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ABSTRACT
Counterterrorism operations in Kenya have often been hindered by a lack of collaboration, coordination and cooperation among the security agencies involved in such operations. This article examines the relationship between neo-elitism and counterterrorism security interagency activity in Kenya. Using neo-elitism as a framework for analysis, with specific reference to the September 2013 Westgate Mall attack counterterrorism operation, it is argued that the lack of collaboration, coordination and cooperation among Kenya’s counterterrorism security agencies often results in unintended adverse consequences. The interagency conflict over the Westgate operation was primarily about command and control, intelligence sharing and official information shared with the public pertaining to the stages of the siege and operation. These security agencies share similar responsibilities and jurisdictions in the rest of the country’s counterterrorism efforts. The interagency conflicts reveal that the country’s security elites pursue personal and agency-specific interests that are aimed at maintaining organisational supremacy over counterterrorism efforts. Recommendations are offered for how to tackle the problem of interagency conflict in order to enhance the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations in Kenya.
Notes on contributor
Oscar Gakuo Mwangi is Associate Professor in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the National University of Lesotho, Lesotho ([email protected])
ORCID
Oscar Gakuo Mwangi http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3559-5900
Notes
1 Bratton and Van de Walle, ‘Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions’; Cammack, ‘Logic of African Neopatrimonialism,’ 600; Beekers and Van Gool, From Patronage to Neopatrimonialism, 12.
2 Bratton and Van de Walle, ‘Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions,’ 458; Cammack, ‘Logic of African Neopatrimonialism,’ 600.
3 Cammack, ‘Critical Assessment of New Elite Paradigm,’ 415; Jones, ‘Elite Democracy,’ 6–9.
4 Field, Higley, and Burton, ‘In Defence of Elite Theory,’ 421–2.
5 Field, Higley, and Burton, ‘New Elite Framework,’ 151–4.
6 Ham and Hill, Policy Process in Modern Capitalist State.
7 Genieys, ‘Sociology of Political Elites in France,’ 424–5.
8 Kaiser, Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities, 2.
9 Ibid., 8.
10 Strickler, ‘Interagency Cooperation: Quo Vadis?’, 4–5.
11 Ibid., 11–12.
12 Ibid., 16–17.
13 Government of Kenya, ‘National Police Service Act 2011 (No 11A of 2011),’ Revised Edition 2012 [2011], 19–26; Government of Kenya, ‘Defence Forces Act 2012 (No. 25 of 2012),’ Revised Edition 2012, 19.
14 Government of Kenya, ‘Proposed Constitution of Kenya,’ 153.
15 Ibid., 154.
16 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, 25–6.
17 Ministry of Interior & Coordination of National Government, https://www.kenyans.co.ke/government/ministry-interior-coordination-national-government
18 Ministry of Defence, https://www.kenyans.co.ke/government/ministry-defence
19 Government of Kenya, ‘National Police Service Act 2011 (No 11A of 2011),’ Revised Edition 2012 [2011], 12.
20 Government of Kenya, ‘National Intelligence Service Act 2012 (No. 28 of 2012),’ 1555.
21 Ibid., 1563–4.
22 Government of Kenya, ‘Defence Forces Act 2012 (No. 25 of 2012),’ Revised Edition 2012, 22.
23 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, 28.
24 KNCHR, ‘Are We Under Siege?’, 32–3.
25 Anderson, Why Mpeketoni Matters, 1; IPOA, IPOA Report Following Mpeketoni Attacks, 9.
26 IPOA, IPOA Report Following Mpeketoni Attacks, 11.
27 Ibid., 11.
28 Ibid., 11–13.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 13.
31 AU, Terrorist Attack, Garissa University, Kenya, Incident Analyses, 1–2.
32 UNSC, Report of Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 192.
33 Ibid., 189–93.
34 Christie, Guadagno, and Rodriguez, ‘School Security,’ 1.
35 Ibid.
36 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, 25–7.
37 Howden, ‘Terror in Westgate Mall’; Government of Kenya, Report on Westgate Terrorist Attack, 29; NYPD, Analysis of Attack at Westgate Mall, 20–3.
38 Field, Higley, and Burton, ‘New Elite Framework,’ 151–4.
39 Howden, ‘Terror in Westgate Mall’; Government of Kenya, Report on Westgate Terrorist Attack, 35; NYPD, Analysis of Attack at Westgate Mall, 17–18.
40 Strickler, ‘Interagency Cooperation: Quo Vadis?’, 8.
41 Government of Kenya, ‘Constitution of Kenya,’ 147.
42 Government of Kenya, ‘Defence Forces Act 2012 (No. 25 of 2012),’ Revised Edition 2012, 29–30.
43 Ibid., 30.
44 Howden, ‘Terror in Westgate Mall’; Government of Kenya, Report on Westgate Terrorist Attack, 20–9; NYPD, Analysis of Attack at Westgate Mall, 21.
45 Howden, ‘Terror in Westgate Mall.’
46 Government of Kenya, Report on Westgate Terrorist Attack, 15–16.
47 Ibid., 32.
48 Ibid., 31.
49 Ngirachu, ‘Security Chiefs Intensify Blame’.
50 Ibid.
51 Genieys, ‘Sociology of Political Elites in France,’ 424–5.
52 Howden, ‘Terror in Westgate Mall.’
53 Government of Kenya, Report on Westgate Terrorist Attack, 6; Mugera, ‘Hell Mall’; ‘Army Retakes Mall’.
54 NYPD, Analysis of Attack at Westgate Mall, 24.
55 Mugera, ‘Hell Mall.’
56 Chandler, ‘Counterterrorism Policies and Strategies,’ 76.
57 Government of Kenya, ‘National Intelligence Service Act 2012 (No. 28 of 2012),’ 1555.
58 Government of Kenya, Report on Westgate Terrorist Attack, 20.
59 Ibid., 20.
60 Ibid., 21.
61 Howden, ‘Terror in Westgate Mall.’
62 Ibid.
63 ‘Battle for Control of Mall Rages On’.
64 Khera, ‘Authorities and Militants Take Nairobi Battle to Twitter’.
65 Government of Kenya, Report on Westgate Terrorist Attack, 38.
66 Ibid., 6; Mugera, ‘Hell Mall.’
67 ‘Army Retakes Mall.’
68 Government of Kenya, Report on Westgate Terrorist Attack, 6.