Democratic cultural policy: democratic forms and policy consequences

Abstract

The forms that are adopted to give practical meaning to democracy are assessed to identify what their implications are for the production of public policies in general and cultural policies in particular. A comparison of direct, representative, democratic elitist and deliberative versions of democracy identifies clear differences between them in terms of policy form and democratic practice. Further elaboration of these differences and their consequences are identified as areas for further research.

Keywords:

• democracy
• culture
• policy
• cultural policy

Notes

1. The examples that are used in this paper are likewise limited to western liberal democracies on the grounds that the democratic forms that are discussed in it are most commonly seen in these states.

2. Current debates about the impact of information technology on these areas demonstrate the struggles that governments have in managing such matters.

3. As with the 1969 French referendum that became a vote on De Gaulle’s presidency rather than necessarily about changes in regional powers and the French senate which were the ostensible concerns of the ballot – see Stevens (1996, p. 95).

4. Although nine governments in the past 18 years may appear to be an improvement on 52 governments in the preceding 47 years.

5. The constitutional separation of Congress and the Presidency in the USA provides a clear example of the importance of this relationship: see Shugart (2006).

6. See the discussion, for example, in Sabatier (2007), of the multiple streams or social construction models of the policy process.

7. This rather assumes that individual choices will produce the optimal result for society as a whole. In crude terms, the choice would appear to be between which forms of tyranny one prefers: that of the mass of individuals exercising their positive freedoms or that of the representative minority, applying negative freedoms to constrain the masses. The basic argument concerning negative and positive freedoms is often over-simplified in this way, and neglects concerns about the relative or absolute nature of liberty (and, indeed, human rights as a whole). A detailed discussion of this point is not necessary here but should be pursued in more detailed analyses of the issue.

8. Alongside a range of social, psychological, economic and other political variables: see Harrop and Miller (1987, chaps. 5–8).

9. Beetham (1987, p. 119), for example, in the context of bureaucratic organisation, argues that the problem is more to do with organisational secrecy and the loss of effective control of organisations by elected politicians than it is to do with the fact of organisation itself.

10. In the case of building bridges, for example, the necessary technical competence to ensure that the bridge will not fall down as soon as people try to cross it would probably be seen as being appropriate. Whether this can be extended to other policy sectors where such forms of technical necessity are not available – such as cultural policy – is open to question.

11. The consequences of applying different logics to decision-making processes are that distinct evaluations of what an ‘ideal’ policy looks like will exist based upon the underlying rationality that is applied to particular cases: see Diesing (1962).

12. It is fair to say, however, that the opposite position – that deliberation will lead to ‘worse’ decision-making – is equally unproven.