Segmented Publics and the Regulation of Critical Speech in China

Abstract

In contemporary China strict censorship coexists with significant freedom of expression and restrictions are enforced inconsistently. Yet certain principles underlie determinations of what is acceptable public speech, depending on the institutional location of the utterance, the identity of the speaker and the time of the event. What is allowed depends on the specific circumstances, but it results from patterns in the institutional practices of Chinese politics that involve constraining debate within “segmented publics”. This article analyses how formal and informal rules limit discussions of particular issues to specific segmented publics, and how varying degrees of debate are permitted within these institutional fields, based on the expertise of their members or, in the case of associations, their engagement in specific areas of policy implementation. Another dimension of variation relates to the personalised character of authority in the Chinese system of governance, which means that leaders set the tone for debate within institutional spheres they control. State control, however, is only part of the story: segmented publics are dynamic spaces where boundaries are permeable, often contested, and constantly in formation. The operation of segmented publics is explored here through case studies of activism in the legal field; on women’s rights in the associational field; at the grassroots in resident and villager committees; and in oppositional publics.

Keywords:

• China
• segmented publics
• censorship
• freedom of expression
• politics
• law
• grassroots organisations

Acknowledgments

The ideas in this article started their life as part of my long collaboration with Pitman Potter and the Asia Pacific Dispute Resolution Project at the University of British Columbia, and came to fruition during a postdoctoral fellowship with the Project. I am most grateful to Pitman for his support of my work. The piece also benefited from stimulating conversations with colleagues in the corridors of the UBC Institute of Asian Research, particularly Timothy Cheek, and from the exciting discussions at the 2012 ARI conference. I am grateful to Jonathan Benney, Peter Marolt and the two anonymous reviewers at ASR for their constructive suggestions on how to make this a better piece of work.

Notes

1. The extent of restriction of information authorised by secrecy laws and regulations in China has been widely noted (Human Rights in China, 2007).

2. Peter Foster, ‘Leading Chinese dissident claims freedom of speech worse than before Olympics’. Daily Telegraph, 27 April 2009. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/5230707/Leading-Chinese-dissident-claims-freedom-of-speech-worse-than-before-Olympics.html, accessed 13 April 2012.

3. PRC Constitution, 1982, Art.s 41 and 111; Organic Law on Villager Committees, 1998, Art. 2; Organic Law on Urban Resident Committees, 1989, Art. 3.

4. This section is based on 2008–09 fieldwork in Tianjin (Woodman, 2011b). The two resident committees I studied – referred to as “Progress” and “Rising China” below – are in Nankai and Hexi Districts, both central districts of the city; one villager committee, Zhang Family Village, is in suburban Beichen District, and the other, Dragon Peak Village, is in mountainous Jixian County in the north of Tianjin Municipality. I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in each site for a period ranging from a month and a half to three months. All real names of committees have been changed to maintain the anonymity of informants.

5. ‘Brief Introduction to XXX Community’. Undated document on file with the author.

6. Organic Law on Villager Committees, 1998.

7. A 2002 survey found that Chinese respondents indicated that the greatest improvement in democratic practice compared with the past was in the area of freedom of expression (Shi and Lou, 2010).

8. The scope of the deprivation of political rights envisaged under Article 54 of the PRC Criminal Law is broad, indicating that those so deprived may not exercise: the rights to vote and stand as a candidate for election; the rights to freedom of expression, publication, assembly, association, march and demonstration; and that they may not hold positions in state organs, and may not have leadership roles in state companies and enterprises, public service organisations or “people’s organisations”.

9. These offences are contained in Chapter I of the PRC Criminal Law.

10. I am indebted to Tim Cheek for suggesting this term.

11. See Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court Criminal Case Verdict No. 3901, 2009.

12. See, for example, Nick Young, ‘Liu Xiaobo wins Nobel, reform loses’. The Guardian, 8 October 2010. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/08/liu-xiaobo-china, accessed 19 November 2014.

13. See, for example, Sharon LaFraniere and Dan Levin, ‘Assertive Chinese held in mental wards’. The New York Times, 11 November 2010.

14. While Liu was sentenced to prison, several other key Charter ’08 drafters, and most of the 303 original signatories, were not charged with any criminal offence for their participation in its writing or their endorsement of it, although many were subject to harassment, intimidation and non-criminal sanctions of various types.