Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat

ABSTRACT

This article examines the various deficiencies of the security agency of the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu in terms of intelligence capacity, capability and competence to counter Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahiduun (hereafter Al-Shabaab), the militant movement fighting against the government and its external backers. Based on field-based oral and written research data in Mogadishu, the article argues that the heavy dependence of the government's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) on various external patrons essentially makes the agency less efficient and effective than Al-Shabaab's intelligence agency, the Amniyat. Looking at the internal dynamics of the government and its rival insurgency movement offers fresh anthropological insights into how the Amniyat is more dynamic than the government's intelligence agency. In spite of its internal faults and failures, the Federal Government has become stuck in an externally-imposed security architecture envisioned by the so-called ‘partners’. This has made the NISA far behind the Amniyat in terms of security provision because both opposing security agencies pursue different methods to broadcast their power and presence. Delving deeper into the inner workings of the security institutions of the NISA and the Amniyat demonstrates that the performances and practices of the two intelligence agencies reflect the acute failure that inherently characterises the government security sector.

KEYWORDS:

• The Federal Government of Somalia
• Al-Shabaab
• intelligence agencies
• NISA
• Amniyat

Notes on contributor

Mohamed Haji Ingiriis is a DPhil Candidate at the Faculty of History, the University of Oxford, and Research Associate at the African Leadership Centre, King's College London. He is Associate Editor for the Journal of Somali Studies and Book Reviews Editor for the Journal of the Anglo-Somali Society. He is now the lead researcher at peace-building research project run by King's College London in partnership with University of Nairobi. He is also researcher at the Varieties of Democracy, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author, The Suicidal State in Somalia: The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969–1991 (Lanham, MD: University of America, 2016). Ingiriis holds two masters’ degrees: an M.A. at the Departments of Anthropology and History at Goldsmiths, University of London (2013) and MSc from the Department of Social Sciences and Humanities at London Metropolitan University (2012). His scholarly work has been published in such peer-refereed academic journals as Africa Today, Third World Quarterly, Cahiers d’études Africaines, Contemporary Security Studies, Journal of International Women's Studies, and The Northern Mariner (an academic journal for maritime research). His book reviews have appeared in The Journal of Modern African Studies, AFRICA: The Journal of the International African Institute, African and Asian Studies. He is the Review Editor for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN).

Notes

1 Dewachi, Ungovernable Life.

2 [The] Federal Republic of Somalia Security and Justice Sector.

3 Hagmann, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia; Healy, ‘Reflections on the Somali State’; Marchal, ‘Warlordism and Terrorism’.

4 Hagmann, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia, 37.

5 Bayart, ‘Africa in the World’.

6 Reno, ‘The Politics of Security Assistance’; Reno, ‘Failed, Weak or Fake State?’ Other security studies on Mogadishu have either concentrated on the police or on the military institution of the Federal Government. See Hills, ‘Policing, Good-Enough Governance, and Development’; Hills, ‘Does Police Work Need a Police Institution?’; Robinson, ‘Revisiting the Rise and Fall of the Somali Armed Forces’. Some exceptions are: Ingiriis, ‘How Somalia Works’; Ingiriis, ‘Politics as a Profitable Business’.

7 Guglielmo, ‘Unravelling the Islamist Insurgency in Somalia’; Hansen, ‘Somalia – Grievance, Religion, Clan, and Profit’; Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom, ‘“Killing a Mosquito with a Hammer”’; Shinn, ‘Al Shabaab Foreign Threat to Somalia’; Shuriye, ‘Al-Shabaab's Leadership’; Tar and Mustapha, ‘Al-Shabaab’; Thomas, ‘Exposing and Exploiting Weaknesses’.

8 Skjelderup, ‘Udūd Punishments in the Forefront’.

9 Exceptions are Ingiriis, ‘The Invention of Al-Shabaab in Somalia’; Ingiriis, ‘Building Peace from the Margins in Somalia’.

10 Kohlmann, ‘Shabab al-Mujahideen’; Pazz, ‘The Youth Are Older’; Taarnby and Hallundbaek, ‘Al-Shabaab’.

11 Somalia, like Afghanistan, has become a laboratory for ‘counter-terrorism’ projects. For different aspects of the securitisation projects in Afghanistan, see Coburn, Bazaar Politics; Johnson, Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories; and Silinsky, The Taliban.

12 Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, 35–60. See also Leander, ‘Wars and the Un-Making of States’, 69–80.

13 Caplan, ed., Exit Strategies and State Building.

14 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 3. See also Lanoszka, ‘Goodbye to All That’; Thruelsen, ‘Security Sector Stabilisation’.

15 Dehéz and Gebrewold, ‘When Things Fall Apart’, 1–20; Vidino, Pantucci, and Kohlmann, ‘Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa’.

16 Ingiriis, ‘Politics as a Profitable Business’, 67–97.

17 Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa, 266.

18 Interview, Al-Shabaab defectors, Mogadishu, Somalia, April–May 2016.

19 Interview, Al-Shabaab defectors, Mogadishu, Somalia, April–May 2016.

20 Thomas, The Theory and Practice, 282. See also Roy, Globalised Islam.

21 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, September–October 2017.

22 This conclusion is based on ethnographic observations made during the first field research in Mogadishu (from May to September 2015) where I talked to the high-profile former Amniyat chief Sakariye Ismail Ahmed Hersi. On 18 June 2017, it emerged that Sakariye was appointed a position in the Somali intelligence agency. Jowhar.com, ‘Maxaa ka jira in Zakariye Ismaaciil Xirsi’.

23 Maruf and Joseph, Inside Al-Shabaab, 90.

24 Interview, Al-Shabaab defectors, Mogadishu, Somalia, April–May 2016. During my field interviews, I met then NISA director as well as his replacement and several other former NISA directors and three deputy directors. While some were hostile and apprehensive, others were open and outgoing, depending on personal relationship or recommendation. On the other hand, it is very difficult to gather information about the Amniyat other than interviewing Al-Shabaab defectors. Hansen has, however, interviewed actual Al-Shabaab members over the telephone, something no one is currently able to do in Mogadishu due to governmental restrictions of communicating with Al-Shabaab (see Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia). I was, however, managed to talk to two young Somali ladies who were previously married to Al-Shabaab commanders – one to a Somali fighter, the other a Kenyan, the latter named Muhyaddin, a Muslim fighter from the Mombasa coast, detained by Al-Shabaab for espionage.

25 Ingiriis, ‘The Invention of Al-Shabaab in Somalia’; Ingiriis, ‘Building Peace from the Margins in Somalia’; Marchal, ‘The Rise of a Jihadi Movement’, 35.

26 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, September–October 2017.

27 Interview, Al-Shabaab defectors, Mogadishu, Somalia, 5 May 2016; Garowe Online, ‘Militants Execute Two Indian Nationals in Southern Somalia’. See also Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 83 and 140; Maxwell and Majid, Famine in Somalia, 56.

28 YouTube, ‘Jaajuus Tansaniyaan ah oo shabaab eysoo bandhigeen’; Garowe Online, ‘Al-Shabaab Executes Alleged’; Anadolu Agency, ‘Al-Shabaab Militants Kill “2 spies” in Somalia’; Middle East Online, ‘Al-Shabaab Publicly Executes Six “Spies” in Somalia’; Voice of America, ‘Al-Shabaab Says Executed More of Its Own in Somalia’. Compare Daily Nation, ‘How Lethal Al-Shabaab Spy was Caught’; Hiiraan Online, ‘Al-Shabaab Executives Five Men for Spying’.

29 Toos Films, ‘DEG DEG. Cf. Radio SYL, ‘Dhagayso Hay’adda nabad Sugidda iyo Sirdoonka Qaranka’.

30 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, May–September 2015, April–August 2016 and September–October 2017.

31 Dhacdo, ‘Yet Another Car Bomb Seized by NISA Officers’; Shabelle News, ‘Explosives-Laden Car’.

32 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, May–September 2015, April–August 2016 and September–October 2017. As Andrew Harding observed: ‘Somalia's government – superficially polished now with its emailed press releases, foreign advisors, and ambitious policy documents – was still a chaotic work in progress and, at times, little more than a temporary alignment of rival factions’. Harding, The Mayor of Mogadishu, 258.

33 Focus groups with Mogadishu residents, Mogadishu, 11 May 2016.

34 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, May–September 2015, April–August 2016 and September–October 2017; Somali Update, ‘Business Community’, 13 July 2017; Somali Update, ‘Puntland Condemns Al-Shabaab’, 7 July 2017; Hiiraan Online, ‘Cabdiwali Gaas’.

35 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, May–September 2015, April–August 2016 and September–October 2017.

36 Interviews, NISA agents, Mogadishu, July–September 2015. For the difficulty of integrating Al-Shabaab's defectors into the society, see Ubink and Rea, ‘Community Justice or Ethnojustice?’, 20.

37 Interview, Al-Shabaab defectors, Mogadishu, Somalia, April–May 2016.

38 Interview, A. A. H., Al-Shabaab defector, Mogadishu, Somalia, 12 May 2016.

39 Interview, F. I. E., Mogadishu, 3 and 5 July 2016.

40 Burke, ‘Militants [Al-Shabaab]’.

41 Reuters, ‘Somalia Sentences’. For the phenomenon of suicide attacks, see Asad, On Suicide Bombing.

42 Interviews, NISA agents, Mogadishu, July–September 2015.

43 Daily Mail, ‘The terror of Tesco's finest’, 23 May 2008.

44 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, May–September 2015, April–August 2016, September–October 2017 and February–June 2018.

45 Interviews, NISA agents, Mogadishu, July–September 2015. Sagal Radio, ‘Agaasimihii nabad-sugidda qaranka oo is casilay’.

46 Interviews, NISA agents, Mogadishu, July–September 2015.

47 Coomaad.net, ‘Madaxweyne Xasan Sh. Oo Balan qaad u sameeyay’.

48 Interview, F. I. E., Mogadishu, 3 and 5 July 2016.

49 Field observations, NISA headquarters, Mogadishu, 13 July 2015.

50 Interviews, NISA agents, Mogadishu, July–September 2015 and May–July 2016.

51 Focus groups with Mogadishu residents, Mogadishu, September–October 2017; and February–June 2018.

52 Universal Somali Television, ‘Sheekh Cali Dheere’; Dalsoor, ‘Wareysi Qaybtii 1aad’. See also Caasimada.net, ‘Dhageyso: Afhayeenkii Shabaab’; Caasimada.net, ‘Ma runbaa in Sheekh Cali Dheeri lagu dilay’.

53 The Indian Ocean Newsletter, ‘Somalia: Has NISA Been infiltrated by Al-Shabaab’.

54 Document: Hay'adda Sirdoonka iyo Nabad-sugidda Qaranka, ‘Tr. 02/09/2018, Ujeedo: Baaq Warqad Furan aan u dirayno madaxwaynaha ahna taliyaha guud ee ciidamada qalabka’.

55 Goobjooge, ‘Wararkii ugu dambeeyay’. These assassinations resonate with the hits in South Africa, but the extent of the political economy warrants further research investigation. For contracted assassinations in South Africa, see Shaw and Thomas, ‘The Commercialization of Assassination’. Kenya's National Intelligence Service (NIS) has also been involved in a ‘dirty war’. See Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom, ‘“Killing a Mosquito with a Hammer”’, 110. Kenya's NIS has been ‘more preoccupied with the political health of some individuals than with the general political health of the society: its reason for existence’. Ombaka, ‘Explaining Kenya's Insecurity’, 22. Also see Jones, Kimari, and Ramakrishnan, ‘“Only the People Can Defend This Struggle”’.

56 Interview, A. A. H., Al-Shabaab defector, Mogadishu, Somalia, 4 May 2016. See Badweyntimes.com, ‘Sawiro’; HornAfrik.net, ‘NISA oo kala shaki xooggan uu ka dhex billowday’; Caasimada.net, ‘Sargaal ka tirsan NISA’; Radio Wehel, ‘Sarkaal ka tirsanaa Ciidamada NISA oo lagu dilay Degmada Shibis’; Somalidamanta.org, ‘[D[il fool xun’; Agnon, ‘Gunmen Kill NISA Officer’; Radio Dalsan, ‘NISA Official Killed’; Garowe Online, ‘7 Militants Killed in Operation’; Radio Mogadishu, ‘Taliyihii NISA ee G/Sh/Dhexe oo la aasay’; Shabelle News, ‘Al-Shabaab Claims Killing Somali Security Chief’; Shabelle News, ‘NISA Soldier Gunned Down’.

57 Caasimada.net, ‘Sanbaloolshe ma ku socdaa?’; Caasimada.net, ‘Xog: Kheyre oo rumeysan in Sanbaloolshe u horseeday qalalaase siyaasadeed’; Caasimada.net, ‘Fashilka haysta hay’adda NISA’.

58 Allgalgaduud, ‘Taliyaha Ciidanka NISA’. For the past notorious record of the commander, see YouTube, ‘Ciidanka NISA iyo Barlam[aa]nka Galmudug’; YouTube, ‘Cadaado’; YouTube, ‘NISA galkacayo loo geeyay’.

59 Garowe Online, ‘Somalia's Intelligence Agency Chief’. Cf. YouTube, ‘NISA oo dhacay dhalintii’.

60 Caasimada.net, ‘Sanbaloolshe: Lama aqbali karo’. One former deputy director suggested that recent operations strengthened paramilitary operations of NISA rather than intelligence gathering. VOA Somali, ‘Faaqidaadda’. Compare Radio Dalsan, ‘NISA Chief Issues Tough Warning’; Jowhar.com, ‘NISA Boss Praises Mogadishu Stabilization Force’; YouTube, ‘DEG DEG Ciidamada NISA’; YouTube, ‘Taliyaha NISA’.

61 Caasimada.net, ‘Xog: Maxaa xarunta NISA ku dhex-maray’.

62 This was also the case in Zimbabwe, where the former intelligence minister Didymus Mutasa recalled that the principle intelligence agency produced ‘not very good reports really’, but he ‘read them’ even when they made him ‘tired’. Tendi, ‘State Intelligence’, 212.

63 Presidential Palace: Press Statement, ‘Madaxweynaha: “Soomaaliya”’.

64 Presidential Palace: Press Statement.

65 Gov.UK, ‘PM speech at the London Conference’.

66 British High Commission in Kenya, from the Senior Representative for Somalia, Somalia Section, 21 February 2011.

67 Caasimada.net, ‘Britain oo shaacisay arrin’. For the ambivalent roles of the UK in post-conflict states, see Coles, Britain's Secret Wars, chapter 11; Bennett, ‘Enmeshed in Insurgency’.

68 Channel 4 News, ‘Al-Shabaab: [I]nterview with Sheikh Ali Dhere – video’. By ‘highest man in Mogadishu’, Sheikh Ali Dheere alludes to Michael Keating, the then Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia and the Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). His predecessor Nicholas Kay was also a British. However, no-one knows how Somali journalists, such as Jamal Osman and Hamza Mohamed, have been managed to contact Al-Shabaab and conduct interviews with hardcore leaders like Sheikh Ali Dheere, the spokesman of Al-Shabaab. Channel 4 News, ‘Jamal Osman Speaks to Al-Shabaab Spokesman Sheikh Ali Dheere’; Al Jazeera, ‘Somalia's Al-Shabab Group Vows Comeback’.

69 Böhnke, Koehler, and Zürcher, ‘State Formation as It Happens’, 94.

70 Farah, ‘Foreign Aid and Extremism in the Horn of Africa’. For the implications of foreign military intervention on Al-Shabaab, see Regens et al., ‘Effect of Foreign Military Intervention’.

71 Malito, ‘Building Terror while Fighting Enemies’, 1866–1886. Also Malito, ‘The Global War on Terror in Somalia’, 49–55. Most recently, the United States was asked to take the easy route and exit Somalia. Fein, ‘Trump Should Follow Reagan and Exit Somalia’.

72 Hellsten, ‘Radicalisation’, 6.

73 Fisher, ‘Managing Donor Perceptions’; Hagmann and Reyntjens, eds., Aid and Authoritarianism in Africa.

74 Kibret, ‘The Terrorism of “Counterterrorism”’; Global Voices, ‘Ethiopian Musicians Charged with Terrorism’, Sunday, July 16, 2017. Compare Africa News, ‘Ethiopia, Somalia to Get £90m UK Humanitarian Aid’; UNSOM, ‘United Kingdom Announces New Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia’. For how the law was revoked, see Mumbere, ‘Ethiopia PM Says Era of State Sanctioned Torture Is Over’.

75 Horseedmedia.net, ‘Somalia Cabinet Approves Anti-Terrorism Amendment Bill’.

76 NISA IN BRIEF, 8.

77 Wilcke, ‘A Hard Place: The United States’.

78 YouTube, ‘DHAGEYSO: Maxay yihiin Ciidanka Gaashaan’; VOA Somali, ‘US-Trained Somali Commandos’; Shabelle News, ‘AMISOM and NISA Claim’.

79 The Times, ‘Troops to Help Somali Militias’.

80 RT News, ‘Scahill: CIA's Secret Somali Sites’; and YouTube, ‘Faah faahin: Weerarka Garoonka Ballidoogle’. See also Mazzetti, Gettleman and Schmitt, ‘In Somalia, U.S. Escalates a Shadow War’; and Risen, ‘After Torture, Ex-Detainee Is Still Captive’.

81 Interviews, NISA agents, Mogadishu, July–September 2015 and May–July 2016; Harding, The Mayor of Mogadishu, 275.

82 New Delhi Times, ‘US Intensifies Efforts in Somalia’; Garowe Online, ‘Airstrikes Bombs Al-Shabaab’; Daily Nation, ‘US Pledges’; ITV News, ‘Theresa May: UK Will Send More Troops to Somalia’; Shabelle News, ‘Suspected U.S. Troops Attack in Al-Shabaab’; Reuters, ‘U.S. Air Strike’; Voice of America, ‘US, Somali Forces’.

83 Al Jazeera, ‘“Anything That Flies Is an Enemy”’. Compare Radio Dalsan, ‘Spy Device Crashes in Mogadishu’. Indeed, Al Jazeera is not – as Marchal assumed – one of the media houses that Al-Shabaab had no trust. Marchal, ‘The Rise of a Jihadi Movement’, 44.

84 Interview, Al-Shabaab defectors, Mogadishu, Somalia, 5 May 2016; Maxwell and Majid, Famine in Somalia, 55.

85 Sieff, ‘Exclusive: U.S.-Funded Somali Intelligence Agency’; Somali Update, ‘U.S. Secretary of State Affirms US Commitment’.

86 Conversations with a Somali minister who attended the meeting which happened in the Mogadishu Airport. The director of one of the underground detention centres funded by the UK government alleged in August 2015 that there were human rights violations perpetrated against child defectors of Al-Shabaab. Compare Xinhua, ‘Somalia Refutes Claims of Child Abuse’. Andrew Harding reported that ‘captured Al Shabab members are sometimes taken to be executed by firing squad’. Harding, The Mayor of Mogadishu, 50.

87 Interview, D. A., senior NISA official, Mogadishu, 24 June 2016.

88 Ibid.

89 Tendi, ‘State Intelligence’, 214.

90 Interviews, NISA agents, Mogadishu, July–September 2015 and May–July 2016; The Indian Ocean Newsletter, ‘Somalia: Al-Shabaab Pushes Back against the CIA’; The Indian Ocean Newsletter, ‘Somalia: The Implications of Combating Al-Shabaab’; Mareeg.com, ‘Somalia's NISA and CIA’. Using Somalia as a model, Ian Oxnevad has recently suggested the adoption of ‘economic intelligence’ for Western intelligence agencies in failed states. Oxnevad, ‘Spying on Chaos’.

91 Tendi, ‘State Intelligence’, 209–13.

92 Somalidamanta.org, ‘Taliye ku xigeenkii Hay’adda NISA’.

93 Field observations, Mogadishu, July 2015.

94 Interview, J. A. J., from Mogadishu, via Viber, 23 March 2017.

95 Goobjooge.net, ‘Agaasimaha NISA oo kala diray Ciidamo’.

96 In my presence at a lunch ceremony in the Villa Somalia, Mogadishu on 9 October 2017, Farmaajo admitted that NISA is designed as politico-military police but he expressed a desire for the agency to be re-designed as an intelligence organisation.

97 Caasimada.net, ‘C/raxmaan C/shakuur: ‘Hay’adii Nabadsugidda Qaranka waxay noqotay’; Radio Dalsan, ‘Hoyga siyaasiga C/raxmaan Cabdishakuur oo la weeraray’, December 18, 2017; Shaaciye.org, ‘Deg deg: Ciidanka NISA’.

98 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, September–October 2017 and February–June 2018.

99 Ibid.

100 Conversations with Abdulkarim Sheikh Muse ‘Qalbi-Dhagah’, Djibouti, 17 December 2018; interviews, NISA agents, Mogadishu, September–October 2017 – February–April 2018; and Xogta.net, ‘Maxaad Kala Socotaa Qaabkii Sirdooneed’.

101 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, September–October 2017 and February–June 2018.

102 A. H., Somali intellectual forum, October 28, 2018.

103 Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya, Hay’adda Sirdoonka & Nabadgelyada Qaranka, Xafiiska Taliyaha, ‘Ujeeddo’; Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya, Hay’adda Sirdoonka & Nabadgelyada Qaranka, Xafiiska Taliyaha, ‘Ujeeddo’; and Gacaltooyo, ‘Agaasimaha Guud ee Hay’adda NISA’.

104 Ceelhuur.com, ‘Xafiiska Taliye Ku Xigeenka NISA oo la Jabiyey’.

105 Discussions, Sakariye Ismail Ahmed Hersi, Mogadishu, 23 October 2017; Jowhar.com, ‘Maxaa ka jira in Zakariye Ismaaciil Xirsi’; HornAfrik.net, ‘Kenya oo ka mamnuucday Dalkeeda’.

106 Field interviews and observations, Mogadishu, September–October 2017 and February–June 2018.

107 Ibid. See also Garowe Online, ‘Somalia: Former NISA Chief to Respond to House Allegation’; Mogadishu Online, ‘Askari ka tirsan ciidan Nabad Sugidda NISA’; Hornafrik.net, ‘Nin toogasho ku dilay askari nabadsugid ah’.

108 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, xvi.

109 When in January 1970, the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) of Lesotho refused to hand over power to the opposition party, the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), they were able to stay in power until 1986 with the support of the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), funded by the South African apartheid regime. Aerni-Flessner, ‘Development, Politics, and the Centralization of State Power in Lesotho’.

110 Burke, ‘US-Assisted Raid on Somali Ex-Leader's Home’.

111 Oxnevad, ‘Spying on Chaos’.

112 Ingiriis, ‘Predatory Politics and Personalisation of Power’.

113 Menkhaus, ‘State Failure, State-Building’, 158.

114 Focus group discussions with civil society groups, Mogadishu, May–September 2015, April–August 2016, September–October 2017 and February–June 2018.