AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF FRENCH MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Abstract

In the post‐Cold War context of decreasing military expenditures and arms‐market crisis, France has redefined its defence policy, giving up the model of protected arms production and exports while reasserting its military and strategic ambitions. But does the country still have the means of its ambitions? The analysis of statistical data since 1990 may show that the independent policy of security has been clearly replaced by a real dependency on armaments and strategies, in the context of higher budgetary constraints. Military expenditures now seem to be more an economic burden than a driving force. The study of the defence budget compared with the general state budget shows that military expenditures are often used as variables of economic adjustment and that inertia effects are important. Several aspects of the French defence policy are underlined, notably the weakness of French military research and development, the declining share of capital expenditures in the defence budget and the decreasing investment in the nuclear field. In addition, the French arms industry suffers from a too‐belated restructuring and from the continuing compartimentalization of European markets.

Keywords:

• French defence policy
• Defence budget
• Defence industrial base
• Structure of military expenditures

Notes

‡ E‐mail: Jacques.fontanel@upmf‐grenoble.fr

¹‘la volonté d’assumer (nos) responsibilitiés sur une scène internationale où notre pays est à la fois attendu et respecté cérémonie des voeux pour 2004, www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/defense/base/autorites/voeux_de/.

²‘Depuis 1996, la France a fait le choix, intangible et fondamental, d’être une puissance‐militaire complète, en conservant une capacité de dissuasion nucléaire, en développant une capacité d intervention dans tous les domaines ainsi qu’une capacité de commandement d’une opération multinationale’ (Bentégeat, 2004).

³However, since 2002 indicators show a rise in defence budget, as in most western countries.

⁴The variation rates have been calculated with data in constant 1995 euros, from Ministère de la Défense, (2002, 2003).

⁵The ‘Potemkinism’ is to hide from the sovereign or the citizen, what goes not well, to show only the forces.

⁶Rapport au Sénat n°117 sur la loi de programmation militaire 2003–2008.

⁷During the 1980s, the expenditures of functioning were lower than expenditures of equipment, infrastructure and research & development. It was the price to pay for the French strategy of deterrence ‘du faible au fort’, characterized by a strong independence of choices and very high investments, given the weak economies of scale. However, this situation was possible thanks to the excellent ratio quality/price of conscription.

⁸Speech of Jacques Chirac, president of the Republic, delivered to IHEDN (Institute of High Studies on National Defence) 8 June 2001. ‘La dissuasion nucléaire est au Coeur des moyens qui permettent à la France d’affirmer le principe d’autonomie stratégique, dont decoule notre politique de défense Elle est aujourd’hui, grâce aux efforts consentis de manière continue depuis le général de Gaulle, un fondement essentiel de notre sécurit é et elle le restera, à mon sens, pendant de longues années encore dans le nouveau contexte stratégique où elle garde tout son sens et toute son efficacité La dissuasion nucléaire est d abord un facteur important de la stabilité internationale’ www.ladocfrancaise gouv.fr/dossier international/nucleaire/debats/dissuasion.shtml.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jacques Fontanel‡

‡ E‐mail: Jacques.fontanel@upmf‐grenoble.fr