Abstract
This article argues that ‘Asia’ has tended to function as an ambivalent ‘sign’ in Australian political discourse, signifying both fear and hope. That ambivalence is reflected in Australian government policy. The article focuses on the period from Gough Whitlam on, tracing the links between debates over Australian relations with Asia and key issues in Australian domestic politics, including debates over immigration, the economy and Australian national identity. Key differences are identified between the views of John Howard and those of recent Australian Labor Prime Ministers. However, it is pointed out that Kevin Rudd also has ambivalent attitudes towards Asia, both encouraging Asian engagement as a path to future prosperity and fearing that Australia will be left behind in an increasingly ‘Asian Century’.
Notes
1The term ‘Asia’ is sometimes used in inverted commas in this article, to indicate that it is partly acting as a constructed sign, rather than just an unproblematic geographical region. The term ‘Asia’ is, as Paul Keating (Citation2000, 21) has acknowledged, of Western origin. ‘Asia’ has also been a contentious concept in the thought of many countries commonly constructed as ‘Asian’, including in Chinese thought (see, for example, Wang (Citation2007) and Hall (Citation2009)).
2Although Malcolm Fraser has claimed that Howard had previously wanted to restrict the Vietnamese refugee intake in 1977 (The Australian 1 January 2008).
3For a useful introductory summary of Australia's relationship with Asia, see McDougall (Citation2009, 91–203).
4The association of radical Islam with the Middle East was so strong that Afghanistan was regularly assumed to be in the Middle East in Australian popular culture rather than central Asia. The Coalition has continued to suggest that Labor is soft on asylum seekers and weak on border protection (The Australian 18–19 April 2009).
5It should be noted that under Rudd, the Asian languages strategy has been rejuvenated, with funding allocated.
6See, for example, the criticisms of Rudd for being China-centred and ignoring India by retired Indian diplomat and commentator, G. Patharasathy, and by former secretary of the Indian cabinet secretariat, B. Raman (The Australian 3–4 May 2008). See also Julie Bishop (Citation2009). Mayer and Jain provide a detailed analysis of Australian relations with India in this special issue.
7There is a very long history to arguments that Australia might be left behind by China – for 19th century examples, see Lake and Reynolds (Citation2008, 43–5).
8For discussions of previous Western conceptions of race and technological superiority see, for example, Dinerstein (Citation2006, 569–74) and Edgerton (Citation2006, 132).
9See David Walker's article in this issue.
10Keating's comments on the role of the West were more restrained than that of the Brazilian President's statement that the crisis ‘was fostered and boosted by the irrational behaviour of people who were white and blue-eyed, who before the crisis they looked like they knew everything about economics, but now have demonstrated they knew nothing about economics’ (The Australian 28–29 March 2009). Although, Australia's Asian neighbours may not have been reassured by Keating's earlier claim that the 1997–99 ‘East Asia crisis should have been run from Canberra’ instead of by the IMF (see D'Cruz and Steele (Citation2003, 289)).
11Australia's political leadership has also been influenced by the Colombo plan. Penny Wong's parents met while her father was a student at the University of Adelaide.