Due to an oversight, the author did not give proper citation to the following argument, which is from Steinberg and Shih’s research article published by Comparative Political Studies in 2012.
It is also worth noting that, although MOFCOM strongly promoted the interests of the export sectors, at this stage there were few signs of direct lobbying from export enterprises. The exporters were earning handsome profits from the continuous export growth thanks to exchange rate stability.
It is also worth noting that, although MOFCOM strongly promoted the interests of the export sectors, at this stage there were few signs of direct lobbying from export enterprises. The exporters were earning handsome profits from the continuous export growth thanks to exchange rate stability (Steinberg & Shih, Citation2012, p. 13).
Secondly, industry associations and private firms can communicate their preferences to local governments or bureaucracies such as the local branches of MOFCOM to exert influence over exchange rate policy. Part of the reason for this is that lower-level officials may speak on behalf of these interest groups because their political careers are dependent on the success of their local economy, to which the local industries make a considerable contribution.
Secondly, industry associations and private firms can communicate their preferences to local governments or bureaucracies such as the local branches of MOFCOM to exert influence over exchange rate policy. Part of the reason for this is that lower-level officials may speak on behalf of these interest groups because their political careers are dependent on the success of their local economy, to which the local industries make a considerable contribution (Steinberg & Shih, Citation2012, pp. 9–10).
According to the CCP Constitution, the Central Committee (zhongyang weiyuanhui) is the Party’s supreme decision-making body, but in practice, the policy decisions of the Central Committee are determined by the Politburo (zhongyang zhengzhiju), especially the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC, zhongyang zhengzhiju changwu weiyuanhui), which has a significantly smaller number of Politburo members.
According to the CCP Constitution, the Central Committee (zhongyang weiyuanhui) is the Party’s supreme decision-making body, but in practice, the policy decisions of the Central Committee are determined by the Politburo (zhongyang zhengzhiju), especially the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC, zhongyang zhengzhiju changwu weiyuanhui), which has a significantly smaller number of Politburo members (Liew, Citation2004, p. 24; Liew & Wu, Citation2007, p. 146).
It was reported that if the RMB were to rise by 3 to 5 per cent against the dollar in 2005, the growth rate of China’s exports might drop to 10 per cent or below; a rise of 15 per cent or more might cause its export growth to go into decline (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005).
It was reported that if the RMB were to rise by 3 to 5 per cent against the dollar in 2005, the growth rate of China’s exports might drop to 10 per cent or below; a rise of 15 per cent or more might cause its export growth to go into decline (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005; Yi, 2007, p. 8; Yi, Citation2011, p. 171).
References
- Liew, L. H. (2004). Policy elites in the political economy of China’s exchange rate policymaking. Journal of Contemporary China, 13(38), 21–51.
- Liew, L., & Wu, H. (2007). The making of China’s exchange rate policy: From plan to WTO entry. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Steinberg, D. A., & Shih, V. (2012). Interest group influence in authoritarian states: The political determinants of Chinese exchange rate policy. Comparative Political Studies, 45(11), 1405–1434.
- Yi, J. (2007) China’s exchange rate policymaking in the Hu-Wen era. Retrieved from https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/briefings/briefing-29-china-exchange-rate-policy-making.pdf
- Yi, J. (2011). The political economy of China’s exchange rate policymaking in the Hu-Wen era. China: An International Journal, 9(1), 164–177.