Abstract
Drawing on English and Arabic Islamic State (IS) communiqués produced by its central media units, wilayat information offices and broader supporter base, this study examines the strategic logic of IS information operations (IO). It argues that the overarching purpose of IS's IO campaign is to shape the perceptions and polarise the support of audiences via messages that interweave appeals to pragmatic and perceptual factors. Pragmatic factors—such as security, stability and livelihood—are leveraged in IS messaging by promoting the efficacy of its politico-military campaign and denigrating its enemies’ efforts via rational-choice (logic of consequence) appeals. Perceptual factors—which are tied to the interplay of in-group, Other, crisis and solution constructs—are leveraged via identity-choice (logic of appropriateness) appeals that frame IS as the champion of Sunni Muslims (the in-group identity), its enemies as Others complicit in Sunni perceptions of crisis, and IS as the only hope for solving this malaise. With this approach, IS seeks to resonate its message across a diverse ‘glocal’ constituency and supercharge supporters towards action. IS simultaneously targets its enemies with messaging that manipulates the inherent dualities underlying perceptual and pragmatic factors, vigorously counters criticisms and ‘baits’ opponents into ill-conceived IO responses.
Notes
1 IS communiqués disseminated online are regularly removed by webhosts, making referencing to the original forum unreliable. All sources referred to in this article are available from the author on request.
2 In November 2014, al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of wilayats in Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Saudi Arabia (Although the Disbelievers Dislike It Citation2014; ‘Remaining and Expanding’ Citation2014, 20–33). In January 2015, the Khorasan wilayat was formally accepted by IS (‘Wilayat Khurasan and the Bay'at’ Citation2015, 33–37). Boko Haram's leader, Abubakr Shekau, pledged his allegiance to IS in an audio message released on March 7, 2015 (‘Bay'ah Jama'at Ahl al-Subbah li-l-Da'wah wa-l-jihad’ Citation2015).
3 First coined by Bernard Fall (Citation1998), the concept of a ‘competitive system of control’ is well established in counterinsurgency literature to describe the politico-military apparatuses that compete for the support of contested populations during small wars (see, for example, Kilcullen Citation2013, 116–168).
4 Al Hayat Media produces a range of print (for example, Dabiq) and video (for example, Flames of War Citation2014) messages. Its products are predominantly for English-speaking audiences, although German (‘Mujatweets Episode #4’ Citation2014), French (‘Al Hayat Media Mujatweet 6’ Citation2014) and Indonesian (‘Eid Greetings from the Land of Khilafah’ Citation2014) messages have featured in some productions. Al-Furqan Media releases statements by IS's senior leaders (see, for example, al-Baghdadi Citation2014) and produces videos (for example, Clanging of Swords Citation2014). Al-Itisam produces Arabic-language content and videos that are similar in style and format to Al Hayat productions (for example, Breaking of the Border Citation2014). The Ajnad Foundation produces recitations of suras (Quranic verses) and nasheeds (‘hymns’).
5 The data in and does not include four photo-eulogy reports identified in the original source (http://justpaste.it/joc3) because the original contents could not be verified due to a faulty link.