INCOMPLETE ROHLFS–SULLIVAN ANALYSIS OF THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMORED TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES FOR OVERSEAS US ARMY OPERATIONS

Abstract

This comment addresses the Rohlfs–Sullivan analysis titled: ‘The Cost-Effectiveness of Armored Tactical Wheeled Vehicles [TWVs] for Overseas US Army Operations.’ The analysis evaluated policies to replace Type 1 and 2 TWVs with Type 3s. There is no evidence the analysis factored in fatality causes, fatality relationships to vehicles, or compared survivability of vehicles. Furthermore, it did not note when Type 3 TWVs were requested, when they impacted fatalities, or TWV use policies. It also assumed Type 3 TWVs prompted negative unit behaviors while discounting evidence of positive behaviors. In summary, the analysis is incomplete and should be revised.

Keywords:

• Cost-effectiveness
• Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle
• High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
• Operation Iraqi Freedom

JEL Codes:

• H56
• J17
• J18
• D24

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Ms Nikki Brockhoff, CAPT Robert Cady, Dr Robert Holcomb, Dr Christopher Lamb, Col Thaddeus Jankowski, and Mr John Rooney.

Notes

Franz Gayl (2013) The views and opinions expressed in this comment are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of his employers at the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense.

¹DoD IG. (2008) No. D-2009-030 – Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)Vehicles: ‘In December 2003 and March 2005, the MCCDC validated MRAP-type vehicle requirements … (HEVs) were deployed in October 2004. In April 2005, the Joint IED Task Force approved … procurement of 122 JERRVs of the 122 JERRVs, 38 were for the Marine Corps.’

²Olive Drab (2012) Cougar and JERRV History: ‘In April 2004, MCSC awarded a sole-source contract to FPI for 28 Cougars that began arriving in Iraq by late fall 2004 … In May 2005, MCSC became the procuring service for the Cougar for all military services. The Cougar became … known as the JERRV. In May 2005, MCSC awarded a sole-source contract to FPI for 122 JERRVs [deliveries to Marines and Army began in Aug 2005]. In May 2006, MCSC awarded a second sole-source contract to FPI for 79 JERRVs. In mid-November 2006, MCSC awarded a third sole-source contract to FPI for 200 JERRVs as part of the MRAP program. Under accelerated efforts in 2007, another [125] Cougars were ordered … followed by a series of orders adding vehicles almost monthly raising the totals above 500 vehicles.’

³Conway (2007) Letter from CMC to CJCS: ‘Based on the recognition of significantly reduced lethal and severe injuries in MRAP vs. the HMMWV, on 2 January 2007, Commander MARCENT requested support for a policy change that would provide MRAP level protection for all Marines operating outside the wire in MNF-W. Under this policy, limited use of the Up Armored HMMWV’s will be authorized in specific tactical situations where the operational characteristics of HMMWV are required.’

⁴Defense Industry Daily (2007) MRAP Vehicle Order: 1,000 Cougars to be Turned Loose: ‘The Marines in particular are pushing hard for … a desired policy change that would require all vehicles operating “outside the wire” in MNF-W (Iraq, Anbar province) to have MRAP-level protection; up-armored Hummers would then require specific commander’s waivers.’

⁵Hejlik (2005) Urgent Universal Need Statement, MRAP Vehicle: ‘The GTE fleet is constantly exposed to IED/RPG/SAF threat while conducting active combat, combat support, and combat service support as well as the inherent dangers that accrue to vehicles conducting line and long haul missions over the open roads.’

⁶Schneck (1994) US Army, After Action Report – Operation Restore Hope: ‘… a HMMWV with its flat bottom, low weight, low ground clearance … and aluminum body remains a death trap in the event of an antitank mine detonation.’

⁷Vandenbrook (2007) USA Today, General: No deaths in 300 attacks on MRAP, ‘… Marines tracked attacks on the vehicles since January 2006 … The Marines operate about 100 of the MRAP vehicles and want an additional 3,000 in Anbar …’

⁸DoD IG. (2007) Procurement Policy for Armored Vehicles: ‘ … the Cougars and the JERRVs proved to have significant and operational value to our warfighters on the field. We reviewed documentation from users and classified data on vehicle performance and learned that the vehicles performed well and saved lives.’

⁹DoD IG (2008) No. D-2009-030 – Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs Process for MRAP Vehicles: ‘DoD was aware of the threat posed by mines and IEDs in low-intensity conflicts and of the availability of mine-resistant vehicles years before insurgent actions began in Iraq in 2003. Yet DoD did not develop requirements for, fund, or acquire MRAP-type vehicles for low-intensity conflicts that involved mines and IEDs. As a result, the Department entered into operations in Iraq without having taken available steps to acquire technology to mitigate the known mine and IED risk to soldiers and Marines.’

¹⁰DoD IG (2008) No. D-2009-030 – Marine Corps Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs Process for MRAP Vehicles: ‘In December 2003 and March 2005, the MCCDC validated MRAP-type vehicle requirements … HEVs were deployed in October 2004. In April 2005, the Joint IED Task Force approved … procurement of 122 JERRVs … Of the 122 JERRVs, 38 were for the Marine Corps.’

¹¹Wikipedia (2012) JERRVs, ‘By September 2004 the US Army had shown interest in Cougar and sent its IED/EOD experts to Charleston, SC, to talk to the design team … the Army decided to combine with the USMC and order the Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicle.’

¹²DepSecDef (2009) Defense Science Board (DSB), Report of the DSB Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent Needs: ‘Institutional barriers – people, funding, and processes – are powerful inhibitors to successful rapid acquisition and fielding of new capabilities.’

¹³DoD News Transcript (2007) DoD News Briefing with John Young, MRAP Task Force Chairman and others from the Pentagon: ‘I was directed by Secretary Gates to form a task force for MRAP vehicles, known as MRAPs, on 30 May 2007. Secretary Gates’ specific direction – and I quote – was to integrate planning, analysis and actions to accelerate over the next year the acquisition of as many MRAPs as is possible and prudent.’

¹⁴American Forces Press Service (2008) Gates Forms Task Force to Promote Intelligence, Surveillance for Warfighters: ‘Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates established a new task force last week to ensure the Defense Department is doing everything possible to provide ISR assets to support warfighters, he announced today. “My concern is that our services are still not moving aggressively in wartime to provide resources needed now on the battlefield … While we have doubled this capability in recent months, it is still not good enough.’”

¹⁵Gayl (2008) PP&O Science and Technology Advisor Case Study: MRAP Vehicle: ‘In response to the I MEF (Fwd) UUNS, the MCCDC EFDC requested that MCSC survey the military wheeled vehicle industry, and obtain MRAP and non-MRAP vehicle capabilities (Reference p. 2.). That study determined that four and six wheeled COTS Cougar, RG-31, RG-32, Mamba, Casspir, Dingo, Cobra, ASV, Eagle, and Lion COTS MRAP variants were all superior to the M1114 in fulfilling the baseline survivability requirements of the I MEF (Fwd) MRAP UUNS.’

¹⁶House of Representatives (2008) Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Rep. Gene Taylor Holds a Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the United States Marine Corps, Verbatim Transcript from 27 Feb 2008: ‘[General] AMOS: He [Gayl] turned in his finished product, and that will now, as the assistant commandant has requested, become the basis for the I.G. to kick off the independent. [Representative] TAYLOR: Is that report classified? [Lieutenant General] CASTELLAW: No, sir, it’s not. [Representative] TAYLOR: Well, I would like to ask unanimous consent that the report be submitted for the record, by Mr. Franz Gayl.’

¹⁷Science and Technology Resources on the Internet (2007) A Guide to Resources for Severely Wounded OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom Veterans: ‘Military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan are surviving wounds in numbers far greater than previous wars. Largely due to advances in body armor and combat medicine as well as the rapidity of evacuation, survivorship is close to ninety percent … However many wounded service members are surviving severe injuries which will require sophisticated, comprehensive, and often lifelong care … IEDs are the cause of 65% of … OIF casualties … Explosive devices produce a characteristic pattern of injuries: TBI, blindness, spinal cord injuries, burns, and damage to the limbs resulting in amputation. Many military personnel are sustaining more than one of these wounds.’

¹⁸The Washington Post. (2007) A Shock Wave of Brain Injuries: ‘About 1,800 US troops, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs, are now suffering from TBIs caused by penetrating wounds. But neurologists worry that hundreds of thousands more – at least 30 percent of the troops who’ve engaged in active combat for four months or longer in Iraq and Afghanistan – are at risk of potentially disabling neurological disorders from the blast waves of IEDs and mortars, all without suffering a scratch.’

¹⁹Hejlik (2005) Urgent Universal Need Statement, MRAP Vehicle: ‘The GTE fleet is constantly exposed to IED/RPG/SAF threat while conducting active combat, combat support, and combat service support as well as the inherent dangers that accrue to vehicles conducting line and long haul missions over the open roads.’

²⁰CNN.com. (2007) Senate passes Iraq withdrawal bill; veto threat looms: ‘… the Senate passed a war funding bill Thursday that sets a deadline for withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq by next April … The House passed the same measure on a 218–208 vote Wednesday night.’

²¹Schmitt (1989) FMFM 1 Warfighting: ‘Combined Arms … In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. To do so, we must follow a doctrine of combined arms. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that in order to counteract one, the enemy must make himself more vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma – a no-win situation.’

²²Conway (2007) Letter from CMC to CJCS: ‘Based on the recognition of significantly reduced lethal and severe injuries in MRAP vs. the HMMWV, on 2 January 2007, Commander MARCENT requested support for a policy change that would provide MRAP level protection for all Marines operating outside the wire in MNF-W. Under this policy, limited use of the Up Armored HMMWV’s will be authorized in specific tactical situations where the operational characteristics of HMMWV are required.’

²³Quantico Sentry. (2007) Corps implements visual monitoring technology for gaming generation: ‘The Marine Corps Combat Development Command demonstrated a new visual monitoring system 29 June that is already being used to identify and defeat threats in Iraq.’

²⁴Danger Room (2008) Drone, Copter Team Kills 2,400 Bombers in Iraq: ‘In Iraq, a hundred-man Army unit is using an array of drones, manned surveillance planes, helicopters, and video downlinks to kill 2,400 bomb-planters and capture 141 more … The 14-month-old, once-classified Army outfit is called Task Force ODIN, for ‘observe-detect-identify-neutralize’ … And the Task Force’s ‘success has led Army officials to expand it and to bring its tactics to Afghanistan.’

²⁵Duffy and Kukis (2008).Time Magazine, The Surge At Year One: ‘Some of the initial results worried Odierno: US casualties in May and June—227 killed—were so high that even he thought he might have miscalculated. But over the summer, the landscape began to change. In Baghdad, GIs moved out of their relatively safe megabases on the outskirts and into smaller bases in the city’s violent neighborhoods—to live, form networks and walk patrols. By the end of June, the generals began to notice that sectarian attacks were decreasing.’

²⁶. Institute for the Study of War (2012), Operation Phantom Thunder: ‘Phantom Thunder concluded on August 13, 2007 … By that time, Iraqi and Coalition forces had conducted 142 battalion-level joint operations. 6,702 suspects were detained; 1,196 enemies were killed; and 419 others were wounded. 382 high-value targets were also killed or captured during Phantom Thunder. Additionally, 1,113 weapons caches were discovered. And more than 2,000 IEDs and vehicle-borne IEDs were found and neutralized.’

²⁷Fletcher (2007), The Times, 'A ‘Sunni Awakening’ – and a Recurring Nightmare.'

²⁸Patraeus (2008) SASC Testimony: ‘… the ceasefire declared by Moqtada al-Sadr last fall as another factor in the overall reduction in violence.’

²⁹Long War Journal. (2008) Sadr to extend cease-fire: ‘US and Iraqi efforts to pressure Sadr to extend the cease-fire appears to have paid off. Sadr was due to make a decision on the truce extension on 23 Febuary.’