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ABSTRACT
As the crisis in the Sudan unfolded after the overthrow of long time President Omar al-Bashir, the Director of the East African Standby Force (EASF) purportedly made a statement to the effect that the force was ready to intervene should the situation become genocidal. Using the case of its failed intervention in Burundi crisis, this article argues that the EASF deployment in the Sudan would generally not be feasible for reasons including: the government of the Sudan would not consent to the intervention; the ongoing dialogue between the warring parties would preclude any intervention; and the lack of capacity of the force to actually deploy. From its failed deployment in Burundi, these lessons can be discerned: first, that for any deployment of the EASF to be authorised, the policy organs especially of the AU must be aligned in their understanding of the situation. Secondly, where there are alternative means of dealing with the situation, military intervention would not be authorised. Lastly, that consent of the host state must be procured before deployment is undertaken out of respect for the principle of sovereignty.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers of this Journal who made insightful comments and suggestions on the draft. All the remaining mistakes are mine.
Notes on contributor
Kasaija Phillip Apuuli is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Kampala. He holds LLM and DPhil degrees in International Law from the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom, and BA (Hons) in International Relations from Makerere University. He was a 2010 British Academy Visiting Scholar at African Studies Centre, University of Oxford, and a 2016 Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence at the University of South Florida and Stetson School of Law in the United States of America, and has also worked in an advisory capacity at the IGAD Secretariat, in Djibouti and Ethiopia.
Notes
1 Oluoch, ‘Standby Force Watching Sudan Closely’, 13.
2 Ibid.
3 Note that the EASF has disowned this statement stating that the Director was misquoted. The EASF argues that ‘the statement can possibly be interpreted to mean that EASF is planning to deploy militarily to Sudan and that the current political situation contains genocidal prospects. This is not only untrue, but it can also cause prejudice to our organization and to the Republic of Sudan’. See EASF, ‘Erroneous Media Reports’.
4 Article 13.
5 Article 13(3), Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002).
6 AU, Peace and Security Council 507th Meeting, Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM(DVII).
7 Apuuli, ‘Establishing the Full Operational Capability of the East African Standby Force’.
8 Ibid.
9 EASF, Annual Report 2017, 22.
10 Ndiae, The African Standby Force, 2.
11 Ibid.
12 Apuuli, ‘The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC)’.
13 Ndaguba, Nzewi, and Shai, ‘Financial Imperatives and Constraints’, 181.
14 See generally Arthur, ‘Promoting Security in Africa through Regional Economic Communities (RECs)’.
15 Apuuli, ‘Establishing the Full Operational Capability of the East African Standby Force’, 2.
16 Ibid.
17 EASF, AU Force Verification Exercise Kick Starts at EASF Secretariat .
18 Ibid.
19 Desmidt and Hauck, ‘Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force’, 18.
20 See generally International Crisis Group (ICG), Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term.
21 For example, General Adolphe Nshimirimana, described as ‘a CNDD-FDD icon’ was assassinated on 2 August. The next day, perhaps in retaliation, prominent human rights activist and third term opponent Pierre Claver Mbonimpa was shot in the face and neck, and barely survived. Two weeks later, Colonel Jean Bikomagu, a retired army chief, was gunned down outside his home.
22 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Fact-finding mission of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to Burundi, 7–13 December 2015’.
23 Ibid.
24 This section draws from my work Apuuli, ‘Uganda's Lackluster Role as Mediator in Burundi's Political Crisis’.
25 AU, Communiqué, Peace and Security Council 551st meeting, PSC/PR/COMM. (DLI), para. 12(v).
26 Desmidt and Hauck, ‘Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force’, 18.
27 AU, Communiqué, Peace and Security Council 557th meeting, PSC/PR/COMM. (DLVII), Addis Ababa, 13 November 2015.
28 See AU, Communiqué, Peace and Security Council 565th meeting, PSC/PR/COMM. (DLXV), Addis Ababa, 17 December 2015. Para. 13(a) (i) spelled out the mandate of the force as follows: to prevent any deterioration of the security situation, monitor its evolution and report developments on the ground; contribute, within its capacity and in its areas of deployment, to the protection of civilian population under imminent threat; contribute to the creation of the necessary conditions for the successful holding of inter-Burundian dialogue and to the preservation of the gains made through the Agreement; facilitate, in collaboration, as appropriate, with other international actors the implementation of any agreement the Burundian parties would reach, including but not limited to the disarmament of militias and other illegal groups, the protection of political personalities and other actors whose security would be threatened; and protect AU personnel, assets and installations. It was to comprise up to 5,000 military personnel and police, including already formed police units and an appropriate civilian component. The mission was to last six months.
29 Ibid.
30 Desmidt and Hauck, ‘Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force’, 18.
31 Ibid.
32 International Crisis Group (ICG), The African Union and the Burundi crisis: Ambition versus reality, 6; Dersso, ‘To Intervene or Not to Intervene’, 2.
33 EASF, Communiqué of the 4th Extra-Ordinary Meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Eastern African Region.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Desmidt and Hauck, ‘Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force’, 18.
37 Apuuli, ‘Uganda's Lackluster Role as Mediator in Burundi's Political Crisis’, 9.
38 UN News Centre, UN Security Council Calls for Stepped Up Mediation Efforts in Conflict-Torn Burundi.
39 The article states as follows: The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles … ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.
40 Desmidt and Hauck, ‘Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force’, 20.
41 Dersso, ‘To Intervene or Not to Intervene’, 6–7.
42 BBC, ‘Sudan Crisis: What You Need to Know’.
43 The Economist, ‘“We Are all Darfur”-Sudan's Genocidal Regime Is under Siege’.
44 Ibid.
45 The protests started in the town of Atbara then spread to Port Sudan and Dongola, before reaching Khartoum.
46 Berridge, ‘Briefing: The Uprising in Sudan’.
47 BBC, ‘Sudan Crisis: What You Need to Know’.
48 This is a wide political coalition of civilian and rebel coalitions of Sudanese groups established in January 2019 including: the Sudan Professionals Association (SPA), the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), the National Consensus Forces (NCF), Sudan Call; the Unionist Gathering, and the Sudanese Resistance Committees.
49 Baldo, ‘Sudan: Hidden Economic Stakes in Ongoing Power Struggle’.
50 Ibid.
51 Burke and Mohammed, ‘Sudanese protesters demand justice following mass killings’; Yuhas, ‘100 Killed in Sudan and Dozens of Bodies Are Pulled from Nile, Opposition Says’. The TMC leaders contested the figure of those killed and reported that only 61 deaths had been recorded.
52 Article 7(1) (e).
53 Article 28(c). The Protocol was adopted by the 23rd AU Assembly held at Malabo, Equatorial Guinea and to-date, 15 countries have signed with zero ratification.
54 Maclean, ‘Sudan's Military Leaders Accused of Ordering Massacre’. For example, in late June 2019, the security forces opened fire on protesting teenagers in the town of El-Obeid killing at least five school children.
55 The deputy head of the TMC, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo aka Hemedti is alleged to have ordered the attack.
56 Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudanese Opposition Rejects Attorney General's Report on 3rd June Massacre’.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 ICG, The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition versus Reality, 10.
60 Sebastián and Gorur, UN Peacekeeping and Host-State Consent: How Missions Navigate Relationships with Governments, 5.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Plano and Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, 276.
64 Dersso, ‘To Intervene or Not to Intervene’, 4.
65 AU, Communiqué, Peace and Security Council 565th meeting, para. 13 (c) (ii).
66 Dersso, ‘To Intervene or Not to Intervene’, 7.
67 Lynch, ‘A Mission That Was Set Up to Fail’.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 The Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur was mediated by the government of Chad.
72 For details see International Crisis Group (ICG), To save Darfur; Human Rights Watch (HRW), Sudan: Imperatives for immediate change-The African Union Mission in Sudan.
73 Penketh. ‘Khartoum Resists UN Peace Force as Fighting Cuts Off Aid from Half of Darfur’.
74 Williams, War and Peace in Africa, 190.
75 Apuuli, ‘Uganda's Lackluster Role as Mediator in Burundi's Political Crisis’, 6.
76 Dersso, To Intervene or Not to Intervene’, 5–7.
77 Ibid. 7.
78 Radio Dabanga, Sudan constitutional declaration signed-Sovereign Council to be announced in two weeks.
79 The pledges include: 3 Motorized Battalions from Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda; 1 Mechanized Battalion from Kenya; 1 Light Infantry Battalion from Burundi; and 1 Squadron of Special Forces from Rwanda among others. For a detailed list of pledges see Apuuli, ‘Establishing the Full Operational Capability of the East African Standby Force’, 13.
80 Apuuli, ‘Establishing the Full Operational Capability of the East African Standby Force’, 9–10.
81 The EASF has conducted field and command exercises as follows: Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Kenya (2008); Field Training Exercise (FTX) in Djibouti (2009); Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Sudan (2011); Field Training Exercise (FTX) called ‘Mashariki Salam’ in Uganda (2013); Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Ethiopia (2014); and Field Training Exercise (FTX) called ‘Mashariki Slam (2)’ in Sudan (2017).
82 Williams, ‘Special Report: The African Union's Coercive Diplomacy in Burundi’.
83 See Apuuli, ‘Establishing the Full Operational Capability of the East African Standby Force’, 10–11.
84 EASF, Annual Report 2018, 24.
85 AU, Policy Framework for the establishments of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part 1), Exp/ASF-MSC/2 (I), 11.
86 Desmidt and Hauck, ‘Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force’, 13.
87 Ndaguba, Nzewi, and Shai, ‘Financial Imperatives and Constraints’, 180.
88 EASF, Annual Report 2018, 24.
89 Ibid.
90 Ndaguba, Nzewi, and Shai, ‘Financial Imperatives and Constraints’, 180.
91 Desmidt and Hauck, ‘Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force’, 20.
92 Dersso, ‘To Intervene or Not to Intervene’, 4.
93 Wilén and Williams, ‘The African Union and Coercive Diplomacy: The Case of Burundi’.
94 ICG, The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition versus Reality, 9.
95 Desmidt and Hauck, ‘Understanding the Eastern Africa Standby Force’, 18.