Policing the near abroad: Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus

Abstract

This article tries to understand Russia's policies towards the South Caucasus and answer the question of whether there is a tension between Russia's interests and policies. An attempt is made to identify Russia's strategic interests in the region and the crucial factors that shape Russian policies. Based on the assumption that today's Russia gives de facto support to the secessionist regimes in Georgia, the author attempts to explain what the Kremlin's motives are in supporting the secessionist regimes. The author investigates whether Russian support for the separatist regimes in the South Caucasus is a reaction to the foreign policy orientation of the parent states or a part of Russia's security political interests. On the one hand, supporting instability in the South Caucasus cannot be a part of the Kremlin's strategic interests, because that can pose a threat to the North Caucasus. On the other hand, however, Russian policies are not designed to achieve long-term stability in the South Caucasus, and controlled instability seems to suit the Kremlin. Why Russia vies for coercive hegemony and supports secessionism are the central questions of this article.

Notes

1. The concept of Derzhava implies a multi-ethnic state which can influence the system of international relations through its military-political potential

2. The concepts of relevant and relative power can be summarised as follows: relevant power is the one that is not necessarily powerful in international politics, but has a large number of tools to influence the security-political and economic processes within a region; relative power is the one that has the relative economic and military power in international politics, but its power is not directly relevant to the security-political and economic needs of a region. In the case of the South Caucasus—Russia being the relevant power and the USA the relative power—many strategic problems in the region can only be resolved by the Kremlin's mediation or consent.

3. At the presidential elections in Abkhazia in October 2004, Russia sought the election of Khadjimba, who had demonstrated loyalty to the Kremlin, and did not favour Sergei Bagapsh, who had promised to pursue an independent policy towards Russia in his election campaign. Russia used economic levers against Abkhazia to include the Kremlin-loyal Khadjimba in the government. The Russian border with Abkhazia along the Psou River was closed and rail and bus connections were cancelled, all of which was carried out with the consent of North Caucasus regional governments. For an account of Russia's stance towards the Abkhazian elections, see Antonenko (2005: 258–68) and Socor (2004).

4. Taking into consideration that Chechnya is run by an authoritarian leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, who places Chechen interests above everything else and who says he has sworn loyalty to President Putin and not his successor, and the fact that Chechnya still holds a tremendous number of fighters, Chechnya's loyalty to Russia is not fixed.

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Notes on contributors

Kavus Abushov

Kavus Abushov holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Law and International Relations and a Master of Science in International Relations. He is currently studying for his PhD at the institute of Political Science, University of Münster in Germany. Kavus is affiliated with the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in research projects