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Abstract
The main goal of this study is to look at factors determining mediation success in post-conflict environments. More specifically, the authors focus on the level of involvement of the mediator in a post-conflict setting and argue that relational mediation strategies should fare better in such environments. A most similar systems comparison of the European Union/USA and Turkish mediation efforts in Bosnia–Herzegovina, both of which started in October 2009, renders support for the authors’ argument. Their analysis of these two cases suggests that Turkey's relational mediation strategy delivered concrete outcomes in post-Dayton Bosnia compared to the structural intervention style adopted by the European Union/USA. The authors conclude that a relational mediation strategy facilitates the achievement of constructive solutions by helping third parties to make broader assessments of the conflict situation, and by offering flexible options in issue selection and process design.
Notes
1. Bosnia–Herzegovina, Bosnia and BiH will be used interchangeably in this article.
2. ‘Structural mediation’ is a new category, which denotes those third-party attempts that aim to deal with structural/institutional issues only. ‘Relational mediation’ is a hybrid category comprising communications and procedural strategies. ‘Pressing mediation’ is the equivalent of a directive strategy.
3. These three mediation styles in peace studies and international relations traditions are conceptualised as different forms of third-party interventions/activities. ‘Structural mediation’ corresponds to peace-building interventions that are geared towards institution-building, the establishment of the rule of law and effective governance, and security sector reform, among others. Similarly, ‘relational mediation’ corresponds to regional cooperation initiatives that enable communication and trust-building among major stakeholders. Finally, third-party activities designed to impose economic sanctions or withdrawal of aid overlap with what is described as ‘pressing mediation’.
4. The recent literature mostly emphasises the third-party role of truth and reconciliation committees in justice issues in post-conflict environments (see, for example, Millar Citation2012; Taylor and Dukalskis Citation2012), or gives descriptive accounts of structural and relational interventions of the EU (for example, Giannaki Citation2007). One notable exception is Diaz (Citation2008).
5. Engagements to achieve constitutional reform, for example, are task-specific engagements.
6. These figures included Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska; Sulejman Tihić of the Party of Democratic Action; Haris Silajdžić of the Party for Bosnia–Herzegovina; Zlatko Lagumdžija of the Social Democratic Party; Dragan Čović of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Božo Ljubić of the Croatian Democratic Union 90; and the leader of the Party of Democratic Progress, Branislav Borenović.
7. Interestingly, the EU representatives continued to associate this delay with the ‘bad faith’ conflicting parties demonstrated in their negotiations, and used visa liberalisation as a stick. However, since Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats could easily get a second citizenship from their kin states, the EU's approach was perceived as singling out Bosniaks for punishment.
8. Interestingly, while many Balkan states and people view the EU as the most prominent framework to establish stabilisation in the region, many are unconvinced with respect to the EU's capability to realise reforms. Some doubts regarding the EU's capability emanate from the long and tiring accession process, during which the implementation strategies and benefits of reform have not been made clear (Sebastian Citation2010).
9. Despite its strong presence in the region, especially during the war years, the local parties perceive a declining US impact since 2004. The plans to close down the OHR, in which US diplomats play a significant role, signal a further decline of the USA’s impact in BiH (Woehrel Citation2011, Citation2012).
10. See, for example, De Rouen Jr. et al. (Citation2011).