Understanding the African Group of Negotiators in the multilateral negotiations on climate change

ABSTRACT

This article examines the performance of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) in global climate change negotiations. It provides theoretical insights on the priorities of the AGN, outlines how the African region self-organises in situations of regime complexity and critically analyses the inherent characteristics that create unique constraints to meaningful participation of the AGN in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The study finds that the political mandate of the AGN together with the consistent technical support from climate-focused continental institutions have strengthened the AGN in these negotiations, where the group has had a consistent set of priorities. The article also highlights areas that could enhance the performance of the AGN, including a critical examination of the effect of multiple coalition membership. The conclusion is that as subordinate actors the AGN is effectively contesting the rules and practices of contemporary global climate governance.

KEYWORDS:

• African Group of Negotiators
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
• Conference of the Parties
• climate change negotiations
• multiple coalition membership
• climate change adaptation

Introduction

The multilateral climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the seat of global response to climate change, have been described as an adversarial exercise rather than a cooperative process as nations pursue a bewildering array of diverse interests and agendas in vastly different political, social, economic, and environmental contexts.¹ Furthermore, UNFCCC negotiations are characterised by asymmetries in both the negotiating capacity and bargaining power of participating countries.² As such, meaningful expression of these interests in the UNFCCC process varies considerably among individual countries and groups of countries.

The interests of the African region in the multilateral negotiations on climate change are represented by the Africa Group, also known as the African Group of Negotiators (AGN).³ The AGN is a ‘block’ of countries, made up of the 54 member states of Africa. The AGN originates in the UN General Assembly, where it is one of the regional blocks.⁴ The AGN is also active in other multilateral environmental agreements, beyond the UNFCCC. In the context of multilateral climate change negotiations, the AGN is a party to the UNFCCC, as it was established to speak with a common and unified voice for the African region.⁵

The AGN concept is a form of ‘club diplomacy’, which is a traditional model of diplomacy⁶ that originates from the principles of state sovereignty and of statecraft.⁷ For the AGN, this is a compelling approach, as it is based on the realisation that as individual countries, African countries do not possess sufficient political and economic clout nor adequate diplomatic capital to ensure favourable outcomes in the UNFCCC negotiations. Previous studies have indicated that power is a crucial element of negotiations.⁸ Florian Weiler lists three factors that determine power in UNFCCC negotiations: the size of a country’s economy, its international prestige and its levels of national greenhouse gas (GHG) emission intensity. When compared to the continent, individual AGN member states score very low on all these factors. The AGN concept seeks to overcome this constraint through (1) providing a coordinated African response (2) reducing the likelihood of contradictory and competing bargaining positions among individual African states and (3) discouraging incentives being offered to individual African states by external powers, which could undermine the unity and cohesion of the AGN during the negotiations. The AGN faces a delicate balancing act between advancing individual country priorities on the one hand and demonstrating cohesion as a negotiating group on the other.⁹ Maintaining such a balancing act is no small feat because African countries present remarkably diverse contexts.¹⁰

Almost a decade since the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the focus of the UNFCCC negotiations has now turned to implementation.¹¹ In the context of multilateral environmental agreements, implementation refers to ‘the measures that states take to make international accords effective in their domestic law’;¹² the term also can be interpreted to refer to ‘the variety of actions required to carry out the commitments resulting from these agreements’.¹³ For the AGN, this era provides a test of the compatibility of the negotiated outcomes of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement with the prevailing socio-economic and policy contexts of the African region.

Africa’s agency in the UNFCCC is critical as the region has some of world’s largest pristine tropical rainforest areas and sources of renewable energy and is home to the youngest population in the world.¹⁴ This not only points to Africa’s key role in determining the future of action to mitigate and adapt to climate change but also locates the African region as a hub for innovative responses to opportunities and challenges posed by climate change.

This article examines the performance of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) in global climate change negotiations. It provides theoretical insights on the priorities of the AGN, outlines how the African region self-organises in situations of regime complexity and explores the agency of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations. It also critically analyses the inherent characteristics that create unique constraints to meaningful participation of the AGN in these negotiations.

The AGN has received far less scholarly attention when compared to other groups in the UNFCCC. Most of the research on UNFCCC coalitions has been on the European Union, the Group of 77 and the Alliance of Small Island States.¹⁵ This leaves coalitions like the AGN poorly understood by policymakers and scholars. This article contributes to filling this knowledge gap in the understanding of global climate governance. It does this by providing actor-oriented theoretical insights on the performance of the AGN in the climate change negotiations.

The article is structured in the following manner: first is a literature review on works considering the performance of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations. This is followed by an outline of how the AGN is self-organised for meaningful participation in the UNFCCC negotiations. Discussion of the priorities of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations comes next, followed by the challenges facing the AGN in advancing its common position in the negotiations. Analysis then turns to a critical examination of the effect of multiple coalitions of AGN member states on the AGN performance in the UNFCCC talks. Lastly, the article highlights approaches that could further strengthen the influence of the AGN in UNFCCC negotiations.

Literature review on the performance of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations

It is no exaggeration that the AGN has limited power in the UNFCCC negotiations as it is unable to offer significant GHG emission reductions nor to offer financial or technical support to other countries. In fact, the AGN’s location in the UNFCCC negotiations has been criticised as that of ‘passive recipients’ of climate diplomacy rather than being ‘active participants’ in climate diplomacy.¹⁶ To leverage its diplomatic weight internationally, the AGN is required to respect, integrate, and align 54 different country positions and concerns that reflect diverse contexts and varying levels of socio-economic development in a complex multilateral process that is characterised by many competing interests and various fault lines. This complexity has drawn the interest of researchers that are seeking to discern Africa’s actual and potential agency within the UNFCCC negotiations.¹⁷

Different scholars advance different views on the impact of the AGN in the global climate change negotiations. Some scholars have been highly critical as they noted that African government participation has had little impact on the outcome of UNFCCC negotiations and constituted a ‘muted voice’.¹⁸ Others have pointed out that the African continent struggles to get its voice heard in global arenas,¹⁹ and that the AGN is largely marginal in the UNFCCC negotiations, its position is fragmented, and it has ‘failed to articulate an African position during UNFCCC negotiations’.²⁰ Some have blamed what they described as incoherent negotiating positions on the part of the AGN as responsible for the weak collective influence of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations.²¹ Others object to the current approach of the AGN in seeking ‘hand-outs’ of support (finance, capacity, technology transfer) from developed countries,²² while still others have pointed out that Africa’s regional powers – Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa – have different interests to those of the rest of the continent,²³ on some occasions breaking ranks with the AGN and acting in their own interests.²⁴ Even some of the optimists on the AGN performance in the UNFCCC indicate that until the Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) and the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) provided clear political leadership, the AGN had a relatively minor role in the UNFCCC negotiations.²⁵

There are also scholars who have opted to focus on the challenges that contribute to sub-optimal articulation of the AGN positions in the UNFCCC negotiations,²⁶ and others who distinguish between two periods of the AGN in the UNFCCC: the pre-1996 period, when the AGN was ‘more or less swept into the negotiating process’; and the post-1996 period, when the AGN had higher levels of awareness and regional coordination before and during the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings.²⁷

By contrast, there are scholars that present a more optimistic contribution of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations. For example, Simon Chin-Yee points out that since COP 12 (which was hosted in Nairobi in 2006), the AGN has been shifting away from a marginal and powerless status and increasingly differentiating its position from that of the Group of 77 (G77) plus China.²⁸ Others indicate that the AGN has become a prominent voice in UNFCCC negotiations as it participated proactively and achieved significant impact especially at COP 12, COP 15 (which took place in Copenhagen in 2009) and at COP 17 (which took place in Durban in 2011).²⁹ Furthermore, others point out that after COP 15, the number of AGN submissions were considerably more than those of the G77 plus China,³⁰ while others offer the view that since COP 15, the AGN has become a strong and united voice in the UNFCCC negotiations.³¹ In addition, some scholars credit the AGN for driving the negotiations on the global goal on adaptation leading up to and post COP 25, which was held in Madrid, Spain, in 2019.³²

From the survey of the literature above, it is evident that the influence of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations has increased over time. However, at the same time, according to some observers, Africa remains at a disadvantage because the Paris Agreement, politically, was least fair to the AGN and other developing regions for several reasons. In particular, they note that the Paris Agreement contains weak provisions for international dimensions of adaptation, was silent on Africa’s special circumstances, and foreclosed claims for loss and damage.³³ Discussion now examines factors that have contributed to the shift in the performance of the AGN at these multilateral negotiations, as well as the continuing constraints.

How does the AGN self-organise for participation in the UNFCCC?

Negotiators from developing countries have been slated in literature for participating in multi-lateral negotiations without political mandates from their governments; a notion termed ‘a hollow mandate’.³⁴ Currently, it is arguable that this situation is not true for the AGN. Michael Nelson³⁵ elegantly sums up the AGN approach in the UNFCCC by pointing to two underpinning pillars: firstly, the ‘African Common Position,’ and secondly, ‘the development of a negotiating coalition’ that presents that position. But how and where does the AGN receive its negotiating mandate?

The support architecture of the AGN is structured around the African Union (AU). Firstly, the Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) approves and endorses the common African position on climate change.³⁶ Established in 2009 by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, CAHOSCC was tasked to provide political guidance and spearhead Africa's common interests during UNFCCC negotiations. The work of the CAHOSCC started at COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, where it was led by the then Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi.

Secondly, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), a permanent forum where African ministers of environment discuss matters of relevance to the UNFCCC, also provides political oversight to the AGN.³⁷ That is, priorities of AMCEN are translated to an African position for presentation at the UNFCCC COP sessions by the AGN. A formal decision by the African states that defined the relationship between AMCEN, the AGN, and CAHOSCC was taken at the AU Summit in 2013.³⁸

Thirdly, regional economic communities (RECs), which are regarded as the building blocks for African continental integration, play an instrumental role in supporting the development of the African position in UNFCCC negotiations through their formal and informal relationships with AMCEN and the CAHOSCC. RECs include the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Fourthly, working groups or platforms that are supported by key regional institutions provide technical support to the AGN before and during COP negotiations.³⁹ These include the African Union Commission (AUC), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and other UN agencies (for example the UN Environment Programme’s Regional Office for Africa), and the Climate for Development in Africa Initiative (Clim Dev-Africa) and other climate-focused continental institutions.⁴⁰ Recently, the Africa Group of Negotiators Expert Support (AGNES), a team that pools regional technical experts, has also been providing technical support to the AGN.

It is important to note that it was only in 2009 that the African Union first presented a clear signal to the continent and the world that it had reached an African consensus on climate change issues.⁴¹ This was a defining political step that provides a clear mandate to all AGN representatives as they develop, articulate and advance a common position for the continent. However, it has been noted that CAHOSCC is fragmented, and this has impeded its operations.⁴² Also, some observers have noted that alignment between the AU structures and the RECs could be improved to enhance coherent and consistent messaging to the AGN and minimise competition for funding sources from international partners.⁴³

The governance of the AGN has by 2024 become predictable and structured. This enables the AGN to deploy its resources across the complex structure, issues, and actors of the UNFCCC negotiations. The AGN is led by a chairperson that is appointed once every two years on a rotational basis among the five continental regions, eg, north, central, south, east, and west Africa. The AGN Chair is supported by a secretariat and by a set of technical lead co-ordinators for each issue in the UNFCCC agenda. The AGN also holds several coordination sessions for lead coordinators. It is possible, it should be noted however, that there is no defined approach for selecting lead negotiators for the different agenda items. The norm is self-nomination or the chair requesting the group to nominate a candidate to take the lead on a particular issue.

Priorities of the AGN in the UNFCCC process

This article does not attempt to cover all the priorities of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations. Rather, it seeks to highlight key AGN positions that are widely covered in the literature. Given the vast power asymmetries in international climate diplomacy, African negotiators in these negotiations have relied on ‘norm-based arguments’,⁴⁴ that combine science, equity and the rule of law.⁴⁵

The leading edge of the African position is built on the climate change paradox facing the African region. That is, the historic and current contribution of African states to global levels of greenhouse gas emissions is very low while at the same time African countries are highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.⁴⁶ Over many years, the AGN has consistently deployed this principled argument associating it with capacity constraints (ie, finance, technical skills, institutions, and information base) of the African region. The AGN framing of the climate change phenomenon is that of an ‘additional burden’ that is restricting effective national and regional economic development. Owing to this reality, they call upon industrialised countries to support African states in national and regional climate change responses.

The second key pillar of the AGN position in the UNFCCC negotiations is the location of adaptation as the principal regional response to climate change.⁴⁷ In fact, in the context of the impacts of drought, desertification, floods, and the need for adaptation, Africa was, at one stage, the only region that was explicitly referred to in the UNFCCC documents.⁴⁸ The consistency of the AGN in advancing this position has undoubtably contributed to the prominence of adaptation in UNFCCC negotiations. This prominence of adaptation is reflected by (1) direct linkages that now exist between climate finance and adaptation, including recognition of the need for equal division of climate finance for adaptation and for mitigation;⁴⁹ (2) the implications for adaptation responses owing to the failure in achieving the global mitigation goal,⁵⁰ (3) the link between the global temperature goal and adaptation,⁵¹ (4) a shift in the framing of adaptation from a local issue to a global responsibility,⁵² (5) the inclusion of the adaptation component in the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) by almost all developing countries, (6) the establishment of the global goal on adaptation by the Paris Agreement;⁵³ and (7) the inclusion of adaptation in the global stock take of the Paris Agreement.⁵⁴ In fact, in 2013, the AGN became the first coalition to spell out the components of the global goal on adaptation.⁵⁵ This outline was contained in an AGN submission,⁵⁶ to the body that negotiated the Paris Agreement known as the Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP).

Even on mitigation-centric topics, like agriculture, the AGN submissions centred on adaptation and food security as the focus of addressing agriculture in the UNFCCC.⁵⁷ As such, in 2019, ‘Methods for adaptation and building resilience’ was one of the six topics discussed by the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA).⁵⁸ The KJWA is a forum that was set up in the Subsidiary Body of the UNFCCC to discuss agriculture and food security. Taken together, in the past decade, the AGN has been a considerable and recognised force in the conceptual and political shifts that have taken place on adaptation in UNFCCC negotiations.

The third key pillar of the AGN position in the UNFCCC is urging developed countries to deliver on their obligatory provisions under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.⁵⁹ These obligations include taking on ambitious mitigation commitments and fulfilling financial pledges to the various financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC.

The fourth pillar is climate finance with a focus on (1) the climate finance mobilisation goal; (2) finance for a just transition; (3) even distribution of climate finance between mitigation and adaptation; and (4) grant-based climate finance.⁶⁰

To date, the AGN has not been able to advance one of its key positions, that on the recognition of special needs and special circumstances of Africa. The political basis of this position is the call for recognition of Africa as one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change.⁶¹ Historically, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the Least Developing Countries (LDCs) are accorded the status of special circumstances in the UNFCCC. However, even the much-lauded Paris Agreement provides no regional differentiation, therefore no special status for Africa.⁶² Nicholas Chan⁶³ provides a detailed account of this issue and concludes that the AGN’s call for recognition of special needs and special circumstances of Africa has divided the solidarity of the developing countries in the UNFCCC negotiations.⁶⁴ The lack of success of the AGN in advancing this issue in these negotiations exposes the double challenge of agenda setting and securing consensus to effect favourable policy challenges in multilateral negotiations.⁶⁵ Furthermore, it is indicative that the efforts to advance issue-specific agendas in the UNFCCC negotiations is usually led by low-power countries, for example the issue of ‘non-market mechanisms’ that is led by Bolivia, and the ‘REDD + mechanism’ that is led by Papua New Guinea.⁶⁶

Progress in advancing this AGN position has stalled due to both political and technical constraints. Politically, in the UNFCCC context vulnerability is associated with distribution of financial and technical resources.⁶⁷ As a result, other regions in the G77 also want to be included in the category of ‘most vulnerable’. This situation would be expected, as a constant theme among developing countries in these talks is a negotiation strategy centred on highlighting vulnerability and climate needs as a means to access international support (ie, finance, capacity building and technology transfer).

Technically, the main obstacle with regard to this priority of the AGN is that the UNFCCC lacks a coherent definition of both ‘vulnerability’ and ‘particularly vulnerable countries’; moreover, the UNFCCC lacks uniform ways to measure vulnerability.⁶⁸ From the public policy point of view, this situation indicates that adaptation is an extremely contentious policy arena in UNFCCC negotiations. From the technical point of view, this situation points to the need for conceptual clarity on adaptation concepts, for example, vulnerability – even if imperfect – as this will help to guide and delineate the UNFCCC negotiations on adaptation.

The negotiations on the Global Goal on Adaptation provides another example where the attempts by the AGN of agenda setting were thwarted by disagreements not only with the developed countries, but also with some groups within the G77 plus China coalition. For example, in the lead up to the COP in Paris (COP21 in 2015), the AGN proposed ‘a quantified’ Global Goal on Adaptation that would be linked to global costs of adaptation.⁶⁹ Mexico and the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) proposed ‘an aspirational’ Global Goal on Adaptation.⁷⁰ Eventually, the Paris Agreement established ‘a qualitative’ Global Goal on Adaptation which was a proposal of the European Union and Environmental Integrity Group (EIG).⁷¹ This example indicates that consistent and sustained coordination across the negotiating coalitions is a critical factor for successful agenda setting in UNFCCC negotiations, as will be discussed below.

Challenges to promoting an African agenda in the UNFCCC negotiations

At the turn of the millennium, as climate change began to garner attention, ‘the Global South’ was viewed as a key but reluctant actor in multilateral environmental agreements; the reluctance of developing countries has been attributed to their self-perceptions of marginalisation and limited capacity.⁷² Their subsequent struggles to assert views in the UNFCCC negotiations have been largely attributed to their lack of participation.⁷³ While participation does not guarantee influence on the outcome, it is an essential precondition to influence the outcome.⁷⁴ Indeed, the issue of participation in the UNFCCC process has been extensively covered in the literature, with several factors identified as causes for poor participation from developing countries in the UNFCCC negotiations. These include delegation size; delegation composition; lack of familiarity with how negotiations are done; inadequate technical research to inform political positions; technical issues (for example slow internet connections, or lack of any internet connection); and language barriers.⁷⁵

In addition, Africa is an extremely diverse continent made up of 54 countries with more than 1.4 billion people, in five geographical regions. The make-up of the AGN includes the LDCs, the SIDS and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), as well as having several regional powers like Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt and South Africa which all differ markedly in their vulnerabilities and readiness to respond to climate change. Moreover, in many African countries, the national climate change responses are developed in a context where state sovereignty is challenged by war or other serious violent conflicts, or in the early post-war phase, high levels of political violence. There are large sovereign debts to factor in, as well as informal cross border migrations and associated trade patterns. In the context of the UNFCCC, negotiators coming from these contexts possess a large variation in terms of expertise, experience, resources, and expectations. Aligning positions from such a tapestry of interests and contexts requires an intricate operation.

Besides these challenges, African countries also tend to group themselves into linguistic formations that are influenced by their colonial history. This extra layer of diversity provides a huge challenge when developing an Africa common position for the UNFCCC negotiations.

And, as with all negotiating coalitions, the AGN is not immune from internal political wrangling. In fact, some observers have indicated that consensus on the AGN negotiating positions in the UNFCCC negotiations has proven fragile in several instances. There are five main causes of incoherence or fragmentation in the negotiating positions of the AGN that have been reported in the literature. These are (1) differences in environmental priorities;⁷⁶ (2) differences in political priorities;⁷⁷ (3) the plurality of coalitions within the African Group;⁷⁸ (4) the interests and priorities of international organisations that overlap in membership with the AGN (such as the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC);⁷⁹ and 5) the fact that some countries in the region receive preference compared to others.⁸⁰ Furthermore, on specific technical issues, divergent views exist among AGN member states. For example, the Arab Group and the combination of SIDS, AOSIS and the LDCs hold different positions on the issue of the global temperature goal and the associated mitigation ambition.⁸¹

Finally, the AGN negotiating position is influenced by a complex balance of power, seen in the relations between the individual AGN member states with the different global political powers.⁸² For example, Jean-Christophe Hoste and Andrew Anderson indicate that high indebtedness coupled with dependence on financial support from established and emerging global powers presents major challenges to the sovereignty of AGN member states and that this situation has led to major compromises by the AGN in the climate change negotiations.⁸³ The trend of reliance on external financial sources for climate change responses occurs even in countries with relatively higher levels of economic independence, like South Africa.⁸⁴ Although this article lacks quantifiable statistics on financial debt, financial aid, and economic dependence of the member states of the AGN, it can be reasonably expected that any curb on the political sovereignty of AGN member states has an impact on their role in the climate change multilateral negotiations.

Therefore, it is argued, the AGN position is developed, and plays out, in a complex global environment that makes cooperation on climate change tenuous. Discussion turns next to the role of coalitions in the AGN’s participation in the UNFCCC.

Coalitions of the AGN in the UNFCCC

AGN member states belong to several coalitions within the UNFCCC; all these coalitions are with other developing countries, thereby following the typical South–North (developing country – developed country) dual character of climate politics (see Table 1).⁸⁵

Table 1. Coalitions of AGN member states in the UNFCCC negotiations.

Coalitions	Member countries	Issue emphasis in the UNFCCC negotiations
Arab Group	Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan,	Impacts of response measures. This issue focuses on means to minimise the impacts of efforts to reduce GHG emissions on the economies of energy exporting countries (see note 78).
LMDC	Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Sudan	Lack of implementation of the UNFCCC provisions by developed countries.
AOSIS SIDS	Comoros, Mauritius, Sao Tome & Principe, Seychelles Cape Verde, Comoros, Guinea Bissau, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles.	Vulnerability to impacts of climate change. Pressurising all large GHG emitters to commit to ambitious GHG emission reductions.
LDCs	Angola; Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; D.R. Congo; Djibouti; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gambia; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mozambique; Niger; Rwanda; São Tomé and Príncipe; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Sudan; Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia	Finance, technology transfer and adaptation.
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India, China	Interpretation of equity and CBDR/RC; the ‘global North’ has the historic responsibility to address climate change; and inadequate climate actions by developed countries.
Coalition for Rainforest Nations	Botswana; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Equatorial Guinea; Gabon; Ghana; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mozambique; Namibia; Nigeria; Republic of the Congo; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Sudan; Uganda; Zambia	Inclusion of land use and forestry in international carbon markets; capacity building and incentives to reduce rates of deforestation in developing countries.

Sources: For the list of coalitions and member states, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings#. For issue emphasis in the negotiations, references are indicated in the table, where the information is not from the authors.

Notes: Like Minded-Group of Developing Countries (LMDC), Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Brazil/South Africa/India/China (BASIC) group, and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) are listed here. The Climate Vulnerable Forum, High Ambition Coalition, and Cartagena Dialogue are excluded as they are not formal negotiating coalitions. Also, the G77 plus China is excluded as it is ‘a default’ coalition. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR–RC) is a principle within the UNFCCC. See D. Panke, ‘African States in International Organisations: A Comparative Analysis,’ South African Journal of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2019): 1–24. The CBDR-RC principle was modified in 2014 at the COP in Peru to include the words 'in light of national circumstances', effectively diluting the meaning of this principle. Members of the LMDC insist on keeping the language used in the Convention, however.

Understanding the origin and scope of the UNFCCC coalitions provides insights on the reasons that AGN member states belong to multiple coalitions. Firstly, belonging to multiple coalitions in the UNFCCC negotiations is unavoidable for AGN member states; as such it is a norm, not an exception.⁸⁶ This is because, by default, all member states of the African Union are members of the AGN coalition and in turn are also members of the G77 plus China coalition. Moreover, 33 of the 54 AGN member states are LDCs, while six countries are SIDS, with four of those six countries also belonging to the AOSIS. An extreme example of a single country that belongs to multiple coalitions is Sudan. Sudan belongs to six coalitions: the AGN, the G77 plus China, the Arab Group, the Like Minded-Group of Developing Countries, the Least Developed Countries and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (see Table 1).

Membership in some of these AGN coalitions – for example membership in the G77 plus China – transcends the UNFCCC negotiations. In another example, there is a long tradition of the ‘Africa Group’ coordinating their approach as a continental group, especially within the UN system, that goes beyond the history of climate negotiations.⁸⁷ Furthermore, it is likely that the practice in the UNFCCC of structuring its otherwise vastly unwieldy negotiation process through coalitions, which has now become a norm, has contributed to the proliferation of the extra layers of representation in these negotiations.⁸⁸

Understanding the characteristics of UNFCCC coalitions is key to understanding the reasons AGN member states belong to multiple coalitions. For example, the G77 plus China is regarded as a ‘permanent coalition’, as it is based on exogenous characteristics that go beyond UNFCCC negotiations.⁸⁹ As such, countries are members of this coalition by virtue of their positions in the geopolitical system rather than by choice. Then there are ‘issue-based coalitions’ – for example, the CfRN – as well as ‘interest-based coalitions’ – for example, the AOSIS. There are also coalitions brought together by ‘ideological orientation’, such as the LMDC, and those that are aligned through ‘geopolitical issues’, for example Brazil, South Africa, India and China – referred to as the BASIC Group.⁹⁰

It is worth noting that some AGN member states belong to coalitions that have fundamentally differently positions on key issues under the UNFCCC negotiations. For example, Comoros belongs to the Arab Group and to the SIDS and AOSIS. Conflicting positions of UNFCCC coalitions that have overlapping membership can pose a strategic challenge for AGN member states. However, belonging to multiple coalitions by AGN member states can also act as a ‘bridge’ for clarifying interests of different UNFCCC coalitions to the AGN. This result would enhance the influence of such an AGN member state in the different coalitions.

There are divergent views on whether the membership of AGN member states in multiple coalitions in the UNFCCC enhances or compromises the cohesion of the group. Some observers indicate that coalitions stifle the ability of the AGN to express the interests that differentiate the African continent from other parts of the world.⁹¹ Others find it inappropriate that the AGN is strongly associated with the G77 plus China.⁹² It has also been reported that the core positions of AGN member states fluctuate due to multiple coalitions;⁹³ and on such instances, AGN member states would align with the option that best suits their national interests.⁹⁴ Other authors provide a balanced view that highlights both advantages and disadvantages of belonging to multiple coalitions in the UNFCCC negotiations.⁹⁵

The multiple coalitions of the member states of the AGN suggest that it is permissible for member states of the AGN to pursue their unique interests. This view is confirmed by the statement that the AGN is ‘a tacit union’, rather than ‘a collective agreement’.⁹⁶ This appears to be a pragmatic arrangement as it is impossible for the common position of the AGN to accommodate all the peculiarities of each of the 54 member states. This makes the AGN a useful strategic institutional resource that is complemented by other coalitions that serve as tactical institutional resources.

Looking ahead

The multilateral climate change regime under the UNFCCC is not, and has never been, a static regime; how can the AGN keep up with the pace of shifts in both climate politics and in the prominence of issues in UNFCCC negotiations?

Firstly, the AGN could identify levers that would help shift the long-held perception, within and outside Africa, of Africans as victims of climate change that should be prioritised only for support through UNFCCC mechanisms and not as agents with their own agenda for climate action. In the context of UNFCCC negotiations, this can be done by advancing the AGN position beyond that of seeing the UNFCCC negotiations as a venue for accessing distributional resources (climate finance, technology transfer, capacity building, education and awareness). For example, the AGN could expand its focus beyond governance structures (eg, for finance, for adaptation, for loss and damage) and invest its technical resources and diplomatic capital in influencing the institutional features of the new climate regime. These could include efforts to: (1) specify burden sharing criteria of the remaining global carbon budget, (2) promote alternative ways of expressing equity in NDCs, (3) develop sets of global common reference metrics for meaningful consideration of adaptation in the global stock take and (4) present options on how to make ‘finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development’ as called for in Article 2.1 (c) of the Paris Agreement.⁹⁷ Such a broadened outlook on the AGN focus would (a) differentiate the AGN from other developing country coalitions; (b) position the AGN among agenda setters; (c) proactively prepare the African region for a more stringent climate regime that could threaten present national economic interests; and (d) provide an informed context in which to play a more active role in the current implementation phase of the Paris Agreement.

AGN members should challenge the system that currently penalises states for geographic and economic vulnerability. This is evident in one IMF study from 2020 that found a negative, significant effect of climate vulnerability on creditworthiness.⁹⁸ Other studies have shown that borrowing to smooth out the cost of a natural disaster over time can result in a cycle of debt accumulation if the frequency and impact of shocks goes up.⁹⁹ The situation is compounded by a ‘debt overhang’ in many countries that is preventing governments from undertaking economically and socially desirable investments in key mitigation, adaptation, resilience, land-use and nature-based projects.¹⁰⁰ The findings of the study by Alessandro Cantelmo suggest that climate finance providers largely are not aligning their financing terms or tailoring the availability of instruments offered based on wider debt sustainability considerations. In the current context of a dual debt and climate crisis for African economies, while additional financing may expand the much-needed fiscal and monetary spaces in developing countries and contribute to more resilient and sustainable low carbon development, there is concern that these efforts may be insufficient if providers do not also align their investments with wider considerations of growing indebtedness.¹⁰¹

There appeared to be some progress at COP28 in Dubai in 2023 on climate finance, beginning with the chair’s Declaration on a Global Climate Finance Framework which comprised a host of different suggestions for increasing the availability, affordability and accessibility of climate finance. Through various official government announcements and side events at COP28, the focus on working towards systemic change appears to have gained momentum. Important initiatives in this vein announced at COP28 included the Global Expert Review on Debt, Nature and Climate, launched by the governments of Kenya, Colombia and France.¹⁰²

Deeply intertwined with the topic of climate finance is the indebtedness of many developing countries. Nearly half of all low-income countries (36 out of 73) are either at high risk of debt distress or already in debt distress.¹⁰³ A recent study showed that, in African countries, governments spend over half of their revenues (53.4%) on debt service, ie, to pay back debt or the interest on debt.¹⁰⁴

The high levels of debt make it difficult for countries to finance climate mitigation and adaptation projects. Most LDCs have poor credit ratings, which have been systematically lowered since the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁰⁵ Low credit ratings can mean high borrowing costs or difficulties in receiving any loan. In addition, as noted earlier, some countries are facing a situation of debt overhang, where their debt levels are so high that they cannot receive any further loans, even for profitable projects. Vulnerability to climate change exacerbates the indebtedness of developing countries, in that they are forced to borrow more to afford the increasing costs of climate adaptation and to repair and rebuild after damage. While this effect is expected to become stronger as climate change intensifies, the IMF study from 2020 that found that climate vulnerability already has a significant negative effect on creditworthiness points to further indebtedness; if international climate finance continues to consist primarily of non-concessional (market-rate) loans, it risks worsening the debt issues.

The Common Framework, an initiative by the main creditor countries (G20 members and the Paris Club), aims to help some developing countries struggling with debt. Under the framework, creditors meet to discuss debt restructuring (changing the terms of the repayment, such as extending the loan period or reducing interest rates) and potential debt cancellation (partial forgiveness of a debt). Despite its ambitions it has not been well-received by all, however; the initiative faces criticism for excluding climate-vulnerable middle-income countries and for not requiring multilateral development banks (apart from the World Bank) to participate, even though they hold the largest share of external debt in many countries.

The African Union has played a key role in ensuring that Africa takes a united stand in global negotiations and evolving mechanisms. One of the major developments was the establishment of the Climate Change and Desertification Unit (CCDU) at the African Union, this having stemmed from several decisions by heads of state and government to address the challenge of climate change. Through its various continental bodies such as the AU/NEPAD, CAHOSCC, AMCEN, the AfDB, the RECs, and UNECA, Africa provides both leadership and resources to support bilateral and multilateral climate change diplomacy.

In addition, there is the Bridgetown Initiative championed by Mia Mottley, the Barbadian Prime Minister, that aims to transform an outdated international financial architecture by increasing the access of developing countries to financial resources at the pace and scale needed to relieve financial stress, enable economic development and address climate change. Africa’s climate finance inflows remain very low, at 3% of global climate finance, and tend to focus on small-scale, fragmented, and uncoordinated operations, primarily in middle-income countries, indicating the need for an action plan to reform the global financial system so the world can better respond to current and future crises. Development finance in general operates in an outdated system – unsurprisingly, given that the world’s financial system hasn’t had a refresh since the 1940s – and thus exacerbates inequalities, being insufficient to respond to the scale of global challenges now confronting the world, including climate change. Such a reset is essential for establishing the links between domestic, foreign, and international climate policy. As such, the global response must include the insights of an African political leadership that has recognised the importance and timeliness for Africa to actively engage in climate diplomacy through a coordinated common position, and one that will design robust policy approaches for a collective effort in confronting complex climate change challenges.¹⁰⁶

Secondly, while traditional diplomacy is built on the foundation of state sovereignty,¹⁰⁷ in the COP meetings of the UNFCCC, social movements have become stand-out role players.¹⁰⁸ While the impact, or lack thereof, of these social movements is not obvious in the actual UNFCCC textual negotiations, it has become impossible to ignore their ability to frame, socialise, mobilise, advocate and sustain a cause. Converting these informal spaces into formal deliberate interactions could enable the AGN to strategically leverage these traits of different social movements to advance those positions that are aligned with the priorities of those social movements.

Thirdly, a lingering omission in the AGN common position is the issue of human rights.¹⁰⁹ Characterised by many fragile states,¹¹⁰ Africa could be missing an opportunity to signal to the global climate community how the intersections between human rights and climate change response affect national and regional climate interventions. As such, the UNFCCC negotiations could provide a useful venue for the AGN to articulate the commitment of the African region to the issue of human rights.

Fourthly, there are signs that the global economy and its associated geopolitical institutions are undergoing a complex transition.¹¹¹ The AGN should articulate an explicit climate negotiation-centric strategy on how to balance its traditional relationships with the established economic powers while strengthening its ties with the emerging economic powers of the Global South.

Conclusion

In the AGN, the geographical and broad cultural identity of being African is mandated by the African regional political structures, CAHOSCC and AMCEN, and is supported technically by African-based climate-focussed institutions, to develop, articulate, and advance a common position for the continent in the UNFCCC negotiations. This translates to aligning markedly diverse sets of political, economic, social, cultural and security interests and contexts in these negotiations. In the early years of UNFCCC negotiations, there was weak engagement of the AGN in UNFCCC negotiations. However, since 2009 the AGN has successfully crafted an Africa common position in the UNFCCC negotiations that has enabled the bloc to assert its influence in these multilateral negotiations. The strategic rhetoric and priorities of the AGN are centred around four core pillars: (1) Africa is least responsible for causing climate change, yet it is one of the most vulnerable regions with severely low adaptive capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change; (2) adaptation is a critical policy priority for addressing climate change; (3) there should be no backsliding by developed countries on their existing financial and mitigation commitments; and (4) provision of climate finance for the African region should be balanced between mitigation and adaptation and should be primarily in the form of grants.

Several political, contextual and process factors have contributed to strengthening the voice of the AGN in the UNFCCC negotiations. These include: (1) increased technical capabilities of the negotiators; (2) consistent and predictable political support; (3) technical support to convert scientific information to negotiating text; (4) improved access to funding; (5) improved understanding of the magnitude of what is at stake at political and technical levels; (6) clear organisational structures; and (7) regular coordination meetings by lead coordinators.

Furthermore, AGN member states have recognised that on their own, they stand no chance to achieve their desired outcomes in these negotiations. To amplify their voice in these negotiations, AGN member states have relied on mutual support through coalitions, exclusively with other developing countries. However, empirical evidence is still required to move beyond anecdotal evidence regarding the impact of coalitions on the cohesion of the AGN. However, lack of normative convergence of what constitutes vulnerability in UNFCCC negotiations, combined with competition for adaptation finance among developing countries, has ensured that the AGN is not successful in advancing its positions on the special needs and special circumstance of Africa and a quantified global goal of adaptation. Importantly, the AGN can be a tool for focussing the African region on its collective interests in the substance of the UNFCCC negotiations, thereby reducing the tensions between regional and national political and economic interests.

Global cooperation on climate change is taking place in an environment that remains characterised by marked differences in bargaining power due to political power asymmetries coupled with information asymmetry and an uneven spread of technological capacities that decidedly favour the Global North and emerging developing countries. Representing a region with significantly diverse competing needs, the AGN holds a critical symbolic status of moral and ethical dimensions within the UNFCCC negotiations.

This article highlights the gradual, but certain, strengthening of the agency of the AGN in the global governance of climate change. This the AGN does through locating itself as an able agenda-setting region and through improving its self-organisation to ensure its ability to exert influence in these multi-lateral negotiations. Furthermore, this article makes it clear that despite chequered political achievements, the voice of the AGN is increasingly heard in the broad spectrum of options and views of parties across the diverse agenda items of UNFCCC negotiations. Specifically, the article highlights the shift over time by the African states in the importance of the UNFCCC negotiations for the African region. In so doing, it contributes to the steady increase of academic interest on the coalitions of countries under the UNFCCC negotiations and in international climate policy. The focus of this article on the AGN ensures that new perspectives are generated in this understudied coalition of the UNFCCC.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Brian Mantlana

Brian Mantlana holds a PhD from the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands. The PhD thesis was on the ecophysiology of terrestrial ecosystems. He did this study while based at the Max Planck Institute for Biogeochemistry in Jena, Germany. Brian has led South Africa’s and Africa delegations in the climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change on forestry issues (2006–2011) and on climate change transparency (2012–2016). Brian is one of the Commissioners that were appointed by the South African President that make up the Presidential Commission on Climate Change. Currently he leads the climate change team at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in Pretoria.

Basanda Nondlazi

Basanda Nondlazi has over 18 years research experience and holds an MSc from the University of the Witwatersrand and a PhD from the University of KwaZulu-Natal in the South Africa. The PhD thesis was on the ecological remote sensing classification and monitoring wetland ecosystems for national and international reporting. He did this study while based at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. He has led South Africa’s delegations for BRICS youth in Russia. Basanda has also been part of the South African delegation to the BRICS Young Scientist Forum. Currently Basanda is a researcher in the Climate Services research group at the at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in Pretoria.

Notes

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