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ABSTRACT
Traditionally the African concept of security concept has been dominated by land-based conflicts with little attention being paid to maritime threats and the protection of the maritime environment. With the rapid escalation of piracy on the East Coast, the African Union (AU) was compelled to develop a joint strategy to address its changing African Maritime Domain (AMD). This was achieved by the AU’s Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050) in 2014, culminating in the adoption of a binding maritime security and safety charter in Lomé in 2016. The Lomé Charter should ideally focus the general provisions of AIMS 2050 so that Africa, as a continent, can take responsibility for security and economic empowerment of the AMD. This article considers various maritime security documents against the backdrop of an African context for understanding maritime security, in order to evaluate whether the Lomé Charter, as a manifestation of AIMS 2050, will realise its aspirations. Focussing on security is not sufficient and too much emphasis is placed in the Lomé Charter on restriction rather than development. Strong political will and leadership is required to facilitate implementation, identifying common security concerns to ensure better cooperative and collective strategies in a diverse implementation environment.
Acknowledgements
This research was conducted under the auspices of the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) of Stellenbosch University.
Notes on contributors
Col Pieter Frederik Brits, B.Juris, LL.B. is the departmental chair Mercantile and Public Law (mil) at the Faculty of Military Science at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Since 2009 he co-authored the following accredited articles:
Brits, P.F., and M. Nel. ‘Compliance with International Humanitarian Law in Africa: A Study’. In Strategic Theory and Contemporary African Armed Conflicts, ed. F. Vrey, T. Mandrup, and A. Esterhuyse, 199–219. 2010.
Brits, P.F., and M. Nel. ‘The Criminal Liability of Child Soldiers: In Search of a Standard’. Journal of Psychology in Africa 22, no. 3 (2012): 481–96.
Brits, P.F., and M. Nel. ‘Military intervention Justified? Contemporary Challenges of the Just Cause Theory’. In Reflections on War: Preparedness and Consequences, ed. T. Potgieter and I. Liebenberg, 203–16. 2012.
Brits, P.F., and M. Nel. ‘What Piracy did for Good Order at Sea: A Perspective on Lessons Learned’. In Towards Good Order at Sea: African Experiences, ed. F. Vrey and T. Mandrup, 51–74. 2015.
Brits, P.F., and M. Nel. ‘A Wake-up Call for the African Navies: Towards more Effective Maritime Law Enforcement’. Acta Criminoligae 29, no. 2 (2016): 172–87.
He authored the following refereed article:
Brits, P.F. ‘The Need for Human Rights Education in the Military’. South African National Defence Force Journal for Educational Technology (September 2014): 5–11.
Dr Michelle Nel is a senior lecturer in criminal and military law at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University and is a researcher with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA). She is an admitted advocate to the High Court and has published a number of peer-reviewed articles on military law, international law and maritime security. She has also presented papers at a number of national and international conferences.
Notes
1. Omorogbe, Ending Africa’s Energy Deficit and the Law, 5.
2. Lin, ‘The Rise of Africa in the International Geopolitical Landscape’, 1.
3. Bassou, ‘Africa’s Natural Resources and Geopolitical Realities’, 1–3.
4. Vreÿ, ‘African Maritime Security’, 121; Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 55.
5. Stockbruegger, ‘Reclaiming the Maritime’, 1.
6. Bueger, ‘Communities of Security Practice at Work’, 298.
7. Engel, ‘The African Union’, 208.
8. Kraska, ‘The Influence of Law on Sea Power’, 116.
9. Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, 7 where Grotius states: ‘Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it’.
10. Ibid., 43–4.
11. Ibid., 28.
12. Coelho, ‘Southern African Maritime Security’, 120.
13. Ibid., 120.
14. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law.
15. Coelho, ‘Southern African Maritime Security’, 120.
16. Akuffo, ‘Human Security and Interregional Cooperation’, 223–37 and 226–7.
17. See Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security?’, 159–60, Chapsos, ‘Is Maritime Security a Traditional Security Challenge?’, 60 and Cordner, ‘Risk Managing Maritime Security’, 48.
18. Kraska, ‘The Influence of Law on Sea Power’, 122.
19. Ibid., 122–3.
20. Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security?’, 161.
21. Chapsos, ‘Is Maritime Security a Traditional Security Challenge?’, 60–1.
22. Cordner, ‘Risk Managing Maritime Security’, 51.
23. Ibid., 47.
24. Ibid., 46.
25. Notably Baker, Akkufo and Coelho,
26. Ntuli, ‘African Maritime Transport Charter’, 331. Article 28(1) of the Charter required the signatures of 20 states.
27. Ibid., 331.
28. Revised African Maritime Transport Charter, Article 2.
29. Ibid., Article 3.
30. Ibid., Article 3(9).
31. Ibid., Article 23.
32. Ibid., Article 26(2).
33. For a detailed discussion on a sustainable development perspective and maritime security see Chintoan-Uta and Silva, ‘Global Maritime Domain Awareness’, 40–1.
34. Baker, ‘Toward an African Maritime Economy’, 39–62.
35. Ibid., 44.
36. Revised African Maritime Charter, Article 5.
37. Ibid., Article 6.
38. Ibid., Article 7.
39. Ibid., Article 8.
40. Ibid., Article 44.
41. Plan of Action Maritime Transport, 1–14.
42. Baker, ‘Toward an African Maritime Economy’, 45.
43. Ibid.
44. Durban Resolution on Maritime Safety.
45. Baker, ‘Toward an African Maritime Economy’, 45.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 46. Baker argues that the action plan would be successful where it is coupled with an ‘overarching vision’ for the maritime sector, ‘a robust plan for improving maritime security’, plans for governance and oversight as well as financial and commercial growth.
48. IMO, Djibouti Code of Conduct. The Code was signed by nine states on 29 January 2009, to wit Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen. Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates have since signed, bringing the total to 20 countries from the 21 eligible to sign.
49. IMO, ‘Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy’; Bueger and Saran, ‘Finding a Regional Solution’, 1–12.
50. The Economic cost to East Africa due to piracy was estimated at USD 1.4 billion for 2017. Oceans Beyond Piracy, ‘The State of Maritime Piracy’, 2.17. See also Mbekeani and Ncube, ‘Economic Impact of Maritime Piracy’.
51. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), ‘Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy’, 1, African Union, ‘Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy’. Compare also articles 6 and 6 of the Yaounde Declaration to articles 4 and 5 of the Djibouti Code of Conduct,
52. Article 5 of the Yaounde Declaration compared to Article 3 of the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
53. Article 11 of the Yaounde Declaration compared to Article 8 of the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
54. Articles 12 and 13 of the Yaounde Declaration compared to Articles 9 and 10 of the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
55. Yaounde Declaration, Article 8 makes specific provision for measures to restrict IUU fishing.
56. Ibid., Article 1(5).
57. Ibid., Article 14.
58. The Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct 2017 was signed on 12 January 2017 by 12 of the 17 participating States eligible to sign. The 12 States who signed were: Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Jordan, Madagascar, Maldives, Mozambique, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen.
59. The ‘blue economy’ refers to all the economic sectors that may have a link to the ocean. The Jeddah Amendment includes shipping, seafaring, fisheries and tourism within the ambit of the concept ‘blue economy’, including the creation of stable conditions that would encourage investment. In this regard see IOM, Jeddah Amendment, 2017, 34.
60. Rider, ‘Djibouti Code Broadened’, 1; Malcolm, ‘Sustainability as Maritime Security’, 238–9, 242.
61. Ifesinachi and Ngwangwu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 55.
62. Ibid. Like the exploitation of a predominant young population, the uneven distribution of wealth, corruption and social exclusionism.
63. Ibid., 57.
64. ICC IMB, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery’, 5.
65. Stockbruegger, ‘Reclaiming the Maritime’, 1.
66. African Union, ‘2050 AIM Strategy’, 11.
67. Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security?’, 161.
68. African Union, ‘2050 AIM Strategy’, 11 and Bueger, ‘Concepts in Practice’, 9.
69. Two-thirds of Africa’s borders are undelimited and remains a source of conflict and contention. See in this regard Ikome, ‘Africa’s Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict’, 11.
70. African Union, ‘2050 AIM Strategy’, 22.
71. African Union, ‘2050 AIM Strategy’, 11 explains its strategic end state as ‘[i]ncreased wealth creation from AMD that positively contributes to socio-economic development, as well as increased national, regional and continental stability, through collaborative, concerted, cooperative, coordinated, coherent and trust-building multi-layered efforts to build blocks of maritime sector activities in concert with improving elements of maritime governance’.
72. Luntumbue, ‘The Long March’, 3; Bueger, ‘Concepts in Practice’, 9. It will be argued below that not enough emphasis is placed on the developmental aspects of the Lomé Charter.
73. For a complete list of objectives see Article 3 of the Lomé Charter.
74. Ifesinachi and Ngwangu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 54.
75. Vreÿ and Mandrup, Towards Good Order at Sea, 5.
76. Lomé Charter, Article 6.
77. Lomé Charter, Chapter 5.
78. Luntumbue, ‘The Long March’, 2–3.
79. Ifesinachi and Ngwangu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 55.
80. Cordner, ‘Risk Managing Maritime Security’, 51.
81. Williams, ‘Thinking About Security in Africa’, 1036; Axworthy, ‘Human Security and Interregional Cooperation’, 22. According to Poku, Renwick, and Porto, ‘Human Security and Development in Africa’, 1157 more than 42 wars were fought in Africa between 1968 and 2006.
82. Mengishu, ‘The Root Causes of Conflict’, 28.
83. Akuffo, ‘Human Security and Interregional Cooperation’, 234.
84. Ibid., 230–3, Haugevik, ‘New Partners’, 25.
85. Akuffo, ‘Human Security and Interregional Cooperation’, 231.
86. Ibid. 234.
87. Sundstrom, ‘NATO Maritime Posture’, 1. See also paragraph 6 of the Alliance Maritime Strategy that acknowledges that globalisation has increased maritime criminal activities such as illegal trafficking in humans, weapons and narcotics.
88. Ibid., 3.
89. General Secretariat of the Council Delegations, ‘Council Conclusions’, 24.
90. Walker, ‘Maritime Security in West Africa’, 88. For a more complete discussion on EU capacity building efforts in West Africa see the EU Gulf of Guinea Action Plan.
91. In this regard see the discussion in the previous section illustrating examples of global assistance.
92. General Secretariat of the Council Delegations, ‘Council Conclusions’, 8. See also Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 54 for a discussion in the importance of West Africa to European and North American markets.
93. General Secretariat of the Council Delegations, ‘Council Conclusions’, 11.
94. UNODC, ‘Drug Trafficking Patterns to and from Eastern Africa’.
95. Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 60.
96. Ibid., 59–60.
97. Axworthy, ‘Human Security and Global Governance’, 20.
98. Tieku, ‘Promotion of Human Security’, 37 defines human security as ‘the protection of people and communities, rather than of states, from violence and imminent danger’. See also Paris, ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift’, 87.
99. Akuffo, ‘Human Security and Interregional Cooperation’, 225; Ifesinachi and Ngwangu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 55.
100. See UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 and the discussion on the UN concept of human security by Gomez and Gasper, ‘Human Security: A Thematic Guidance Note’.
101. Akuffo, ‘Human Security and Interregional Cooperation’, 227.
102. Ibid., 224. See also Tieku, ‘Promotion of Human Security’, 27–8 where he postulates that the Constitutive Act provides the AU with the framework to address human insecurity, enabling the AU to ‘prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the Continent’.
103. Ifesinachi and Ngwangu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 55.
104. Gomez and Gasper, ‘Human Security: A Thematic Guidance Note’, 3.
105. Lomé Charter, Article 3.
106. Ibid., Article 6.
107. Akuffo, ‘Human Security and Interregional Cooperation’, 227.
108. Ibid., 227.
109. Cilliers, ‘Human Security in Africa’, 8 argues that if national security is not in place, individual and international human security cannot exist.
110. Chintoan-Uta and Silva, ‘Global Maritime Domain Awareness’, 40–1.
111. General Secretariat of the Council Delegations, ‘Council Conclusions’, 2.
112. Walker, ‘Maritime Security in West Africa’, 90.
113. Ifesinachi and Ngwangwu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 56.
114. Cilliers, ‘Human Security in Africa’, 12; Ifesinachi and Ngwangwu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 56.
115. Cilliers, ‘Human Security in Africa’, 12.
116. See Ifesinachi and Nwangwu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 54 as it relates to piracy and armed robbery at sea specifically. The EU supports a multi-layered approach and in its ‘Gulf of Guinea Action Plan’, 15, contends that maritime security will enhance stability on land but also argues that financial resources are not enough. It will require enhanced diplomatic and political coordination.
117. Maru, ‘The First Ten Years’, 1.
118. Ifesinachi and Ngwangwu, ‘Implementation of the Yaounde Code of Conduct’, 56.
119. Cilliers, ‘Human Security in Africa’, 11.
120. Maru, ‘The First Ten Years’, 7.
121. Ibid.; Tieku, ‘Promotion of Human Security’, 27.
122. Tieku, ‘Promotion of Human Security’, 35.
123. Maru, ‘The First Ten Years’, 7.
124. Blédé and Walker, ‘Fulfilling the Promise of Lomé’, 2.
125. African Union, Lomé Charter, 3.
126. African Union, Lomé Charter, Preamble.
127. Chapsos, ‘Is Maritime Security a Traditional Security Challenge?’, 60.
128. Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security?’ 161.
129. Ibid., 159.
130. Ibid., 161.
131. Cordner, ‘Risk Managing Maritime Security’, 47.
132. Ibid., 51.
133. Chintoan-Uta and Silva, ‘Global Maritime Domain Awareness’, 40.
134. Ibid., 41.
135. Cilliers, ‘Human Security in Africa’, 31.