https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3957-9086
ABSTRACT
As the new decade dawns, Africa remains a key frontier for terrorist activity with ongoing terrorist campaigns in Nigeria, Kenya and Somalia, among other places, while new insurgencies have emerged in the Central African Republic and Mozambique. This article provides an introduction to this special issue on terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa, highlighting the need to review African response(s) to terrorism as the problem worsens. While Africa often appears to speak with one voice against terrorism, it does not act as one. Thus, it is argued that African states need to review their domestic and joint responses to terrorism, to allow for a more comprehensive understanding of (in)capabilities and how best to address them. With the backdrop set, assessments are undertaken in Somalia, South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. The issues of terrorism financing and bioterrorism are also discussed. Collaboration and sharing best practices among peers on the continent are proposed.
Introduction
Near the dawn of the previous decade, Greg Mills postured that Africa had taken on a new strategic significance following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.Footnote1 This strategic significance has remained, in part because of Africa’s position within the strategic interests of the West,Footnote2 but also because of the continued proliferation of terrorist activity on the African continent. As another new decade dawns, it becomes necessary to review the latter phenomenon. The need for review is rooted in the imperative to understand key developments in counter-terrorism (CT) and in countering violent extremism (CVE), as well as to glean insight into what challenges African states still face as they continue their efforts to reduce terrorism on the continent. The authors acknowledge the ongoing conceptual debates regarding CT and its relationship to CVE and other practices (such as preventing violent extremism), and have in this article chosen to use both terms to accommodate this debate.Footnote3 Additionally, it is imperative to note that other journals have published special issues on the topic of terrorism and CT in Africa;Footnote4 however, they have each had a focus on either a specific terrorist group or on a specific region. The special issue which follows in these pages is distinctive in that it seeks to provide a continental review, with case studies from various regions and covering issues that operate continentally – specifically, terrorism finance and bioterrorism. The current offering aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the current circumstances pertaining to terrorism and CT/CVE in Africa in 2021.
With the above in mind, and to provide a backdrop for the contributions in this special issue, this article serves as an introduction to the special issue, (Counter-) terrorism in Africa: Reflections for a new decade. Following the introduction, the authors will discuss terrorism and CT/CVE in Africa, with a particular emphasis on how challenging it is to define terrorism and how the practice of CT/CVE has evolved in Africa over time. The delimitations of the special issue will also be discussed. Thereafter the authors will proceed to discuss the issues raised by each of the eight contributions in this special issue. By means of concluding remarks, the authors will summarise the main arguments, and proceed to briefly outline areas for future research.
Terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa: Background, definitions and context
Terrorism is a challenging concept to define. This is particularly true in the African context where, as will be shown below, liberation movements and the respective government(s) they were fighting used the term ‘terrorist’ interchangeably to describe one another. Concerning this contextual hot potato, Alex Schmid presents five conceptual lenses through which terrorism can be defined. These include: (1) terrorism as a criminal act; (2) terrorism as an act aimed at acquiring influence; (3) terrorism as an act of war, when a perpetrator of terrorist activity would prefer to be seen as a warrior; (4) terrorism as an act of communication; and (5) terrorism as a religious act.Footnote5 In an earlier response to the definition dilemma, Thomas Badey argues that terrorism should be defined by means of five criteria, namely: (1) repetition; (2) motivation; (3) intent; (4) actors (understood as state and non-state actors); and (5) effect.Footnote6 Referred to as a ‘present-day approach’, Badey’s list is meant to minimise room for generalisations and simplifications, thus ensuring that governments agree on what is rather than what could emerge in future.Footnote7 Oladosu Ayinde engages the definition debate further by arguing that a deeper, more historical view of terrorism should be taken, one which accommodates pre-independence times, during which Africa experienced three distinct phases of terrorism or terror-like phases, namely: the Afro-Oriental Phase, the Afro-Occidental Phase and the Afro-Global Phase.Footnote8 The Afro-Oriental Phase had both an internal and an external component. The internal component relates to rulers offering up their own subjects (thereby potentially terrorising those subjects)Footnote9 to external actors, with the aim of establishing and fostering political ties. There were for instance reported occurrences of cannibalism which occurred when rulers offered foreign visitors a female servant as a gift; in the 14th century, King Sulayman Mansa Musa of what is today Mali practised such acts of gifting.Footnote10 The external component of this phase occurred when Arab traders enslaved African residents.Footnote11 While neither case necessarily encompassed a form of political violence, these acts were likely not only to strike fear into the minds of victims and onlookers,Footnote12 but also to increase the political power of the rulers. The Afro-Occidental Phase, beginning in the 15th century, further saw the enslavement of African residents by European powers, while the final Afro-Global Phase beginning in the 19th century emerged when the European powers extended their exploitation of Africa by formally colonising the majority of the continent's geographical space.Footnote13
These various contributions to the definition dilemma discussed above paint a fascinating picture of how sensitive the subject of terrorism is and thus how it complicates the practices of CT and CVE, however it is not within the scope of this article to further ponder the merits of those contributions. In an attempt to accommodate the various articles of this special issue and the perspectives they offer, the authors have settled on the balanced definition provided by Bruce Hoffman, who maintains that:Footnote14
… terrorism is [an activity that is:] ineluctably political in aims and motive, [is] violent – or, equally important, threatens violence [and is] designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target.
Table 1. Multilateral cooperation on CT/CVE in Africa
clearly shows that African bodies have made several commitments to combating terrorism. However, also illustrates that these bodies largely call on the international community to support African domestic responses to terrorism, as well as inviting the international community to lead CT efforts. Both of these realities point to Africa’s lack of agency as well as a lack of financial independence. As Martin Ewi and Kwesi AningFootnote16 state:
[f]or the AU to play its expected role as the premier African organisation with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, it must be able to establish adequate human and financial capacity to reach out to its member states and [regional economic communities].
‘ … the capacity and resources at its disposal in order to engage effectively in combating terrorism in Africa is limited. The [African] Union tends to rely heavily on the UN, the EU and the US in the fight against terrorism in Africa.
It must be noted that not all AU member states are equally committed to the fight against terrorism, partly because not all of them are physically impacted by the menace that is terrorism.Footnote21 Nevertheless, in February 2020, the AU summit tasked the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to consider forming a special CT unit in the AU’s (yet to be deployed) African Standby Force (ASF).Footnote22 In response to this, a task force has been set up. However, although members agree that violent extremism has become a threat to Africa and that Africa's response must be bolstered, there is disagreement on whether a counter-terrorism unit under the ASF is the best response.Footnote23 As envisioned, the unit would receive input from the AU's Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security; the PSC Military Staff Committee; the regional mechanisms; and the AU security cooperation agencies, as well as other stakeholders. The question remains, as noted by Shewit Woldemichael,Footnote24 whether attention will be paid to how to improve upon ‘the ad hoc nature of existing missions that some African states believe has made it difficult to fine-tune a structured response to terror threats.’ In addition, there are hopes that ‘Africa’s response to terrorism could also expand from its current heavy military focus to include non-violent preventive measures aimed at the underlying conditions driving radicalisation and violence.’
Moreover, although there exists a general consensus within the AU on a broad definition of terrorism, the difficulty emerges when AU members perceive terror threats differently. This persistent lack of cohesion is concerning, particularly when one considers that Africa’s position as a proliferator of terrorism globally has worsened with timeFootnote25 (see ). The lack of cohesion among AU member states is best explained by factors causing convergence or divergence within the CT/CVE regime. Beth WhitakerFootnote26 argues that compliance within the CT/CVE regime rests upon four factors, namely: (1) perception of a terrorist threat; (2) access to funding for governments to combat terrorism; (3) the nature of domestic political institutions; and (4) the relative influence of domestic constituencies. Factor one emerges when a political leader believes that his or her state is a target, or feels vulnerable, which prompts him or her to categorise opponents as ‘terrorists.’Footnote27 The second factor emerges when powerful – or at least more financially stable – states provide funds to poorer states to enhance their CT/CVE capabilities;Footnote28 factor two can also emerge when poorer states are receiving funding for a secondary area (such as education or healthcare) in exchange for their cooperation on CT/CVE affairs.Footnote29 The third factor considers how a state’s political institutions facilitate compliance. From this perspective, democratically elected leaders will seek to comply with certain tasks within the CT/CVE regime so as to accrue and safeguard both domestic and international political capital.Footnote30 On the opposite end of the political spectrum, non-democratic leaders can often enforce greater compliance than their democratically elected counterparts due to the fact that they limit individual liberties, which is a key element of counter-terrorism efforts.Footnote31 The final factor considers the role of constituencies (within a state) that desire compliance or non-compliance with the CT/CVE regime. Those likely to seek compliance are members of the police and military, prosecutors seeking convictions and victims of past terrorist attacks (and their close relations). Those who would oppose compliance are, for instance, lawyers and human rights activists concerned with civil liberties.Footnote32 Whitaker’s study made three key findings:Footnote33
African states which experience a domestic terrorist threat are more likely to comply with the CT/CVE regime.
African states who receive funding to enhance their CT/CVE efforts are not uniformly compliant with the CT/CVE regime.
In some cases, transitional democracies are less willing to comply with the CT/CVE regime because of opposition from, for instance, parliamentary committees, who block CT/CVE measures due to the increased mobilisation of domestic consistencies favouring non-compliance for various reasons, including the perception that a regime is being imposed upon them by stronger states. This latter finding is worrisome as it threatens the legitimacy of the CT/CVE regime.
Table 2: The growing proliferation of terrorism in Africa over the last decade.
While the above findings are enlightening, they do not go far enough in answering why a lack of cohesion is both evident and persistent within the AU’s CT/CVE efforts. In addition to the above, it is worth mentioning two further factors. First, the terms ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ were often used by colonial powers to describe the actions and actors of liberation movements fighting for independence; those seeking liberation would also use the aforementioned terms to describe the actions and activities of the colonial powers.Footnote34 The liberal application of both the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ to some former liberation movements and individuals within themFootnote35 perhaps explains why some African states are more willing to embrace current measures while others are not. Secondly, it is important to look beyond political will (or the lack thereof), institutional composition or structure to understand compliance with the CT/CVE regime. In order to glean a more comprehensive understanding of the extent of cohesion within the AU with regard to CT/CVE affairs at present, it also becomes necessary to assess the technical competencies of African states for effective CT/CVE implementation.
Using data presented by the Institute for Economics and Peace via the annual Global Terrorism Index,Footnote36 the authors tabulate eight years of data to illustrate the growing proliferation of terrorism in Africa over the last decade. (See .)
The table presents the top 20 global terrorism proliferators and their respective continental rankings. Starting in 2013 Africa had six proliferators in the top 20 ranking globally, with Somalia, Nigeria and Sudan occupying the top three spots on the continent, respectively. In 2014 Nigeria moved from 7th place to 4th place globally, thus securing the top position as Africa’s top terrorist proliferator. In 2015 Nigeria moved up one spot to 3rd place globally and has since then retained both 3rd place globally and 1st place continentally, as of the time of writing. further shows that West and East Africa, as regions, are the largest terrorism proliferators. This result is unsurprising given that the former plays host to Boko Haram and its three factionsFootnote37 while the latter plays host to two of Africa’s failed states: Somalia and Sudan. These trends are not favourable; of particular concern is Southern Africa's ascent to a leading position in the ranks of global and continental terrorism proliferation. Of particular note, in this case, is Mozambique which has been relatively quiet in the past 30 years since the end of its civil war, but has come to occupy the position of 15th globally and 8th continentally as of 2020. Observers in the Southern African region have warned against terrorism becoming a problem in the region. Steve WakluFootnote38 has argued that the inability of political leaders to satisfy the needs and ensure equal participation of certain ethnic groups in the region may breed radical ethnic sentiments. Ngonidzashe MarangweFootnote39 instead warns that the region’s porous borders and abject poverty should be of greater concern, as these factors have helped to give rise to political Islam in other parts of the African continent. While both issues merit concern, the latter was the first of the two to become a reality with the rise of Ansar al-Sunna (also known as Ahlu Sunna, Wa-Jama, Ansar al Sunna or, more commonly, as al-Shabaab). This group commenced its emergence in 2014, exploiting social, political and economic gaps to drive recruitmentFootnote40 and gaining greater notoriety following the group’s first attacks in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique in October 2017.Footnote41
Overall, shows that Africa has been responsible for 50% of the world’s terrorism since 2016. This has important implications. Either Africa’s CT programmes are non-existent in some places and ineffective in others, or the environments conducive for terrorist activity in Africa simply outnumber the efforts which may exist to combat it. Perhaps it is the lack of cohesive African voices to address (and not only condemn) the problem from within that allows its proliferation. For African states to emerge as leaders in the fight against terrorism, with a voice of greater unity and action, a reflective assessment of domestic responses and capabilities is necessary. It is easy to blame the lack of effective CT/CVE on a lack of political will. However, political will, as noted by Lori Post, Amber Raile and Erica Raile,Footnote42 is poorly defined:
[P]olitical survival … often requires labelling failures in a way that places blame on a vague and distant ‘other,’ and chalking it all up to a lack of political will fits quite nicely.
Delimitations of the study
Despite its best efforts to provide a cross-regional and multi-issue view of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Africa, this article and the special issue as a whole naturally faces several limitations. These limitations are fourfold. Firstly, the issue of CVE programme evaluation is not fully addressed. This is because CVE programme evaluation is an emerging field and lacking in substantive data; this was found to be particularly true in Africa,Footnote47 but also pertains to the Global South more broadly.Footnote48 Secondly, CT and CVE tend to be conflated into a single, globalised concept, with state and non-state actors integrating the two differently. In some respects, CVE has become the new international buzz word, with many non-governmental organisations incorporating CVE as one of their organisational mandates.Footnote49 This has resulted in donors exporting the concept of CVE into their programmes with little regard for what this will mean for beneficiary populations. As a result, it has been difficult to carry out effective CVE programmes on the continent as the concept of CVE is misunderstood by local communities.Footnote50 The authors of this work propose that future research on CVE focus on two key questions: (1) what does CVE mean for Africa? and (2) how can CVE programmes and their evaluation be localised?
A third limitation concerns coverage of the various regions of the continent; North and Central Africa, it is noted, do not feature prominently in this special issue and should receive more attention in a future study of CT in Africa. Finally, it will also fall to future research to address the issue of e-jihad – or ‘e-terrorism’/cyberterrorism. While it is widely acknowledged that terrorists have used social media to further their causes,Footnote51 there are new dynamics brought about by the remote working conditions necessitated by the COVID-19 lockdowns around the globe from early 2020. This situation presents new opportunities for terrorist groups to engage in the dissemination of their chosen narratives. ISIS, for example, has issued sharia directives online informing its supporters on how to behave during a pandemic while also cautioning followers against travelling to Europe.Footnote52 This will no doubt form the basis for future studies of how best to counter terrorism in the future.
Reflections and insights for the new decade
With the backdrop in place and the limitations acknowledged, discussion can move to the content of this special issue, which addresses the issues of terrorism and CT in Africa in two sections. The first considers specific issues that transcend national boundaries, and the second delves into issues in specific states in East, West and Southern Africa.
Kayla Arnold considers how the rise of highly contagious diseases such as Ebola and the corona virus (COVID-19) provide renewed potential for bioterrorism in Africa. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), among other terrorist groups, has maintained the long-term goal of obtaining and deploying bioweapons – that is, intentionally spreading disease pathogens – and could achieve this in a relatively cost-effective manner.Footnote53 Arnold offers a new perspective on the potential for the growth of bioterrorism by illustrating how terrorism and vaccine campaigns intersect. Arnold draws particular attention to state fragility and Polio; terrorism; anti-vaccination movements, and anti-Western sentiments. Arnold proceeds to warn that Africa suffers from a ‘double threat’ in relation to the threat of disease as not only does disease spread more rapidly in rural environments such as in Africa, but also efforts to combat the spread of disease are undermined by anti-vaccination movements. The article offers the recommendation that religious and traditional leaders be made aware of the short-term and long-term dangers of anti-vaccination sentiment in their local communities.
In the next contribution, Vesna Markovic begins the discussion by reviewing how Africa’s top two proliferators of terrorism, Nigeria and Somalia, have responded to terrorism financing. Terrorist groups have employed sophisticated means of funding their operations including the exploitation of diplomatic channels, the trade in counterfeit goods and other illicit businesses, and support from Islamic banks.Footnote54 Terrorist financing has changed dramatically over the years.Footnote55 In the recent literature, Bauer and LevittFootnote56 take particular note of this, indicating that terrorist organisations are becoming more financially savvy, using more cost-effective means of financing their activities as well as self-funding. And while evidence of these new methods continues to emerge it is further acknowledged that semi and ungoverned spacesFootnote57 allow for the continuation of illicit activities such as drug dealing, smuggling, kidnapping for ransom and tax collection from populations. Markovic notes that, while Nigeria has performed considerably better than has Somalia in curbing terrorist funding, much work remains to be done. Of particular concern is the need for effective implementation of anti-terrorism financing legislation and to reclaim the semi and under governed spaces in these states.
Section two of this special issue commences with a contribution by Stephen Buchanan-Clarke. Buchanan-Clarke’s article interrogates South Africa’s responses to international terrorism, focussing on internal and external factors, respectively. Internally, South Africa’s legislative responses to, CVE are discussed, as well as Pretoria’s general stance on terrorism. Externally, the focus moves to how the nature and scope of South Africa’s response to international terrorism may hinder the Republic’s ability to provide strong and stable leadership in key continental organisations such as the Southern African Development Community and the AU. Buchanan-Clarke emphasises that the capacity of South Africa’s diplomatic services places this state in a unique position to address issues relating to international terrorism – particularly in Mozambique – collaboratively and cooperatively; this conclusion is, of course, hypothetical as the situation is still unfolding.
The special issue then turns its attention to East Africa with a contribution by Juliet Kamau. Kenya’s position as a terrorism proliferator has varied over time. This variation, or ‘yoyo effect’ is reflected in where Kenya makes an appearance in 2012\3, 2014, 2015 and 2016 as a leading proliferator, moving between 18th and 19th in the top 20 global rankings, based on the annual Global Terrorism Index. Kenya is again 19th in 2018, but has not reappeared since then. This pattern illustrates the fluid-like nature of terrorist violence. It is worth mentioning that a state’s disappearance from the top 20 rankings does not mean that the terrorism threat to that particular state is contracting, nor does it mean that the menace is resolved. Instead, it could indicate policy effectiveness, but also it may be a function of the relative worsening of terrorist activity in other states affecting the rankings. Kamau shows that the more Kenya engaged in CT affairs, the more active terrorist groups – mostly, but not exclusively, al-Shabaab – became. This demonstrates the ‘yoyo phenomenon’ of Kenya's position as a proliferator of terrorism in Africa. Kamau goes on to warn that the Kenyan government needs to do more to address the ‘push factors’ of terrorist violence in Kenya – namely, poverty and unemployment – as well as the lack of public participation and effective counter-narrative messaging. The lack of progress in this regard could explain why Kenya, despite dropping out of the rankings, has not resolved the terrorism issue.
Daisy Muibu moves the discussion of al-Shabaab to Somalia, based on an in-depth study of public perceptions of state responses to terrorism in Kismaayo city in Southern Somalia. Muibu investigates the relationship between police militarisation and police empowerment in conflict-ridden societies, arguing that the police and the citizenry need to collaborate in order to counter threats to the social order such as terrorism. Understanding such a relationship is vital in the fight against terrorism as law enforcement and military actors often exert undue force on civilians, thereby generating negative perceptions which result in weak public–security sector relations, adding to an erosion of the social contract. In fact, research by LekalakeFootnote58 shows that while favourable perceptions can change within short periods of time (within a year or less), negative perceptions persist in countries where terrorism is most potent. For example, Nigerians are more likely to indicate that the military ‘never’, ‘rarely’ or ‘sometimes’ protects civilians as opposed to citizens of Kenya and Mali, where public perceptions of security sector performance are more positive. Muibu finds that while perceptions in Somalia may not be as bad as elsewhere on the continent, emphasis is placed on the fact that more work is needed to ensure the emergence of a trusting relationship between civilians and law enforcement.
The special issue then turns attention to West Africa, and specifically to Nigeria and Boko Haram. Sven Botha in his article aims to determine how the Nigerian government has responded to the plight of women and girls who were previously part of Boko Haram’s operations, both on a coercive and non-coercive basis. In making such a determination Botha first provides an eight-part typology which provides insight in how women and girls take on a wide array of combative and non-combative roles within Boko Harm, the latter illustrating the extensive use of symbolic roles to hold the gaze of the international community and exploit Western stereotypes. Botha’s analysis, on balance, finds that Nigeria was slow to respond to the plight of women and girls. He recommends a closer relationship with state and non-state actors in Nigeria, as well as initiatives to build the capacity of women and girls so that they can have their perspectives heard and play a greater role in CT/CVE affairs. Emeka Thaddues Njoku and Joshua Akintayo continue the focus on Nigeria and Boko Haram’s impact on women and girls, focusing on their ‘post-Boko Haram’ experience.Footnote59 The article, based on empirical research, emphasises the finding that a ‘sex economy’ has emerged in Nigeria’s camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) – largely populated by those fleeing terrorist activity in the northeast region of the country– whereby women and girls are forced to provide sexual favours in exchange for food, shelter, and other basic necessities. Njoku and Akintayo further conclude that the Nigerian government tolerates the phenomenon of the ‘sex economy’, an issue which requires urgent attention. Beyond calling for the adequate provision of foods and other necessities, and controlled distribution of these in IDP camps, the authors suggest the provision of training in entrepreneurial and other skillsets to aid these women and girls in generating income through the production and sale of goods and services needed in northern Nigeria. It must be noted that Njoku and Akintayo's findings contradict those of Okeke-Ihejirika et al,Footnote60 who find that no sexual exploitation was evident in any of the IDP camps they visited. This interesting diversity of findings necessitates further research to probe the issue; if sexual exploitation is evident in some IDP camps but not in others, then researchers and practitioners may have a unique opportunity to collaborate on how to showcase and replicate examples of good practice from camps where sexual exploitation is not evident.
Finally, Monday Hassan aims to broaden the special issue’s discourse on West Africa’s Boko Haram by interrogating the secret to Boko Haram’s continued resilience despite continuous claims of Boko Haram’s defeat. Hassan finds that Boko Haram’s resilience is largely due to the group’s access to resources, its political astuteness in corrupting Nigerian anti-terror efforts, and its organisational structure. Of particular concern is the second factor, which emphasises the existence of corruption in the military; this also gives rise to conspiracy theories pertaining to Boko Haram’s true purpose. A leading conspiracy theory in this regard relates to the Chibok Abductions of April 2014 where theorists claimed that the figure of 276 kidnapped schoolgirls was fallacious, questioning how such a large number of girls could have been kidnapped without any of them using a mobile phone to alert relatives to the unfortunate event.Footnote61 This theory was later disproven by some of the Chibok Girls themselves.Footnote62 Hassan’s conclusions point to a greater need for concerted efforts in countering the terrorist threat on many levels.
Taking African responses to terrorism forward
The reflections and insights provided by the contributors of this special issue confirm that African responses to terrorism have lagged behind the pressing and persisting realities. As indicates, there are gaps in the overall response ‘architecture’. For instance, there is no statement, protocol or multilateral agreement regarding IDPs, gender or the importance of non-state actors in CT and CVE affairs. The military has been the ‘go-to’ counter-terrorism tool in Africa; the limitations of this approach have been well documented.Footnote63 Assistance in the fight against terrorism in Africa continues to be driven mostly by the Global North; Rwanda is the only African state to financially contribute to the CT efforts of the (African) G5Footnote64 in the SahelFootnote65 – a rare example which diverges from the trend of reliance on external resources. In this regard, the exchange of CT and CVE experiences by different states in the Global South is deserving of further attention, as states residing in the Global South face similar socio-economic circumstances and are thus in the best position to share possible solutions to common problems.
Based on the foregoing analysis, and on the continued lack of movement within the AU on the proposed CT unit within the ASF, it is here proposed that key African states (namely those who continue to be most adversely affected by terrorism) should act to join forces to enhance their efforts on CT and CVE matters. This collaboration would benefit from a basis of shared best practises, on a peer learning basis, on matters of CT and CVE. Such a proactive approach would afford African states the opportunity not only to take greater control of their response(s) to terrorism, but also to allow for the emergence of a coalition of the willing, a group of states who could inspire a new CT and CVE norm of action and not just expressions of solidarity. This practice could, given time, be extended to a broader level, expanding on the current development cooperation among nations of the Global South to include CT and CVE. While it should be noted that the UN Counter-Terrorism Office has encouraged such South-South cooperation,Footnote66 there is little information available to scholars and the public in general on these efforts. On the other hand, there is some indication that the exchange of knowledge on CT and CVE practices between states of the Global South remains an ongoing project, with initial results suggesting that some of these exchanges have yielded outcomes that align with the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy, as well as with the promotion of human rights.Footnote67 While the authors do not wish to pre-empt the outcome of the UN's efforts in this regard, the suggestion here is that African states could at the same time pursue bilateral and multilateral exchanges, among themselves as well as with like-minded states in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia; key exchanges in this regard should include a focus on CT training for the police, modules on the challenges and solutions to the plights of women and girls, and the rekindling of the social contract. It is worth noting that this recommendation is not unique to the African context. Transregional assessments of CT approaches have also yielded a similar outcome recommending that governments form smaller multilateral CT coalitions and stronger bilateral ties with ‘like-minded’ states.Footnote68 The AU’s Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism is the ideal mechanism to help facilitate such exchanges on the continent and with other actors from other regions.
Conclusion
This article sought to provide an overview of some of the pressing issues confronting terrorism and counter-terrorism on the African continent, and to provide an introduction to this special issue. It demonstrated, through scrutiny of the Global Terrorism Index data, how Africa’s unfortunate position as a proliferator of terrorism has worsened over the past decade. It noted that while Africa, via the AU, has made a firm commitment to fighting terrorism and has taken some steps toward operationalising that commitment, the commitment is hampered by several factors. These include an overreliance on external support and a habit of blaming political will (or the lack thereof) for stagnated multilateral responses to terrorism, as well as a lack of domestic state capacity.
The majority of contributions made to this special issue placed an emphasis on domestic CT policy review and improved implementation. Key to developing a more cohesive African response to terrorism, it is proposed, is a collaborative approach in which states most adversely impacted by terrorism openly share their successes, opportunities and challenges; this peer-based approach would allow for a bottom-up approach to response formulation, as opposed to the top-down approach and reliance on initiatives from the Global North which appear to be dominating CT thinking on the continent.
Overall, terrorism and the social, political and economic issues that drive it, remain ever present in Africa. This article, in conjunction with the articles that follow, has attempted to provide a foundation for reflection, critical thought and debate on how Africa responds to terrorism.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Sven Botha
Sven Botha is, at the time of this writing, the Head Tutor and a MA candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at UJ. His MA research focuses on the evaluation of counter-terrorism programmes in the African context via a gendered lens. He is a member of the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS) and is also a former member of SAAPS’ executive council (2019–2021). Sven’s research interests include terrorism, counter-terrorism, preventing/countering-violent extremism, gender, diplomacy, foreign policy and early-career development in the Social Sciences. Sven has published a number of articles, book chapters and book reviews on his research interests and is currently working on the introduction on a number of new teaching and learning materials in the areas of Political Science and International Relations.
Suzanne E Graham
Dr Suzanne Graham is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg. At the time of this writing, Dr Graham is the Vice Dean of Teaching and Learning in the Faculty of Humanities at UJ. Her Masters research focused on terrorist waves and corresponding terrorist groups. Dr Graham is Co-President of the Regional Integration and Social Cohesion (RISC-RISE) Consortium headquartered at UJ.
Notes
1 Greg Mills, ‘Africa’s New Strategic Significance,’ in Africa and the War on Terror, ed. John Davis (London: Routledge, 2007), 17–27.
2 Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa After the Cold War: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and War on Terror (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2018), 344.
3 Counter-terrorism is often regarded as the military responses to terrorism, while CVE is often regarded as the ‘softer’ non-militaristic approaches to terrorism that focus on factors such as the socio-economic drivers of terrorism. However, the international community’s acceptance of a CVE norm in (or about) 2011 has resulted in CVE becoming a ‘homeless concept.’ From this perspective, CVE can be treated as a mere puzzle piece needed to complete the greater counter-terrorism puzzle with the latter serving as an umbrella term. On the opposite end of the spectrum, CVE is seen as a stand-alone concept that should instead be married to preventative counter-extremism (PVE). PVE is a term used to refer to measures which are undertaken to prevent an individual from becoming sympathetic to terrorist groups while CVE is used to refer to practices that are focused on those individuals that have already begun to sympathies with terrorist groups. See: Stéfanie von Halatky ed., Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Assessing Domestic and International Strategies (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2019); Michael J. Williams, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: Designing and Evaluating Evidence-Based Programs (London, Routledge, 2020). The authors wish to indicate that they are aware of this ongoing conceptual debate, and are electing to mention both CT and CVE in this article due to the need to acknowledge ongoing efforts by African governments and their partners (both in this article and the special issue as a whole) which may not be classified as CT. Moreover, the concept of CVE and its meaning in Africa requires more attention. Until greater contextual clarity is provided, both terms should be included.
4 Examples in this regard include the Canadian Journal of African Studies (special issue entitled: Boko Haram Beyond the Media edited by Melchisedek Chétima in 2020) and Security (special issue on Boko Haram edited by J Tochukwu, Ike E Onyishi and Alyious-Michael Okolie in 2020) and African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review (special issue entitled: Understanding Boko Haram’s Past, Present and Trajectory edited by Michael Nwankapa in 2021).
5 Alex P. Schmid, ‘Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 2 (2004): 197–221.
6 Thomas J. Badey, ‘Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach’, Terrorism and Political Violence 10, no. 1 (1998): 90–107.
7 Badey, ‘Defining International Terrorism’, 1998, 105 and 106.
8 Oladosu Afis Ayinde, ‘Beyond 9\11: Histories and Spaces of Terrorism in Africa,’ in Securing Africa: Post-9\11 Discourses on Terrorism, ed. Malinda S Smith (London: Routledge, 2016).
9 Ayinde, ‘Beyond 9\11’ 2016.
10 Ayinde, ‘Beyond 9\11’ 2016.
11 Ayinde, ‘Beyond 9\11’ 2016.
12 Ayinde, ‘Beyond 9\11’ 2016.
13 Ayinde, ‘Beyond 9\11’ 2016.
14 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 3rd ed. (New York: Colombia University Press, 2017).
15 The OAU was succeeded by the AU in 2002.
16 Martin Ewi and Kwesi Aning, ‘Assessing the role of the African Union in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa,’ African Security Review 15, no. 3 (2006): 43.
17 Richard Iroanya, ‘The of the African Union in Combating Terrorism,’ Africa Insight 37, no. 1 (2007): 73.
18 African Union website on ‘Sustainable financing’, https://au.int/en/aureforms/financing
19 International Crisis Group, ‘What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?’ Africa Report no. 219, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram#:~:text=The%20MNJTF%20established%20a%20critically,force%20has%20brought%20some%20dividends.
20 Carla Martinez Machain, ‘Exporting Influence: U.S. Military Training as Soft Power,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Advanced online publication (2020): 22 and 23.
21 Stanley O Ehiane, ‘Strengthening the African (AU) Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Africa: A Re-awakened Order,’ Journal of African Union Studies 7, no. 2 (2018): 123.
22 Shewit Woldemichael, ‘Counter-terrorism in Africa must adapt to new realities’, (2020) ISS Today, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/counter-terrorism-in-africa-must-adapt-to-new-realities
23 Woldemichael, ‘Counter-terrorism in Africa must adapt to new realities’
24 Woldemichael, ‘Counter-terrorism in Africa must adapt to new realities’
25 Placeholder for reference from the Institute for Economics and Peace
26 Beth Elise Whitaker, ‘Compliance Among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime,’ Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 (2010): 639-662.
27 Whitaker, ‘Compliance Among Weak States’, 645 and 646.
28 Whitaker, ‘Compliance Among Weak States’, 647 and 648.
29 Whitaker, ‘Compliance Among Weak States’, 647 and 648.
30 Whitaker, ‘Compliance Among Weak States’, 649.
31 Whitaker, ‘Compliance Among Weak States’, 649.
32 Whitaker, ‘Compliance Among Weak States’, 649.
33 Whitaker, ‘Compliance Among Weak States’, 661 and 662.
34 Simon Allison, ‘Good Talk, Not Enough Action: The AU’s Counter-Terrorism Architecture, and Why It Matters’ (Policy Brief 66, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2015), 1.
35 Simon Allison, ‘Good Talk, Not Enough Action’; Christopher Clapham, ‘Terrorism in Africa: Problems of definition, history and development’, South African Journal of International Affairs 10, no. 2 (2003): 13-28; Michael van Winden, ‘They Once Called Mandela a Terrorist’, eAfrica 2 (2004). https://saiia.org.za/research/they-once-called-mandela-a-terrorist/; Some examples include South Africa’s African National Congress, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
36 Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 2012 Global Terrorism Index (Sydney: IEP, 2012); IEP, 2014 Global Terrorism Index (Sydney: IEP, 2014); IEP, 2015 Global Terrorism Index (Sydney: IEP, 2015); IEP, 2016 Global Terrorism Index (Sydney: IEP, 2016); IPE, 2017 Global Terrorism Index (Sydney: IEP, 2017); IPE, 2018 Global Terrorism Index (Sydney: IEP, 2018); IPE, 2019 Global Terrorism Index (Sydney: IEP, 2019); IPE, 2020 Global Terrorism Index (Sydney: IEP, 2020).
37 At the time of this writing, Boko Haram consists of three factions, namely: Ansaru, Islamic State West African Province and Jamā’a Ahl al-sunnah li-da’wa wa al-jihād (JAS). For more detail, please refer to the article by Sven Botha in this special issue.
38 Steve Waklu, ‘Dynamics of Terrorism in the Multi-Ethnic States in Sub-Sharan Africa,’ African Journal for the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2017): 103–26.
39 Ngonidzashe Marongwe, ‘International Terrorism Potential in Southern Africa,’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 9 (2015): 776–93.
40 Blessed Mangena and Mokete Pherudi, ‘Disentangling Violent Extremism in Cabo Delgado Province, Northern Mozambique: Challenges and Prospects,’ in Extremisms in Africa Volume 3, eds. Alain Tschudin, Craig Moffat, Stephen Buchanan-Clark, Susan Russell and Lloyd Coutts (Cape Town: ABC Press, 2020), 348–64.
41 Makaita Noel Mutasa and Cyprian Muchemwa, ‘Ansar Al-Sunna Mozambique: Is it the Boko Haram of Southern Africa?,’ Journal of Applied Security Research doi:10.1080/19361610.2021.1882281
42 Lori Ann Post, Amber N.W. Raile and Erica D. Raile, ‘Defining Political Will’, Politics and Policy 38, no. 4 (2010): 670.
43 Boni Yao Gebe, ‘The Quest for a Union Government of Africa: Reflections on the Vision and Realities of Political Integration,’ South African Journal of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2008): 41–53.
44 Johan N. Ugoani, ‘Political Will and Anticorruption Crusade Management in Nigeria,’ Independent Journal of Management and Production 7, no. 1 (2016): 72–97.
45 Patricia Agupusi, ‘The African Union and the Path to an African Renaissance,’ Journal of Contemporary African Studies 39, no. 2 (2021): 261–84. In this context, the term African Renaissance refers to Africa’s ability (via institutions such as the African Union) to hernance its political and socio-economic independence from the Global North.
46 Cyril Obi, ‘Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in Relation to the Economic Community of West African States’ in African Foreign Policies in International Institutions (New York: Palgrave,2018), 311–25.
47 The lead author of this article is currently designing a practically applicable theory to aid CVE programme evaluation in Africa.
48 Bart Schuurman, ‘Topics in Terrorism Research: Reviewing trends and gaps, 2007-2016,’ Critical Studies on Terrorism 12, no. 3 (2019): 466.
49 Michael Opondo (Software Development\Data Scientist, Jill Cannon Associates LLC), Interview by Sven Botha, October 2020.
50 Imrana Alhaji Buba, (Founder and Coordinator, Youth Coalition Against Terrorism-Nigeria), interviewed by Sven Botha, June 2020.
51 Sven Botha, ‘Radicalisation Via E-Jihad in the Era of Interactive Social Media: A Closer Look at Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and ISIS,’ in Extremisms in Africa Volume 2, eds. Alain Tschudin, Craig Moffat, Stephen Buchanan-Clark, Susan Russell and Lloyd Coutts (Johannesburg: Tracy McDonald Publishers, 2019), 243–58.
52 Aymenn Al-Tamini, ‘Coronavirus and Official Islamic State Output: An Analysis,’ Global Network on Extremism and Technology, https://gnet-research.org/2020/04/15/coronavirus-and-official-islamic-state-output-an-analysis/
53 Craig Moffat, ‘The Global Health Threat to Human Security: How Pandemics May Set the Scene for Bioterrorism’ in Extremisms in Africa Volume 3, eds. Alain Tschudin, Craig Moffat, Stephen Buchanan-Clark, Susan Russell and Lloyd Coutts (Cape Town: ABC Press, 2020): 14 and 15.
54 Nimrod Raphaeli, ‘Financing of Terrorism: Sources, Methods and Channels,’ Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4 (2003): 59–82.
55 Katherine Bauer and Matthew Levitt, ‘Funding in Place: Local Financing Trends Behind Today’s Global Terrorist Threat,’ International Counter-Terrorism Centre Journal (Special issue: Evolutions in Counter-Terrorism-Volume II: Contemporary Developments) (2020): 47–75.
56 Bauer and Levitt, ‘Funding in Place’
57 Bauer and Levitt, ‘Funding in Place’, 48.
58 Rorisang Lekalke, ‘Public Opinion on Security and Terrorism in Africa,’ in Extremisms in Africa Volume 1, eds. Alain Tschudin, Stephen Buchanan-Clark, Susan Russell and Lloyd Coutts (Johannesburg: Fanele an imprint of Jacana Media 2018), 36–80.
59 The authors wish to acknowledge that they are aware of the fact that women and girls may elect to return to Boko Haram after leaving for socio-economic or other reasons. Therefore, the phrase ‘post-Boko Haram experience’ is used to illustrate that Njoku and Akintayo’s article focuses on the experiences and plights of women and girls existing outside of the group.
60 Philomina Okeke-Ihejirika et al., ‘Beyond poverty fixation: Interrogating the Experiences of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria,’ Third World Quarterly 41, no. 9 (2020): 1476–97.
61 Brandon Kendhammer and Carmen McCain, Boko Haram (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2018), 148.
62 Kendhammer and McCain, Boko Haram, 148.
63 Thomas Dempsey, Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute-US Army War College, 2006); Ashley Elliot and Georg-Sebastian Holzer, ‘The Invention of ‘terrorism’ in Somalia: Paradigms and Policy in US Foreign Relations,’ South African Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 2 (2009): 215–44; Jakkie Cilliers, Violent Islamist Extremism and Terror in Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2015); Mathieu Bere, ‘Armed Rebellion, Violent Extremism, and the Challenges of International Intervention in Mali,’ African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 7, no. 2 (2017): 60–84; Marisha Ramdeen, ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa,’ Conflict Trends no. 2 (2017): 49–56.
64 The G5 here refers to a bloc of African states, namely: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, that formed in 2014 to address common challenges faced by states existing in the region. In 2017 the G5 formed a joint military task force to combat terrorist operating in the region. The G5 acronym should not be confused with the Group of 5 Bloc (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) formed in 2005 to promote dialogue and understanding between more economically developed states and less economically developed states.
65 ‘Rwanda commits $1 million towards joint force to pacify the Sahel region,’ The New Times (Rwanda), March 23 2018, https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/231552 The authors note that is worth mentioning that the rareness of this phenomenon is most likely linked to the fact that Rwanda chaired the AU at the time the G5 sought donations from the international community. As chair of the AU, it can be argued that Rwanda made the donation to lead by example.
66 UN Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), South-South Cooperation, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/cct/south-south-cooperation
67 UNOCT, UNCCT Annual Report 2019 (New York: UNOCT, 2019), 124.
68 Yonah Alexander, ‘Counterterrorism Strategies: Summary and Conclusions,’ chap 7 in Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations, ed. Yonah Alexander (Washington: Potomac Books, 2006).