TERROR SUPPORT AND RECRUITMENT

Abstract

We analyse a dynamic model linking terrorist activities to popular support through a recruitment mechanism. It is shown that anti‐terrorism policies focusing on liberal ideals (reducing repression, increasing economic opportunity) are effective at abating recruitment, thereby affecting the dynamic stability of terrorist attacks. In contrast, deterrence’s comparative advantage is in counteracting hard‐core members, implying that terror eradication itself requires an emphasis on hard‐core membership, rather than popular support for terror activities.

Keywords:

• Terrorist networks
• Anti‐terrorist policies
• Terrorist recruitment

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We are grateful to two anonymous referees, Todd Sandler and the North American editor, John T. Warner, for helpful comments. Arce’s research was partially funded from the McCallum Endowment.

Notes

¹Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) and Tessler and Nachtwey (1998) examine economic and religious considerations in shaping views about the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.

²See also Brito and Intrilligator (1989, 1992) and Sandler and Hartley (1995).

³If we instead examine public opinion, rather than support, the sign of λ is not given a priori. It is positive for support and negative if the public disapproves of terrorist attacks. For example, one can think of a Catholic in Northern Ireland that wants independence from the UK (β > 0) but does not consider the violence of IRA as justified (λ < 0).

⁴For example, Intrilligator and Brito (1988: 241) examine the rule of thumb that regular army members should outnumber guerrillas by a 10:1 ratio. By contrast, as deterrence can take many forms, we examine no specific deterrence/terrorist ratio, but allow for the possibility of comparable units. For example, in characterizing the long‐run equilibrium (below) we show that if the number of hard‐core terrorists used in attacks is large enough to offset deterrence, terrorism will be a permanent threat.

⁵Lagging equation (3′) by one period and multiplying by δ yields: δT _t − 1 = − δω + αδR _t − 1 + αδ ² R _t − 2 + αδ ³ R _t − 3 + … Subtracting this from equation (3′) obtains equation (3″)

⁶See Tu (1994: 40–2).

⁷Recall that the PLO, Libya and Iraq were the only Arab States who opposed the Arab League’s resolution calling for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

⁸Our focus is therefore on terrorism supply, rather than the consumption of terror versus ordinary goods. See Anderton and Carter (2004) for the difficulties involved in conceptualizing the opportunity cost of terrorism from a consumption framework.

⁹Note that such opportunities are not uniquely economic, e.g. redefining the social eligibility for marriage.