Romance baiting, cryptorom and ‘pig butchering’: an evolutionary step in romance fraud

ABSTRACT

Romance fraud uses the guise of a genuine relationship to deceive a victim into transferring often large amounts of money to an offender/s. Romance fraud has been in the top three categories of financial loss for Australian victims over the past decade, and this is a trend mirrored internationally. However, in recent years there has been a convergence of romance fraud and investment fraud approaches. Terms such as romance baiting, cryptorom and ‘pig butchering' have all emerged to describe how offenders are evolving in their attempts to defraud victims through offering fake cryptocurrency investment opportunities, using a relationship as the mechanism. This article analyses this shift in romance fraud offending and its embracing of investment scheme opportunities. It highlights the underlying reasons for the success of this amalgamated approach and further demonstrates how it potentially distorts the reporting of fraud as well as prevention messaging targeting these incidents.

KEYWORDS:

• cryptocurrency
• cryptorom
• investment fraud; ‘pig butchering’
• romance fraud
• scam

Introduction

Ling met Zac on a dating app. He was attentive, handsome and he ran his own business. During COVID-19, Zac was stuck overseas and was unable to get back to Australia. He told Ling that his business was suffering but that he had started investing and couldn’t believe how easy it was. He showed Ling his investments, and she was impressed at the earnings. Zac began to encourage Ling to invest in a new cryptocurrency that he said was guaranteed to be bigger than Bitcoin. He told Ling they could put the money towards their future. Ling transferred Zac $5,000 to set up an online account to purchase cryptocurrencies. Zac encouraged Ling to invest more and more money. Before long, when Ling realised she had transferred over $25,000, she decided she wanted some of her money back. She then discovered her account was frozen and to unlock it, she would need to pay an extra $5,000. Ling didn’t have the money. She contacted Zac but he blocked her on the app. Ling realised that Zac was a scammer and the investments were fake. (ACCC, 2021, p. 49)

Fraud is a global problem. Each year, millions of individuals are victims of deception and experience a range of financial and non-financial losses (Button & Cross, 2017). Fraud is defined by its use of deception to obtain a financial reward (Fletcher, 2007). This is usually in the form of direct money transfers but can also be through gaining personal credentials to perpetrate identity crimes. While fraud itself it not new, the evolution of technology has radically altered the ways it can be perpetrated (Yar & Steinmetz, 2019). This is argued to have exponentially increased the number of potential victims able to be targeted worldwide (Button & Cross, 2017).

While there are endless approaches or storylines for fraud (Cross & Kelly, 2016), there are some dominant categories. Investment fraud and romance fraud are two examples, being prevalent not only in terms of numbers but also financial harm. Investment fraud losses more than doubled from AUD$326 million to over AUD$750 million between 2020 and 2021 (ACCC, 2022). This doubled further to $1.5 billion in 2022 (ACCC, 2023). Losses to romance fraud were recorded at AUD$210 million in 2022 (ACCC, 2023). Both fraud types have been consistently in the top three categories of highest financial loss in Australia for over a decade (ACCC, 2020).

As with all crime types, there is a constant evolution in the ways that offenders tailor their approaches. There is evidence to suggest the bringing together of these distinct fraud types by offenders to improve their effectiveness and overcome current prevention messaging. This emerging category of fraud has a variety of names including romance baiting, cryptorom or ‘pig-butchering’. Regardless of the term used, it is the deliberate amalgamation of romance and investment fraud characteristics to maximise offender gains.

The following article examines this convergence of romance and investment fraud. First, it provides a summary of what is known about romance fraud and how it has traditionally operated. It also provides a short outline of investment fraud to give a context to the current discussion. The article then turns to an examination of the convergence of romance and investment fraud schemes and how they operate in practice. The opening example provides a foundation on which to build. In doing this, the article highlights five ways that the current amalgamated approach is effective in targeting victims: through harnessing the power of the relationship; increasing the victim pool; raising fewer red flags; increasing the difficulty in detecting fraud; and increasing the difficulty in investigating transactions. Consequently, it highlights two factors for consideration: how it is unlikely to be captured in current statistics and how it obfuscates current prevention messaging across both romance and investment fraud approaches.

Overall, the article provides insight as to why the combination of romance and investment fraud appears so successful. It seeks to answer the question of why combining the methodologies of romance and investment fraud increases the effectiveness of victimisation, particularly around financial losses. It therefore points to a critical need to rethink current prevention messaging to reduce future victimisation.

Understanding romance fraud

Romance fraud pulls on the heart strings of unsuspecting victims, usually by requesting money transfers to an offender. Using the pretext of an intimate connection, romance fraud can be defined as ‘relationships constructed through websites for the purpose of deceiving unsuspecting victims to extort money from them’ (Coluccia et al., 2020, p. 25). The use of a relationship has been a favoured means of perpetrating fraud, gaining prominence globally during the past ten years, with an associated uptake of online dating and social media platforms designed to facilitate communication and connections. For example, a recent Australian report found that between 2015 and 2020, dating apps were the most prevalent way of meeting a partner, accounting for 29.4% of introductions (Tsarenko et al., 2021). There is a social acceptance of dating apps as a mainstream way of meeting a potential partner, with estimates of over 4.6 million Australians having engaged in some form of online dating (ACCC, 2015; Relationships Australia, 2017) and this figure continuing to grow. The corresponding increase in romance fraud losses can be seen in conjunction with this rise is dating app use.

In 2021, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) asserted that reports for romance fraud hit record high levels, with over 56,000 victims reporting losses of over USD$547 million, an 80% increase on reported losses for 2020 (FTC, 2022). Similarly, the Internet Crime Complaint Centre (IC3), also based in the United States of America, in their 2021 annual report stated that almost 25,000 victims reported losses of more than USD956 million to romance fraud (IC3, 2022, p. 12). Upward trends were observed in the United Kingdom with reports of romance fraud increasing by 73% during 2021, compared with 2020, totalling £30.9 m lost and case numbers jumping to 41% (Clark, 2022). Romance fraud is also not restricted to countries in the Global North, with many Asian and African countries also experiencing losses to this type of fraud (TechShielder, 2021).

While the financial losses are significant, research indicates that only a minority of fraud generally is reported to authorities (Smith, 2007; 2008). Further, these figures only account for an estimation of monetary losses and fail to account for the substantial array of non-financial losses experienced (Button et al., 2014; Cross, 2020; Cross et al., 2016). Romance fraud victims are also known to experience an additional layer of harm, termed the ‘double hit' of victimisation (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012). In effect, victims must also grieve the loss of the relationship in addition to any financial harms they might sustain. In some cases, victims describe the loss of the relationship itself as a harder outcome to process compared to straight monetary losses (Cross et al., 2016).

While victimisation experiences may vary, there are commonalities in its progression and characteristics. Whitty (2013) describes the scammer’s persuasive techniques model, which outlines seven stages of romance fraud.

Stage one—find a victim motivated to find their ideal partner.

Stage two—present the victim with a fake profile (offenders use various means to improve their desirability to connect in the first instance (see Cross & Holt, 2021; Holt & Graves, 2007)).

Stage three—grooming process (offenders use a variety of techniques to establish trust and rapport with the victim to engender confidence in the strength and nature of the relationship (see Cross, 2020; Cross et al., 2018)).

Stage four—the sting (request for money, across a variety of scenarios (see Button et al., 2014; Cross, 2020; Cross & Holt, 2021)).

Stage five—continuation of the scam (requests for money escalate over time) (Cross et al., 2018).

Stage six—sexual abuse (this does not occur in every instance, but is evident in some examples, see Cross et al., 2022).

Stage seven—revictimisation (victims may be targeted by a new scheme or a new offender, also known as recovery fraud (Button & Cross, 2017)).

It is important to note that not all victims experience each of these stages, and that romance fraud is not necessarily a linear progression through each. Rather, victims can move between and even skip stages. However, it does provide a framework for understanding the many different facets of romance fraud and victimisation. The article now moves to a brief outline of investment fraud prior to detailing its convergence.

Understanding investment fraud

Investment fraud involves an offender persuading a victim to transfer their money into what is portrayed as a solid investment opportunity (Cross et al., 2016). However, the investment opportunity either does not exist, or the offender has directed the funds into their account rather than the genuine one. Investment schemes can be complex and sophisticated in nature, with offenders often having professional advertising and supporting materials to reinforce their claims (Button & Cross, 2017). Victims have reported logging into websites and monitoring their funds, and in some circumstances, even being able to withdraw funds in the early stages (ACCC, 2022; Cross et al., 2016). This creates a sense of trust and legitimacy with the victims, who are then likely to invest an even larger amount of money, which is ultimately lost.

In recent times, there has been a strong focus and preference for the promotion of cryptocurrency investments by offenders. There are a range of ways that offenders use cryptocurrency to defraud their victims. For example, individuals may be asked to invest in a fake website, apps or exchanges. Individuals may also be invited to invest in specific types of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. This usually requires the direct transfer of funds to offenders. Victims may also be asked to pay for fake crypto tokens or to use cryptocurrency directly to pay for other goods and services.

The use of cryptocurrency as a popular payment method can be seen as part of the evolution of fraud during the past decade. Over a decade ago, the preferred payment method of offenders was through remittance agencies, such as Western Union or MoneyGram. With a large focus on prevention and disruption by police and other agencies (including the remittance agencies themselves) offenders moved to the recruitment of money mules to receive funds onshore and subsequently siphon them off to overseas accounts. This sought to overcome prevention messaging which focused on the payment type as a potential indicator of fraud. Again, significant attention by police, banks and other financial institutions has caused offenders to shift towards cryptocurrency.

This is effective for several reasons. First, cryptocurrency is new, and there is limited knowledge of how these currencies work. Second, offenders ‘take advantage of the hype and the less regulated environment to “invest” in Bitcoin or another cryptocurrency on [the victim’s] behalf' (ACCC, 2022). In combination, these factors have seen the effectiveness of cryptocurrency investment solicitations and increased fraud losses across Australia and the world. While in Australia bank transfers are currently still the most prevalent payment type for fraud, the use of cryptocurrencies rose by 162% in 2022 (ACCC, 2023, p. 6).

The convergence of romance and investment fraud

Romance fraud has witnessed a distinctive shift in methodology in recent years. While the traditional approaches outlined above are still effective and in existence, there has been a coming together of romance fraud and investment fraud, with a focus on cryptocurrency. There are three broad terms which are used somewhat interchangeably to describe this new approach to romance fraud: romance baiting, cryptorom and ‘pig butchering’. Romance baiting is the term which first appeared in Australia in a media release from Scamwatch in February 2021. This was part of their romance fraud awareness campaign in the lead up to Valentine’s Day. The media release described romance baiting as follows:

This new technique, called romance baiting, involves scammers meeting people on dating apps and then moving the conversation to an encrypted chat site. After a few weeks of developing a relationship, the scammer will begin asking about the victim’s finances and encourage them to participate in an investment opportunity. (ACCC, 2021)

The term cryptorom can be attributed to the Sophos blog. It first appeared in May 2021 (Chandraiah et al., 2021). Unsurprisingly, this term is an amalgamation of crypto- from ‘cryptocurrency' and -rom from ‘romance scam' (Ducklin, 2021; see also Chandriaiah & Wu, 2021).

While both terms emerged in 2021, evidence of this fraud type can first be attributed to China in the early 2010s but rose to prominence after 2018 (Zuo, 2021). Termed 杀猪盘 (Sha zhu pan), which roughly translates to ‘pig butchering' scam, it is a very visceral and brutal term used to describe the process. It involves the ‘fattening up' of the victim, using known romance fraud techniques to develop trust and rapport and a likely compliance with any monetary requests, before ‘slaughtering' them by convincing them to invest, thereby taking away their (often substantial amounts of) money (Wang & Zhou, 2022).

Despite the difference in terms, they all largely refer to the same process, as highlighted in the opening example to this article. This article adopts the term romance baiting to describe the convergence of romance and investment fraud, based on the Australian use of the term (ACCC, 2022).

The initial stages of romance baiting are consistent with traditional romance fraud, whereby the offender seeks to develop trust and rapport with the intended victim. This stage seeks to engender trust and a perceived legitimacy in the relationship and may include the use of grooming and social engineering techniques (see Cross, 2020; Cross et al., 2018). This builds the foundation for the next stage of the scheme: a request for money.

In traditional romance fraud approaches, a financial request is usually premised on circumstances largely derivative of an emergency, including medical, criminal justice or business expenses (Cross et al., 2016; Cross & Holt, 2021; Holt & Graves, 2007). In these cases, victims are asked to directly transfer a monetary amount to the offender via a range of payment methods, including bank transfers or through a remittance agency.

Under romance baiting, the request for money is not attributed to an emergency. Instead, it is premised upon the suggestion for the victim to participate in an investment opportunity, often cryptocurrency (Wang & Zhou, 2022, p. 22). This suggestion is usually couched in the offender’s personal experience (as seen in the opening example), or the success of a family member/friend. Further, it is premised upon the building of the relationship and looking into the future. Like all other frauds, once the victim sends the money as directed, the money is lost. At some point they will be locked out of their trading platform, or it will disappear entirely. Any efforts to contact the offender are futile, and the victim likely recognises that they have been defrauded.

The effectiveness of these new approaches to romance fraud

There are several reasons why the amalgamation of romance and investment fraud (using cryptocurrency) has been such an effective tool for fraud offenders. These are outlined below.

Harnessing the power of the relationship

The continued use of the guise of a genuine relationship to defraud victims highlights the effectiveness of this as a mechanism to develop trust and rapport and to, ultimately, gain a financial advantage. Offenders have come to realise the power of personal relationships in seeking to gain their financial reward and deliberately use this as a technique. Using the premise of an intimate relationship overcomes any suspicions encountered in traditional investment schemes, where victims are often cold-called by an offender offering an investment opportunity. It also arguably draws upon Cialdini’s (2001) techniques of persuasion, namely liking and social proof. A person is more likely to comply with a request from someone they like, and they are also more likely to perform an action if they see others around them doing the same thing (Cialdini, 2001). Both are evident in the romance baiting context, where the victim sees their partner investing in the identified opportunity. Further, invoking the success and expertise of other family/friends of the offender provides greater assurance to the victim that the opportunity is legitimate and beneficial. There is also evidence to suggest that Gardner’s (2006) seven levers of persuasion are evident in romance baiting approaches and enhance the ability of offenders to achieve their financial targets (Wang & Zhou, 2022). The development of a trusted relationship is a deliberate tactic used by offenders that enables them to deploy a range of psychological abuse techniques to exert power and control over victims and gain/maintain compliance with any financial requests (Cross et al., 2018).

Increasing the victim pool

Offenders are always looking to expand their potential reach of victims globally. Romance fraud, while targeting all demographics, has traditionally had greater success with older adults. For example, losses to romance fraud in Australia are highest among adults over 45 (ACCC, 2022). This is largely attributed to older adults who are looking for a new relationship, having had a previous marriage dissolve and children grown up and gone to live independently.

However, the shift towards combining cryptocurrency investment schemes with romance fraud approaches has seen a significant shift in victim demographics. For the new romance baiting category, victims are more often in a younger age group compared to traditional romance fraud. For example, the ACCC (2021, p. 2) note that in 2020, those aged between 25–34 lost the highest amount to romance baiting. This is further observed in a Chinese context, with those in their twenties and thirties who have a tertiary education predominantly targeted (Zuo, 2021). In this way, romance baiting has expanded the realm of likely success for romance fraud offenders and has effectively identified a vulnerability in a younger cohort.

Fewer red flags

Offenders employ a range of justifications underpinning their monetary requests. As noted, these are often based on emergencies related to health (of the offender or a family member), criminal justice (bail or legal representation fees) or business operations (needing to purchase goods and/or services or pay employees) (Cross & Holt, 2021; Holt & Graves, 2007; Ross & Smith, 2011). In these circumstances, the offender will request that the victim directly transfer money to a specified account, often through a bank transfer or remittance agency. These requests can arouse a level of both suspicion and reluctance on the part of the victim who may be hesitant to send money or begin to question the legitimacy of the request. Current prevention messaging is heavily focused on alerting people to an offender’s request for money and is framed around instructions not to send money (Cross & Kelly, 2016).

In romance baiting, the financial reward for the offender is achieved in an entirely different way. Offenders present an investment opportunity to the victim and persuade them to invest for their own benefit and for that of the relationship. In doing this, the offender is not asking the victim to send them money directly for any fabricated reason (Wang & Zhou, 2022, p. 22). Instead, the offender is suggesting to the victim that they take advantage of what is promoted as an opportunistic but sound financial decision. Victims do not realise that they are inadvertently sending money to an offender, albeit under covert circumstances. Rather, they believe that they are investing in a legitimate business venture. This reduces the red flags used in current prevention messaging against romance fraud, which focuses heavily on sending money directly to an offender.

Increased difficulty in detecting fraud

It is challenging for many victims to recognise the reality of their situations and the level of deception they have been subjected to. This is a struggle for those involved in traditional romance fraud (Cross, 2020). The shift by offenders to the strategy of gaining their financial reward through what the victim perceives as an investment further reduces the likelihood that victims will recognise they have been defrauded. Investment fraud has existing challenges in terms of the longevity of the ruse and the long-term outlook for profits. Investment fraud victims initially struggle to identify that they have been deceived, as they instead perceive the loss to be a bad investment. Cryptocurrency in particular is a volatile and high-risk market for genuine investments, therefore it is likely that many victims involved in romance baiting will not realise the true extent of what has occurred and may not associate this with fraud. This has consequences for the reporting of fraud, which is already known to have low reporting rates (Copes et al., 2001; Smith, 2007; Titus et al., 1995).

Increased difficulty in investigating transactions

Across all fraud victimisation, the ability of police and other law enforcement to investigate any financial losses is limited at best. There are genuine challenges as to why this occurs, including the anonymity of offenders (or their use of stolen/synthetic identities), the transnational nature of fraud and legislative restrictions (Cross & Blackshaw, 2015; see also Curtis & Oxburgh, 2022; Levi et al., 2015).

However, the use of cryptocurrency elevates the level of difficulty for police in being able to track any transactions made by victims. By their very nature, cryptocurrencies are difficult to monitor and attribute to individuals, compared to traditional bank accounts. In this way, the affordances of the cryptocurrency itself work in favour of offenders and against individuals seeking any response to their victimisation.

The challenges posed by romance baiting

The emergence of romance baiting provides another means through which offenders target victims. Known statistics indicate its success, and this is likely to increase in future years. Fraud is escalating globally, as is evident in annual figures. However, the emergence and success of romance baiting raises two issues that deserve specific mention.

Distorting current statistics

It is well established that fraud has one of the lowest reporting rates across all crime types, with estimates of less than one-third ever being reported (Copes et al., 2001; Mason & Benson, 1996). This is further asserted to be even lower in an online context (Smith, 2007, 2008). Official statistics also fail to acknowledge the array of non-financial harms experienced by victims (Button & Cross, 2017). In this way, any official fraud statistics are likely to be a severe underestimate of what has occurred and represent a minority of actual losses. There is a limitation as well with the type of data being used to ascertain fraud victimisation and corresponding trends. The majority of known fraud statistics are drawn from official government reports (such as the ACC’s Targeting Scams annual report) and are taken from self-reports of individuals. In this way, the data is only representative of those who acknowledge their victimisation and choose to report across various agencies and authorities and does not represent the ‘dark figure of crime' (Scott, 2014). The limits of official statistics are well known, particularly as they relate to police agencies (Buil-Gil et al., 2022; MacDonald, 2002) and the reporting of cybercrime (including fraud) (Van de Weijer et al., 2019). While there is no screening on the ACCC data, as the Scamwatch website allows uninhibited reporting (unlike police data whereby the complainant must convince an officer to take a complaint), the data still is not assumed to be an entirely accurate account of the true extent of victimisation, particularly when it comes to specifying financial losses. Individuals may both underestimate or overestimate actual and perceived losses, depending on their circumstances and understanding of what has occurred.

Notwithstanding these caveats, official statistics are an important indicator for government and other agencies to understand victimisation and allocate resources accordingly, as it relates to the broader remit of cybercrime (Harkin et al., 2018). The current trend in romance baiting is likely to skew statistics across the two categories of romance fraud and investment fraud. For example, in Australia in 2021, reported losses from investment fraud more than doubled from AUD$328 million to over AUD$720 million (ACCC, 2022). This occurred again in 2022, with a doubling to $1.5 billion (ACCC, 2023). The increase in romance fraud was remarkably lower, with an increase from AUD$132 million to AUD$148 million in 2021 (ACCC, 2022) and to AUD$210 million in 2022 (ACCC, 2023). At face value, it may be interpreted that romance fraud losses did not increase significantly during 2021 or 2022; however, it is argued that this is not representative of what has occurred.

Romance baiting is currently captured under the investment fraud category by the ACCC, given that financial losses occur as the result of a false investment. In this way, romance baiting (and therefore romance fraud) is arguably contributing to the doubling of investment fraud losses across two consecutive years. This highlights that the categorisation of fraud types can have an influential effect on the narratives produced by statistics. While romance fraud may not be rising as substantially as a category on its own, the increase in romance baiting and its capturing within the investment fraud statistics is likely rendering invisible the true extent of romance fraud.

Circumventing current prevention messaging

Prevention messaging is a challenge for all fraud approaches, and this is evident with romance fraud. Current messaging focuses heavily on advising individuals not to send money to someone they have met on a dating website. For example, Scamwatch (n.d.a) leads with the advice: ‘Never send money to someone you haven’t met in person'. The use of investment approaches as a means of gaining money from victims circumvents this advice, as victims are not sending money to their alleged partner. Instead, they believe they are transacting with what they believe to be a legitimate investment opportunity. It subverts the direct request and the personal element evident in traditional romance fraud approaches, while maintaining the same financial outcome for offenders.

Using the guise of an intimate relationship also potentially takes away the premise of it being an investment fraud approach, as, again, the current advice is not always applicable to these circumstances. Prevention advice around investment fraud encourages victims to look out for individuals who make contact out of the blue and offer an investment opportunity (Scamwatch, n.d.b). This is dominant in cold-calling and boiler room approaches. Using the guise of a relationship with victims prior to investment discussions overcomes this. In this way, offenders are savvy to current prevention messaging and modify their approaches to reduce the effectiveness of current protection advice.

Conclusion

Fraud continues to affect millions globally. While the key characteristics of fraud (being the use of deception for financial reward) remain constant, the ways in which offenders are targeting victims is constantly changing. This is particularly evident in the case of romance baiting, whereby offenders have amalgamated traditional romance fraud with cryptocurrency investment schemes to defraud unsuspecting victims.

This article has explored romance baiting in detail, particularly highlighting five factors which are argued to be effective strategies used by offenders. This included harnessing the power of the relationship; increasing the victim pool; raising fewer red flags; increasing the difficulty in detecting fraud; and increasing the difficulty in investigating transactions. Apart from these factors contributing to the ongoing victimisation of millions globally, it was argued that, when combined, there are distinct challenges arising from this evolving fraud approach. First, this article exposed the difficulties in capturing the reality of romance fraud in current official statistics and instead asserted the likely hidden nature of this approach when captured in broader investment fraud figures. Second, it illustrated how the techniques used in romance baiting avoid current prevention messaging across both romance fraud and investment fraud categories. In this way, it is possible that many victims are unlikely to recognise their involvement in romance baiting until it is too late.

Overall, the current discussion highlights several points. First, it highlights an ongoing challenge related to the collection of fraud statistics and how administrative processes of agencies both alter and influence the understanding of longitudinal crime trends (Wallace et al., 2021). The categories of fraud currently used by the ACCC (and many other agencies) are socially constructed around current understandings and approaches of fraud, and the allocation of reports to these categories is subject to change. However, there are no clear ways to overcome this in terms of creating a new category of romance baiting or capturing the reports under romance fraud (which would perpetuate the same problem in reverse). Taxonomies of fraud seek to address this (see Beals et al., 2015) but likely require ongoing revision to maintain their accuracy. While statistics will always have their nuances and cannot be used to capture all the complexities of fraud (Button & Cross, 2017), it will need to be accounted for in the future to ensure that categories such as romance fraud are still given the attention and priority they deserve.

Second, it emphasises the need to continually revise prevention messaging and the ways in which fraud education and awareness is communicated to society. It is difficult to craft a message that is both broad enough to capture the attention of individuals and specific enough to be relevant to their circumstance. In this way, it supports calls to focus on simplistic messages on the transfer of money in any situation (Cross & Kelly, 2016). To avoid the specific challenges faced by fraud prevention messaging, there are potential alternatives to be explored. For example, approaching this as a broader campaign on financial literacy, whereby fraud is not a central focus, may get attention. This could result in an increased knowledge of how to approach genuine financial opportunities and investments and, by default, reduce the effectiveness of fraudulent approaches (Cross, under review). A similar approach could be taken regarding respectful, healthy relationships, whereby campaigns that focus on broader social issues may indirectly have an effect on fraud victimisation. Neither of these have been explored in great detail to date.

Third, the emergence of romance baiting yet again stresses the ways that offenders continually modify their approaches to maintain success. While the premise of romance baiting was first seen over a decade ago, it is only in recent years that the approach has gained prominence and popularity amongst offenders. This demonstrates that offenders are constantly reworking their approaches to ensure they remain effective in targeting and exploiting victims. Prevention messaging struggles to stay ahead of the nuances and complexities of these approaches and therefore provides limited scope to reduce victimisation. In this way, a shift to broader campaigns relevant to romance baiting (such as financial literacy and respectful relationships) may demonstrate some benefit.

It is critical to consider the future of fraud and establish actions to reduce the prevalence and severity of fraud victimisation. This is particularly the case for those approaches that use the premise of a relationship to perpetrate their deception, as evident in romance baiting. Offenders will continue to target victims using whatever methods are available to them. Focusing on the specifics of each approach, while important, can be seen somewhat as a distraction to the central premise of fraud, a request to send money (in the case of romance baiting, under the guise of an investment). Romance baiting is a prime example of the ways in which offenders can merge different fraud types for their own advantage to subvert current prevention and awareness efforts. Current attempts to combat fraud are clearly not working as intended and provide a fertile ground for the improvement and revision of efforts in the future.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).