Moderate Muslims and Democratic Breakdown in Indonesia

ABSTRACT

For much of the 2000s, scholars and activists lauded Indonesia’s surprisingly successful transition to democracy. Recent years, however, have made imperfections visible to the point where the breakdown of Indonesian democracy is imaginable if not yet under way. This article investigates the conditions under which moderate Islamic organisations support non-democratic values and actors, and by doing so contribute to Indonesia’s democratic decline. Drawing on original survey data and interviews, as well as case studies in which the preferences of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah leaders have become visible, this article argues that these organisations’ values are compatible with both democracy and authoritarianism. While NU and Muhammadiyah exemplify the civic associational ties and democratic culture that are necessary for making democracy work, civic pluralism is not their only value. NU and Muhammadiyah have a hierarchy of values that they promote and defend, and are willing to forgo civic pluralism in order to combat blasphemy against Islam, ensure Muslim control over overwhelmingly Muslim regions, and limit political expression concerning heterodox approaches to Islam or non-Muslim involvement in matters of aqidah (faith). NU and Muhammadiyah also operate within the country’s political patronage system, and their material interests can lead them away from supporting democratic values.

KEYWORDS:

• Democracy
• authoritarianism
• Indonesia
• Islam
• moderates

Acknowledgments

I am grateful for thoughtful feedback from Donald Emmerson, Robert Hefner and Kaija Schilde. I am especially thankful to Gustav Brown and Amelia Fauzia for organising this special issue, and to the editor David Hundt and the two anonymous reviewers for outstanding advice on how to improve the manuscript. This article is dedicated to the memory of Alfred Stepan.

Notes

1. The prominent pluralist intellectuals from NU and Muhammadiyah are too numerous to list exhaustively here, but among the most influential since democratisation have been Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Tutty Alawiyah, Luthfi Assyaukanie, Azyumardi Azra, Achmad Mustofa Bisri, Arief Budiman, Sandra Hamid, Syafi’i Maarif, Sahal Mahfudz, Masdar Mas’udi, Husein Muhammad, Abdul Mu`ti, Siti Musdah Mulia, Haedar Nasir, Lies Marcoes Natsir, Quraish Shihab, Said Aqil Siradj, Maria Ulfah, Nasaruddin Umar, Abdurrahman Wahid and Habib Luthfi Yahya.

2. Ahok’s conviction was based on comments he made on the campaign trail, when he said that those who cited a Quranic verse to support their view that Christians should not hold high office were being duplicitous. An edited video of his speech posted online was made to appear as though Ahok was criticising those who follow the Quran. The video went viral. Islamist groups seized on the moment to rally against the governor and in support of Ahok’s opponents in the 19 April election. Their movement propelled Ahok’s opponent, Anies Baswedan, into the governor’s mansion. And they propelled Ahok into prison.

3. The two major sects of Ahmadiyah, Qadiani and Lahore, differ on the question of the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad. This article focuses exclusively on the Qadiani since they have been the subject of controversy in Indonesia. “Ahmadiyah” thus refers to the Qadiani.