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ABSTRACT
Resulting from several social, political, economic and above all radical Islamic factors, the armed conflict in Cabo Delgado raised a variety of questions in the national and international system, among them the modus operandi of the group, now called Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jammá. Thus, the present article analyses the way in which the modes of insurgency and subversion help to understand the modus operandi of the Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jammá. For this purpose, a methodological study was established in which the semi-structured interview technique involved officers and documentary analysis for data collection. The results of the study show that the modus operandi of the Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jammá is circumscribed to the organisation of numerous semi-autonomous cells which carry out guerrilla, terrorist and subversive actions. Furthermore, it was highlighted that the conflict was initiated by a minority of individuals subordinate to a radical religious ideology, and the objective of its operationalisation, until then, was carried out in three phases: preparatory, agitation and insurrection.
Notes
1 Garcia, ‘O fenómeno subversivo na actualidade’, 1.
2 Chichava, ‘Quem é o inimigo que ataca Cabo Delgado’, 1.
3 Habibe, Forquilha, and Pereira, ‘Radicalização islâmica no norte’, 6.
4 Ibid., 10.
5 Chichava, ‘Quem é o inimigo que ataca Cabo Delgado’, 1,2.
6 Ibid., 1.
7 Habibe et al., ‘Radicalização Islâmica no norte de Moçambique’.
8 Maquenzi and Feijó, ‘Pobreza, desigualdades e conflitos no norte’, 13.
9 Morier-Genoud, A insurgência jihadi em Moçambique, 9.
10 Habibe et al., ‘Radicalização Islâmica no norte de Moçambique'; Maquenzi and Feijó, ‘Pobreza, desigualdades e conflitos no norte’; Morier-Genoud, A insurgência jihadi em Moçambique.
11 The mission is made up of military personnel from South Africa (the largest power in the region), Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho and Angola.
12 Garcia, Da guerra e da estratégia a nova polemologia, 61, 62.
13 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War; and Devetak, ‘Globalization’s Shadow’.
14 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, ‘To Map the Political Confrontation’, 12.
15 Estado-Maior do Exercito, Regulamento de campanha e operações 130-1, vide cap. 1, n. 3.
16 Leal, ‘A guerra irregular’, 1, 2; and Ministério da Defesa, Glossário Das Forças Armadas, 136.
17 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.
18 Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
19 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
20 United States of America, Department of the Army, FMI 3-24.2, see chap. 1, n. 1.
21 Rosales, ‘A guerra de insurgência na actualidade’, 235.
22 Ibid., 235.
23 Domínguez and Pasadas, ‘Insurgencia contra insurgencia’; and Department of the Army, FMI 3-24.2, see chap. 2, n. 3-27.
24 Leandro, ‘Estratégias de acção’.
25 Rosenau, Subversion and insurgency, 4.
26 Ibid.
27 Leandro, ‘Estratégias de acção’.
28 Ibid.; Rodrigues, ‘Insurgência ou subversão’.
29 Ferreira, ‘Subversão’, 128.
30 Garcia, ‘O fenómeno subversivo na actualidade’; Department of the Army, FMI 3-24.2; Rodrigues, ‘Insurgência ou subversão’; and Ferreira, ‘Subversão’.
31 Garcia, ‘O fenómeno subversivo na actualidade’; and Garcia, Da guerra e da estratégia a nova polemologia.
32 Rodrigues, ‘Insurgência ou subversão’.
33 Habibe et al., ‘Radicalização Islâmica no norte de Moçambique’.
34 Morier-Genoud, A insurgência jihadi em Moçambique, 6.
35 Ibid.
36 Habibe et al., ‘Radicalização Islâmica no norte de Moçambique’.
37 Rodrigues, ‘Insurgência ou subversão’; and Garcia, Da guerra e da estratégia a nova polemologia.
38 Garcia, Da guerra e da estratégia a nova polemologia.
39 Domínguez and Pasadas, ‘Insurgencia contra insurgencia’; Department of the Army, FMI 3-24.2; and Chichava, ‘Quem é o inimigo que ataca cabo delgado’.
40 Issufo, ‘Cabo Delgado’.
41 United States of America, Department of the Army, FMI 3-24.2.
42 Habibe et al., ‘Radicalização Islâmica no norte de Moçambique’.
43 Ibid.
44 Okunade, Faluyi, and Matambo, ‘Evolving Patterns Insurgency in Southern and West Africa’.
45 Domínguez and Pasadas, ‘Insurgencia contra insurgencia’; Department of the Army, FMI 3-24.2; and Habibe et al., ‘Radicalização islâmica no norte de Moçambique’.
46 Okunade, Faluyi, and Matambo, ‘Evolving Patterns Insurgency in Southern and West Africa’.
47 Rodrigues, ‘Insurgência ou subversão’; Garcia, Da guerra e da estratégia a nova polemologia; Ferreira, ‘Subversão’; and Habibe et al., ‘Radicalização Islâmica no Norte de Moçambique’.
48 Maquenzi and Feijó, ‘Pobreza, desigualdades e conflitos no norte’; and Morier-Genoud, A insurgência jihadi em Moçambique.
49 Morier-Genoud, A insurgência jihadi em Moçambique.
50 Ibid.
51 Okunade et al., ‘Evolving Patterns Insurgency in Southern and West Africa’.
52 Habibe et al., ‘Radicalização Islâmica no Norte de Moçambique’.
53 Rodrigues, ‘Insurgência ou subversão’; and Habibe et al., ‘Radicalização islâmica no norte de Moçambique’.
54 Machel, ‘Ofensiva da legalidade’.
55 Luluva, ‘O contributo das FADM na manutenção da paz em Moçambique no contexto de conflito político militar, que acções e desafios’.
56 Okunade et al., ‘Evolving Patterns Insurgency in Southern and West Africa’.
57 Ibid.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Mauro Tiago Njelezi
Mauro Tiago Njelezi is an officer of the Armed Defence Forces of Mozambique who is an assistant teacher and researcher at the Marshal Samora Machel Military Academy, located in Mozambique, Nampula City. He is trained in military sciences, particularly ground artillery, and in education sciences, specifically in psychopedagogy. His latest scientific works deal with insurgency, military higher education and the teaching and learning process focused on the figure of the teacher and the study.