Contesting China-funded Projects in Cambodia: The Case of Stung Chhay Areng Hydropower

ABSTRACT

This article investigates contestation over China-funded hydropower projects in Cambodia by examining the case of Chhay Areng. By analysing different social forces mobilising in pursuit of their own interests, particularly an anti-dam campaign group and the ruling party, this article emphasises the changing political dynamics that shaped both the strategies and outcomes of the contestation. Based on interviews with civil society representatives and a review of newspaper articles and published works, the article provides insights into the role of civil society and social media in the mobilisation and in shaping the outcome of this case. It also casts light on the nature of Chinese international development and the impact of the resultant contestation on China's influence and role as a regional and global power.

KEYWORDS:

• Cambodia
• Chinese aid
• Chinese influence
• Cambodian politics
• state–society relations

Acknowledgements

This work benefitted from discussions the author had with Melissa Curley, Shahar Hameiri and Garry Rodan. The author also expresses appreciation to Michael Barr and the two anonymous reviewers for Asian Studies Review for their valuable comments.

Notes

1. Stung is literally translated as “small river”.

2. Official Development Assistance (ODA) includes both grants and concessional loans, and the Chinese government is known for its preference for giving concessional loans. In Cambodia, reports from the CDC reveal that most Chinese ODA comes in the form of loans: 99.9 per cent in 2013, 100 per cent in 2014, and 99.7 per cent in 2015 (Council for Development of Cambodia, 2016). Chinese ODA had a low base of approximately US$2.6 million in 2000, before it picked up in 2004, when ODA reached US$32.5 million, and experienced steady growth thereafter (Council for Development of Cambodia, 2010), reaching US$223.5 million in 2017 (Council for Development of Cambodia, 2018b).

3. According to an undated MIME report, the project would have a 110 km² reservoir, a dam height of 55 metres and an installed capacity of 260 MW (Middleton, 2008).

4. Among the villages to be affected by the dam, people are loosely divided into “communities”, each of which is informally led by one or two influential local leaders.

5. Khmer Daeum is a term used to refer to indigenous people considered to be ancestors of modern-day Cambodians. They may also be regarded as an “ethnic minority”.

6. Youth aged between 18 and 30 are believed to have made up some one-third of the electorate at the 2013 election (Abbott, 2013). A more conservative estimate is that this group comprised 25 per cent of the total voting age population (Hughes, 2015). Undeterred by the ruling party’s threat of violence, youth formed the “majority of the political base of the CNRP”, the main opposition party (Un, 2014).

7. The so-called “culture of dialogue” was a mechanism agreed upon after the CNRP’s elected MPs took their seats in the National Assembly. It was meant to provide a venue for the two parties to discuss policies in a more amicable manner without resorting to trading opinions through media, which might emotionally hurt one another.