Using Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty to rethink cultural policy: a case of Poland

Abstract

The overarching aim of this paper is to rethink the normative aspects of Polish cultural policy after 1989, using a conceptual framework built upon Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty. More specifically, this article aims to analyse the rhetoric used in cultural policy and the practice of policy-making, in order to uncover and characterise the normative role that the state has played in shaping and executing cultural policy in Poland after 1989. The analysis shows that Polish cultural policy has been dominated by a perfectionist logic, which corresponds to Isaiah Berlin’s concept of positive liberty. It means that cultural policy has not been axiologically neutral but instead it has been based on state’s judgements about what kind of art is worthy support. On the other hand, the analysis shows that Polish cultural policy after 1989 cannot be classified as negative liberty.

Keywords:

• polish cultural policy
• ideology
• Isaiah Berlin
• liberalism

Acknowledgements

I sincerely thank two anonymous reviewers whose suggestions helped improve and clarify this paper.

Notes

1. Pevnick’s study is based on American system of publically-supported charitable giving and proves that: (1) in the said system the wealthy give to causes that only serve the wealthy (elite, ‘high art’ institutions), (2) owing to the progressive income tax, in a tax-deduction based system an ability to direct public funding increases with income - which produces political inequality.

2. Some Polish municipalities and voivodship begun to develop cultural policy strategies in 2009–2010. However, most of the documents have a very general and blurry nature and they play a minor role in real-life policies.

3. a rapid transition from a communist to capitalist economy, usually including extensive privatisation of previously public-owned assets.

4. The term ‘national identity’ has not been explicitly defined in cultural policy documents but its understanding was captured in interviews with policy officials carried in 1994–1995 (Kurczewska 2000). Kurczewska distinguishes two approaches to national identity: (1) ‘civic’ national identity, founded on voluntary commitment to a political-territorial community, formed by citizens that give force to principles of justice they all can share, and (2) ‘cultural’ national identity, based on common culture, ethnicity, race, or religious affiliation shared by the people (Volk), regardless of their will. Kurczewska shows that both kinds of national identity are present in the history Poland (while in the days of the ‘Republic of Nobles’, XVI to XVIII century, the first one predominated, after the loss of sovereignty, XIX century, the second one came to the front) and both kinds were revealed in the interviews. However, she shows that generally the second kind (identity as ‘shared tradition, history, religion, descent’) was dominant in the 1990s, especially among right-wind politicians.

5. Waldemar Dąbrowski was a Minister of Culture in the left-wing government although he was not a party member himself.

6. such as Andrzej Celiński, who took the office in 2001 and intended to undergo a structural reform in culture, aimed at finding new, market-rooted sources of funding. Most of his ideas were however rejected by Polish cultural community which perceived them too liberal and market-oriented. Celiński resigned after eight months.

7. by liberals I mean left-wing as well as centre-right parties. While a centre-right party would not be probably considered ‘liberal’ in traditional political science, given the weak position of left-wing parties in Poland and polarisation of the right side of the political scene (centre-right vs. far right), this classification seems accurate.