Capability building and alliance cohesion: comparing the US-Japan and US-Philippines alliances

ABSTRACT

The level of alliance cohesion is measured along the following dimensions of alliance operation: attitudinal, behavioural, and functional. However, it is insufficient to evaluate the level of cohesion only by examining how those indicators have changed over time. If it were sufficient to do so, it would presume the level of alliance cohesion would be bound to become similarly high in cases such as those of the US-Japan and US-Philippines alliances in which the commonly perceived threat is now widely and deeply entrenched. This article argues that the capabilities dimension be included in the list of indicators evaluating the level of cohesion. The US places greater emphasis on encouraging its allied partners to address specific capability gaps, foster trust, and improve jointness and interoperability with the US forces and thus contribute further to the evolution of division of alliance labour in which they take a larger role in both regional and global defense as well as cater for their own needs. The evolving division of labour that has been facilitated—and made possible—by a junior ally's enhanced capabilities has incentivized both the US and its ‘capable’ ally to work together to enhance alliance cohesion and credibility.

KEYWORDS:

• Alliance cohesion
• capabilities
• division of labour
• US-Philippines alliance
• US-Japan alliance

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Jiyun Kih is an independent researcher. Her work mainly addresses the changing dynamics of the US-led network of bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, the potential for an alliance triangle in region, while attempting to extend her interests into the development of stronger security ties between the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances.

Notes

1 Article 9 of the postwar Constitution stipulates that the Japanese people ‘forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.’

2 Article 5 stipulates that ‘Each party recognises that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the Administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.’

3 The Regional Defense Strategy promulgated in 1993 allowed the US to pre-position equipment and arrange military exercises with allies and regional partners without establishing the US installations in foreign territories to promote flexibility, mobility, and rapid response capability centred around ‘temporary basing solutions.’

4 There are concerns that the US will respond to specific contingencies below the threshold of military force.