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Abstract
In this article, we analyse the social accountability (SA) mechanisms that have recently been established in Cambodia. These initiatives take place in a socio-political context marked by pervasive neo-patrimonial structures. Our focus is on the “strategies” implemented by state actors, CSOs and ordinary citizens (mediated by neo-patrimonial structures) – strategies that demonstrate a “neo-patrimonial trap” into which SA initiatives have fallen, whereby official institutions and accountability lines have been undermined. These “strategies” are: to focus SA activities on local level authorities who have no means or power to introduce changes in governance or to improve public services, and to allow SA practices to emerge only to the extent that they do not threaten actual authoritarian distribution of power, norms and practices of clientelistic exchange, and the benefits obtained through patron-client relations. As a result, citizens have not been empowered to demand accountability but, paradoxically, have been encouraged to take over some government responsibilities. This, in turn, strengthens the networks of clientelism and patronage. These insights indicate the weak potential of externally-imposed SA mechanisms in an authoritarian and neo-patrimonial setting in which the government is only partly committed to achieving accountability. The findings are based on a two-year study conducted using a combination of qualitative sociological methods and an ethnographic approach.
Notes
1. Clientelism refers to relationships of political subordination in exchange for material rewards. Specifically, authoritarian clientelism enforces such imbalanced bargains with threats of coercion. Other forms of clientelism enforce bargains with threats of the withdrawal of critical services (Fox, Citation2007).
2. However, other authors claim that patronage-based, party-voter linkage exists in many countries, even in some advanced industrial democracies such as Italy, Japan, Austria and Belgium (Kitschelt, Citation2007).
3. Patron-client relations, as defined by James Scott, represent “a special case of dyadic ties, involving a largely instrumental friendship, in which an individual of a higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection and/or benefits to the person of a lower status (client) who then reciprocates by offering general support and assistance – including personal services – to the patron” (Scott, Citation1972, p. 8).
4. Some research indicates that the entire Cambodian economy is under the control of a small number of families with ties to the ruling party, the Cambodian People’s Party (Peou, Citation2005, p. 151), while others emphasise that the concepts of political and economic elites are synonymous (Cock, Citation2010, pp. 243–244).
5. Other studies discuss interaction of neo-patrimonialism with other development issues – e.g. Frewer (Citation2013), Un & So (Citation2011); for a broader discussion of neo-patrimonialism in Cambodia, see Kimcheoun et al. (2007).
6. In Cambodia, community-based organisations are usually larger, grassroots organisations with a weaker professional and administrative structure whose main purpose is to engage citizens directly in local development and bottom-up planning, while NGOs are usually smaller, more professional organisations that are focused either on service delivery or human rights activism.
7. In 2014, interviews were held in 6 provinces: Battambang, Banteay Meanchay, Pursat, Takeo, Kampot and Koh Kong. Respondents were representatives of NGOs, CBOs, CCs and schools as well as ordinary citizens. A total of 32 interviews and focus group-based discussions were held. The field work was carried out from February to March 2014. In 2015, 44 interviews were held in 8 communes across 6 districts in 4 provinces (Phnom Penh, Svay Rieng, Kampong Cham and Kratie), 6 of those with politicians from CPP and CNRP (3 from each party) and the remaining 38 with citizens.
8. It is often stated that modern development relies on NGOs, rather than states as agents of genuine public interest and as the main catalyst of bottom-up development (Mandel, Citation2002; Kamat, Citation2004; Sampson, Citation2004; Roy, Citation2008). NGOs are perceived as true representatives of the interests of their communities due to their grassroots-like character and presumed ability to understand the needs of their respective communities. Consequently, debates are focused on the efficiency of civil society actors in performing some traditional state functions, such as delivering social services (Jordan, Citation2006; Edwards, Citation2004) or fostering good governance (Malena, Forster, & Singh, Citation2004), rule of law (Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, Citation2006) or democracy (O’Donnell, Citation2004).
9. Our research indicates that 14.9% of respondents are members of organisations, primarily mutual help (non-political) organisations and political parties (Babović & Vuković, Citation2015, pp. 14–15). The World Bank study records 23% membership, but the majority in this case actually belonged to traditional associations, created around pagodas, which are non-political in nature. Professional NGOs (which constitute the majority of registered CSOs in Cambodia) are rarely membership-based organisations, and for the most part lack grassroots constituencies. They typically consist of small numbers of paid staff who defend a certain cause or advocate on behalf of a certain target population (such as women, children or poor people) but lack meaningful and sustained linkages with such groups (World Bank, Citation2009, p. 44).
10. Their middle-class position is evident from their professional backgrounds (former government employees, foreign graduates, and so forth) and also visible in the various forms in which they express their status affiliation (possession of electronic devices, watches, cars, bags, and so forth). For earlier accounts, see Johns (Citation2000).
11. The nexus between an increase in knowledge and an increase in the capacities of citizens is often emphasised in development projects. This nexus was the subject of detailed analysis in the Serbian context in Vuković (Citation2015).
12. The School Support Committee is a body composed of representatives of local communities, which ensures that their voice is heard in decision-making relevant to the work and future of the school.
13. This is not to conform to culturalist explanations of failed democratisation and authoritarian rule in Cambodia, but quite to the contrary, to emphasise the importance of structural factors and power relations in explanations and responses (Springer, Citation2010, p. 14ff).
14. Borrowing would lead them to a vicious circle as they would “then borrow from another to return debts and just like that, in a circle” (Interview, villager, February 2014).
15. Our respondents reported that this had increased their daily income from two to ten dollars on productive days.
16. Communes included in the research were mostly dominated by the ruling CPP party.