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ABSTRACT
The workhorse of military alliances theory is the joint products model where the prominent existence of private benefits from alliance activities alleviates the free-riding problem. In the case of NORAD Modernization project, there are potentially large private economic benefits accruing to Canada. These benefits may include technology transfers and domestically produced inputs from some sectors exhibiting comparative advantage. In this latter case, the benefits will largely depend on whether a JSF type consortium will undertake the investments efficiently as opposed to the so-called benefits obtainable from Canada’s fundamentally inefficient offsets program, Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB). The article focuses on Canada’s Key Industrial Capabilities (KIC), the 17 sectors officially selected as supporting the country’s operational capabilities. The width of this selection as well as the procurement and industrial policy interaction are briefly discussed.
Acknowledgments
We gratefully acknowledge very relevant, extensive, and constructive comments from the referees. Moreover, we thank the significant research assistance by Lt(Navy) Kevin Kodis to Part 3 of the paper entitled Canadian industrial participation and potential private benefits.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. Fergusson (Citation2020), Budning et al. (Citation2021a).
2. Jenkins (Citation2013).
3. Heal et al. (Citation2002) introduced the concept of interdependent security.
4. Further rivalry or publicness issues will arise for the non-security joint products, to be discussed in Part 3. Charron & Fergusson (Citation2020).
5. Berkok et al. (Citation2023), Fetterly & Solomon (Citation2021).
6. Verklan (Citation2021).
7. RADA (Citation2020).
8. Anticipated to be a low-earth orbit (LEO).
9. Labbé (Citation2020b), Lamont et al. (Citation2011), Lackenbauer & Bouffard (Citation2021).
10. Brockmann and Schiller (Citation2022), Kunertova (Citation2022).
11. Bouffard and Lajeunesse (Citation2022).
12. Csenkey and Genest (Citation2021), Ball et al. (Citation2016), CDAI (Citation2020a).
13. Budning et al. (Citation2021b).
14. Acoustic multi-mission sensors.
15. Labbé (Citation2020b).
16. Labbé (Citation2020a).
17. Brown (Citation2014).
18. Shoot-assess-shoot doctrine is ‘a defensive plan that entails shooting one interceptor and assessing its success before firing others obviates the need to fire large salvos of very expensive interceptors. This “shoot-assess-shoot” doctrine led to the MDA’s concept of early intercept, emphasizing the first intercept attempt during the first half of the threat’s flight path. Unfortunately, such an approach necessitates tracking sensors and interceptor launch sites well forward of the defended area (or in space).’ Corbett (Citation2013); also in Russell (Citation2021).
19. Corbett (Citation2013).
20. RADA Citation2020.
21. Software-Defined Network (SDN): Such a network exhibits an architecture that the network can be centrally controlled or ‘programmed,’ using software applications. This enables C2 to manage the network consistently with the strategic objectives in mind.
22. These industries would be artificial intelligence, cyber resilience, sonar and acoustic systems, and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) systems (Jenkins Citation2013; Jones and Perron Citation2022; White Citation2022).
23. CRS (Citation2022b), McDonald (Citation2020).
24. Lamont et al. (Citation2011).
25. Footnote 15.
26. Lamont et al. (Citation2011).
27. A kill chain consists of detecting, identifying, and stopping adversary activity.
28. CDAI Citation2020c.
29. Russell (Citation2021), Sherman (Citation2021), Verklan (Citation2021).
30. CDAI Citation2020b.
31. CRS (Citation2022a).
32. Pope (Citation2020).
33. White (Citation2022).
34. The Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) is the U.S. initiative to replace the current domain and control systems with one that connects the existing sensors and shooters, i.e. commanders in control of defeat mechanisms, and distribute the available data to all domains (sea, air, land, cyber, and space) and forces that are part of the U.S. military. The system originated in the U.S. Air Force. Through NORTHCOM it will be adapted to the Modernized NORAD.
35. CDAI Citation2020b.
36. Building in High Arctic and generating energy will require technological innovations.
37. Charron et al. (Citation2019).
38. Labbé (Citation2020a).
39. Cho (Citation2020).
40. Charron et al. (Citation2019), Anand (Citation2022), Raymond (Citation2022), Raymond & Munier (Citation2021).
41. Brewster (Citation2021), Chase and Fife (Citation2022), Gilmour (Citation2021), Glesby et al. (Citation2021), Ibbitson (Citation2022), Kieley (Citation2021).
42. Berthiaume (Citation2022).
43. Budning, Wilner, and Côté (Citation2022).
44. Csenkey and Genest (Citation2021).
45. Csenkey and Genest (Citation2021).
46. Berkok, Secrieru, and Peyrow (Citation2023).
47. Austere environment advanced construction materials in High Arctic as well as deep-water ports in the Arctic.
48. Mallory (Citation2018).
49. See Appendix A listing the KICs and, in particular, describing those directly relevant to the Modernized NORAD.
50. At the time of writing the first draft of this paper about a year ago, the world may have entered what some are terming as ‘post-post-Cold War’ era with Russia emerging, beyond any reasonable doubt, as a belligerent military power with a powerful nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the self-proclaimed ‘Near-Arctic’ China’s Arctic interests and activities are rising unabated.
51. Mason (Citation2022).
52. Appendix A draws attention to those KICs that are most technologically relevant to the transition.
53. Droff & Malizard (Citation2020), Engerer (Citation2011).
54. See footnote 28.
55. Davis (Citation2022), Dean (Citation2022), Haney (Citation2020).
56. Hare and Goldstein (Citation2010).
57. Canada is ranked 5th amongst 29 top countries in AI by Stanford University’s Global AI Vibrancy index, https://aiindex.stanford.edu/vibrancy/ (accessed 23 December 2022).
58. Appendix A describes industries competing in these markets. For instance, Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Systems and Cyber Resilience sectors.
59. CDAI (Citation2020b).
60. As well as China’s hardening stance on Taiwan.
61. A U.S. Strategic Command effort to cooperate with America’s closest allies in space. Under Operation Olympic Defender, America is leading a coalition of allied space-faring nations to work together to deter hostile acts in space, strengthen deterrence against hostile actors and reduce the spread of debris orbiting Earth.
62. CDAI Citation(2020b). Also see Raymond (Citation2022).
63. Jenkins (Citation2013). We note that the 17th capability, Clean Technology, has just been added.