Neo-liberalism and the politics of Australian aid policy-making

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Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Patrick Kilby, Jane Hutchison, Shahar Hameiri, and Richard Robison for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper and Caddi Johnson for her research assistance. The usual caveat applies.

Notes

1. For instance, the ALP was highly critical of the Howard government's use of aid money to fund the establishment of an immigration detention centre in Nauru (see, for instance, Sercombe 2006) while the Liberal and National parties were critical of the Hawke-Keating government's use of aid money to promote Asian engagement, especially through the Development Import Finance Facility (see, for instance, Kelton 1998: 5).

2. Interview with Graham Tupper, former Executive Director of ACFID, Canberra, September 2007.

3. For an overview of the views associated with the critical tradition in development studies, see Kothari and Minogue (2002).

4. Interview with Senator Natasha Stott Despoja, Spokesperson on Foreign Affairs for the Australian Democrats, Adelaide, 3 October 2007. See also Blackburn 1993: 238.

5. The current AAC includes a number of representatives from the development NGO community: Tim Costello (World Vision); Paul O'Callaghan (ACFID); Tony Eggleton (CARE Australia); Gaye Hart (ACFID); and Jack de Groot (CARITAS).

6. See, for instance, AIDWATCH's claims in relation to the Australian Tax Office's treatment of its charitable status (AIDWATCH 2007). It should be noted that such threats have not necessarily been effective. On the one hand, some of the more critical development NGOs are not heavily reliant on government funding and concessions—indeed, some, such as Oxfam, have a policy of limiting their reliance on such funds. On the other hand, AIDWATCH has found a way of remaining in business despite the withdrawal of its charitable status.

7. To be sure, the progressive minor political parties have been able to trade their Senate vote for government legislation in one area of policy for changes in aid policy, as Brian Harradine did in 1996 when he shared the balance of power in the Senate. Harradine, a socially conservative Tasmanian senator, traded his vote on the privatisation of Telstra and other government legislation in exchange for changes in AusAID's family planning policies. But such episodes have been relatively rare, presumably reflecting a calculation on the part of the minor political parties that there are not enough votes in aid policy to justify such deals. This is where a requirement for parliament to approve aid policy would have made a significant difference: there would have been no opportunity cost for the minor political parties in doing deals in relation to aid policy, making it more likely for social justice principles to be incorporated into aid policy.

8. I am referring specifically here to Mark Baird, a former World Bank Vice-President, who co-wrote the background paper on Asia; Ron Duncan, the former head of the NCDS and the head of the White Paper Core Team, who co-wrote the background paper on the Pacific; and the consultants from the CIE who co-wrote the background paper on the environment.

9. I am referring here to Gaye Hart, the President of ACFID.

10. See, for instance, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee (2006).

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Andrew Rosser

Andrew Rosser is Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at the University of Adelaide. His research interests include Indonesia's political economy, the politics of state-building in Timor Leste, the resource curse, and the politics of Australian aid policy. His work has appeared in World Development, IDS Bulletin, Third World Quarterly, New Political Economy, Journal of Contemporary Asiaand numerous edited books