Is ASEAN Finally Getting Multilateralism Right? From ARF to ADMM+

ABSTRACT

ASEAN-led security multilateralism in the contemporary Asia–Pacific has been described as a frustrating enterprise. While many ASEAN-led regional arrangements have been perceived as mostly ineffective, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in particular has been singled out as the poster child for what is wrong with Asia–Pacific multilateralism. In contrast, the progress in security cooperation achieved by the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) has been surprising. Comparing the ARF and the ADMM+, this article addresses whether the ADMM+, to the extent it has learned from the mistakes of the ARF, is an indication that Asia–Pacific countries are finally developing a security multilateralism that works. In this respect, the ADMM+ has hitherto surpassed expectations. But it faces significant challenges that, if unmanaged, could hinder its progress.

KEYWORDS:

• Asia–Pacific
• ASEAN Regional Forum
• ADMM+
• multilateralism
• security cooperation

Notes

1. See Chapter VII, Article 21, Paragraph 2 of the ASEAN charter.

2. Full ratification of the ACCT by all 10 ASEAN members occurred in 2013. On ASEAN counterterrorism cooperation from a legal perspective, see Tan and Nasu (2016).

3. As Thomas Wright has argued about bilateralism as a precondition for an effective multilateralism, “Any solution must improve bilateral relationships and base institutional cooperation on a pre-existing commonality of interest. States should work to convert their strongest bilateral relationships into multilateral arrangements. Beyond mere shared commitment to an aspirational goal, true common interests are rooted in considerable overlap of how countries see and reach solutions to problems” (Wright, 2009, p. 164). For a similar argument concerning regional trade, see Kim (2015).

4. PD is diplomatic, political, military, economic and humanitarian action undertaken by governments, international organisations and/or non-governmental actors with the aim to prevent: the rise of disputes and conflicts between and within states; the escalation of such disputes and conflicts into armed confrontation; the spill-over or spreading of violence from such disputes and conflicts to other countries or areas; and the rise of acute humanitarian crises and, failing that, the management of such (Acharya, 1994). Its host of measures include early-warning systems, fact-finding missions, enhanced good offices of the ARF chair for mediation, and other preventive mechanisms applicable to peacetime and/or moments of crisis (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Cahill, 1996; Lund, 1996).

5. There is sufficiently strong evidence that disillusionment with the ASEAN-led regional security architecture, especially the ARF, was a key motivation behind Rudd’s decision to propose his alternative architecture (Colebatch, 2008). As Richard Woolcott, the special envoy tasked by Rudd to promote his Asia–Pacific Community vision, has argued, the ARF is woefully inadequate because “many believe it is too large and has made insufficient progress since its inception” (Woolcott, 2009, p. 3).

6. Borrowed liberally from the domains of cyber security, disaster risk reduction and so forth (CRS, 2016; TEISS, 2018), the concept and language of the 3R are therefore neither novel nor original to the ADMM.

7. For example, research has shown that the perceived legitimacy of the PD actor is a contributing factor to the success of PD (Huan & Emmers, 2016).

8. This point is made in the broader context of defence diplomacy in the Asia–Pacific region, including the ADMM+ (Baldino & Carr, 2016).

9. This much is implied in the literature on strengthening the abilities of militaries to deal with “full spectrum threats” (Lim, 2005; Sathasivam, n.d.).

10. For example, in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in December 2004, Singapore activated Operation Flying Eagle, its biggest-ever deployment of men and materiel to Indonesia and Thailand (Boey, 2005). The operation elicited quiet concern around the region regarding what Singapore, with its force and lift capabilities on full display, could do to its neighbours if it harboured bellicose intentions.

11. On big versus small multilateralism, see Kahler (1992) and Wright (2009).

12. For an argument that strategic moderation and restraint are in fact the essential foundation for the functioning of the balance of power system rather than a consequence of its functioning, see Claude (1989).

13. The argument here is that ASEAN is a “default leader” of Asia–Pacific regionalism because its weakness as a regional actor means it threatens none of the great and regional powers, who themselves do not trust one another enough to lead the region (Katsumata, 2014).

14. “Regional order in the grand sense lies beyond the current capacity of ASEAN but its more limited version is of considerable importance, certainly in comparison with the condition of relationships among its members before August 1967” (Leifer, 1987, p. 13).