other work streams, questions remain on whether – and if so, how – to provide proper accountability of the G20’s overall contribution to the 2030 Agenda, a debate that should transcend the DWG. In any case, the DWG Accountability Framework emerged from the fact that G20 leaders, in the 2012 and 2013 summits, ‘highlighted the need for the DWG to deepen its focus on accountability in the interest of increasing the effectiveness of its actions’;⁵⁹ the progress report on development commitments certainly provides information that is valuable for assessing effectiveness.

Analysis next turns to review a specific angle of the legitimacy conundrum pertaining to development cooperation commitments arising from within the DWG. In this context, legitimacy beyond G20 member stakeholders matters – even if every member were to guarantee the inclusion of non-state actors in its respective domestic deliberations; legitimacy is inherently linked to developing countries’ priorities and ownership, and therefore has a direct impact on the effectiveness issue. To what extent are developing countries engaged?

Outreach to developing countries in the DWG has been an important feature of the G20 development agenda. It helps ‘the G20 to better understand the perspectives of non-G20 members and the development challenges confronting specific groups such as the smallest developing countries.’⁶⁰ Mechanisms for outreach include side events, workshops, policy dialogues, consultations and participation in meetings of non-G20 countries, whether permanent (like Spain) or selected annually in their capacity as representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations, or because of their involvement in specific G20 actions. In addition, dialogue with members of the Commonwealth and La Francophonie have occurred since 2010 and specific assessments of progress have been produced for specific commitments. In fact, the DWG Accountability Framework states that the progress reports should also include input and views from non-G20 members and information on linkages to other G20 work streams.

The Hangzhou Comprehensive Accountability Report in 2016 contains findings derived from a survey and follow up discussions that the Commonwealth and La Francophonie conducted among their members on the accountability of the G20 and its development agenda. Key messages included that ‘awareness of the work of the G20’s DWG was limited’ and ‘potentially impacted perceptions of the G20 as well as the effectiveness of engagement with developing countries’.⁶¹ The Lowy Institute Report on G20 Outreach and Non-G20 Member Views on the G20 highlights that inviting smaller countries is not sufficient. There is a need to brief non-members on the G20, hear the views and concerns of non-members, and consider that they may not fully understand the G20 system and ‘where their contribution can add value’.⁶² Indeed, dialogue needs to be held directly with non-G20 developing countries to inform G20 decision-making for effective development cooperation. Nevertheless, based on the accountability reports, dialogue seems dependent on each presidency and not sufficient overall. One could also assume that in the G20, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, India and South Africa carry a moral responsibility to voice the needs and priorities of vulnerable populations and to push for development effectiveness for less developed countries that benefit from development cooperation actions agreed at the DWG (in line with normative legitimacy argumentation). But, in the end, systematic work from the G20 as a whole is also required to understand whether DWG outcomes and collective actions targeting developing and less developed countries actually emerge from these countries’ priorities, and whether the actions are transparent, implemented according to plan, and beneficial to the recipient countries.

It is undeniable that challenges remain, in terms of effective communication on commitments and progress, and that these challenges tend to block positive spill over from deliberations with non-governmental actors, which otherwise might increase the input legitimacy conferred by these actors upon the deliberations. Documents emerging from the G20 are not always easily accessible, not every work stream has accountability frameworks, and the communication efforts of the G20 are concentrated on the leaders’ summits. Input legitimacy would surely be enhanced if the results of accountability exercises like the one carried out by the DWG were shared clearly and systematically through a smart public diplomacy strategy that does not depend on the style of each presidency, regardless of the status of the commitments’ implementation. Hence, external legitimacy could increase even in the case of mixed results.

Understanding challenges to the G20’s effectiveness-legitimacy nexus through processes in the development working group

Having identified some of the key features of the G20’s transformation from club into network governance and challenges regarding the effectiveness-legitimacy nexus in general, and in relation to the DWG in particular, this section will discuss two concrete examples highlighting input and output legitimacy in the DWG context. As stated before, our principal argument is that by looking deeper into the specific clusters of government and non-state actors operating around the G20 troika and moving down one level from the leaders to the work streams, positive examples of network governance can be found regarding the G20’s effectiveness in the actual processing of commitments made in the DWG. The analysis approaches this from a Mexican perspective, with AMEXCID as the government entity representing Mexico at the DWG. Two concrete examples will be highlighted in the following discussion. First will be the working procedures in the DWG concerning the G20’s role in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in G20 countries and beyond. Second will be the individual contributions by specific G20 presidencies rallying other G20 countries for specific initiatives. In this case, Mexico’s involvement in the DWG through AMEXCID and Germany’s efforts to push forward the Voluntary Peer Learning Mechanism for the 2030 Agenda implementation will serve as examples of specific countries’ efforts to address the problems of the effectiveness-legitimacy nexus and to facilitate network governance.

Network governance in the Development Working Group (DWG)

As mentioned earlier, the G20’s shift from club to network governance has expanded into an increasingly wide-ranging network of formal and informal meetings between government officials that has led to the emergence of a culture of cooperation among advanced and emerging countries. Below, we analyse Mexico’s participation in the Development Working Group (through the AMEXCID), and its engagement with the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda and its annual updates, and the Voluntary Peer Learning Mechanism launched during the German presidency, with its resulting policy briefs (involving China, Germany, Mexico, Norway, and The Netherlands).

In 2015, G20 Leaders committed to developing an action plan in 2016 to achieve greater alignment between the G20’s work with the 2030 Agenda.⁶³ During the Chinese presidency, the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda was produced and then adopted.⁶⁴ The DWG oversees the horizontal integration of the action plan. Given that G20 members contribute to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda by collective as well as individual concrete actions at international and domestic levels, the action plan included collective actions by all different work streams of both Sherpa and Finance Tracks, reflecting ongoing mid- and long-term G20 commitments. Every year, an update is produced to accommodate deliverables by subsequent presidencies.

Accordingly, the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda promotes dialogue between work streams but also demands greater coordination domestically. Crucially, it provides a snapshot that captures the complete expected contribution by the G20 to the 2030 Agenda, which, in itself, signals a potential effectiveness risk: every year the list of commitments grows without a clear pathway for monitoring progress. With the approval of the G20 Action Plan, the accountability process of development commitments was adjusted to include selected commitments pertaining to sustainable development that go beyond the scope of the DWG. However, by no means can the DWG conduct a thorough accountability process for commitments that did not emanate from the DWG, especially if the other working groups in both Sherpa and Finance Tracks have not agreed to such comprehensive accountability processes. Interestingly, in the Osaka CAR in 2019, the DWG committed to completing the update of its accountability framework during Saudi Arabia’s presidency in 2020 ‘for greater coherence of G20 efforts and to incorporate lessons learned since the adoption of the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda’.⁶⁵

As a consequence of the 2030 Agenda, the approach to development commitments in the DWG has acquired an additional characteristic. Owing to the universality of the 2030 Agenda, initiatives within the DWG have broadened in scope – not without debate – to include commitments not only promoting development cooperation, but also involving national development areas where every country, regardless of their income level, faces specific gaps or challenges. This debate, subject for a paper itself, touches a major issue: in the 2030 Agenda era, how does the G20 define the limits of the DWG work, which prior to 2015 centred on development cooperation, but now – as expressed by David Nabarro, UN special adviser on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – must consider that ‘every country is now a developing country’?⁶⁶

Mexico, as a developing country but also a South-South cooperation partner and member of the OECD, has been vocal about the universality of the agenda and the relevance of recognising South-South and triangular cooperation as useful mechanisms for implementing collective actions. At the same time, learning and knowledge sharing has become central in the DWG initiatives: learning from other G20 members’ national experiences, other regional contexts, and other types of development cooperation. Different thematic initiatives throughout the history of the DWG have encouraged knowledge sharing as a mechanism to implement collective actions for the benefit of developing countries, for example the G20 Initiative #eSkills4Girls,⁶⁷ the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion,⁶⁸ and the Platform for Agricultural Risk Management.⁶⁹

Early Childhood Development (ECD), a priority established by Argentina in 2018 for the DWG, is the emblematic example of efforts to address universal development challenges where national and international action is required.⁷⁰ Mexico was invited to chair the ECD Steering Committee in the DWG during Argentina’s presidency, to facilitate the negotiation process. Owing to the multidimensional character of the topic and the role of Mexico in the initiative, AMEXCID reached out to other relevant institutions in Mexico that led to the following results: AMEXCID became a permanent invitee of the Inter-ministerial Commission for Early Childhood, which belongs to Mexico’s National System of Integral Protection for Children and Adolescents. The commission incorporates a variety of governmental agencies, line ministries and autonomous public sector institutions, and includes representatives of specialised civil society, the private sector, academia and international organisations. Participation in this commission allowed for a closer dialogue with key domestic actors that contribute to shaping the Mexican position on the topic at the DWG, which arguably fosters input legitimacy. Being part of the commission also reduces the gap between the actual implementers and the international negotiators, thereby increasing the likelihood for output legitimacy of the G20’s work. In addition, AMEXCID was able to share with other national institutions the status of the DWG negotiations on the ECD initiative, as well as to learn about national best practices that could be shared with G20 members and other developing countries.

The ECD initiative, as approved in Buenos Aires, explains the relevance of ECD as a matter of fundamental rights and its impact in building human capital. It calls on G20 members to act and lead by example in the following areas: financing and investment; data, monitoring and evaluation; and knowledge sharing and international cooperation. Some of the collective actions foreseen in the initiative – mainly those on knowledge sharing (via a platform for best practices) – inherently implied processes that exceeded Argentina’s term in the chair. In any case, the interest of domestic actors and future presidencies in furthering the ECD agenda may certainly vary. In consultation with government officers, during the Japanese presidency ECD was mentioned in the G20 Initiative on Human Capital Investment for Sustainable Development and the DWG as a whole participated in the integration of the Osaka Comprehensive Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments. This report mentions that G20 countries have provided ‘over 40 case studies on ECD programmes and policies with the Early Childhood Development Action Network (ECDAN),’ which have been disseminated through the ECDAN online platform. According to the report, ECDAN is collecting and documenting additional ECD practices and tools in low-income countries, refining its communication strategy, as well as facilitating communities of practice and advocacy and knowledge exchange events.⁷¹

It is fair to assume that the network formation between AMEXCID and the ECD community in Mexico across ministerial or sectorial boundaries is a product of coincidence between the domestic and the global agendas in 2018. The inter-ministerial commission survived the federal government transition in December 2018; however, the DWG accountability reports cannot provide information on the individual actions taken by G20 members to translate their multilateral commitments into concrete actions; they particularly focus on collective actions, and there are no national reports systematically aimed at tracing national actions to implement international agreements at the G20. It remains to be seen to what extent AMEXCID continues performing as broker ensuring that the ECD community remains connected and able to benefit from the G20 networks and knowledge sharing processes in this area. This suggests another layer to be explored in future research regarding G20 development commitments, in addition to effectiveness and legitimacy: (country specific) impact. Notwithstanding the above, connecting the global and the domestic agendas on ECD was a positive outcome and one that should be acknowledged.

Increasing G20 ‘effectiveness scores’ through specific country contributions: The case of Germany and the Voluntary Peer learning Mechanism, and Mexico’s involvement

As exemplified in the previous section, looking at the national implementation of collective actions or group collaboration around specific initiatives could be a fruitful approach to better understand the G20’s effectiveness-legitimacy nexus, and some of its sensitive features. Below, we address the Voluntary Peer Learning Mechanism (VPLM) for the G20 countries’ implementation of the 2030 Agenda, promoted by Germany during its presidency, as a complementary action to member countries’ individual commitments to submit voluntary national reviews (VNRs) on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda to the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF). For its part, Mexico has submitted two VNRs: the first one from 2016 referred to preparatory measures aimed at creating an adequate environment for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda; the second one, from 2018, addresses the first years with the 2030 Agenda. This document includes not only actions at the federal level but also contributions of diverse social actors and levels of government, as multiple approaches are required to fulfil the 2030 Agenda. Knowledge sharing and mutual learning is the essence of South-South and triangular cooperation, which is why it was natural for Mexico to support the initiative proposed by Germany and get involved in the VPLM. Two groups were created according to the learning interests of the countries: Group 1 around alignment of national development strategies for the 2030 Agenda and horizontal and vertical coherence (China, Germany, and Mexico), and Group 2 around private sector engagement (Netherlands, Norway, and Mexico). Each group acquired its own personality and working arrangements based on a flexible approach regarding participation, which featured virtual dialogue, information exchange, systematisation of experiences in the case of Group 2 and one face-to-face meeting in the case of Group 1. Also, each group generated policy briefs that were annexed to a document – the Buenos Aires Update: Moving Forward the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – summarising main takeaways in two different dimensions: (1) the specific topic where countries exchanged experiences and practices, and (2) the knowledge sharing process itself.⁷²

In contrast with most DWG commitments that require long-term engagement and a more complex institutional gearing, the VPLM provides an immediate and straightforward environment to test the theory on the G20’s transition from club to network governance and argue in line with input legitimacy, specifically. The extensive exchange conducted through the VPLM forged a sense of network formation among the participants, particularly the DWG delegates and international organisations such as the UNDP and the OECD, which allowed for continued informal exchanges and collaboration in other endeavours. The VPLM also required direct involvement by other actors that do not participate in the regular group meetings but play a role in the coordination of the national implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The actors engaged were defined by the topics agreed at the DWG which, in 2017 – still at an early stage in the national implementation of the 2030 Agenda – focused on the coordination structures, meaning that participants involved reached a wider audience than the DWG delegates, but still at a governmental level. In this regard, AMEXCID had to engage the office of the presidency, the Ministry of the Treasury’s Performance Evaluation Unit (not the department usually in charge of the G20 Finance Track), and the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy. Representatives at the face-to-face meeting not only learned from countries as remote and different as China and Germany, but also engaged in constructive debate among Mexican institutions, propelled by the learning environment and feedback by other countries. As stated in a policy brief jointly produced by China, Germany and Mexico on the results of the first round of the VPLM on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda: ‘the extensive exchange between the participating countries helped to develop a sense of network formation and interest in further exchange and mutual learning, even beyond the limits of the current VPLM round.’⁷³ This experience confirms the theory that G20 dynamics are shifting toward network governance, in which the processing of issues takes place within a wider set of actors and mechanisms and beyond traditional diplomatic encounters – a development which may be conducive to greater input legitimacy for the G20 as a whole.

The first round of the VPLM also provides testing ground for this article’s argument on the probability of higher ‘effectiveness scores’ by focusing on actions at the working group level and through greater inter-ministerial coordination and collaboration, which then helps us to address the legitimacy problem of multilateral forums, traditionally perceived as the exclusive purview of ministries of foreign affairs, but in this particular case including participation by both state and non-state actors.

While the VPLM was successfully launched by Germany during its presidency, the German presidency failed to secure from all G20 countries the commitment to have submitted (at least) one VNR report by 2019, owing to the voluntary nature and the different stages in setting up structures and processes for national implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The evolution of G20 collective and individual efforts on the issue of implementing the 2030 Agenda remains to be seen. Regarding the VPLM, the goal remains to ensure its permanence in the DWG. Argentina successfully managed to maintain enthusiasm by engaging other members in a second round;⁷⁴ the question for the future is to what extent this peer learning mechanism will have a long-lasting impact on the DWG’s regular operation and dialogue among members and between those members and other work streams.

For Mexico, participating in the first round of the VPLM served to demonstrate coherence with the multilateral discourse on several issues: commitment to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, support for its universal character, and the promotion of knowledge sharing and mutual learning between countries regardless of their development level, in line with Mexico’s South-South and triangular cooperation traditions.

Conclusions

The debate on what constitutes a legitimate global order and what are the main challenges to legitimate global governance is ongoing in many places around the world. How can multilateralism, trust, and reciprocity be maintained amid destructive nationalism and protectionism? What is the place for inclusiveness and sustainability in societies becoming increasingly polarised and where civic space is shrinking?⁷⁵ Obviously, diverging views exist on the issue of what constitutes a legitimate global order and what its key priorities should be, and those views will inform any evaluation of the G20 from an effectiveness and legitimacy perspective. One potentially valuable avenue for the G20 in its struggle with the effectiveness and legitimacy dilemma could be to listen more carefully to the recommendations from its own ‘family members;’ the B20, C20, T20, W20, and Y20. These engagement groups are vital since they ‘maintain or probably rather rebuild the basis of cooperation below the level of international diplomacy.’ ⁷⁶ Grimm and Berger add that

[t]his process ‘under the surface’ remains relevant – or even gains relevance – when agreement cannot be reached between governments. In other words: transnational action can help to keep issues on the plate when there exists a tendency to push them off the negotiation table.⁷⁷

This article makes a call for moving beyond the leaders’ level of the G20, based on a detailed examination of the dynamics in the work streams and working groups. This examination sought to provide a better understanding of the interrelationship between commitments and domestic implementation in the G20 countries, as well as characteristics of the G20’s effectiveness-legitimacy nexus and features of input and output legitimacy therein. We argue that a suitable theoretical-analytical approach is to view the G20 through the lens of network governance. Two case studies provided evidence, from Mexico and Germany.

Working group-level dynamics are complex and the path of efforts to meet commitments can be qualified as opaque. Therefore better communication regarding the progress toward meeting commitments could have a fundamental impact on securing the G20’s relevance in the world, boosting its external legitimacy. Indeed, as a means to attract the interest of new generations of decision-makers in G20 countries (and beyond), and the outreach groups, the G20 might benefit from engaging in an open and critical reflection on its work, impact, and degree of inclusivity. In addition, a well-functioning communication strategy, coupled with serious introspection, would also entail building the visibility of network governance with different stakeholders in the wider ‘G20 family’, particularly in ‘low’ politics areas like education, research and development or health, which are also suitable for displaying particular ‘soft power’ initiatives on the part of individual G20 countries.⁷⁸ This is obviously also relevant for the Finance Track dealing with the core issues of the G20 agenda; overseeing macroeconomic coordination and preserving financial stability in the global economy. It is therefore important to bear in mind that G20 commitments do not necessarily imply collective implementation; they can be translated into individual or group country action at the domestic or regional level where ‘effectiveness scores’ can be identified and assessed. Accordingly, when discussing effectiveness and legitimacy in the G20 context, it is fruitful to pay attention to this nexus in the domestic setting.

It is also vital that individual member countries assume the task of informing the general public about their presence in the G20; what is on the agenda, shared commitments, likely implications for public policies, and so forth. It must be noted that Mexican governments in the past have not made this a priority. While the staunchest globalisation critics are unlikely to be ‘converted,’ moderate sceptics of the G20 might perhaps gain a better understanding and even an appreciation of the scope for multi-stakeholder participation and transnational network governance in the G20. As such, analysing those initiatives that drive both internal and external legitimation processes – for example, through dialogue with the outreach groups, the T20’s policy recommendations for the G20, or the horizontal nature of deliberations in the DWG on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (engaging in the ‘best practices’ exercise on implementation through the VPLM) – are promising fields of research for the future.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID

Rebecka Villanueva Ulfgard http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8856-2563

Note on contributors

Rebecka Villanueva Ulfgard is Associate Professor in International Studies, Instituto Mora, Mexico City. Her research publications cover Mexico in the G20, Mexico’s international development cooperation, civil society participation in the foreign policy process, and transition to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. She is the lead editor of the series Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America for Palgrave Macmillan.

Bernadette Vega Sanchez is an independent consultant currently collaborating with the UNDP Mexico and GIZ on South-South Cooperation and management of multi-stakeholder partnerships. Formerly she was Senior Advisor and Director of Data, Monitoring and Evaluation at the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID), and head of the Mexican delegation in the G20 Development Working Group between 2016 and 2018.

Notes

1 Harris Rimmer S, ‘A critique of Australia’s G20 presidency and the Brisbane summit 2014’, Global Summitry, 1,1, 2015, pp. 41–63; Slaughter S, ‘The prospects of deliberative global governance in the G20: Legitimacy, accountability, and public contestation’, Review of International Studies, 39, 1, 2013, pp. 71–90; Slaughter S, ‘Building G20 Outreach: The role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry’, Global Summitry, 1, 2, 2015, pp. 171–86; Slaughter S, ‘Interpreting civil society engagement with the G20: The qualified inclusion of the 2014 civil 20 process’, Globalizations, 16, 1, 2019, pp. 36–49.

2 Cf. Hilbrich S & J Schwab, ‘Towards a more accountable G20? Accountability mechanisms of the G20 and the new challenges posed to them’, DIE Discussion Paper, 13/2018.

3 Harris Rimmer, ‘A critique of Australia’s G20 presidency and the Brisbane summit 2014’.

4 Ibid., p. 42–43.

5 Held D et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

6 Castells M, The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.

7 Moghadam VM, 2000, p. 80 quoted in Hudson A, ‘NGOs’ transnational advocacy networks: From “legitimacy” to “political responsibility”?’, Global Networks, 1,4, 2001, p. 334.

8 Tallberg J et al., Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

9 Dahl R, On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998; Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture; and Scharpf F, Governing Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

10 Buchanan A & Keohane RO, ‘The legitimacy of global governance institutions’, Ethics & International Affairs, 20, 4, 2006, pp. 405–37.

11 Schmidt V, ‘Democracy and legitimacy in the European Union revisited: Input, output and ‘throughput’’, Political Studies, 61, 1, 2012, Abstract.

12 Slaughter, ‘Building G20 Outreach: The role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry’.

13 Hudson A, ‘NGOs’ transnational advocacy networks: From “legitimacy” to “political responsibility”?’, p. 332.

14 Ibid., pp. 340–41.

15 Cf. Cooper AF et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013.

16 Cf. chapter contributions in Muldoon JP et al. (eds), The New Dynamics of Multilateralism, Diplomacy, International Organizations and Global Governance. Boulder: Westview Press, 2011.

17 Cf. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni M, ‘Global governance networks’, in Nicoll Victor J, AH Montgomery & M Lubell (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks. UK: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 689–714.

18 Cooper AF, ‘Squeezed or revitalized? Middle powers, the G20 and the evolution of global governance’, Third World Quarterly, 34, 6, 2013, p. 977.

19 Castañeda JG, ‘Not ready for prime time. Why including emerging powers at the helm would hurt global governance’, Foreign Affairs, 89, 5, 2010, pp. 109–23.

20 Cooper AF, ‘The G20 as an improvised crisis committee and/or a contested “steering committee” for the world’, International Affairs, 86, 3, 2010, Abstract.

21 Slaughter, ‘Building G20 Outreach: The role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry’.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.; Villanueva Ulfgard R & A Jaime, ‘New multilateralism and governmental mechanisms for including civil society during Mexico’s presidency of the G20 in 2012’, Third World Quarterly, 35, 8, 2014, pp. 1529–46.

24 Slaughter, ‘Building G20 Outreach: The role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry’.

25 Cf. Thakur R, ‘Multilateral diplomacy and the United Nations: Global governance venue or actor?’ in Muldoon JP et al. (eds), The New Dynamics of Multilateralism, Diplomacy, International Organizations and Global Governance. Boulder: Westview Press, 2011, pp. 249–65.

26 Cf. Slaughter, ‘Building G20 Outreach: The role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry’, and Slaughter, ‘Interpreting civil society engagement with the G20: The qualified inclusion of the 2014 civil 20 process’, for in-depth analysis of this development.

27 Cf. Callaghan M et al., ‘G20 Outreach and Non-G20 Member Views on the G20’, Report. Lowy Institute, 29 January 2014, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/g20-outreach-and-non-g20-member-views-g20>; Tallberg et al., Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences.

28 We base this assertion on our own literature review of Mexican academic sources addressing Mexico’s role in the G20.

29 Gleckman H, Multistakeholder governance: A corporate push for a new form of global governance. State of Power 2016. Democracy, Sovereignty and Resistance. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2016, p. 92. <https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/state-of-power-2016.pdf>.

30 Hocking B, ‘Non-state actors and the transformation of diplomacy’ in Reinalda B (ed) The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors, 2011. UK: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 3–18.

31 Melissen J, ‘Public diplomacy’, in Cooper AF, J Heine & R Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 436–52.

32 Heine J, ‘From club to network diplomacy’, in Cooper AF, J Heine & R Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 54–69.

33 Conley Tyler M et al., ‘Think tank diplomacy’, Brill Research Perspectives in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, 2, 3, 2017, pp. 1–96.

34 Constantinou C et al., ‘Transprofessional diplomacy’, Brill Research Perspectives in Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, 1, 4, 2016, pp. 1–66.

35 Cf. Alejo A & Villanueva Ulfgard R, ‘Proactive, responsible, and in good faith’: Network diplomacy in Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latin American Policy, 10, 2, 2019, pp. 220–35.

36 Heine, ‘From club to network diplomacy’, p. 62.

37 Hochstetler K, ‘Civil society’, in Cooper AF, J Heine & R Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 181.

38 Cooper, ‘Squeezed or revitalized? Middle powers, the G20 and the evolution of global governance’,p. 742.

39 Slaughter, ‘Building G20 Outreach: The role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry’.

40 Stone D, 2008, pp. 30–1, cited in Slaughter S, ‘Global civil society or networked globality’, in Farazmand A (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 2017, p. 3, Springer online, <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-31816-5_1261-1.pdf>.

41 Cf. Eccleston R et al., ‘G20 endorsement in post crisis global governance: More than a toothless talking shop?’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17, 2, 2015, pp. 298–317, arguing against this kind of sweeping generalisations.

42 Yao K & K Takenaka, ‘China’s Xi at G20 says world economy at risk, warns against protectionism’, Reuters, 3 September 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-china-usa-idUSKCN1190E9>.

43 Cf. Payne A, ‘How many Gs are there in ‘global governance’ after the crisis? The perspectives of the ‘marginal majority’ of the world’s states’, International Affairs, 86, 3, 2010, pp. 729–40; Slaughter, ‘Building G20 Outreach: The role of transnational policy networks in sustaining effective and legitimate summitry’.

44 Harris Rimmer, ‘A critique of Australia’s G20 presidency and the Brisbane summit 2014’, p. 58.

45 Notes from keynote conference delivered by Mathias Albert (University of Bielefeld), ‘Who governs the globe?’ National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), 30 October 2017.

46 Ibid.

47 Cf. Hudson, NGOs’ transnational advocacy networks: From “legitimacy” to “political responsibility”?’, pp. 331–52.

48 Cf. McKeon N, ‘Transforming global governance in the post-2015 era: Towards an equitable and sustainable world’, Globalizations, 14, 4, 2017, pp. 487–503.

49 Notes from keynote conference delivered by Mathias Albert (University of Bielefeld), ‘Who governs the globe?’ National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), 30 October 2017.

50 Slaughter, ‘Interpreting civil society engagement with the G20: The qualified inclusion of the 2014 civil 20 process’, p. 37.

51 G20, G20 Leaders Declaration 2012, Los Cabos, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html>.

52 G20, G20 Leaders Declaration 2013, St. Petersburg, <https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/media/g20_leaders_declaration_st._petersburg_summit.pdf>

53 G20, G20 DWG Accountability Framework, 5 September 2014, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/g20_development_working_group_accountability_framework.pdf>.

54 G20, Saint Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments, 2013, <https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/saint-petersburg/St-Petersburg-Accountability-Report-G20-Development-Commitments.pdf>; G20 DWG 2014 Annual Progress Report. Brisbane, 2014, <http://g20.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/G20-DWG-2014-Annual-Progress-Report-1.pdf>; G20 DWG 2015 Annual Progress Report. Antalya, 2015, <https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/antalya/G20-Development-Working-Group-Annual-Progress-Report-2015.pdf>.

55 G20, G20 Call on Financing for Inclusive Business. Buenos Aires, 2018, <https://www.inclusivebusiness.net/sites/default/files/2018-12/g20_call_on_financing_for_iibb.pdf>.

56 G20, Osaka Comprehensive Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments, Osaka, 2019, <https://www.g20.org/pdf/documents/en/annex_13.pdf>.

57 G20 Inclusive Business Activities Update. December 2018, <https://www.inclusivebusiness.net/sites/default/files/2018-12/G20%20Inclusive%20Business%20Activities%20Update.pdf>.

58 G20, Hamburg Annual Progress Report on G20 Development Commitments. 2017, Executive Summary, p. 6, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-g20-hamburg-annual-progress-report-en.pdf>.

59 G20, G20 DWG Accountability Framework, 5 September 2014, p. 2, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/g20_development_working_group_accountability_framework.pdf>.

60 Saint Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments, 2013, p. 73, <https://www.oecd.org/g20/summits/saint-petersburg/St-Petersburg-Accountability-Report-G20-Development-Commitments.pdf>.

61 G20, Hangzhou Comprehensive Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments. Hangzhou, 2016, p. 80, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/hangzhou-accountability-development.pdf>.

62 Callaghan et al., G20 Outreach and Non-G20 Member Views on the G20, p. 6.

63 G20, Leaders Declaration, Antalya, 2015, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-communique.html>.

64 G20, G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. China, 2016, <https://www.b20germany.org/fileadmin/user_upload/G20_Action_Plan_on_the_2030_Agenda_for_Sustainable_Development.pdf>; G20, Hangzhou Comprehensive Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments. Hangzhou, 2016, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/hangzhou-accountability-development.pdf>.

65 G20, Osaka Comprehensive Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments, Osaka, 2019, p. 37, <https://www.g20.org/pdf/documents/en/annex_13.pdf>.

66 Global Daily, ‘“Every country is a developing country”: An interview with David Nabarro on sustainable development and conflict prevention’, 6 July 2016, <http://globaldaily.com/every-country-is-a-developing-country-an-interview-with-david-nabarro-on-sustainable-development-and-conflict-prevention/>.

67 <https://www.eskills4girls.org/>.

68 <https://www.gpfi.org/about-gpfi>.

69 <http://p4arm.org/>.

70 G20, G20 Initiative for Early Childhood Development. Buenos Aires, 2018, <https://www.ecdan.org/assets/g20_initiative_for_early_childhood_development.pdf>.

71 G20, Osaka Comprehensive Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments, Osaka, 2019, p. 51, <https://www.g20.org/pdf/documents/en/annex_13.pdf>.

72 G20, BUENOS AIRES UPDATE. Moving forward the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. PDF version, Argentina, 2018, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/buenos_aires_update_0.pdf>.

73 Ibid., p. 21.

74 G20, Buenos Aires Annual Progress Report on G20 Development Commitments. Buenos Aires, 2018, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/annual_progress_report_2018_0.pdf>.

75 Some of these topics were addressed specifically at the T20 summit in Buenos Aires, 16–18 September 2018.

76 Grimm S & A Berger, ‘Cooperation to overcome the challenges to multilateralism?’ Blog post. Future of Globalisation. Deutsches Institut fur Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) / German Development Institute, 19 September 2018, <https://blogs.die-gdi.de/2018/09/19/t20-cooperation-to-overcome-the-challenges-to-multilateralism/>.

77 Ibid.

78 Cf. Harris Rimmer, ‘A critique of Australia’s G20 presidency and the Brisbane summit 2014’, p. 43.